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A bstract
Trade in  services is central to the world economy today. 
Telecommunications services, in  particular, can be traded directly as well 
as providing a medium through which goods and other services can be 
traded. They are therefore critical to development and the expansion of 
world trade.
This thesis provides a legal analysis of the liberalization of trade in  
telecommunications services through the m ultilateral framework of the 
General Agreement on Trade in  Services (GATS). More specifically, it 
examines the interplay of m ultilateral rules and the domestic regulation of 
telecommunications in  the context of the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
the US, and India.
The telecommunications industry has u n til recently been heavily 
regulated. Even in the US, the movement towards deregulation began only 
in  the 1970s. An in  depth examination of the US telecommunications 
industry in  Chapter 2 provides a background analysis of the origin of 
policies on liberalization of telecommunications domestically and 
internationally. Chapter 3 examines the current importance of the service 
economy and the decision of the developed countries, in  particular the US, 
to expand trade in services through liberalization. Chapters 3 and 4 
illustrate the extent to which developed countries were the driving force 
for a m ultilateral framework w ithin the WTO to govern trade in services, 
including telecommunications. Chapter 5 shows that developing 
countries, such as India, although demonstrating their recognition of the 
benefits of telecommunications liberalization through autonomous 
regulatoiy reforms, have so far been restrictive in their WTO services 
commitments.
From this study, it is clear that the movement in  both developed and 
developing countries is towards liberalization and competition. More 
specifically, the thesis demonstrates the extent to which trade 
liberalization together w ith domestic regulatory reform are necessary in  
order to achieve the liberalization of trade in  telecommunications services.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
“M arkets, like  freedom , w ork w ell only w ith in  a  suitable fram ew ork o f ru les ."1
This thesis provides a legal analysis of the liberalization of trade in  
telecommunications services through the m ultilateral legal framework of 
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). It examines the 
implementation of the rules-based system of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) on telecommunications specifically w ithin the domestic legal 
systems of the United States and India, but draws more generally a 
number of im plications for the interplay between m ultilateral rules and 
domestic policies on telecommunications services.
Liberalization of trade in services was incorporated into the 
m ultilateral rules-based system of the WTO at the end of the Uruguay 
Round of GATT m ultilateral trade negotiations in 1994. Services 
encompass many different varieties and sectors. In  particular, the 
telecommunications service sector is an im portant backbone of every 
economy and is indispensable to trade: telecommunications services 
provide the underlying means through which trade in other services and 
goods can be traded as well as being an economic activity that is tradable 
in  its own right.
A treaty of legally binding rules governing world trade in services was 
drawn up as the GATS, forming one of the WTO Agreements. The GATS is
1 Maria Livanos Cattaui, “Trade rules after Seattle: A business perspective," in The Role of 
the World Trade Organization in Global Governance (Sampson, ed.) (United Nations 
University Press: 2001), p. 259.
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intended to reduce barriers to trade in  services and ensure the 
transparency of government regulations and other government measures 
affecting trade in  services. Its central purpose is to ensure the progressive 
liberalization of services sectors and trade in services.
The Agreement on Basic Telecommunications (ABT), attached as the 
Fourth Protocol to the GATS,2 is a product of the extended negotiations on 
trade in services that took place after the conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round, as part of the struggle to achieve greater m arket access 
commitments in  im portant specific sectors such as telecommunications 
and financial services. In  addition, the negotiations on basic 
telecommunications produced a set of regulatory and pro-competitive 
principles known as the Reference Paper. The GATS, the Fourth Protocol 
and the Reference Paper provide the main WTO legal instrum ents 
governing the liberalization of trade in telecommunications services.
The liberalization of trade in services through the m ultilateral 
framework of the WTO has, since its introduction to the negotiating tables 
by the US during the early stages of the Uruguay Round, continuously 
attracted fiery debates among trade negotiators, government officials, 
economists, lawyers, and academics in  both developed and developing 
countries due to its controversial and inevitable attribute of interfering 
w ith policies and measures normally reserved for domestic authorities. 
This thesis w ill analyse the debates surrounding the liberalization of trade 
in  services, w ith particular reference to telecommunications, looking at the 
merits and difficulties of such liberalization.
2 The ABT is the commonly used but unofficial name given to the Fourth Protocol to the 
GATS. The ABT contains the schedules of commitments negotiated and tabled at the end 
of the extended negotiations on basic telecommunications. The “Agreement on Basic 
Telecommunications* or ABT will be used throughout this thesis when referring to the 
Fourth Protocol and the attached schedules.
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I. The Scope and O bjective o f the Thesis
The aim of the thesis is to examine the regulatory framework on 
telecommunications services w ithin the national regimes of the US and 
India and to determine how and to what extent these WTO Member States 
have implemented the liberalization rules and principles of the GATS. 
Examples are also drawn from the EU and the UK where relevant.
As a result of this in  depth study into the liberalization process both 
internationally and domestically, this thesis seeks to establish how the 
implementation of the liberalization of trade in telecommunications 
services should work under the GATS and to provide practical suggestions 
for countries liberalizing their telecommunications services sectors in  
compliance w ith the rules and principles of the GATS. The thesis also 
examines the practical im plications of liberalization.
This requires us to look also at the history of the negotiations that 
led to the creation of the GATS in order to ascertain the concerns of 
developing countries and to understand the perspective of developing 
countries in  the liberalization process of trade in telecommunications 
services.
I I.  S tructure o f the Thesis
The thesis begins, in  Chapter 2, w ith an in depth examination into the 
telecommunications industry of the United States, and in  doing so this 
first substantive chapter sets the scene for the following chapters. The US 
is unique in  that from the beginning its telecommunications industry was 
run by private operators. Although from the 1930s u n til the 1980s the
14
law authorized AT&T, the major US telecommunications provider, to 
operate as a monopoly, it  remained in private hands. This was in  contrast 
to the rest of the world where state-owned companies operated most 
telecommunications industries. The US was the first industrialized 
country to liberalize its telecommunications sector and introduce 
deregulation and competition and this is why it is of importance to our 
enquiry into liberalization th at is now taking place w ithin the WTO 
context. It  also spear-headed the liberalization of telecommunications 
services in international trade through the forum of the WTO. 
Examinations of US domestic regulation of the telecommunications sector 
and its international policies on trade in telecommunications services 
provide a background analysis of the origin of policies on liberalization of 
telecommunications services both domestically and internationally.
Chapter 3 analyzes the services sector and traces the development of 
its growth into an im portant economic activity, particularly in  the US, and 
more im portantly the growth of trade in services. This chapter examines 
the liberalization process of trade in services from the first 
acknowledgment of this economic sector as tradable in the US Trade Act of 
1974, to its inclusion on the agenda of the Uruguay Round of GATT 
m ultilateral trade negotiations and finally to its first international 
agreement as part of the framework um brella of the newly established 
WTO. The chapter demonstrates once again the US's role and leadership 
in  the liberalization of trade in  services through the m ultilateral channel of 
the GATT and WTO. Furtherm ore, the chapter analyzes the GATS 
provisions and their application to the liberalization of telecommunications 
services.
15
Chapter 4 examines the liberalization of trade in  telecommunications 
services w ithin the context of the WTO, particularly concentrating on the 
relevant provisions of the GATS, the Annex on Telecommunications and 
the Reference Paper. To this end, it  looks at the first WTO case on 
telecommunications services (which involved the US and Mexico) before a 
WTO panel,3 and analyzes the Panel’s interpretation of the GATS and its 
application to the liberalization of trade in telecommunications services. 
The chapter discovers th at the Panel decision has im portant im plications 
for both developed and developing countries w ith regard to both 
international and domestic aspects of telecommunications services 
liberalization and the extent of commitments developing countries are 
likely to make in  the current WTO round of trade negotiations.
Chapter 5 studies the telecommunications industry in India and 
offers insight into the development and circumstances of the liberalization 
of telecommunications in  a fast-growing developing country. The chapter 
finds that the Indian government has been keen to embrace reforms 
introducing competition into the telecommunications sector. However, the 
new b ill on communications is still very restrictive and continues to 
m aintain heavy government involvement in most aspects of the telecoms 
industry. India has made lim ited commitments in  basic 
telecommunications w ithin the WTO at the end of the Uruguay Round and 
the extended negotiations on basic telecommunications. Furtherm ore, 
although India has undertaken autonomous liberalization in  the 
telecommunications sector vis-d-vis its obligation to the WTO, it has, in  its 
recent offers on trade in  services in the current Doha Round tabled at the
3 WTO, Mexico -  Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services, Panel Report, 
W T/D S204/R , adopted 1 June 2004.
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WTO on 16 December 2003, scheduled very few of these autonomous 
measures as commitments.4
Finally, the conclusion advances some policy im plications and 
conclusions drawn from the analyses in the substantive chapters.
I I I .  Methodology
The methodology used in  this thesis includes the reviewing and analyzing 
of the literature on telecommunications law, international economic law, 
particularly on the WTO and the GATS, and general public international 
law. The categories of literature included journal articles, newspaper 
articles, books, economic studies, official documents, treaties and 
legislations. In  examining the domestic frameworks on
telecommunications, legislation, legal instruments and case law of the US, 
India, the EU and the UK were consulted. As for the study of the legal 
system of the WTO, the process involved analyzing the complex layers of 
GATS Articles, its annexes on telecommunications, the Fourth Protocol to 
the GATS, schedules of Members’ commitments on m arket access, 
national treatm ent and additional commitments, the Reference Paper, as 
well as other relevant WTO Agreements, and WTO case law. The thesis 
compares and contrasts the domestic and international legal systems in  
the context of the liberalization process of telecommunications services.
4 The main method of services negotiations in the WTO is the request and offer process, 
under which each country tables its demands from its trading partners and its offers to its 
trading partners in specific sectors.
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Chapter 2
From Regulation to  Liberalization: US Leadership in 
Telecom m unications
The United States as the country where the telegraph and the telephone 
was invented consequently became the leader in  the advancement of the 
telecommunications industry.1 For fifty years after the invention of the 
telephone, alternating periods of heavy competition and monopoly control 
characterized the operation of the industry. In  the 1930s, the risk of 
m arket failure in  this service industry led the US government to deliberate 
on the correct regulatory response: whether to regulate it as a monopoly, 
nationalize it or m aintain the status quo which at the tim e consisted of 
operation under m arket forces without any government regulation. The 
US government under Franklin D. Roosevelt chose the first option. The 
US is thus the origin of today’s modem form of state regulation whereby 
the operation of the telecommunications industry is left in  private hands 
but at the same tim e is overseen by an independent government regulator.
In  contrast, European countries chose to nationalize their 
telecommunications industries after in itia l periods (shorter than in  the US) 
of provision by competing private companies.2 As a result, ‘regulation’ of 
the telecommunications industry in Europe took the form of state-owned
1 The US is the world’s largest telecommunications services market and among the most 
competitive. WTO, Trade Policy Review: United States, Report by the Secretariat, 
W T/TP R /S /88, 15 August 2001, p. 111.
2 This was particularly the case in the United Kingdom. See Hall, Scott and Hood, 
Telecommunications Regulation: Culture, Chaos and Interdependence Inside the Regulatory 
Process (2000), Chapter 2; Oftel, “Oftel’s five minute guide to the history of 
telecommunications regulation in the UK", Oftel News, Issue No. 60, June 2003, pp. 6-7.
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enterprise run by the governments Though the United Kingdom adopted 
an independent regulatory approach to telecommunications in  the early 
1980s, the US form of regulation only first appeared in m ainland Europe 
in  the early 1990s. Consequently, the US is more experienced in this form  
of governmental regulation than Europe.
In  addition, ‘deregulation’ and the process of opening the 
telecommunications industry up to competition first developed in  the US. 
This process led to the divestiture of the American Telephone and 
Telegraph Company (AT&T), the US telecommunications monopoly 
provider, in  1984 and the emergence of a new era in  the evolution of the 
industry. Since the divestiture, the US government has adopted pro- 
competitive and liberalizing policies both domestically and internationally. 
Furtherm ore, the US has taken a very active and influential role in  
bringing these policies to the forefront of the m ultilateral trading system of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor, the 
World Trade Organization (WTO).
The US was the m ain driving force behind the first m ultilateral 
framework on trade in services.4 It  has also been responsible for the 
creation for the first tim e of a specific m ultilateral framework of rules 
governing telecommunications services.5 In  particular, the US’s domestic 
laws and policies on the liberalization of telecommunications services -  
based on transparency, non-discrim ination, competitive safeguards, 
independent regulator and cost-oriented rates -  have been transplanted
3 See Giandomenico Majone, De-regulation or Re-regulation: Regulatory Reform in Europe 
and the United States (1990); G. Majone, “The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe", 17 
Western European Politics (1994), pp. 77-101.
4 The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). See Chapter 3.
5 See Chapter 4.
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into the WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications (ABT).6 For all the 
above reasons, this chapter, in  exploring the liberalization process of trade 
in  telecommunications services, examines the US telecommunications 
industry from its birth in the nineteenth century to the present day. The 
focus is on the government's regulatory policies in both domestic and 
international arenas and the leadership of the US in the regulation and 
liberalization of the telecommunications sector.
I. A B rie f H istory o f the US Telecom m unications Industry: 
the Early Years 1876 -1920s
The telecommunications industry began with the inventions of the 
telegraph in  1837 and the telephone in 1876.7 These two significant 
events brought about a revolution in the transmission of information; the 
new services made it possible to relay information more quickly and over a 
much greater distance than existing means, like the postal service and 
w ritten or printed publications.8 On 14 February 1876, Alexander 
Graham Bell filed the original patent for the telephone, or more precisely, 
an improvement on the telegraph in the form of a Talking telegraph'. On 
the same day, but a few hours later, Elisha Gray filed a notice of intent to 
apply for a patent on a device that could convey speech. This earlier filing
6 See Chapter 4.
7 For sources on the early history of the telecommunications industry, see N.R. Danielaian, 
AT&T: The Story o f Industrial Conquest (1939); John Brooks, Telephone : The First Hundred 
Years (1975); Sidney H. Aronson, “Bell’s Electrical Toy: What’s the Use? The Sociology of 
Early Telephone Use* in The Social Impact o f the Telephone (Ithiel de Sola Pool (ed.)) (1977); 
Anton Huurdeman, The Worldwide History o f Telecommunications (2003) is particularly 
comprehensive and an interesting read.
8 Historical accounts show that Samuel Morse, an American, was the person usually 
credited with the invention of the electrical telegraph; hence, the statement that the US is 
the birthplace of the telegraph. However, his invention was built upon earlier experiments, 
conducted in Europe and the US.
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by Bell, the basis for which the US Patent Of&ce awarded Bell, not Gray, 
the patent for the telephone,9 became the focus of hundreds of law suits, 
and the pivotal event that gave birth to the telephone company that would 
grow and be known across the world.10
The telecommunications industry in its early years developed without 
government regulation. From 1876 to the 1920s, the evolution of the 
telephone industry consisted of alternating periods of competition and 
monopoly. For the first two years after its invention, the telephone was a 
battle between Western Union and the Bell Telephone Company. This 
section and the following subsections w ill examine the US 
telecommunications industry prior to the creation of a systematic form of 
federal regulation which began with the Communications Act 1934.
1. Beginnings of the Telephone Industry: Bell Telephone v Western 
Union
Western Union, originally the New York and Mississippi Valley Printing 
Telegraph Company, was created in 1851 to provide telegraphic 
communications in  the US. It built the US’s first transcontinental 
telegraph line in  1861 and became the most powerful telegraph company 
of the era.11 Meanwhile, Bell and his two financial backers, Gardiner 
Hubbard and Thomas Sanders, formed the Bell Telephone Company on 9 
July 1877. The Bell Telephone Company started off w ith only two full-tim e
9 The award was also based on the distinction between a notice of intent and an actual 
patent application. The US Patent Office issued a patent to Bell on 7 March 1876. Bell 
received a second patent in 1877 for the telephone, covering the combined receiver- 
transmitter instrument and its various mechanical features.
10 This company is the American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T) which began 
life as the Bell Telephone Company in 1877.
11 Adam Thierer, “Unnatural Monopoly: Critical Moments in the Development of the Bell 
System Monopoly*, 14(2) The Cato Journal (Fall 1994).
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employees and there was no comparison between it and Western Union, 
which had grown into a corporate giant by then, in  terms of size and 
operation.
Due to the poor prospects of the newly formed Bell Company, 
Gardiner Hubbard, in  the autum n of 1877, offered to sell to Western 
Union all rights to the telephone for $100,000. Fatally, as viewed with 
hindsight, W illiam  Orton, President of Western Union, rejected what he 
considered to be a mere ‘ electrical toy*, believing the device was nothing 
more than a passing novelty. However, only a few months after, Western 
Union realized they had made a mistake when customers for the telegraph 
company’s stock ticker service were busily ordering telephones. Western 
Union bought Elisha Gray’s telephone patents and challenged Bell patents 
on the basis of its ownership of Elisha Gray’s work. This set the stage for 
a m ajor corporate battle between Western Union and the fledgling Bell 
Company, and marked the first competitive period in US 
telecommunications.
The telecommunications industry in its early years was left to develop 
according to m arket forces and patent laws. Emerging telephone 
companies, particularly Bell and Western Union, competed for businesses 
and developed strategies that brought them into conflict. There was no 
government agency to intervene, and disputes were settled by the courts. 
When a company began gaining control of virtually a ll sectors of the 
industry, for instance when Bell Telephone acquired a controlling interest 
in  Western Union, anti-trust law kicked in to check the company by
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preventing the rise of monopolistic and restrictive practices in  the 
telecommunications industry.12
Once it had acquired Gray’s patents, Western Union embarked on a 
patent suit against Bell Telephone. This resulted in a key victory for Bell 
when Western Union concluded an out-of-court settlement in  1879. 
Western Union, believing Bell would win the tria l, agreed to a contract 
which surrendered a ll of its patents, claims and facilities in the telephone 
business in exchange for $325,000 and 20 per cent of Bell telephone 
rental receipts over the 17-year life of the Bell patents. Western Union 
also agreed, during the life of the contract, to confine its message- 
transm itting activities to the telegraph field. In  return, Bell agreed to stay 
out of telegraphy. The agreement effectively set up Bell Telephone 
Company as the telephone monopoly and gave Western Union the 
monopoly in  telegraphy. This agreement, which lasted u n til 1894 when 
the Bell patents expired, consequently ended the brief, albeit vigorous, 
early period of telephone competition. 13
2. Bell Monopoly: 1 8 7 9 -1 8 9 4
By 1885, the Bell Telephone Company succeeded in  integrating vertically,!4 
forming relationships w ith the operating companies licensed under its 
patents. In  1882, Bell bought a controlling interest in the Western Electric
12 See Section 1.4 below on the Wilson administration’s proposed anti-trust action against 
the Bell System and the Kingsbury Commitment.
13 Both Bell Telephone and Western Union aggressively expanded telephone development 
during 1878 in attempts to compete with one another. See R. Horwitz, The Irony o f 
Regulatory Reform (1989), p. 97; Charles Brown, “The Bell System*, Encyclopedia o f 
Telecnrnmunicatiaris, (1991); Huurdeman (2003), p. 188.
14 A firm is vertically integrated when it controls the complete range of manufacturing, 
sales, and services of a product.
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Company, an equipment supply arm of Western Union, which became the 
principal m anufacturer of Bell telephone equipment; and in  1885, created 
a subsidiary, the American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T), to 
operate its long-distance system.« Bell Telephone, reconstituted as the 
American Bell Telephone Company in 1880, gradually acquired most of its  
licensees and collectively the enterprise became known as the Bell 
System, w
The monopoly period from 1879 to 1894 was veiy profitable for Bell. 
By 1895, Bell’s revenue was 98 per cent that of Western Union’s.17 The 
monopolistic empire of the Bell system was also bu ilt on the aggressive 
method of using patents held by Bell companies, particularly American 
Bell, to sue other companies that attempted to offer telephone service. The 
agreement signed by Western Union and Bell in 1879 did not restrict other 
independent companies from attempting to set up telephone businesses 
and enter the m arket that Bell had created. Thus, although Western 
Union no longer posed a threat to Bell, there were other competitors trying 
to provide telephone services. However, Bell, as holder of all patents to the 
telephone, thwarted competition. In  the 1880s, Bell won a ll 600-plus 
infringem ent lawsuits brought to enforce its patents. U ntil the expiration 
of the agreement, and its patents, in  1894, only Bell Telephone and its 
licensees could legally operate telephone systems in  the US.
15 By the end of the year, AT&T completed its first line, between New York and 
Philadelphia. The initial capacity of the line was one call at a time. See 
http: /  / www.att.com/historv.
16 The Bell System consisted of AT&T, 22 Bell Operating Companies, Western Electric and 
Bell Laboratories (set up in 1925).
17 Herring and Gross, Telecommunications: Economics and Regulation (1936), p.47; G.W. 
Brock, The Telecommunications Industry: The Dynamics o f Market Structure (1981), p. 108.
24
During this monopoly, the Bell System grew into a formidable 
enterprise. For the most part, however, it did not attem pt to beat the early 
competitors by offering cheaper and better services.18 The Bell monopoly 
era was characterized by lim ited growth of service. In  fifteen years, 
telephones per 1,000 people grew from 1.1 in 1880 to only 4.1 in  1894. w 
In  contrast, in  the fifteen-year period of vigorous competition that followed, 
telephones per 1,000 people grew from 4.8 in 1895 to an impressive 82.0 
in  1910.20 These early periods in  the histoiy of the US telecommunications 
industry reveal the contrast during the monopoly period, on the one hand, 
and competitive years, on the other, in  the growth of the telephone 
industry in  terms of num ber of telephones and the extent of services 
provided. It  was clear that competition, not monopoly, yielded economic 
benefits to the industry and to consumers.
3. Fiercely Competitive Years: 1894-1907
The monopoly status enjoyed by the Bell Company during the life-span of 
the 1879 agreement it had entered into w ith Western Union ended w ith  
the expiry of that contract. After 1894, a period of very active competition 
began once a g a in .2 1  It  was described, in  1934, to be “one of the most
18 Brooks (1975). This would change when vigorous competition, once again, forced Bell to 
invest in research that would improve the quality of telephony.
19 Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics o f the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, 
(Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1975), Vol. 2, Series R-2, p. 784, as 
quoted in G. W. Brock, Telecommunication Policy fo r the Information Age: From Monopoly to 
Competition (1994), p. 63.
20 L.S. Hyman, R.C. Toole and R.M. Avellis, The New Telecommunications Industry: 
Evolution and Organization, Vol. 1 (Public U tility Reports, Inc., 1987), p. 93, as quoted in 
Thierer (1994).
21 By the end of 1894, over 80 new independent competitors had already captured 5 per 
cent of the total market share. G.W. Brock (1981), p. 112.
25
violent competitive periods any industry ever had in the United States.”22 
Those competitive years, especially from 1894 to 1902, would prove 
beneficial to the telephone industry in terms of the great increase in  
telephone installations.
When Bell’s fifteen-year agreement ended in 1894, there were less 
than 300,000 telephones in  use.23 In  contrast, during the eight years of 
vigorous competition, the independent telephone companies installed 
almost a m illion telephones, and Bell, in response, installed another 
m illion.24 From 1902 to 1907 growth was more active than ever before, 
w ith the independent companies having installed 2 m illion telephones and 
Bell installed almost 2 m illion more.25 These competitive years proved 
valuable to the expansion of the telephone industry in providing services 
for the population across the US. By 1912, there were 8.7 m illion 
telephones in  use: one phone for every 11 people. This was more per 
capita than in  any European country in 1934, except Denmark and 
Sweden.26
W hile people across the US were benefiting from the growth in  
telecommunications services, the Bell System was faced with extensive 
competition. Between 1894 and 1904, over six thousand independent 
telephone companies entered the telephone business.27 These competitors
22 Statement of Dr. David Friday, U.S. House of Representatives, 73rd Congress, 2d Session,
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Hearings on H.R. 8301: A Bill to Provide 
fo r the Regulation o f Interstate and Foreign Communication by Wire or Radio, and fo r Other 
Purposes, May 15, 1934.
22 Ibid., p.259.
™ Ibid., p.260.
26 Ibid.
26 ibid.
27 AT&T: A Brief History at httn: /  7www.att.com/history.
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grew by servicing areas not served by the Bell System, but then quickly 
began invading AT&T’s territory, especially where Bell service was poor.28
Fierce competition prompted the Bell System to seek a better position 
in  the telephone industry through more lenient laws for raising capital, 
which was desperately needed to finance its growth as competition 
intensified. As American Bell, the parent company, was restricted by the 
laws of Massachusetts where it was established (which required the 
legislature to approve corporate plans to raise capital and where 
companies were restricted in  their ownership of subsidiaries), it decided to 
transfer its assets to the New York-established AT&T in 1899. AT&T thus 
became the parent company of the Bell System.
The vigorous competition throughout this period forced Bell to 
develop new policies. For instance, it began sublicensing some 
independent exchanges, and in  effect brought them into the Bell System. 
In  areas where Bell-licensed companies were confronted w ith competition, 
the Bell companies cut telephone rates. It greatly expanded its operating 
plants and established new exchanges, often resulting in  head-to-head 
competition w ith independents in various cities. Its long-distance network 
was its single most significant advantage. AT&T thus sought to expand its 
long-distance service in  order to press its system advantage over isolated 
competitors, and acquired strategically located independent exchanges. 
Bell also used its political influence and financial power to curb the growth 
of independents -  refusing to interconnect independent telephone 
companies into its long-distance or local networks except where Bell could 
benefit from such interconnection. It  also prohibited Western Electric
28 Thierer (1994).
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from supplying equipment to independent companies.29 But despite Bell’s 
tactics and its competitive advantage the independents came to control 
around 50 per cent of a ll telephones at the height of the competitive 
years.30
Although the Bell System had grown into a dominant m arket player 
and developed into an integrated system, its financial situation was 
precarious. Aggressive competition left AT&T effectively out of funds by 
1906-1907, forcing it to curtail virtually all licensee capital expenditure 
programmes.31 The competitive years had taken a toll on the former 
monopoly provider; one man would step in and set the course of the 
telecommunications industry for the next seventy years.
4. AT&T's Emerging Dominance: Theodore Vail, the Mastermind
Theodore Vail returned for his second term as president of AT&T in  April 
1907.32 He immediately set about strengthening AT&T’s position by 
changing its fundam ental focus from competition to consolidation, 
believing in  the superiority of a single telephone system. V ail’s mission 
was to make AT&T the monopoly telephone company. In  1908, as part of 
AT&T’s national advertising campaign, he introduced the slogan “One 
System, One Policy, Universal Service”. To achieve his vision, Vail adopted 
a vigorous plan of acquisitions, internal reforms of the Bell System, 
refusing interconnection and working w ith the government.
29 On Bell policies during the competitive years, see Brown (1991) and Horwitz (1989), p. 
98.
30 Horwitz (1989), p. 98.
31 Brown (1991).
32 His first term as president was from 1885-1887 when AT&T was newly formed. He was 
sixty-two when he returned to AT&T in 1907.
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Bell’s acquisition policy had begun with the expiration of its basic 
telephone patent in  1895, and was pursued particularly aggressively 
during V ail’s leadership. AT&T acquired independent competitors which 
became operating subsidiaries of the Bell system. Furthermore, it also 
managed, at one tim e, to secure a controlling interest in Western Union, 
the nearest thing to a long-distance competitor. Only under threat of an 
antitrust suit did AT&T agree to divest itself of its Western Union 
holdings.33
Vail also strengthened the company internally. He launched a major 
reorganization of operations into three functional departments -  plant, 
commercial and traffic -  and set about standardizing equipment. Bell 
operating companies were no longer permitted to direct Western Electric to 
m anufacture equipment to their own specifications. Standards were also 
set for operating procedures throughout the Bell System. Technological 
success in the Bell System also enhanced its standing in  the m arket place. 
In  January 1915, AT&T completed and opened the first US 
transcontinental line,34 and in  October of the same year, they made the 
first call across the A tlantic.3* Vail made research and development in  the 
Bell System a priority and effectively modernized it.3*
The strength and size of AT&T might lead to the mistaken 
assumption that its telephone system covered most of the geographical
33 See below on the 1913 anti-trust suit against AT&T.
34 The service was available to all telephone customers, but at the initial price of $20.70 for 
the first three minutes between New York and San Francisco -  volume was low. Brown 
(1991); AT&T History at htto: /  / www.att.com/historv .
35 However, full transatlantic telephone service did not begin until 1927, which was initially 
between the US and London. The conversations crossed the Atlantic via radio and the 
initial capacity was one call at a time, at a cost of $75 for the first three minutes. AT&T 
History at http: /  / www.att.com/historv.
36 In  1925, Bell established Bell Telephone Laboratories Inc. as its research and 
development subsidiary.
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area of the US. Bell, however, had bu ilt its system in metropolitan centres 
only, thus allowing demand in  small towns and rural areas to induce new 
entrants.37 The Bell system, however, was the most successful by reason 
of its aggressive acquisition policies and the strengthening of its internal 
operations. The prim ary issue, however, was interconnection. 
Interconnection is the linking or connecting of two telecommunications 
carrier networks for the m utual exchange of traffic.3® AT&T refused to 
interconnect the independent carriers to its networks.
Consequently, although the US was provided w ith a proliferation of 
telephones during the competitive years which gave even remote rural 
areas access to the telephone, the separate systems were not connected to 
each other due to AT&T’s obstructive behaviour. Part of the trouble was 
that rival telephone systems were constructed to different technical 
specifications because of AT&T’s unwillingness to license its patents. This 
m eant that Bell customers could only talk to other Bell customers, while a 
business that wanted a line to a wide range of customers needed to 
subscribe to more than one telephone company. Some state legislators 
attem pted to require interconnection, but AT&T fought in  court and 
generally won.39
At the tim e, no government agency w ith the appropriate powers 
existed to require AT&T to allow other competitors to interconnect to its 
systems. This made it possible for AT&T to grow into a powerful
37 Brock (1994), p. 65.
38 See US Code of Federal Regulations, Title 47, 47 CFR Ch. 1 Section 51.5 (October 1, 
2003 edition), available at http: /  /wireless.fcc.gov/rules.html. Interconnection is also 
defined as the “connection of a piece of telephone equipment to the nation-wide telephone 
network". See FCC, A Glossary o f Telecommunications Terms (1998), available at 
htto: /  / www.fcc.gov/Consumers/glossarv.html.
39 Brooks (1975), p. 114.
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monopoly.40 The public soon came to view AT&T as something of a 
corporate bully.41 AT&T’s actions of hostile acquisitions and its unyielding 
refusal to grant interconnection to independents prompted the government 
to take action and consider establishing some control over the industry.42
In  1913, the Wilson Adm inistration, under pressure from  
independent companies whose services were in  decline through V ail’s 
aggressive policies, proposed antitrust action (and even public ownership) 
in  telephony. Vail, however, cleverly turned the company’s policy around. 
This leads us to the fourth m ain strategy in V ail’s plan of achieving his 
vision of a “one system, one policy, universal service” telephone industry 
for the US: V ail’s cooperation w ith the government and his effective use of 
the government’s own actions as a means to creating a monopoly for 
AT&T. AT&T settled its first anti-trust suit in  the form of a letter, known 
as the Kingsbury Commitment (after AT&T vice-president Nathan 
Kingsbuiy). The Commitment was a promise to relinquish control of 
Western Union Telegraph Company, to allow independent companies
40 Today, interconnection is one of the key aspects of promoting competition in the 
telecommunications sector. It  is so vital that the concepts of transparent and non- 
discriminatoiy terms of interconnection are central to the telecommunications policies of 
all developed countries. Moreover, these concepts have found their way into international 
commitments as one of the provisions in the WTO Reference Paper on pro-competitive 
principles. From historical experience, the US was keen to include a provision on 
interconnection in the Reference Paper: the US knew from history that interconnection is 
very important to market access and competition in telecommunications. Interconnection 
was also the focal argument in the US case against Mexico in the WTO panel’s first case on 
telecommunications services. See Chapter 4 on the Reference Paper and the Mexico- 
Telecommunications case.
41 Dick Olufs, The Making o f Telecommunications Policy (1999), p.31.
42 Up to this stage, the federal government did not feature in the development of the 
telephone industry. Regulation was a matter for states. The beginning of federal 
regulation of telecommunications finds its root in the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, which 
extended the power of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), originally established in 
1887 to regulate the railroad industry, to include overseeing communications. The ICC 
was given jurisdiction over interstate rates charged by telegraph, telephone and cable 
companies. However, due to its preoccupation with railroad problems, the ICC exercised 
very little regulatory oversight of the telephone industry beyond instituting an accounting 
system for the industry. For the most part, there was little regulation of the telephone until 
the establishment of the Federal Communications Commission in 1934.
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lim ited interconnection to AT&T’s long-distance network and to acquire 
independents only w ith the approval of the regulators. In  exchange, the 
Justice Department relaxed its pressure on AT&T.
The Kingsbury Commitment was the key turning point in the 
evolution of US telecommunications from competition to monopoly. It  had 
a number of far-reaching consequences for the US telecommunications 
industry. First, by allowing independents to interconnect to the Bell 
system the government effectively reduced competition between Bell and 
the independents and ironically allowed AT&T to gain greater control over 
the industry. Although interconnection reduced Bell’s ability to drive its 
competitors out of business, it also eliminated the independents’ 
incentives to establish a competitive long-distance system. The Kingsbury 
Commitment, although thought by the government to be pro-competitive, 
thus marked the re-emergence of Bell dominance and the beginning of the 
end for telephone competition.**
Second, the Commitment actually contained a bu ilt-in  incentive for 
“monopoly-swapping” rather than continued competition.44 This was due 
to the manner in  which regulators interpreted the agreement not to 
restrict AT&T from acquiring any new telephone systems, but only to 
require that an equal number be sold to an independent buyer for each 
system AT&T purchased. Hence, as Brock noted:
This provision allow ed B ell and the independents to exchange telephones in  order 
to give each other geographical m onopolies. So long as only one com pany served 
a  given geographical area there was little  reason to expect price com petition to 
take p lace.45
45 Horwitz (1989), p. 101; Thierer (1994).
44 Thierer (1994).
«  G.W. Brock (1981), p. 156.
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Third, the Kingsbury Commitment meant the recognition by law of 
the 1879 division of fields between voice and record/data 
communications.46 The result was that the markets were carefully carved 
up to create a monopoly for telegraph, another one for each of the 
established local telephone exchanges and another for AT&T’s long­
distance operations, thus creating a sort of “competitive apartheid”.47 Bell 
might not own everything, but some monopolist or other would dominate 
each discrete m arket.
Consequently, the Kingsbury Commitment not only made it possible 
for AT&T to avoid the threat of nationalization or “postalization”,48 it 
secured AT&T’s position as monopoly provider. After 1913, the violence of 
competition had abated and most of the growth occurred in the Bell 
system.49 On the whole, the Kingsbury Commitment, w ith a helping hand 
from an unaware government, thus paved the way towards the idea that 
the telephone industry was a natural monopoly.50
Meanwhile, Vail worked closely with regulators to legitim ize this idea 
of a natural monopoly.51 AT&T would receive antitrust exemption to 
operate a vertically integrated telephone system and would receive a fair
46 The 1879 agreement between Western Union and the Bell Company effectively 
constructed a division in the electrical communications industry by stipulating that the 
company providing one type of communications services -  telegraph -  was not to enter into 
the business of the other type of communications services -  telephones, and vice versa.
47 M. Kellogg, J. Thome and P. Huber, Federal Telecommunications Law  (1992), p. 16-17.
48 “Postalization" involved the telephone system being taken over by the Post Office 
Department and operated together with the postal service. In  1913, the new U.S. 
postmaster general advocated this. Cf. In the UK, the telegraph was nationalized as early 
as 1868 and in the 1890s, the trunk telephone network followed. In 1912, the UK adopted 
blanket postalization of the telephones. Most of Western Europe had also “postalized" their 
telephones. See Horwitz (1989), pp. 100-110; Brooks (1975), pp. 148-149.
49 Brooks, Telephone (1975), p. 260-1.
50 Olufs (1999), p. 33.
51 See Richard Vietor (1994), p. 172; Olufs (1999), p. 33; R. Garnet (1985), p. 130.
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and reasonable return on its investments. In  turn it would provide a 
technically advanced, reliable system available to as many people as 
possible - what is called “universal service*. The term  itself was coined by 
V ail.52 At the same tim e, Vail began to speak favourably of government 
regulation, arguing that such policy could be beneficial and a stabilizing 
force for telephony.53 As Olufs observed:
A new assum ption had entered the regulatory arena: a  regulated m onopoly, 
w orking closely w ith  governm ent officials, could effectively deliver a  national 
service.54
V ail’s visionary policies and clever business tactics contributed to the 
monopolistic dominance of AT&T in telecommunications - a dominance 
which shaped public and official opinion into believing that the telephone 
industry was a natural monopoly which would best deliver in  the public 
interest through regulations
I I.  A New Bra o f Governm ent Regulation: the
Com m unications Act o f 1934
The idea of the telephone as a natural monopoly that could deliver services 
in  the public interest was the fundamental rationale upon which the
52 According to Duesterberg and Gordon, the current understanding of the term “universal 
service* dates only to the late 1960s and early 1970s and the best historian of this idea is 
Milton Mueller. The idea of “universal service* used by Vail was an inventive means of 
eliminating competition in telephony and thereby making AT&T the monopoly service 
provider. See Thomas Duesterberg and Kenneth Gordon, Competition and Deregulation in 
Telecommunications: The Case fo r a New Paradigm (1997), p. 48; and Milton Mueller, 
Universal Service: Competition, Interconnection and Monopoly in the Making o f the American 
Telephone System (1997).
53 Horwitz (1989), p. 99; R. Garnet (1985), p. 130.
54 Olufs (1999), p. 33.
55 One commentator noted: “Legislators began referring to competition in the same term as 
Vail -  ‘duplicative,’ ‘destructive,’ and ‘wasteful’.* Thierer (1994).
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passing of the 1934 Communications Act was based.56 This im portant Act 
brought the telecommunications industry under one regulatory agency, 
whereby the systematic and structured federal control of this industry 
began. It was the first significant active involvement of Congress in  
telecommunications regulation. The second major intervention would be 
sixty years later w ith the enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 
1996, a measure w ith a totally different purpose.57
An examination of the theory of natural monopoly is undertaken in  
this section to determine why the US government chose, in  1934, to 
regulate the telecommunications industry instead of leaving it to m arket 
forces and allowing it to operate under competition.5® The section then 
discusses the US independent telecommunications regulator, the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC), created by the 1934 Act and the 
regulatory policies that governed the telecommunications sector during the 
monopoly era.
56 The constitutional basis of economic regulation and the public interest standard could 
be traced to the landmark case of Munn v. Illinois in 1877, where the Supreme Court ruled 
that the states had the right to regulate business. The opinion of the majority stated: 
“When ... one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in 
effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the 
public for the common good.* Munn v. Illinois (94 U.S. 113 (1877) at 126). The idea was 
thus adopted to the telephone, which had come to be viewed by the government as an 
infrastructure providing public services and therefore should be regulated in the public 
interest.
57 See Section V below.
58 The natural monopoly argument for regulation is perhaps the most important and widely 
accepted argument for economic regulation. It has provided the rationale for regulating not 
only telecommunications service, but also for electric-power and natural gas distribution, 
water supply, and some common carrier transportation service. Viscusi, Vernon and 
Harrington, Economics o f Regulation and Anti-Trust (1995), p. 351.
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1. Regulation of the Telecoms ‘Natural' Monopoly
The idea began to emerge that competition in the telecommunications 
industry was wasteful and expensive. The cost of building one telephone 
connection required poles being erected and wires strung from pole to pole 
to connect every telephone customer. Many telephone companies emerged 
after Bell’s patents ended in  1894 to provide competing services. The 
problem, as seen above, was that the different networks were not 
interconnected. The result was that businesses often had to subscribe to 
more than one service provider. The government, w ith the influence of 
AT&T, came to see this as wasteful and inefficient. The government 
wanted one system to provide telephone service, by then an im portant 
factor in  the US economy, to the population across the country. The 
government came to believe that every US person was entitled to telephone 
service -  embracing V ail’s vision of universal service. The justification for 
regulation was the belief that the telephone industry was a natural 
monopoly.
(a) The Theory of Natural Monopoly
In  the nineteenth century, economists such as Augustin Cournot and 
Jules Dupuit depicted the monopoly as a single firm  that could charge
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prices free of m arket dictation.59 A monopoly is simply a m arket in  which 
there is only one supplier, and is characterized by three features: the firm  
is motivated by profits, it stands alone because barriers to entiy prevent 
new firm s from entering the industry, and the actions of the monopolist 
itself affect the m arket price of its output.60 A monopoly is held to be 
inefficient and in the long term  there is no tendency for costs to be at their 
lowest possible level, because the pressure from more efficient, incoming 
competitors does not exist.
John Stuart M ill in  1848 made a critical distinction between what 
have come to be labelled as a “natural” monopoly and a “contrived” 
monopoly, although he did not explicitly use the terms “natural” or 
“contrived”.61 The natural monopoly was not defined in terms of the actual 
number of firm s in  the m arket at a given time or in terms of its ability to 
m anipulate price, but instead in terms of the relative efficiency of serving 
the m arket w ith a single firm .62 The concept of natural monopoly soon 
began to be identified w ith the notion of economies of scale.63 An industry 
is a natural monopoly “if  the production of a particular good or service by 
a single firm  minimizes cost”.64
The issue is how society can benefit from least-cost production - 
which obviously requires single-firm  production - w ithout suffering from  
monopoly pricing. The problem is that a single firm  would eventually win
59 See A. Coumot (1838) and (1960); J. Dupuit (1844) and in K. Arrow and T. Scitovshky, 
eds. (1969); Kaserman and Mayo, “The Economics of Regulation: Theory and Policy in the 
Postdivestiture Telecommunications Industry*, in Public Policy Toward Corporations 
(Heggestad and Smith, eds.) (1988), p. 142.
60 Bannock, Baxter and Davis, The Penguin Dictionary o f Economics (1998, 6th edition).
61 J.S. M ill, Principles o f PolitUxd Economy (1848, 1st edition).
62 Kaserman and Mayo (1988), p. 142.
63 Economies of scale are factors which cause the average cost of producing a commodity to 
fall as output of the commodity rises. Bannock, Penguin Dictionary o f Economics (1998).
64 Viscusi, Vernon and Harrington (1995), p. 351.
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the entire m arket by continuing to expand output and lowering its costs. 
Having won the m arket, it could then set the monopoly price. Government 
regulators have therefore justified the need for direct regulation of an 
industry that is thought to be a natural monopoly, as in  the 
telecommunications industry.
The theory of natural monopoly has been extensively revised, from  
the work of Bonbright65 in  1961 through to the more recent work of 
Baumol, Panzar, and W illig66 in  1982. The revised theory reveals that 
economies of scale can no longer be relied upon as the exclusive 
determ inant of whether or not an industry is a natural monopoly. Instead, 
a natural monopoly is defined in terms of the ‘subadditivity’ of the cost 
function: when “the production of all combinations of outputs [in an 
industry] is accomplished at least cost by a single firm .”67 In  other words, 
it  is most cost-efficient for one firm  to produce all levels of output, rather 
than for one firm  to produce a portion of the output and another second 
firm  to produce the rest of the total output of an industry. Subaddivity 
depends on both economies of scale and economies of scope.68 If  both 
exist, then subadditivity w ill likely exist. This revised definition of natural 
monopoly consequently triggers the need to question the validity of the 
beliefs, held so strongly in  the first half of the twentieth century, that 
certain industries, like telecommunications or electricity, were natural 
monopolies and therefore required regulation.
65 Bonbright, Principles of Public Utility Rates (1961).
66 Baumol, Panzar and Willig, Contestable Markets and the Theory o f Industry Structure
(1982).
67 Viscusi, Vernon and Harrington (1995), p. 257.
68 Economies of scope are factors which make it cheaper to have one firm produce a range 
of related products than to have different firms produce each of the individual products on 
their own. See supra n. 63 for the definition of economies of scale. Bannock, Penguin 
Dictionary o f Economics (1998).
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There have been further advances in  the theory of natural monopoly 
involving “potential entry” into the industry. Kaserman and Mayo 
summarized this as follows:
W hen (1) potentia l en tran ts  can serve the same m arket dem and and have access 
to the same general technology and inputs as incum bent firm s, (2) potential 
entran ts do not face en try costs greater than  those faced by cu rren t incum bent 
firm s, and (3) potentia l en tran ts  evaluate the p ro fitab ility  o f en try a t the 
incum bents’ p re-entry prices, th en  it  can be shown th a t industry pricing, 
regardless of m arket stru ctu re , w ill rem ain  efficient due to the th rea t o f en try .69
W hat this means is that when these three conditions are satisfied, an 
industry thought to be a natural monopoly could actually produce outputs 
with efficiency results approximating that of a competitive m arket. If  this 
is the case then regulation is consequently unnecessary since there would 
not be a threat of the incumbent firm  charging monopoly price.70 Once 
there is potential for competition in a market, the break down of a system 
of regulation of a natural monopoly becomes possible if  not inevitable. 
This recent development to the theory of natural monopoly would explain 
the weakening of the natural monopoly rationale of telecommunications 
regulatory policies in  the late 1960s and would pressure the FCC to allow  
new entrants into the industry, for example M CI, AT&T’s rival in  private 
line services.71
69 Kaserman and Mayo (1988), p. 144.
70 The object of economic regulation is to substitute for competition in order to discipline 
natural monopolies. If  competitive characteristics exist in a market, then logically there is 
no need for regulation.
71 See Section 111.2(c) below.
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(b) Was AT&T a ‘natural’ monopoly or a ‘created’ monopoly?
It appeared that the long-distance m arket was a natural monopoly -  but 
this appearance was created by AT&T’s dominance and the creation of this 
dominance was in turn helped on by government actions. But was the 
telephone industry, in  actuality, a “natural” monopoly?72
There are a number of factors that explain why the telephone 
industry appeared at the tim e to be a natural monopoly. First, u n til the 
1940s, the best available production technology was the open-wire line 
system,73 which involved stringing wires between poles in order to send 
messages across geographical regions. Because of the very high fixed 
costs of such a system and the relatively low m arginal cost of adding 
another customer, economies of scale were believed to exist.74
In  the 1930s, AT&T developed coaxial cable, which replaced the open 
wire line system as the best available technology. Coaxial cable is able 
simultaneously to cany a much greater number of long-distance 
communications lines. However, while a technological improvement, 
coaxial cable also entails sufficiently large fixed costs that a natural 
monopoly existed even for the largest intercity telecommunication routes. 
Thus, cost efficiency demanded single-firm production, and AT&T was the 
government’s chosen monopoly supplier.
72 It must be noted that “the problem of determining empirically whether a monopoly is 
justified by cost conditions - whether a natural monopoly exists - is difficult; attempting to 
do so by inference from the actions and cost data of a regulated utility is nearly 
impossible". Waverman, “The Regulation of Intercity Telecommunications", in Promoting 
Competition in Regulated Markets (Phillips, ed.) (1975), p. 204.
73 The open-wire line system had a one-call-at-a-time capacity. This was how the 
telephone system (network) first started off. See AT&T’s history at 
http://w w w .att.com /history.
74 See the theory of natural monopoly above.
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Second, AT&T had the huge advantage of operating a recognized 
company and providing established services. The company held patents 
that were especially crucial in  large systems. AT&T had already 
established rights of way for its wires. Potential competitors would have to 
cope w ith state and local rules barring competition and negotiate 
connection w ith the nearby AT&T facilities.75 The FCC recognized the fact 
that one corporation dominated the telephone industry, that the Bell 
System had consistently pursued the policy of obtaining control of a 
nation-wide unified telephone system and that it had so far been 
successful in the elim ination of effective competition.76 At the end of 1936 
there were 18,516,211 telephone stations in the United States, of which 
14,827,755 were Bell-owned.77 In  its first report, based on the first 
comprehensive investigation of the telephone industry, the FCC affirmed 
the telephone industry to be a natural monopoly:
A ttem pts a t th is  late date to develop a strong, independent telephone system to  
compete w ith  the B ell System  w ould be fu tile . Protection of the rate-paying  public  
by m eans o f effective com petition is now, and for a  num ber o f years has been 
im possible.78
U ntil the late 1930s therefore, long-distance telecommunications could be 
described as a natural monopoly.
However, on closer examination, the telephone industry m ight not, of 
its own constitution, be a natural monopoly but was moulded into one by 
certain government policies (both accidental and intentional), tactical 
moves by AT&T and the First World W ar.79 A number of government
75 Brock (1981), p. 177.
76 FCC, Investigation o f the Telephone Industry in the United States (1939), p. 578.
77 Ibid., p.579.
78 Ibid.
79 See Thierer (1994).
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actions contributed to the formation of the natural monopoly of the 
telephone industry, but we w ill concentrate on three: the Kingsbury 
Commitment, the abandonment of postalization and the W illis-Graham  
Act. The effects of the Kingsbury Commitment have already been 
discussed above. The Kingsbury Commitment, as we have seen, also 
prevented the postalization of AT&T. Nonetheless, during World War I, the 
entire telecommunications industry was nationalized (postalized) for a year 
(from 1 August 1918 to 1 August 1919) due to national security reasons. 
This period proved beneficial to AT&T as the government signed a contract 
that was highly favourable to AT&T.80
In  addition, AT&T applied for an increase in telephone rates. To meet 
its obligations to AT&T and to expand its wartime service, the Postmaster 
General ordered a 20 per cent increase in long-distance rates in December 
1918. At the end of the war, of the approximately $ 50 m illion in  rate 
increases approved by the postmaster general during nationalization, $ 42 
m illion went to AT&T.81 Local authorities resisted the rate hikes but the 
Supreme Court ruled that the Postmaster General had the power to set 
telephone rates. This period of nationalization convinced Vail that 
government oversight could play a strategic role in the company's vision of 
“one system, one policy, universal service”.82
The public furore over the rate increases elim inated any prospects for 
continued government ownership of telephony, and the system was 
returned to private ownership in 1919. Thus, the idea of nationalizing the 
US telecommunications industry was abandoned, and unlike Europe and
80 Noobar Danielian, AT&T: The Story o f Industrial Conquest (1939), p. 252.
81 Thierer (1994).
82 Danielian (1939), p. 248; G. Oslin, The Story o f Telecommunications (1992).
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most of the world, operation of the industry in the US remained in private 
hands. The abandonment of nationalization meant, however, that the US 
telephone industry was allowed to continue as a monopoly, dominated by 
AT&T.
Rate regulation of interstate services during WWI had im portant 
effects on telecommunications policy and the evolution of the industry into 
a natural m o n o p o ly .* *  The view emerged that a single monopolistic 
provider controlled through rate regulation could effectively achieve social 
policy objectives.84 State regulators began following federal action in  
regulating rates. Business and urban users were charged higher and 
above-cost rates than rural customers to raise revenue to extend services 
to distant locations and to artificially suppress rural rates. Thus, cross­
subsidization of the telecommunications industry b e g a n .88 Furtherm ore, 
by averaging rates geographically to subsidize rural telephony, 
policymakers and regulators discouraged local telephone competition.88 
Few firm s w ill seek to enter a m arket and offer service where it is difficult, 
if  not impossible, to undercut the subsidized service of the incumbent 
carrier. The combination of state and federal regulation thus stabilized 
and ended the rate wars that had occurred during the early period of 
competition (1894-1912).87 Regulation had the effect of increasing the 
difficulty of new entiy, and thus helped AT&T achieve its monopolistic 
hold and put in place the policy of “universal service”.88
83 Thierer (1994).
84 Thierer (1994); Horwitz (1989) pp. 103, 132-133; R. Garnet (1985), p. 152.
85 Hyman, Toole and Avellis (1987), p. 81.
88 Thierer (1994).
87 Brock (1981), pp. 159-161.
88 Ibid.
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Another government action which could have contributed to the 
monopoly of the telephone industry was the enactment of the W illis- 
Graham Act in  1921.89 This gave the Interstate Commerce Commission 
(ICC) powers to approve or disapprove consolidations and mergers of 
telegraph and telephone companies. Strong support for the Act came from  
competing independent telephone companies whose financial fortunes had 
declined and wished to be bought out by B e l l . 9 0  By this tim e, the 
prevailing view was that telephony constituted a natural monopoly, and 
that AT&T should be allowed to take over the failing independents without 
the risk of an ti-trust action. The W illis-Graham Act thus provided anti­
trust im m unity to AT&T,91 so that AT&T was authorized to operate as a 
monopoly.
Another factor that paved the way for federal regulation of the 
telecommunications industry involved rate-making. The problem involved 
the competing jurisdictions between state and federal bodies. State 
commissions wanted to control the rates AT&T charged for long-distance 
(interstate) services and the high license fee AT&T charged its local 
operating companies for services provided to them by the AT&T parent. 
By charging local operators a license fee AT&T was able to shift costs and 
services between jurisdictions and transfer revenue out of the local 
companies and into the parent company. The efforts of state regulatory 
commissions to alter this balance were, however, rebuffed by the courts.92
89 Willis-Graham Act, 42 Stat. 27, June 10, 1921; Horwitz (1989), p. 102.
90 G. Hamilton Loeb (1978), pp. 13-14; Bomholz and Evans (1983), p. 33; Thierer (1994).
91 Horwitz (1989), p. 102.
92 In  1923, the Supreme Court refused to permit the Public Service Commission of Missouri 
to disallow certain payments by the local Bell company to AT&T. Southwestern Bell 
Telephone Company v. Public Service Commission o f Missouri, 262 U.S. 276 (1923).
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However, in  1930, during the Great Depression, the court, in  a 
change of attitude towards regulation, ruled that AT&T charges to the local 
operating companies m ust be justified in terms of costs to AT&T of 
performing the services.93 The court ruled that the local telephone 
network was used jo intly for local and long-distance service and effectively 
mandated a “station-to-station” theory of separations, whereby long­
distance would have to pay some percentage of the jo in t costs of the local 
exchange. Thus, the decision provided the legal foundation for the 
practice of separations, which has played a crucial role in  later policy 
issues in communications.94 The court nonetheless also clearly ruled that 
interstate service rates were beyond the authority of the state commission. 
The need for a federal body w ith the appropriate jurisdiction to deal w ith 
interstate services rates thus provided one of the reasons for the creation 
of the FCC.
There was no doubt that a monopoly existed in the telephone 
industry and certain issues, for instance the rate problem between state 
and federal jurisdictions, convinced those in government that some form of 
systematic federal regulation of the industry was needed. However, the 
arguments explored above seem to suggest that the telephone industry 
was not a natural monopoly per se, but that AT&T was allowed to develop 
into a monopoly through government actions and other factors, such as 
AT&T’s aggressive business tactics, discussed above.95
93 Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Company 282 U.S. 133 (1930).
94 “Separations* was the procedure by which regulators divided assets and costs between 
the state and federal jurisdictions. The separations polity is discussed in section 11.4(b) 
below.
95 See Section 1.4.
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By 1932, AT&T’s m arket share reached 79 per cent, w ith control of 
m ajor local operating companies, the major equipment m anufacturing 
apparatus and the long-distance network.96 The percentage of all 
telephones operated by independent telephone companies declined from  
36 per cent to 21 per cent from 1921 to 1934.97 By 1934, virtually all 
telephones were connected w ith the Bell System and there was no direct 
competition to it.96 Given this situation, the hope was to legitim ize the 
concept that an efficient telephone industry would only be able to provide 
quality service necessary for an advancing nation like the United States 
through one firm  because that industry was a “natural” monopoly.
As stated earlier, a natural monopoly runs the risk of becoming 
inefficient, and alternative policy solutions are therefore adopted in  an 
attem pt to avoid or cure inefficiencies. Possible alternatives include “doing 
nothing”, competition among bidders for the right to the monopoly 
franchise, state ownership, and regulation." W ith the enactment of the 
1934 Communications Act, the US Congress chose to regulate the 
telephone industry. The FCC set out the rationale for the adoption of the 
first legislation on telecommunications regulation as follows:
The necessary a ttrib u tes  o f so-called n atu ra l m onopoly w hich ord in arily  attend  
efficient and econom ical telephone service; the in tim ate relation  o f such service to 
social w ell-being, both local and national; the n ature o f telephone service as a  
fundam ental necessity o f m odem  living; and the public in terest in  the progressive 
developm ent of increasingly effective and econom ical com m unication facilities are 
a ll factors w hich disclose the underlying character o f th is  business as an  essential 
public u tility  - en titled  in  the in terest o f its  patrons to reasonable protection from  
w asteful com petition, and en titled  to m ake reasonable charges for its  service, b u t
96 Horwitz (1989), p. 102.
97 Bomholz and Evans, “The Early History of Competition in the Telephone Industry’ , in 
Breaking Up BeU: Essays on Industrial Organization and Regulation (David Evans, ed.)
(1983), pp. 7-40 at 14; and FCC, Telephone Investigation (1939), pp. 139-143.
96 Ibid.
99 Viscusi (1995), p.358.
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subject to public scrutiny, regulation, and control, to the end th a t adequate 
service, equal treatm ent, and reasonable and nondiscrim inato iy rates m ay be 
assured to a ll who m ay apply. The im portance of the telephone ind ustry  and the  
m agnitude of telephone operations dem and actual and not nom inal reg u lation .100
2. The Communications Act o f 1934
Regulation is influenced by the politics, economic policies, institutional 
roles, and technological developments of each era. During the Presidency 
of Franklin D. Roosevelt, a new era of governmental regulation emerged. 
Roosevelt took over the presidency after the Great Depression, which from  
1929 to 1933 reduced the national economy to two-thirds, and trade to 
half the size it had been four years earlier.101 One in four workers was 
unemployed, and m illions of Americans were poverty-stricken.102 The 
Roosevelt adm inistration adopted an activist federal role in rebuilding the 
economy through efficiency, clear lines of authority and accomplishment 
of organizational goals.103 President Roosevelt and his advisors sought to 
create an organized system of regulation, including the grouping of like 
activities under single agencies.104 The Roosevelt adm inistration justified  
this reorganization as a means of bringing about greater efficiency and 
effectiveness of government.
In  the field of telecommunications, the President recommended that 
Congress create a new agency that would bring this industry 
comprehensively under federal regulation. He stated:
100 FCC, Investigation o f the Telephone Industry (1939), p. 597.
101 The 1930s also witnessed the collapse of the m ultilateral trade and payments system 
which had emerged in the late nineteenth century. A. Kenwood and A. Lougheed, The 
Growth o f the International Economy: 1820-1990 (1992), p. 235.
102 W illiam Nester, A Short History o f American Industrial Policies (1998), p. 164.
103 Olufs (1999), p. 35.
104 Ibid.
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I have long fe lt th a t for the sake o f c larity  and effectiveness the relationship  o f the  
Federal Governm ent to certa in  services know n as u tilities  should be divided into  
three fields: Transportation , power, and com m unications. The problem s of 
transportation  are vested in  the In terstate  Commerce Com m ission, and the  
problem s o f power [...] in  the Federal Power Commission.
In  the field  of com m unications, however, there is today no single Governm ent 
agency charged w ith  broad au th o rity .
I recom m end th a t Congress create a  new agency to be know n as the Federal 
C om m unications Com m ission, such agency to be vested w ith  the au tho rity  now  
lying in  the Federal Radio Com m ission and w ith  such au thorities  over 
com m unications as now lies w ith  the In terstate Commerce Com m ission - the  
services affected to be a ll those w hich rely on w ires, cables, or radio as a  m edium  
of transm ission.105
The President’s message initiated debates and hearings in both 
Houses, and Congress passed on 19 June the Communications Act of 
1934. The Act created the regulatory agency that is the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) and brought about systematic federal 
regulation of telecommunications.
3. Creation of the FCC: A ‘Super* Regulator
As we have seen, there was no effective regulation of AT&T, apart from the 
Kingsbury Commitment, before the 1934 Act. AT&T obtained the benefit 
of “a de facto sanctioned monopoly without the quid pro quo of regulatory 
oversight.”106 However, the 1934 Act, an event that would condition the 
US telecommunications industry for the next sixty years, changed that. 
There emerged a federal authority, the FCC, to regulate the 
telecommunications monopoly provider AT&T, and which continues to
105 S.doc 144, 73d Congress, 2d Session.
106 Horwitz (1989), p. 104.
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regulate the telecommunications industry today.107 The US has thus had 
fifty years of experience in monitoring the telecommunications industry 
through an independent regulator prior to other countries -  the UK, for 
instance, only established its independent regulator, Oftel, in  1984. The 
US is therefore an authority in utilizing the independent regulator to 
oversee the telecommunications industry; at first, to regulate a monopoly 
but now to liberalize and introduce competition into the 
telecommunications sector.
(a) Structure of the FCC
The FCC is an independent regulatory agency, independent of the 
Executive Branch and directly responsible to Congress. It is currently 
composed of five Commissioners,108 each of whom is appointed by the 
President, subject to the consent of the Senate.109 Each commissioner 
serves five-year terms and can be re-appointed once only.110 The President 
designates one of the five commissioners as chairm an.111 As chief 
executive officer of the Commission, it is the Chairm an’s duty to preside at 
all meetings and sessions of the FCC, to represent the Commission in all 
m atters relating to legislation and reports and in conferences or 
communications w ith other government bodies, and to coordinate and 
organize the work of the Commission in a manner that promotes prompt
107 Today, the power, functions and authority of the FCC are derived from the 
Communications Act of 1934 as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996.
108 The FCC originally had seven Commissioners, which were reduced to five in 1983.
109 Section 4(a) of the 1934 Act as amended, 47 U.S.C. 154.
110 Section 4(c) of the 1934 Act as amended.
111 Section 4(a) of the 1934 Act as amended.
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and efficient disposition of all m atters w ithin the jurisdiction of the FCC.112 
The Commissioners are responsible for form ulating policy initiatives, 
implementing new legislation and adopting agency rules and regulations. 
For day-to-day running, however, the Commissioners delegate 
responsibilities to its bureaus and offices.113
(b) Powers and responsibilities of the FCC
The FCC’s mandate was broad and general. Its broadest obligation was 
“to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States 
a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio 
communication service w ith adequate facilities at reasonable charges”.114 
This was the mandate established in 1934 by the Communications Act 
and remains so today. As explained above, the FCC was created to 
regulate the telephone industry, but was also responsible for
112 Section 5(a) of the 1934 Act as amended, 47 U.S.C. 155.
113 Currently there are six bureaus and eleven staff offices. The six bureaus are Consumer 
and Governmental Affairs, Wireline Competition, Enforcement, Wireless 
Telecommunications, Media and International. The eleven offices are Office of the 
Administrative Law Judges, Communications Business Opportunities, Engineering and 
Technology, General Counsel, Inspector General, Legislative Affairs, Managing Director, 
Media Relations, Secretary, Strategic Planning and Policy Analysis, and Workplace 
Diversity.
114 Section 1 Communications Act 1934. The Act thus embraced the concept of “universal 
service*.
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administering the broadcasting industry and allocating the 
electromagnetic spectrum. 118
The FCC, often described as a ‘super’ regulator, has wide jurisdiction, 
covering numerous sectors of communications, including fixed, mobile, 
satellite and broadcasting, as well as licensing and enforcement. It 
regulates all interstate and foreign communications issues, including 
content regulation.11® It  also has jurisdiction over tariffs, mergers and 
acquisitions in  the telecommunications and broadcasting industries. The 
FCC’s jurisdiction covers both service providers and facilities-based 
operators.
Section 4(i) embodies the Commission’s broad powers:
The Com m ission m ay perform  any and a ll acts, m ake such ru les and regulations, 
and issue such orders, not inconsistent w ith  th is Act, as m ay be necessary in  the 
execution o f its functions.117
This broad power to “perform any and all acts ... as may be necessary in  
the execution of its functions” and the FCC’s functions being to “execute 
and enforce the provisions of this Act”118 endorses the FCC w ith the ability 
to wield significant policy-making authority.119
115 A different situation applied to the former UK regulator, Oftel (Office of 
Telecommunications), whose regulatory responsibilities did not include regulating 
broadcasting. There were separate regulators each for broadcast in radio and broadcast 
through television. Today, a new regulator, Ofcom (Office of Communications), which came 
into operation on 29 December 2003, is closer in role and power to the FCC. Ofcom is the 
UK’s independent regulator of communications with responsibilities in broadcasting (radio 
and television), telecommunications and wireless communications. It is also a competition 
authority for the UK’s communications industries. Ofcom has replaced and inherited the 
duties of five former regulators: Oftel, the Broadcasting Standards Commission, the 
Independent Television Commission, the Radio Authority, and the Radiocommunications 
Agency.
116 Following the passage of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, the FCC also regulates 
certain intrastate issues.
117 Section 4(i) Communications Act 1934 as amended, 47 U.S.C. 154. Italic emphasis 
added.
118 Section 1, 1934 Act as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151.
119 Karen Lee and Jamison Prime, “Telecommunications in the United States", in 
Telecommunications Law  (Walden and Angel, eds.) ( 2001), p. 325.
51
Although the FCC has wide jurisdiction in the regulation of all 
interstate and foreign communications by wire or radio, it was expressly 
forbidden from regulating intrastate communications services.120 
Subsequent court decisions, however, have lim ited this exclusion to those 
m atters that are “... separable from and do not substantially affect the 
conduct or development of interstate communications.”121 As a result the 
FCC has been able to assert regulatory authority over the measurement 
and division of the rate base, inside wiring, and term inal equipment.
The 1934 Act also entrusted the Commission w ith broad and 
powerful enforcement mechanisms. The FCC may enforce the provisions 
of the 1934 Act directly, or request the US federal district courts to in itiate  
enforcement proceedings.122 The Commission has broad authority to 
ensure compliance w ith federal telecommunications law, subject to the 
requirem ent that any action taken is “consistent w ith the public interest, 
convenience and necessity”.123 These broad enforcement powers allow it to 
ensure the implementation of its telecommunications policies, enabling it 
to have a direct hand in shaping the telecommunications industry.
120 Except as provided in sections 223 through 227 inclusive (which include provisions on 
obscene telephone calls, oh regulation of pole attachments, telephone services for the 
hearing and speech impaired, telephone operator services, and on restrictions to telephone 
equipment), and section 332 (on mobile services), and subject to the provisions of section 
301 (license for radio communications) and Title VI (cable services). Section 2 
Communications Act 1934. Regulatory matters that fall under state jurisdiction are 
regulated by the state public utility commissions.
121 North Carolina Utility Commissionv. FCC, 537 F.2d 793 (4^ Cir. 1976).
122 See Section 401 Communications Act 1934.
123 These principles appear in a number of provisions in the 1934 Act as amended by the 
1996 Telecommunications Act. See Section 706(a) of the 1996 Telecommunications Act on 
advanced telecommunications services; Section 214(a) Communications Act 1934 has ‘... 
public convenience and necessity require and Sections 214(c) and (d) 1934 Act. These 
principles also apply to state commissions: see Sections 214(e)(2) and 310(d) 1934 Act.
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4. FCC Policies during the Monopoly Years
Between the 1930s and the late 1960s the FCC (or the individual state 
public u tility  commissions) regulated virtually every aspect of the 
telecommunications industry. During these years, the policy of the 
Commission was to regulate AT&T’s monopoly in  the public interest 
through price and entry mechanisms. As explained above, the government 
viewed the US telephone industry as a natural monopoly, and it followed 
that the US public would benefit most from having only one major 
company provide the country’s telephone services. Thus the irony that the 
FCC -  created to m onitor the telephone industry that was dominated by 
this single firm  -  ensured that AT&T remained in this dominant 
position.124 There were two main causes for this dominance: FCC’s 
policies of regulating AT&T as a natural monopoly, and the fact that 
regulating the telecommunications industry was an enormous and difficult 
task.
As in  any industry, developments in technology could change the 
nature of the industry in  relation to the m arket. This was particularly so 
in  the telecommunications industry, where the introduction of microwave 
technology in the 1940s was responsible for increased demand for 
competition in  the industry. The regulators, however, failed to realize that 
an industry that no longer qualified as a natural monopoly did not need to 
be regulated as one. The FCC, however, w ith its inferior resources of man­
*24 See Olufs (1999), pp. 36-37.
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power and capital was not always capable of keeping up w ith the fast- 
growing telecommunications industry.
The policies that shaped the FCC’s regulation during the 
monopolistic years of the telecommunications industry could be grouped 
into three broad categories: rate-of-retum  regulation, the separations 
system of rate-m aking and entry regulation.125
(a) Rate-of-retum  Regulation
Regulation of a monopoly entails the direct involvement of the independent 
regulator in  rates charged by the regulated provider. In  fact, the basic 
working of the regulatory process consists of rate regulation.126 The FCC 
directly regulated AT&T’s rates un til the 1990s. The aim is to control the 
monopoly firm ’s pricing so that it does not abuse its monopoly position 
and obtain super-normal profits through pricing that might be very high in  
relation to costs. The object of rate regulation is to ensure that prices are 
approximate to those in  a competitive environment, where it is assumed 
that competition w ill ensure that there should not be excess profit.
In  its rate regulation of the telecommunications industry, the FCC 
adopted the rate-of-retum  model of regulation. Rate-of-retum  regulation 
allows the firm  to earn no more than its allowable costs, where costs 
include a pre-determined maximum rate of return to be earned by the 
shareholders who have invested in  the equity of the firm . In  essence, rate-
125 Rate-of-retum regulation and the separations system are regulation through pricing 
policies, while entry regulation constitutes an entry-type policy.
126 It has been pointed out that rate regulation is only appropriate where one or more firms 
can exercize market power by raising prices above competitive levels. It  thus follows that if 
there are no longer any firms that can exercise market power, regulation should be 
removed. Naftel and Spiwak (2000), p. 67.
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of-retum  regulation is a cost-plus contract between the u tility  and the 
state. A ceiling is placed on the profits that a company could keep from its 
regulated business, based on the company's required rate of return on 
capital.
Because the core of the monopoly problem, as traditionally 
conceived, is monopoly prices and profits, the determination of the overall 
revenue requirements that ju s t cover the test-year127 costs of the regulated 
firm  is the heart of the regulatory process. Thus, the problem with 
regulation of a monopoly consists of calculating rates, which is very 
complex.128 The m ain problem was that the FCC did not always have the 
man power or a ll the inform ation necessary to calculate the correct rate 
base. Thus, it often turned out that the FCC left AT&T to determine its 
own rates which were then approved by the FCC on the assumption that 
AT&T ‘knew best'. Moreover, this enabled AT&T to control the process, 
because it alone possessed the relevant inform ation. The supply of 
information available is a particularly important constraint on regulatory 
decision making. This issue of information costs was one of the main 
arguments used to highlight the inefficient workings of the FCC and its  
apparent weakness in  keeping up with AT&T. The argument was thus 
rate-setting is best left to m arket forces.129
127 A test-year is ordinarily the most recent typical year of operations for which complete 
data are available.
128 It is difficult to accurately determine all costs: the cost of equity capital, the valuation of 
rate base, and often costs and valuation are not continuously updated. See Posner (1969), 
pp. 592-597.
129 S. Lundstedt and M. Spicer, “Latent Policy and the Federal Communications 
Commission", in Telecommunications, Values, and the Public Interest (S. Lundstedt, ed.) 
(1990), p. 293-4.
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Meanwhile, studies on the rate-of-retum  model of regulation were 
conducted and concluded that it was fundamentally flawed.130 In  the 
1960s Averch and Johnson demonstrated that under fairly general 
conditions rate-of-retum  regulation w ill provide an incentive for regulated 
firm s to employ an inefficient input m ix.131 They demonstrated that a 
firm  regulated w ith respect to the maximum allowable rate of return on 
equity had an incentive to be inefficient in both production -  to substitute 
capital for labour -  and pricing. These firms also had an incentive to 
misprice services.
Rate-of-retum  regulation also creates problems of incentives which 
are not compatible w ith m inim ization of costs or maximization of social 
welfare.132 In  addition, rate-of-retum  regulation results in the regulated 
firm ’s diversion from ensuring customer satisfaction to playing the 
regulatory “game” -  that is, using the regulatory process to the firm ’s
advantage.133 The problem is that it is difficult to determine the basis on
which rates are set under the rate-of-retum  regulation, and the regulated 
firm  m ust thus resort to manoeuvres that would keep it ahead of the 
game.
Most industry participants, academics and a growing number of 
regulators today consider the rate-of-retum  regulation for 
telecommunications services to be “flawed, expensive and inefficient”.134 
The FCC began moving away from rate-of-retum  regulation in the early
130 See H.A. Averch and L.L. Johnson, “Behaviour of the firm under regulatory constraint", 
52 American Economic Review (1962), pp. 1052-69; H. Leibenstein (1966); L.J. White 
(1972); J.W. Mayo (1984).
131 Averch and Johnson (1962).
132 Crandall and Waverman (1995), p. 106.
133 Crandall and Waverman (1995), p. 99.
134 Crandall and Waverman (1995), p. 41.
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1980s towards cost-based regulation. Economists consider cost-based 
regulation to be a more efficient way of regulating telecommunications 
towards competition. This choice of regulatory mechanism has been 
incorporated into the 1996 Telecommunications Act and the WTO 
Reference Paper. 135
(b) Separations System
The difficulty in rate regulation is further augmented by the historical 
division between intrastate and interstate jurisdictions.136 As seen above, 
the court’s decision in Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Company provided 
the legal foundation for the separations system.137 ‘‘Separations” was the 
name of the procedures by which regulators divided assets and costs 
between the state and federal jurisdictions. “Settlements” was the term  for 
sim ilar averaging procedures worked out between AT&T and independent 
telephone systems. “Separations and settlements” constituted procedures 
by which the AT&T parent company paid local telephone operating 
companies for handling the local-exchange ends of long-distance traffic.138 
This historical division m eant that the FCC and the state public utilities  
commissions (PUCs) had to come together to develop a system of 
ratemaking.
The complicated rate-m aking procedures were necessary for technical 
and jurisdictional reasons. The following illustration is adopted from
135 See Chapter 4.
136 See also Section II. 1(b) above.
137 Ibid.
138 This is analogous to the international system of settling accounting rates between 
operators of different countries. See Section V I.5 below.
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Horwitz (1989). Technically, every long-distance call must begin and end 
in  the local exchange. A call originating, for instance, from a residence in  
New York to a business in  Los Angeles first goes to the local exchange 
central switching centre of New York. The signal is then switched onto 
AT&T long-distance lines where it is routed to the Los Angeles local 
exchange central switching centre. Finally, the signal is delivered to the 
Los Angeles business. Local exchange facilities thus are used both to 
connect callers w ithin the local exchange area and to begin and end long­
distance calls. These different services share equipment and facilities. 
Jurisdictionally, local telephone exchanges are regulated both by state 
PUCs and by the FCC. Long-distance calls may be intrastate (such as 
telephone calls between Los Angeles and San Francisco) and hence under 
PUC authority, or interstate (calls between New York and Los Angeles), 
under the jurisdiction of the FCC.
The controversy over separations procedures was the dominant 
regulatory issue in the late 1930s and early 1940s. It  was not u n til 1943 
that the FCC and AT&T established a formal rule-m aking separations 
agreement. 139 prior to this, the FCC practised the method of inform al rate- 
setting w ith AT&T through “continuing surveillance. ” 140 This method 
describes the FCC practice of watching AT&T earnings and inform ally 
suggesting rate adjustments, rather than convening formal evidential 
hearings on rates . 141 The regulation of rates by negotiation had the effect 
of keeping pace w ith the quickly changing economic dynamics of the
139 In the Matter o f Methods fo r Separating Telephone Property, Revenues, and Expenses, 
Docket 6328, inquiry opened June 9, 1942, FCC Annual Report, 1942.
140 Horwitz (1989), p. 134.
141 Horwitz (1989), p. 129.
58
telephone industry, but it also had the effect of never determining actual 
policy. 142
In  the 1943 agreement, the FCC and AT&T negotiated a $ 50 m illion 
reduction in interstate rates, and AT&T agreed both to establish interstate 
rates according to the station-to-station principle and to increase the 
percentage of interstate revenues going to the local exchanges. 143 Although 
the FCC did finally establish a policy on separations, but due to the 
difficulty of setting rates, the process of regulation by negotiation 
proceeded as before.
The separations procedures provided the basis for 
telecommunications cross-subsidization. 144 Its common use is one of the 
many perplexing aspects of economic regulation . 143 This is particularly so 
as cross-subsidization is anti-competitive. It allows the big firm  to keep 
entrants out or competitors to struggle by using its revenues from  
profitable areas to keep prices low in other areas. For instance, the 
restriction in competition allowed AT&T to continue as the dominant
143 Olufs (1999), p. 37.
143 In  the Matter o f Methods fo r Separating, supra n. 139, pp. 26-27. The agreement 
adopted the station-to-station calculations as opposed to the board-to-board model. In  
separations jargon, the switches connecting local exchanges to long-distance lines are 
called “boards". The telephone set in a customer’s premise is called a “station". If  A makes 
a long-distance call from Los Angeles to B in New York in a board-to-board call, the portion 
of the call between A and the toll board of Los Angeles is considered a local service; and the 
portion that goes between the boards of Los Angeles and New York is considered a toll 
(long-distance) call. If  this call between A and B is considered a station-to-station call, the 
entire call is a toll call. Calculating the cost of a station-to-station call is very difficult 
because it requires calculating how much of the cost of the toll call should be apportioned 
to the local company. See Olufs (1999), pp. 38-40.
144 Cross-subsidization involves the use of revenue from the sale of one product to 
subsidize the sale of another product. More specifically, the price of one product is set to 
exceed its average cost while the price of a second product is set below its average cost. As 
Viscusi explains, such pricing behaviour is perplexing because it appears to be 
inconsistent with both profit maximization and welfare maximization. See Viscusi (1995), p. 
338. See also Richard Posner, “Taxation by Regulation", 2 Bell Journal o f Economics and 
Management Science (Spring 1971), 22-50.
145 Viscusi (1995), p. 337. Cross-subsidization of local telephone rates from long-distance 
revenue is still practiced heavily in developing countries’ telecommunications industries, 
including India. See Chapter 5.
59
provider. In  particular, subsidies are a crucial deterrent of competition. 
Because incumbents’ local service rates were kept artificially low by 
im plicit and explicit subsidies, new entrants would be discouraged from  
attem pting to compete w ith the incumbents for local service customers.
Furthermore, the entrenched system of universal service made it 
difficult for competition to emerge in the US telecommunications 
industry.14* Whenever a potential competitor attempted to enter the 
m arket and offer products and services in competition w ith AT&T, AT&T 
always argued that this would disrupt the smooth operations of their 
networks and result in  decline in  the quality of services provided. This 
would in turn affect the provision of universal service. Fearing that this 
could result in  adverse effects to the public interest, the FCC and PUCs 
always treated AT&T’s arguments w ith deference. This pattern lasted until 
the 1970s.147
Conversely, however, the separations policy -  due to its high 
allocation of costs from local services to long-distance -  drove heavy long­
distance users, such as large corporations, to find alternatives to switched 
services, such as private networks, and thereby provided incentives for 
entry into the long-distance m arket.14* The separations policy induced the 
development of new telecommunications services and the corresponding 
regulatory measures.
146 Charles Kennedy, An Introduction to US Telecommunications Law, (2001), p. xxi.
147 Horwitz (1989), p. 129, and see Olufs (1999), p. 37.
14* Brock (1994), p. 70.
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(c) Entiy Regulation
Entry policies involved restricting entry into the telephone m arket in order 
to protect AT&T and allow it to operate as a monopoly. These policies 
targeted new telecommunications services and new technologies. Because 
the FCC had developed a commitment to the natural monopoly, common 
carrier regulatory form ula, any new service or technology was seen as a 
supplement to the existing system, and should not be permitted to disrupt 
that system. FCC policies supported AT&T as the main protector of 
system quality and generally considered interconnection restrictions as 
reasonable. 149 The Hush-A-Phone case150 of 1948 demonstrates this point.
Hush-A-Phone was a company that sold, for almost th irty years, a 
cup-like device that could be snapped onto the telephone set w ith the 
intention of shielding the phone from other noises and assure relative 
privacy. AT&T began notifying its customers (predominantly department 
stores) that used the hush-a-phone that it was illegal and should be 
removed. The Hush-A-Phone company complained to the FCC requesting 
the FCC change AT&T’s interconnection tariffs to allow use of the device. 
After hearings in which AT&T demonstrated that the device interfered with 
the quality of the transmission, the FCC unanimously agreed the device 
should be illegal. 151 The FCC believed that this protective regulation would 
best accomplish public interest goals. Hush-A-Phone then took its case to
149 On interconnection, see also Section 1.4 above.
150 Hush-A-Phone Corp., 20 F.C.C. 391 (1955); Hush-A-Phone v. United States, 238 F. 2d 
266 (D.C. Cir., 1956).
151 This FCC decision was made in 1951. In  1955 an almost entirely new group of FCC 
commissioners upheld the initial decision.
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the Court of Appeals. In  1956, to the surprise of many, the Court reversed 
the FCC’s decisions and upheld Hush-A-Phone’s contentions. 152 Hush-A- 
Phone is not only an illustration of FCC practice of protecting AT&T but 
also of a more liberal view in  the courts w ith regard to telecommunications 
interconnection. 153
The FCC’s lack of solution to the problem of monopoly power is 
evident in its deferential treatm ent of AT&T. Notwithstanding evidence of 
monopoly-generated abuses and service shortfalls, the FCC chose to fight 
monopoly power by erecting operating barriers between 
telecommunications services. Voice common carrier could not also be 
record carriers. Common carriers could not also be broadcasters, and 
vice-versa. 154 W ith technological developments, new institutional barriers 
were erected, such as those between voice and data and between 
telecommunications and computing.
In  sum, FCC policies on the regulation of rates, separations and 
entiy demonstrate the failings of regulating a natural monopoly, and the 
consequent move towards liberalization and competition of 
telecommunications. However, the heart of the problem of 
telecommunications regulation during the monopoly years was the 1934 
Act itself. The purpose of the 1934 Act when it was legislated was not to
152 Hush-A-Phone v. United States, 238 F. 2d 266 (D.C. Cir., 1956).
153 The court’s liberal view, however, is limited to holding that if an interconnecting device 
does not physically im pair any of the facilities of the telephone company, any commission 
restriction on interconnection is an “unwarranted interference with the telephone 
subscriber’s right reasonably to use his telephone in ways which are privately beneficial 
without being publicly detrimental.* The court did not instruct the FCC to deregulate 
customer premises equipment (CPE) nor to introduce competition. Hush-A-Phone v. US 
(1956), 269.
154 Common carrier or common communications carrier is the US term for public 
telecommunications operator and does not include broadcasters. Telephone and telegraph 
operators are common carriers. See Section 3(10) Communications Act 1934, as amended, 
47 U.S.C. 153.
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secure competition, but the opposite. Its purpose was to create a single 
body to regulate a monopoly. The Act itself did not specifically state this, 
but hearings before the passing of the Act reveal such an objective. 155 
From 1934 to the 1970s, the FCC was trying to do what it was established 
to do.
The problem the FCC faced in carrying out its regulatory duties also 
stemmed from the fact that its mandate when it was established in  1934 
was vague and general. 155 Its  obligation was broad: to ensure nation-wide 
and world-wide wire and radio communication service on a universal basis 
at reasonable rates . 157 The 1934 Act also states that the FCC must carry 
out its obligations in  the public interest. However, it does not go further 
and detail how the FCC should achieve its objectives.
When the FCC was established technical arrangements and economic 
institutions in the communications industries already existed. 155 The 
common carrier industries were already virtual monopolies while the 
broadcasting industry ran on a commercial system. Furthermore, 
institutions ^regulating’ these industries already existed (the ICC and the 
Federal Radio Commission). The powers and authority of these agencies 
were transferred to the FCC. The FCC thus constructed a system of
155 See U.S. Senate, 73rd Congress, 2nd Session, Committee on Interstate Commerce, 
Hearings on A Bill to Provide fo r Regulation of Interstate and Foreign Communications by 
Wire and Radio, and fo r Other Purposes (S. 2910), March 9, 13, 14, 1934; U.S. House of 
Representatives, 73rd Congress, 2nd Session, Committee on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce, Hearings on H.R. 8301, April 10, May 9, 10, 11, 1934.
156 Lundstedt and Spicer also raised this point in their discussion of latent policies that 
arise within the FCC with respect to regulating local ownership of television stations. They 
state: “One important factor is vagueness in statutory guidelines for FCC policy. The 
Communications Act of 1934 [...] provides only that the FCC act in the ‘public interest, 
convenience, and necessity.’ The vagueness of the Congressional directive allows the FCC 
the discretion to evolve its own policies hence make possible a divergence between manifest 
and latent policy." S. Lundstedt (ed.) (1990), p. 293.
157 Section 1 Communications Act 1934, 47 U.S.C. 151. See also Section 11.3(b) above.
155 Horwitz (1989), p. 126.
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regulation that favoured pre-existing institutions and services. 159 As 
Horwitz observed:
I f  there were a bottom  lin e to com m unications regulation, it  would be th a t the  
FCC acted to safeguard the continuous provision o f service to the public. The 
regulation of telecom m unications was essentially protective because, despite 
problem s, the system w orked.160
However, the rapid change in technology, w ith emerging innovations 
in  telecommunications, soon proved that the FCC’s policy of m aintaining a 
monopoly in the interest of providing an efficient and reliable telephone 
service to the public was out-dated, and that the time had arrived for 
reform of the US telecommunications system . 161
I I I .  Towards Com petition and the Idea o f Deregulation
Five m ain factors opened up the US telecommunications industry to 
competition and deregulation. First, as already shown, the method of 
using rate regulation based on rate-of-retum , coupled w ith the historical 
separations system, presented numerous problems, in  particular cross­
subsidy. Second, there were pressures to the efficiency of AT&T and its 
provision of services in  the public interest caused by technological 
advances, and increase in user demand from large and new 
telecommunications users. Third, the equipment m arket was not a 
natural monopoly and therefore its regulation cannot withstand the 
potential entry of competitors to the m arket; 162 so that the economic
159 Horwitz (1989), p. 127.
160 Horwitz (1989), p. 128.
161 See L. Waverman in A.Phillips (ed.) (1975).
162 The hush-a-phone device is a case in point.
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rationale to regulate this m arket could not hold. Fourth, anti-trust 
problems contributed crucially to the undermining of AT&T’s long period 
of regulatory protection. Fifth, the political climate began to change 
towards liberalism . This is particularly im portant as changes in public 
policy and political theories define the transformations of regulatory 
polices on telecommunications in each era.
A number of institutions played their part in  the evolution of US 
telecommunications from monopoly regulation to liberalization and 
deregulation: the federal regulator (FCC); the state regulators (PUCs); the 
federal courts; the Departm ent of Justice (DOJ); and Congress, 
responsible for the 1934 and 1996 Acts. The most influential players 
were, however, the FCC, the DOJ and the courts.
This section examines the events leading up to the end of the 
monopoly period and the beginning of the competition age. The DOJ, 
towards the end of the 1940s, took up the political challenges to the Bell 
System.
1. Second Anti-trust Suit against AT&T: 1949163
The DOJ and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) complement the 
regulatory work of the FCC. These two institutions are in charge of anti­
trust law . 164 Federal anti-trust law has played a key role in the regulation
163 The first anti-trust suit against AT&T was in 1913 which resulted in the Kingsbury 
Commitment. See Section 1.4.
164 The primary US anti-trust laws are the Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 
717 (26 September 1914) (15 U.S.C. 41-58); the Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (15 
October 1914) (15 U.S.C. 12-27 and 29 U.S.C. 52-53); and the Sherman Anti-trust Act, ch. 
547, 26 Stat. 209 (2 July 1890) (15 U.S.C. 1-7).
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of telephony and to a lesser extent, broadcasting and te le v is io n .166 The 
FCC, unlike the DOJ which has the power to in itiate an investigation into 
alleged anti-competitive conduct, has only investigatory powers over 
subsidiaries of carriers and therefore lacked the authority to force 
divestiture of the Bell System. Thus, it was the DOJ that challenged the 
Bell system in the courts through anti-trust suits.
Before the break-up of AT&T in  1984, to most Americans “telephone 
company” and “Bell” were synonymous.166 The Bell System, which 
included AT&T, twenty-two Bell-operating companies, Western Electric, 
and Bell Telephone Laboratories, was virtually a vertically integrated 
monopoly. This very nature of the Bell System led the DOJ to file an anti­
trust suit in  1949 alleging that Western Electric’s control of the equipment 
m arket violated the Sherman Antitrust Act.167
The DOJ sought to divest Western Electric from the Bell System; it 
sought to separate an unregulated equipment supply m arket from the 
provision of monopoly-regulated services.168 In  1956, however, the suit, 
after considerable delay, was settled before going to tria l.169 The consent 
decree that settled the m atter contained the following term s.176 AT&T was 
allowed to keep Western Electric, and the Bell telephone companies were
165 Lee and Prime (2001), p. 328.
166 Gerald F. George, “The Federal Communications Commission and the Bell System: 
Abdication of Regulatory Responsibility’, 44(3) Indiana Law Journal (Spring 1969), p. 459 
at 459.
167 [0]Unlike the 1913 and 1974 anti-trust cases against AT&T, the 1949 case was not 
triggered by the complaints of competitors. Alan Stone, How America got On-line (1997), p. 
44.
168 Horwitz (1989), p. 141.
169 Because AT&T was a major supplier to the Defense Department at the time, the 
beginning of the Korean War caused the Secretary of Defense to request a postponement of 
the suit to avoid interference with the mobilization effort. Brock (1994), p. 71.
170 Consent Decree in United States v. Western Electric, Civ. No. 17-49 (D.N.J., Jan. 23, 
1956). Hereinafter the 1956 Consent Decree.
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not required to have their equipment requirements placed on a competitive 
bid basis. In  other words, the government accepted the integrated 
corporate relationship between AT&T, Western Electric, Bell Labs and the 
associated operating companies. The 1956 Consent Decree thus left the 
Bell System largely unchanged and its monopoly intact.
In  return, AT&T and Western Electric were lim ited to the telephone 
business. The Decree generally restricted AT&T to the provision of 
common carrier communications services, except for government and 
defense-related work. AT&T also agreed that Western Electric would no 
longer manufacture radio broadcasting transm itting equipment and 
television station apparatus, but to lim it production to telephony 
equipment required by AT&T and its operating companies. Furthermore, 
AT&T agreed to license its Bell System patents to all interested parties at 
reasonable royalty rates. This allowed any applicant the use of some 8600 
existing AT&T patents, including the important transistor p a t e n t .  171
The 1956 Consent Decree created an operating barrier for AT&T. 172 
But this barrier relied upon a technological distinction that was soon to 
become obsolete: the distinction between telecommunications and data 
processing, and the related boundary between common carrier and non­
common carrier activities. This boundary is the source of the distinction 
between value-added and basic telecommunications services which 
characterized the US regulation of telecommunications, and later became
i7i Horwitz (1989), p. 141.
1?2 Most significantly, by agreeing to restrict itself to telephony AT&T essentially agreed to 
stay out of computers - a new area of technology that would grow to become the foundation 
of today’s information society. See Horwitz (1989), pp. 143-145.
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a controversial issue in the GATT and WTO attempts to liberalize trade in  
telecommunications services.173
AT&T survived divestiture w ith the aid of the FCC and the Defense 
Departm ent.174 It argued that divestiture would result in increases in  
costs and the lowering of quality of service if foreign, non-Bell, equipment 
were attached to the telephone system. Furthermore, the FCC asserted 
that it could competently regulate a vertical monopoly in the public 
interest.173 These arguments influenced the DOJ’s decision to settle the 
case, as they believed they would lose if  the case went to tria l.173
Politics and the public philosophy of the time influence regulatory 
policies. During the 1949 anti-trust suit, anti-trust philosophy was the 
government’s driving engine in public policy. Government policies were 
aimed at promoting competition and avoiding such events like the Great 
Depression (1929-1932). Fear of post-war depression was high and the 
Trum an adm inistration pursued vigorous anti-trust action. The 1949 case 
against AT&T was one of numerous cases launched against some of 
America’s biggest firm s and monopolies.177
173 See Chapter 4.
174 Horwitz (1989), p. 128 and 142-3; Olufs (1999) pp. 42-43; Brock (1994) pp. 71-72; 
Stone (1997), pp. 46-48.
173 Horwitz (1989), p. 143.
173 Ibid.
177 Anti-trust cases during this period included those against General Electric; the Great 
Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, at the time the US’s largest food retailer; the large 
tobacco companies; and American Can Company, the US’s largest manufacturer of tin 
cans. Stone (1997), pp. 43-4.
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2. The Road Towards Competition
The other factors that influenced the change in regulatory policies were 
AT&T’s inability to meet new user demands in the late 1950s and the 
development in technology. The pressure of high demands came mostly 
from big business users. In  the post-war period im portant users began to 
see telecommunications as a crucial way of transacting business.178 The 
petroleum industry, in  particular, provided a crucial push towards the 
expansion and diversification of services and network systems. The need 
for radio communications for off-shore rigs, oceangoing-vessels, petroleum  
pipelines and geophysical exploration impelled the petroleum industry to 
develop their use of telecommunications. Other industries soon came to 
discover their value. Regulatory agencies were faced with new issues such 
as whether to allow these industries to have the choice of a private system, 
interconnection rights and frequency allocation.17®
In  addition, the invention of television created high capacity demands 
from networks wanting to transm it television signals to their affiliates 
which AT&T facilities were unable to meet.18® Furthermore, technological 
innovation in  telecommunications made it possible for entrepreneurs to 
enter telecommunications and it exacerbated user demands to bypass the 
regulated system. The arrival of microwave technology in particular
178 Stone (1997), p. 55.
17® Ibid.
iso Waverman (1975), p. 232; Horwitz (1989), p. 223.
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generated competitors to the Bell System.181 AT&T’s insufficient capacity, 
along with the lobbying of large telecommunications users, consequently 
pushed the FCC to perm it the entry of new providers of “specialized” 
telecommunications services.182
In  the previous section, we identified the DOJ’s role in  the 
development of the US telecommunications industry. Here, it is the 
federal regulator and the judiciary who played crucial parts in  the 
industry’s evolution from monopoly to competition. This is particularly so 
in  the cases examined below, where, for instance, the FCC’s decision in  
favour of AT&T and against the new independent provider has led the 
independent operators to appeal to the courts.188
Beginning in  the 1960s, the FCC and the courts took several major 
steps towards relaxing regulation in some telecommunications m arkets, 
for instance equipment and private long-distance. The FCC began to allow  
competition at the margins in  order to solve the demand problem and 
carry out its duty in the public interest, but did not foresee the domino 
effect it would have. The decisions of the FCC to allow competition in  
private lines and term inal equipments during the 1960s and 1970s set in  
motion the process of liberalized entry.
Five cases are examined below in the exploration of the underlying 
movement from monopoly to competition. The decisions in these cases 
generated a domino effect towards liberalization. We w ill also see the
181 Microwave technology was researched and developed under the military. Thus there 
was no proprietary patent situation as there would be for AT&T’s inventions. The 
development of microwave technology therefore allowed radio equipment firms to enter the 
telecommunications industry as competitors. In  addition, because microwave used radio 
frequencies, communication services could be offered without having to go through AT&T’s 
carrier networks.
182 Horwitz (1989), p. 223.
183 Hush-a-phone case; MCI case (Section 111.2(c) below).
70
emergence of interconnection issues as an im portant component in the 
liberalization of the telecommunications sector and more significantly, the 
introduction of competition.184
(a) The Above 890 case
The Above 890 decision concerned the newly developed ability of 
companies to transm it long-distance messages by microwaves.185 Big 
businesses such as banks, insurance companies and oil companies often 
sent data by “private lines” as opposed to long-distance “public lines”. 
Private lines went from one company installation to another without going 
through AT&T’s long-distance switches, and were relatively expensive. 
Businesses therefore wanted to purchase their own microwave equipment 
to cut costs and have the security of their own systems. In  the Above 890 
case, the FCC had to decide on the allocation of the microwave portion of 
the radio frequency spectrum. For the first time in an FCC proceeding, 
virtually all big business -  led by the petroleum industry -  came together 
to provide a unified front against AT&T to contend that they needed 
privately provided microwave to serve their unique requirements.186 This 
would potentially foreclose AT&T and other common carriers from a large 
volume of traffic.
In  the case, the FCC established a presumption in favour of the 
authorization of new communication services, perm itting the
184 See Section 1.4 of this Chapter, and see Chapters 4 and 5.
185 In the Matter o f Allocation of Microwave Frequencies in the Band Above 890 Me., 27 
F.C.C. 359 (1959).
186 Stone (1997), p. 56.
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establishment of private transmission facilities for all private line services, 
including video delivery. The FCC rejected AT&T’s argument that licensing 
private systems would cause irreparable harm to universal service and an 
increase in the cost of service.187 The Commission acknowledged that 
AT&T had not met the demand for private point-to-point systems. More 
im portantly, the FCC noted that competition would promote innovation in  
both technology and services.188
The decision, however, applied only to a business’s internal 
communications, not connection to AT&T’s lines, and prohibited 
companies from sharing non-AT&T private lines. It opened the door to the 
building of new and eventually competitive long-distance networks. 
Companies could now acquire their private line services elsewhere if  AT&T 
did not offer what they wanted or, if  there were cheaper alternatives.
The Above 890 decision had little  direct effect on the industry, but it 
had three very im portant indirect effects.189 First, the delimited 
liberalization of entry set the stage for subsequent decisions that would 
open entry more widely to other specialized services.19® Second, the FCC’s 
decision also underm ined AT&T’s dominance of the telecommunications 
industry.191 Third, AT&T’s response to Above 890 w ith “TELPAK”, a bulk 
private line discount service, engaged practices that reawakened old
187 The FCC viewed private microwave as an exception to the common carrier control of 
intercity communications, and thus regarded it as unnecessary to discuss boundary 
questions between public and non-public services. Above 890 at 412 (1959), and see Stone 
(1997), p. 56.
188 Above 890 at 414.
189 Horwitz (1989), p. 226.
190 For instance, the Carterfone decision and the M CI case; see below.
191 Stone (1997), p. 56.
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antitrust fears. 192 Regulatory policies were changing in  response to 
developments in the industry. 193 The road to liberalization had been laid.
The Above 890 decision also signalled a turn in FCC procedures. 
Previous to this decision, the FCC conducted its regulation of AT&T 
through informal negotiations behind closed doors. In  the Above 890 
case, large businesses came together for the first time to argue that 
restrictions on equipment manufacture and rate structures were in  
violation of the law. To deal w ith the contending sides, the FCC had to use 
its formal hearing process, thus opening up political debate.
It must however be recognized that the FCC was merely allowing 
some competition to fill the demand gap that AT&T could not fu lfil, and 
ensure that telecommunications services were provided on a universal 
basis. The door to competition was opened a crack by the FCC’s decision 
in  Above 890, but the following cases would push it wide open.
(b) Carterfone case
The FCC’s decision in  the Carterfone194 case represents a turning point in  
the regulation of A T & T . 195 The Carterfone device connected the national 
telephone land line system with two-way mobile radios to provide radio
192 AT&T’s reaction to the Above 890 decision with TELPAK in 1961 produced the first long­
distance price competition in telephones. It was also the first time rates were being set 
based on cost. AT&T, in trying to compete with new private line providers, used a cost- 
based pricing scheme (marginal cost pricing), as favoured by most economists and the 
system used in today’s liberalization of telecoms. However, AT&T’s competitors argued it 
was driving other competitors out of the business by pricing at rates less than actual cost. 
In 1976, the FCC, worried by this and the size and power of AT&T, made TELPAK illegal. 
See Olufs (1999), pp. 43-44. In the matter o f Amer. Tel. & Tel. Co. Long Line Dept., FCC 
Docket No. 18128, 61 FCC 2d 587 (1976).
193 See beginning of Section III on these changes.
194 In the Matter o f Use o f the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, 13 FCC 
2d 420 (1968), recon. denied, 14 FCC 2d 571 (1968). Hereinafter Carterfone.
195 Olufs (1999), p.46.
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telephony to, for example, oil drillers located too far away from local 
networks. When attached to a phone, the Carterfone allowed direct 
communication to take place between the mobile radio user and those 
using the telephone network without the need for base station operator to 
relay the messages m anually. AT&T did not offer such an equivalent. Oil 
companies became very im portant customers of Carter Electronics, the 
company that made the Carterfone, and because offshore drilling became 
an im portant activity of the oil industry during the 1960s, the American 
Petroleum Institute strongly endorsed the Carterfone’s value at the FCC
hearings. ^
The FCC, in  1968, ruled that companies could connect to the public 
network and that AT&T had to provide standards for equipment used for 
connection. 197 Carterfone opened the telephone attachment (equipment) 
m arket generally, notwithstanding AT&T’s attem pt to restrict competition. 
This decision thus affected AT&T’s equipment monopoly. By the late 
1960s, the turn in the direction of telephone regulatory policies extended 
into services as well.
In  Carterfone, AT&T argued that interconnection should not be 
allowed because it would im pair the safety and quality of the network. 
The FCC not only found against AT&T, but used its decision to establish 
new equipment interconnection principles. The FCC held that there was 
“no m aterial distinction between a foreign attachment such as the Hush-a- 
Phone and an interconnection device such as the Carterfone so far as the
196 Further endorsements came from utilities, the US Air Force, the National Aeronautics 
and Space Agency, the Antitrust Division, and within the FCC, the Common Carrier 
Bureau. Stone (1997), p. 59.
197 Caterfone (1968).
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present problem is c o n c e r n e d .”1** The new rule advanced by the FC C  
stated that,
a custom er desiring to use an  interconnecting device to im prove the u tility  to him  
of both the telephone system  and a private radio system should be able to do so, 
so long as the interconnection does not adversely affect the telephone com pany’s 
operations or the telephone system ’s u tility  for others.199
This case signaled the beginning of competition in the equipment 
sector of the telecommunications industry. As in Europe and India, 
liberalization and introduction of competition started off in  the equipment 
m arket.200 The equipment m arket was not a natural monopoly. The 
argument that the equipment m arket should not be regulated but left to 
competitive m arket forces had been made twice before the Carterfone 
decision.201
(c) MCI
If  the Carterfone case marked the beginning of competition for equipment, 
the M CI decision in 1969 introduced competition into the long-distance 
m arket, once AT&T’s stronghold.202 In  1963, Microwave Communications, 
Inc. (MCI) filed a Section 214 Communications Act application w ith the 
FCC for authorization to construct and operate a point-to-point microwave
100 Carterfone, 13 FCC 2d 420 (1968), 423-4.
100 Ibid.
2°° See Chapter 5. A corollary to this is the indication that it is easier to liberalize goods 
than it is to liberalize services, being a more intangible situation. This is true domestically 
and internationally. See for instance the case of the GATT/WTO in Chapters 3 and 4.
201 First, the Walker Report of 1935 reported that the equipment market was not a natural 
monopoly; see Horwitz (1989), pp. 137-9, and FCC, Proposed Report: Telephone 
Investigation (1935). Second was the anti-trust suit of 1949 that led to the 1956 Consent 
Decree. These two incidents both explored the issue of allowing the equipment market to 
function under competitive conditions.
202 In Re Applications o f Microwave Communications, Inc., 18 F.C.C. 2d 953 (1969).
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common-carrier system from Chicago to St. Louis and intermediate 
points.2°3 Its proposed service would be both intrastate and interstate. As 
expected, AT&T opposed this and petitioned the FCC to deny M CI’s 
application.
The FCC, usually a supporter of AT&T against competition, found in  
favour of MCI to be a specialized carrier of the proposed route so as to 
meet the interoffice and interplant communication needs of small 
businesses.204 By four to three, the FCC established a competitor to the 
Bell System .205 The decision created a market for private line systems, and 
represented a change in policy towards possible competition.
Predictably, M CI’s success encouraged others to seek entrance to 
other forms of long-distance transmission. This is a good illustration of 
the revised theory of natural monopoly on the influence of “potential entry” 
into an industiy.206 MCI possessed the same technology as AT&T and 
more im portantly, had the ability to cater for demands which AT&T failed 
to meet. The costs for MCI to enter the private line systems m arket were 
no greater than what AT&T would in c u r .2 0 7  MCI had the ability to be a 
direct competitor to AT&T in  this market. The potential entiy of other 
competitors into the telecommunications industry therefore weakened the 
justification that the industry required regulation because it was a natural 
monopoly.
203 To obtain authorization under S. 214, MCI had to prove that present or future “public 
convenience and necessity" require the construction and operation of the new line.
204 M C I(1969).
205 The tight voting showed the divided opinion in the FCC about introducing competition 
into the telecommunications long-distance sector. The dissenters objected mainly for the 
effects the decision would have on long-term policy for the AT&T network. Olufs (1999), p. 
47.
206 See Section II. 1(a) above.
207 see Waverman (1975), pp. 232-233.
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Regulation of the telephone industry was guided by economic as well 
as social reasons, but it was also a part of the political machinery. As 
Horwitz noted, the MCI decision “in some respects [...] also reflected the 
influence of the environment of regulatory activism”.208 During this period, 
the capture theory - where the regulated firms had effectively seized 
control or “captured” their regulators - was widespread.209 The 1970s saw 
an increase in political pressure on the FCC to lower barriers to new 
competitors entering AT&T businesses. These pressures led the FCC and 
federal courts to move more towards competitive principles.
(d) Specialized Common Carrier
The MCI decision in 1969 only gave MCI permission to service the St. 
Louis-Chicago route. M CI, and other new firm s, had to petition to enter 
each individual route thereafter, and there was a flood of applications for 
entiy into the long-distance m arket since the decision. In  1971, the FCC 
decided in the Specialized Common Carrier inquiry finally to allow free 
entry into the private line systems market for services that the specialized 
common carriers would provide.210 It was a unanimous decision in favour 
of competition.
208 Horwitz (1989), p. 227.
209 The capture theory explains that regulation is supplied to serve producer interests as 
opposed to the public interest. See W.A. Jordan, “Producer Protection, Prior Market 
Structure and the Effects of Government Regulation”, 15 Journal o f Law and Economics 
(April 1972) 151-176; T. Makkai and J. Braithwaite, “In and Out of the Revolving Door: 
Making Sense of Regulatory Capture”, in A Reader on Regulation (Baldwin, Scott and Hood, 
eds.) (1998).
210 FCC, First Report and Order, FCC Docket 18920, “Specialized Common Carriers”, June 
3, 1971, 29 FCC 2d 870.
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Nonetheless, the FCC’s conception of competition in the Specialized 
Common Carrier decision was a narrow one. The FCC did not allow or 
expect the specialized common carriers to compete directly against AT&T. 
The decision was to allow them to enlarge the m arket w ith new services 
which AT&T had insufficiently provided. It permitted specialized carriers 
to provide services in private line only, but not public switched services 
provided by AT&T and other authorized common carriers. The decision 
opened up the private line m arket to competition while AT&T's traditional 
long-distance switched services remained protected. Nonetheless, m arket 
entry standards were relaxed by the MCI and Specialized Common Carrier 
decisions.
(e) The Execunet decision
The Execunet case is an im portant example of the judicial role in  the 
deregulation process. In  1975 MCI offered a service (“Execunet”) which 
effectively duplicated AT&T’s regular message toll service (MTS) .211 They 
began this without FCC approval and the FCC ordered MCI to stop, ruling 
that MCI had been authorized to offer private line services only.212 The 
Court of Appeals, however, reversed the FCC’s decision, ruling that once 
the FCC had licensed a firm  to provide any service, it could provide every
211 In the US, switched long-distance (toll) service is often called message toll service 
(MTS). It is a toll service that allows the caller to access any other subscriber on the 
network through the switching machines of the long-distance company and the relevant 
local exchange companies. It is the same as “fixed-line long-distance service” or “national 
long-distance service*. International telephone voice services are called IMTS (international 
message telephone service).
212 In the Matter o f MCI Telecommunications Corp., 34 R.R. 2d 539 (1975), 37 R.R. 2d 1339 
(1976), rev*d sub nom. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 356 (D.C. Cir. 
1977), cert. Denied sub nom. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 434 U.S. 1040 (1978).
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service (with the same equipment) unless the FCC specifically denied it the 
right to do so. The FCC had not so stipulated.213
The Court significantly ruled that new entrants were legally entitled 
to interconnection. In  another reversal of an FCC decision, the court ruled 
that AT&T must provide local interconnections for Execunet and sim ilar 
services.214 This opened up the entire long-distance m arket, public and 
private, to competition for the first time: AT&T’s protected exclusivity for 
long-distance public switched services was ended. The Court’s activist 
role not only paved the way for greater competition, it also questioned the 
legitimacy of AT&T’s monopoly: "... there may be good reasons for 
according AT&T de jure  freedom from competition in certain fields; 
however, one such reason is not simply that AT&T got there first.”215
Since the Execunet case, we see a move towards competitive 
principles in policy-making in both the FCC and the courts.
IV . The End o f a Monopoly: the Divestiture o f AT&T
By the 1970s, US public policy began to welcome competition and 
deregulation for the telecommunications industry. The rationale for a 
natural monopoly of the telephone industry was weakening significantly, 
and the direction for regulation of the telecommunications industry began 
to take a different turn. We now examine how the third anti-trust suit 
against AT&T culminated in the breaking-up of the world’s largest
213 MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 356 (D.C. Cir 1977).
214 M CI Telecommunications Corpv. FCC, 580 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir., 1978).
215 Ibid., at 380.
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corporation and the end of an era of government-endorsed monopoly in US 
telecommunications.
1. The 1974 Anti-trust Suit
In  November 1974, the DOJ filed an anti-trust suit in  the federal district 
court against AT&T, Western Electric and Bell Telephone Laboratories, 
Inc. (the Bell system) alleging that AT&T had used its monopoly power to 
exclude other m anufacturers from making customer equipment and to 
exclude long-distance competitors from interconnections. More 
specifically, the DOJ charged the defendants w ith three offenses: 
monopolization, attem pt to monopolize and conspiracy to monopolize the 
telecommunications services and equipment markets. There were two 
issues to the 1974 suit: that the equipment m arket should be open to 
competition due to its questionable natural monopoly status, and 
interconnection.
The 1974 DOJ challenge to the monopoly powers of AT&T was much 
more comprehensive than the 1949 one which ended with AT&T remaining 
a monopoly. The 1974 suit, which sought the divestiture of Western 
Electric and some or a ll of the Bell Operating Companies, would, in  1982, 
lead to the eventual break-up of AT&T. This marked the beginning of the 
liberalization and deregulation process of the entire US 
telecommunications industry.
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2. The Undermining of Telecoms Regulation as a Natural Monopoly
The examination of the 1974 anti-trust suit reveals four main issues. 
First, the attempt by AT&T to avert the success of the suit by roping in the 
help of Congress involved political mechanisms. Second, the case against 
AT&T was based on legal issues; namely, abuse of its monopoly position in  
the areas of equipment and long-distance telecommunications services (in 
particular regarding interconnection), cross-subsidization and anti­
competitive conduct. Third, institutional issues on the ability of the FCC 
to effectively monitor a monopoly in the public interest were raised by the 
DOJ. This issue was linked to the fourth issue, whether regulation of a 
monopoly or enforcement of anti-trust law was the better solution for the 
telecommunications sector.
(a) Political mechanisms
AT&T, as expected, resisted the process of deregulation at all costs. It 
denied all the charges made against it and determined to fight the case 
through the legal system. In  the six years before the tria l in  January 
1981, AT&T asked Congress to enter the debate after failing to win the 
support of the FCC or the Court of Appeals.21* The FCC, in the m id-1970s 
began taking an anti-protectionist stance on AT&T -  in  the Second 
Computer Inquiry, begun in 1976, it pointedly moved toward pro-
216 The Defense Department as usual supported AT&T by rejecting any break-up of the Bell 
system because of its potentially adverse impact on defense procurement.
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competitive d e r e g u la t io n .2 1 7  in 1979, the FCC Chairman and the Common 
Carrier Bureau Chief even suggested publicly that AT&T should be broken 
up .218 Congress during these years attempted to reform the 
Communications Act of 1934, but a consensus could not be reached and 
no changes were made to the law.
The size and complexity of the suit, in addition to the political issues 
surrounding it, seemed to jeopardize the chances of success. But when 
the case was reassigned to Judge Harold Greene in June 1978, following 
the death of the Judge originally in  charge, he laid down strict deadlines 
and implemented procedural devices to narrow the issues.
(b) Legal issues
The government’s case did not challenge the existence of AT&T’s monopoly 
but alleged that AT&T had used its monopoly to leverage its operations in  
the long-distance service and the equipment markets, thereby impeding 
competition. Technological innovations allowed for the growth in  
competitors in  the telecommunications long-distance and equipment 
markets and the government had been using regulation to allow 
competition to develop in  those m a r k e ts .219
The government introduced evidence that AT&T had monopolized 
both the long-distance telecoms market and the equipment m arket. The 
government contended that the Bell System used its leverage in  its
217 in the Matter o f Amendment o f Section 64.702 o f the Commission’s Rules and Regulations 
{Second Computer Inquiry), Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking, 61 FCC 2d 103 
(1976), and Final Decision, 77 FCC 2d 584 (1980).
218 Telecommunications Reports, Vol. 45, Nov. 12, 1979, 5 as cited in Horwitz (1989), p. 
238.
219 See Above 890, Carterfone, MCI and Specialized Common Carrier discussed above.
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monopoly control over the local exchanges to control the potentially 
competitive long-distance and manufacturing markets by cross­
subsidizing the competitive enterprises w ith revenues from the monopoly 
sectors and by using various forms of discrimination (particularly with 
regard to local exchange access).
(c) Failure of the FCC: regulation v anti-trust
The DOJ also introduced evidence that public u tility  regulation was 
incapable of preventing this anti-competitive conduct. The argument was 
that regulatory failure of the telecommunications industry as a monopoly 
necessitated the divestiture of AT&T. So central was this argument to the 
government’s case that it called former high-ranking FCC employees to 
testify that regulators were finding it difficult to supervise the Bell 
System’s m ix of monopoly and competitive (or potentially competitive) lines 
of business.220 In  essence, the underlying question was whether the 
problems were properly addressed by regulation, as AT&T claimed, or by 
an anti-trust solution, as the DOJ argued.221
In  the end, technological innovations that allowed for the growth in  
competitors in the telecommunications market, the inability of AT&T to 
meet the demand for services of large corporations, the change in the 
political climate towards regulation in favour of competition all contributed 
to the divestiture of AT&T and the idea that the time had arrived for the
220 Joseph Kearney, “From the Fall of the Bell System to the Telecommunications Act”, 50 
Hastings Law Journal (August 1999), p. 1395 at 1409.
221 See Stone (1997), pp. 91 and 95. J. Kearney (1999), p. 1409.
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deregulation of telecommunications. Legal and technological innovation 
eventually dismantled the Bell monopoly.222
3. The MFJ and the Break-up of AT&T
On 8 January 1982, AT&T agreed to a settlement of the anti-trust suit 
proposed by the DOJ. The consent decree223 that settled the case required 
break-up of the Bell system. In  August 1982, Judge Greene entered the 
Modification of Final Judgment (MFJ),224 which slightly modified the 
divestiture provisions voluntarily agreed by the parties.223 The MFJ also 
rescinded the 1956 Consent Decree that ended the 1949 anti-trust suit, 
and thereby lifted the constraints on AT&T to operate in non-common 
carrier markets. Thus, the MFJ allowed AT&T finally to enter other areas 
of telecommunications, such as broadcasting, the media and computers.
On 1 January 1984, the divestiture of AT&T came into effect and the 
Bell system came to an end. In  its place emerged the new AT&T which 
was made up of long-distance services, a manufacturing arm (Western 
Electric) and Bell Labs.223 These businesses AT&T managed to retain from  
its divestiture, while having to give up its 22 wholly owned local operating
222 Alan Reynolds, “For Whom the Feuding Bells Toll”, The Washington Times, 3 August 
2003, and also at http:/  / www.cato.org/research/articles/revnolds-030803.html. We recall 
that technological innovation lowers entry barriers and therefore the argument for potential 
competition and the crack in the natural monopoly theory.
223 Stipulation for Voluntary Dismissal, U.S. District Court, District of New Jersey, United 
States v. Western Electric, & AT&T, Civil Action No. 17-49, in Decision to Divest, Vol. 2, 900- 
923, 1294-1302.
224 United States v. AT&T, Modification of Final Judgement, 552 F.Supp. 131. (Hereinafter 
MFJ).
225 While substantially accepting the terms agreed to by AT&T and the DOJ, Judge Greene, 
in order to strengthen the financial viability of the local telephone companies, permitted 
them to provide, but not manufacture, customer premises telephone equipment and to 
publish the Yellow Pages. In  addition, he stipulated that AT&T would no longer be able to 
use the logo or name “Bell” (except in the case of Bell Telephone Laboratories).
226 Bell Labs is now called Lucent.
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companies (Bell Operating Companies or BOCs). After the divestiture, the 
22 independent BOCs were owned by seven regional holding companies, 
called Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs).227
The 22 BOCs (also known as ‘Baby Bells’) were allowed to retain  
monopolies in local m arkets,228 while competition was introduced in the 
long-distance market. The MFJ divided the country into 164 Local Access 
and Transport Areas (LATAs), and, subject to certain exceptions, allowed 
the BOCs to provide telecommunications services w ithin (intraLATA), but 
not between (interLATA) the LATAs.229 Basically, the BOCs were permitted 
to provide local telephone services and “long-distance” service within 
LATAs, but not between LATAs, and so barred from the long-distance 
m arket.
This approach of preventing these companies from combining 
monopoly and competitive telecommunications businesses was designed 
to ensure economic separation of the companies w ith the ability to impede 
competition (i.e. the BOCs, by virtue of their local monopolies) from the 
companies w ith the incentive to do so (i.e. Western Electric and AT&T 
Long-Distance Lines, by virtue of their participation in competitive or 
potentially competitive markets). However, it created a situation of 
‘asymmetric regulation’.
227 The seven RBOCs have since consolidated into four: Verizon (US’s largest telephone 
company), SBC Communications Inc., Qwest Communications International Inc., and Bell 
South Corp. The original seven RBOCs were NYNEX, Bell Atlantic, BellSouth, Ameritech, 
Southwestern Bell, US West, and Pacific Telesis.
228 The 1996 Act would later change this.
229 The LATAs were geographical areas in which the US was divided into after the 
divestiture of AT&T for the purposes of regulating the new telecommunications 
environment. The LATAs were generally centred around a city or other identifiable 
community of interest, and each one marked the boundaries within which operating- 
company subsidiaries of the RBOCs could provide telephone service.
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This by-product of the divestiture of AT&T owed its origin to the 
economic policies of W illiam  Baxter, the government’s anti-trust chief. He 
stipulated that the divestiture should be based on the division of assets 
into regulated businesses and competitive businesses. Those that fell on 
the regulated side included those involved in local telephone services, and 
the competitive side would include equipment, enhanced services, data 
processing and long-distance services.23** This distinction created the most 
controversial aspects of the AT&T settlement. The new companies (Baby 
Bells) were forbidden from manufacture or distribution of customer 
premises equipment (CPE) or other telecommunications products. In  
addition, for the same reason, they were excluded from the interexchange 
long-distance and information-service businesses. More generally, they 
were expected not to provide any other product or service, except local 
telephone service or local access, “that is not a natural monopoly service 
actually regulated by tariff.”231
The divestiture changed the regulatory structure of the 
telecommunications sector from a natural monopoly regulated by an 
independent regulator to ‘competitive’ markets managed by a judge. From 
1984 un til 1996, the US telecommunications industry was regulated by 
the MFJ which was administered by Judge Greene. The district court, not 
the FCC, was given the authority over the BOC’s entry into long-distance, 
manufacturing, and other businesses.232 As a result, they lobbied 
Congress and the executive branch for a decade seeking congressional 
legislation to allow them to enter the long-distance m arket. The end-
233 Stone (1997), p. 100.
231 Section II (D)(3) MFJ (1982).
232 Section V II MFJ (1982).
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product was the 1996 Telecommunications Act, the first relevant 
legislation since the 1934 Communications Act.
From 1984 until 1996, the FCC continued to regulate interstate 
telecommunications, including AT&T’s price and rates.233 Virtually every 
AT&T price change became a political issue. For example, if the proposed 
price seemed too high to the FCC or its competitors AT&T was accused of 
exercising its power as an oligopoly. If price was too low, AT&T risked 
accusations of predatory pricing. As Olufs observes:
Although the evidence suggests that AT&T did neither of these, the decision­
making process was subject to formal complaints and hearings. The FCC process 
was more quasi-legislative than quasi-judicial in nature, which opened the 
process to a wide variety of political interests.234
To summarize, the US telecommunications industry, after fifty years 
of legally endorsed monopoly, was transformed by the biggest break-up in 
corporate history.235 Widespread acceptance of the ideas of competition 
and deregulation propelled telecommunications politics to national 
attention.236 By the early 1990s these notions were the cornerstone of the 
economic policies of both US political parties. The Reagan years marked a
233 The FCC adopted the rate-of-retum  formula on AT&T, while leaving its competitors to go 
unregulated, because AT&T still dominated the long-distance market. In March 1989, the 
FCC abandoned rate-of-retum  regulation and adopted price caps. In the UK, the 
government chose to regulate BT, since its privatization in 1981, through price caps (RPI-X 
formula), rejecting the US style of rate-of-retum due to its numerous flaws. The UK was the 
first to introduce the RPI-X formula. The US has now adopted this formula. Alan Bell in 
Oftel News, Issue No. 62, November 2003, p. 10.
234 Olufs (1999), p. 66. Contrast this with the FCC’s practice of informal regulation of 
‘continuing surveillance’ through negotiations during the monopoly era.
235 See Stone (1997), Chapter 5.
236 Olufs (1999), pp. 67-68.
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change in accepted views of public administration and the civil service.237 
Reagan declared that “government is the problem”.233
Due to the dramatic development in technology over recent decades, 
particularly computers, digital technology and the Internet, the 
telecommunications landscape is no longer defined by a simple and clear 
division between common carrier, subject to natural monopoly regulation, 
and broadcaster, operating through competitive markets, while censored 
by the FCC. Regulation, as sanctioned by the 1934 Act, was not able to 
keep up with technological advances. The ‘convergence’ of 
telecommunications technology, the break-up of the Bell system and the 
increase in data telecommunications beyond plain voice traffic signalled 
the need to revise regulatory policy and to re-examine the rationale for 
regulation.
V. The Telecom m unications Act o f 1996
The 1996 Telecommunications Act is a modem response to this new era of 
telecommunications convergence and increased competition. President 
Clinton, signing the Act in 1996, declared that it was a “truly revolutionary 
legislation that will bring the future to our doorstep.”239 The goal of
237 Cf. Reagan’s era coincides with Margaret Thatcher’s time in government during which 
the UK government embarked on mass privatization of its infrastructures, including 
telecommunications.
233 Olufs (1999), p. 68.
239 President Bill Clinton, “Remarks by the President at the Signing Ceremony for the 
Telecommunications Act Conference Report”, 8 February 1996. It was the Clinton 
administration which led the way towards the era of information superhighway: the Nil 
initiative (‘National Information Infrastructure’). The N il was not simply about 
telecommunications deregulation -  the administration believed that the Internet would 
grow into a major commercial network and was in some ways a new form of commerce. 
The administration was primarily driven by the economic development goal, and they 
believed that new information technologies were the key to such growth. Olufs (1999), pp. 
68-9.
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Congress was to create a legislative change as dramatic as the evolution of 
the old-fashioned telephone, carrying voices over distant wires, into 
telecommunications, and the transmission of information, including data 
and video. With the 1996 Act, the monopolistic local telephone company 
is forced to share its market, while at the same time, being permitted into 
the competitive world of long-distance service and the potentially 
competitive video market. In the words of the FCC:
In the old regulatory regime, government encouraged monopolies. In the new 
regulatory regime, we and the states remove the outdated barriers that protect 
monopolies from competition and affirmatively promote efficient competition using 
tools forged by Congress.240
The question is what is meant by competition? One answer concerns 
the number of competitors while the other applies behaviour criteria such 
as rivalry in price and quality. Competition in the Clinton administration 
meant ‘managed competition’, in other words, the telecommunications 
industry was not to be completely deregulated, but re-regulated for the 
promotion of competition. The FCC was given more flexibility to decide 
where increased competition would be feasible. These new powers are 
contained in the 1996 Act provisions on forbearance and the promotion of 
competition.
Regulation of telecommunications today is to promote competition in  
this service industry, with the aim of bringing about greater efficiency in 
services and development that would ultimately serve the public interest.
240 In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996, Part II, Order, 61 Fed. Reg. 45, 476, 45, 479 (1996).
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1. Changes to the US Telecoms Framework: Regulation for the 
Promotion of Competition
The 1996 Act revoked the 1982 decree that settled the AT&T anti-trust 
suit,241 and government agencies, mainly the FCC, were ordered to make 
policies that would manage a transition to a more competitive industry. 
The 1996 Act was enacted to “promote competition and reduce regulation 
in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for American 
telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of 
new telecommunications technologies.”242 To achieve this objective, the 
1996 Act contains two key elements: deregulation and promotion of 
competition in the different telecommunications markets.
(a) Deregulation
The primary statutory mechanisms for deregulation are the FCC’s 
forbearance authority and the Biennial Review. Section 401 of the 1996 
Act amends the 1934 Communications Act by adding a new Section 10 
which contains the forbearance authority:
The Com m ission shall forbear from  applying any regulation or any provision o f the  
Act to a telecom m unications carrier or telecom m unications service [...] i f  the  
Com m ission determ ines th a t such regulation is not necessary to ensure th a t the 
charges, practices [...] in  connection w ith  th a t telecom m unications carrier or 
service are ju s t and reasonable and are not u n justly  or unreasonably 
discrim inatory [and] forbearance is consistent w ith  the public in terest.243
241 See Title VI of the Telecommunications Act 1996.
242 Preamble, Telecommunications Act 1996, Pub. LA. No. 104-104, 110 Stat.56 (1996).
243 47 U.S.C. 160
In making its decision, the Commission must consider whether 
forbearance will promote competitive market conditions.244 If  the 
Commission finds that forbearance will promote competition, that 
determination may be the basis for a finding that forbearance is in the 
public interest.245 The 1996 Act stops short of full deregulation by giving 
power to the FCC to make a discretionary decision when not to apply a 
regulation in the public interest. The regulation is still there, but the FCC 
can hold back from enforcing it if  the public interest is thereby served.
Further deregulatory reform was introduced into legislation by 
Section 402(a) of the 1996 Act that added Section 11 on Biennial review to 
the 1934 Communications Act. Under this new provision, the Commission 
is required to review, in every even-numbered year beginning in 1998, all 
regulations issued under the Act and has to determine whether it is no 
longer necessary in the pubic interest as the result of meaningful 
economic competition between providers of service.246 The Commission 
must repeal or modify any regulation it determines to be no longer in the 
public interest.247 Forbearance and the biennial review process are 
“critical components of Congress’s vision of a pro-competitive, deregulatory 
telecommunications marketplace.”246
244 Ibid.
245 Ibid.
246 47 U.S.C. 161
247 Ibid.
248 Kathleen Abernathy, “My View from the Doorstep of FCC Change", 54(2) Federal 
Communications Law Journal (March 2002), p. 199 at 211.
91
(b) Promotion of competition
On the promotion of competition, the 1996 Act added Part II, 
“Development of Competitive Markets”, to Title II to the 1934 
Communications Act.249 This new Part contains provisions on 
interconnection, resale, removal of barriers to entry, and requirements for 
unbundling the local loop250 as part of the legislative undertaking to 
promote competition in the telecommunications sector.
Section 251 of the amended 1934 Communications Act establishes a 
general duty for all telecommunications carriers to interconnect with the 
facilities and equipment of other telecommunications carriers.251 More 
specifically, it imposes a broad duty on incumbent local exchange carriers 
(ILECs -  the Baby Bells’) to provide any requesting telecommunications 
carrier “non-discriminatory access to network elements on an unbundled 
basis at any technically feasible point on rates, terms and conditions that 
are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory”,252 technically known as local 
loop unbundling’ (LLU). It is important to note that this concept has been 
exported by the US and imported into the WTO framework on basic 
telecommunications as Section 2.2 of the Reference Paper.255
249 Section 101(a) Telecommunications Act 1996.
250 Local loops are the wires that run from telephone exchanges into homes and offices. 
Local loop unbundling (LLU) is the process whereby incumbent telephone operators share 
their networks with rival companies seeking to provide telecommunications services. By 
allowing competitors to lease or resell lines, at least until competing networks have been 
constructed, regulators have been able to foster competition in both telephony and 
broadband access. The US local loop unbundling regime is known as UNE-P (Unbundled 
Network Element Platform).
251 Section 251(a) Communications Act 1934 as amended.
252 Section 251(c)(3) Communications Act 1934 as amended.
253 See Chapter 4.
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The irony of LLU is that, although it is often described as 
deregulation, it actually means more regulation. In order to tackle the 
continued dominance and monopolies of the ILECs, regulators force 
incumbents to share their networks with rival companies, thus requiring 
close and continuing regulatory oversight to ensure that incumbents play 
fair, set reasonable rates and act quickly when problems a r is e .2 5 4  
Nonetheless, access to the local loop by competitors is vital to the 
immediate introduction of competition to telecommunications, as costs of 
entry through network facilities building are enormously expensive for new 
entrants. LLU is a prime example of regulation to promote competition.
Section 251 of the amended 1934 Act is the first formal adoption, at 
the national level, of an aggressive competition policy in local-exchange 
services. It terminates the monopoly of local telephone companies 
permitted by the MFJ. It also allows cable television firms to compete with 
traditional local telephone companies.
In addition to opening up the local market to competition, the 1996 
Act for the first time permits the BOCs to enter the long-distance 
market.255 As the goal of the 1996 Act is to make the US 
telecommunications industry wholly competitive, once the bottleneck is 
eliminated through the opening of the local exchange, the theory is that 
there will be no further need to exclude the BOCs from entering new 
businesses like long-distance services. Once the bottleneck is eliminated 
there will be no danger that the local exchange service provider can
254 The Economist, “Beyond the Bubble: A Survey of Telecoms', 11 October 2003, p . 19.
255 Section 151(a) of the 1996 Act; Section 271 of the 1934 Act as amended.
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leverage monopoly power emanating from control of the local exchange.256 
However, there is a 14-point ‘competitive checklist’ that the BOCs must 
satisfy before they may compete in the long-distance market.257 In March 
2003, Verizon became the second RBOC to obtain authorization to provide 
long-distance services throughout its region.255 Verizon, and any BOC 
approved to enter the long-distance market must, however, continue to 
comply with Section 271 checklist requirements; the FCC can ensure 
compliance through such methods as imposing penalties or suspending 
approval.25* In September 2003, the FCC further approved a BOC’s entry 
into long-distance services by authorizing SBC to provide in-region, inter- 
LATA service in Michigan.266
2. The 1996 Act: the Flaws
The implementation of the 1996 Act, through deregulation and effective 
competition, has proved difficult for the FCC, and its benefits have not 
been as rapidly seen as the lawmakers had hoped. Some have pointed out 
that the failure to achieve effective competition lies in the flaws inherent in 
the 1996 Act itself.261 The 1996 Act suffers from the same shortcoming as 
the original 1934 Act: the legislations were adopted “in the public
256 Kathleen Wallman, “A Birthday Party: The Terrible or Terrific Two’s? 1996 Federal 
Telecommunications Act”, 51(1) Federal Communications Law Journal (December 1998), p. 
229.
257 Section 271 Communications Act 1934 as amended.
258 FCC News, 19 March 2003, available at http:/  / www.fcc.gov.
259 Section 271 (d)(6) Communications Act 1934 as amended.
260 FCC News, 17 September 2003, available at http: /  / www.fcc.eov.
261 Aimee Adler, “Competition in Telephony: Perception or Reality? Current Barriers to the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996”, 7 Journal o f Law and Policy (1999), p. 571 at 584 and 
624; Randolph May, “The Pubic Interest Standard: Is It too Indeterminate to Be 
Constitutional?” 53(3) Federal Communications Law Journal (2001), pp. 427-468.
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interest”.262 The 1934 Act was adopted in the public interest to correct a 
market failure -  the telephone industry was a natural monopoly. The 
1996 Act, on the other hand, was enacted in the public interest to address 
the issue that the telecommunications industry was no longer a natural 
monopoly but needed to be deregulated and competition promoted. The 
public interest standard continues to permeate throughout the new Act. 
The public interest standard is, however, vague, indeterminate and 
depends on the public policy of the time.
This has, for instance, resulted in few of the provisions of the 1996 
Act reflecting, strictly speaking, precise policies.2** Most of them require 
the FCC to make new rules, often without precise legislative direction 
except that they must be “in the public interest”. For instance, the Act 
requires the FCC to establish a new regulatory framework to promote local 
services competition, stating:
W ithin 6 months a fter the date of enactm ent of the Telecom m unications Act of 
1996, the Com m ission shall complete a ll actions necessary to establish  
regulations to im plem ent the requirem ents of [Section 2 5 1].264
This implementation of the controversial local loop unbundling 
regime has been of particular problem. The FCC’s efforts to implement the 
regime have led to legal challenges by incumbents trying to slow down the 
unbundling process, having twice reached the Supreme Court. Moreover, 
by 2003, the US LLU policy was still not implemented, further made 
difficult by disagreements between Chairman Powell and Commissioner
262 R. May (2001), pp. 447-452; and see beginning of Section II above and supra, n. 56.
263 Olufs (1999), p. 92.
264 Section 251(d)(1) 1934 Act as amended. Emphasis added.
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Kevin Martin on the best p o lic ie s .2** The FCC nonetheless managed to 
adopt new rules on LLU in February 2003.266 However, this new Order 
gave a substantial role to the state commissions in regulating LLU, and 
once again the FCC’s efforts, challenged by the Baby Bells, were struck 
down by the Court of Appeals in March 2004.267 These two elements, state 
utility commissions intervention and federal court rulings, were what 
policy-makers were hoping to lessen by the new 1996 Act. The continued 
division of roles between state and federal regulators, a hazard of the US 
federal system, remains a weakness in US telecommunications regulation.
In December 2004, the FCC adopted new rules to implement the LLU 
regime, directly responding to the Court of Appeals’ decision.2** The FCC 
must hope that the legal challenge to its LLU rules stops here.
V I. US Policies on the Global Liberalization o f 
Telecom m unications
Despite flaws in the 1996 Act as a regulatory framework for 
telecommunications, the US has exported strong principles of 
telecommunications regulation - namely competitive safeguards, non­
discrimination, transparency, reasonable terms, conditions and rates, 
interconnection and unbundled access - into the WTO framework, and has
265 See The Economist, “When stars collide”, 13 February 2003, and “The FCC presses auto- 
destruct”, 27 February 2003, at http: /  / www.economist.com: FCC News, “FCC Adopts New 
Rules for Network Unbundling”, 20 February 2003, at http: /  / www.fcc.gov.
266 FCC News, 20 February 2003.
267 See FCC News, “FCC Adopts New Rules for Network Unbundling Obligations of 
Incumbent Local Phone Carriers”, 15 December 2004.
2m ibid.
96
similar policies on the liberalization of international telecommunications 
services.269
As the landscape continued to change dramatically, after the end of 
AT&T’s monopoly era, US policies shifted from a purely domestic focus to 
issues of competition from foreign entrants and international 
telecommunications services. This section examines the new playing field 
in US telecommunications with the following themes in mind. First, 
competition since the 1984 divestiture occurred initially among new 
domestic entrants in the recently opened markets. For example, in long­
distance, competitors to AT&T wasted no time in setting up and offering 
competing networks and services, and competing firms could now enter 
the local services market. Furthermore, there has been an increase in the 
number of firms providing international telecommunications services.276 
As competition began to expand the US telecoms market and make it 
profitable, it became attractive to foreign companies, in particular those 
offering international telecommunications services.
Second, as the US telecommunications sector became more 
competitive many firms competed fiercely against one another, making it 
more difficult for them to survive. These firms needed to expand abroad 
and search for other specialization in order to evolve and stay alive in the 
new and highly competitive market. AT&T, for one, began expanding
269 International telecommunications services are telecommunications services provided 
between countries, i.e. originating from one country and terminating in another country. 
International telecommunications services are provided either on a facilities-based or pure 
resale basis.
270 In 1997, 52 international carriers reported providing facilities-based services, and 318 
carriers reported offering international services on a resale basis, up from 230 in 1995. 
WTO, US TPR, Report by the Secretariat, 1 June 1999, para. 43.
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overseas and specializing in data communications services and the 
Internet.
The third theme is the WTO. The WTO is central to the movement to 
secure the liberalization of trade and favourable conditions abroad. With 
the US telecommunications market for the most part liberalized, and US 
telecoms firms seeking to find comparative advantages in markets abroad, 
the US government turned its attention to extending liberalization beyond 
its shores. To expand trade in telecommunications services and ensure 
US firms could participate on an equal level playing field with dominant 
incumbent providers in foreign markets, the US sought binding 
liberalization commitments by governments through multilateral 
frameworks like the WTO. For instance, although telecommunications 
liberalization was taking place in most other developed countries towards 
the end of the 1980s and throughout the 1990s, many, predominantly 
developing countries, still maintained state-owned telecommunications 
providers, which had control of their domestic markets.271 Even if the 
domestic market might be experiencing competition from other domestic 
providers of telecommunications services this did not mean the market 
was open to foreign carriers. The opening of domestic markets to foreign 
participants became a US objective, to be achieved through clear and 
binding multilateral rules.
The second and third themes are the subjects of Chapters 3 and 4. 
In this section we discuss US regulatory policies on international 
telecommunications services and the opening up of the US market to 
foreign providers of telecoms services. The US sees its policies as
271 India’s biggest provider, BSNL, is today still 100% state-owned.
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furthering its traditional leadership role in promoting trade liberalization 
and developing a system of benefit to all.272 Consequently, US domestic 
policies on telecommunications liberalization often have extraterritorial 
effects.273
Tbe FCC liberalized and promoted competition in trade in 
telecommunications services in four main ways. First, the FCC 
encouraged competition in international services among domestic 
suppliers through deregulation of its Section 214 authorization 
requirement (International Competitive Carrier policies). Second, as 
competition increased in the international services market, the FCC 
applied the same deregulatory policies to non-dominant foreign telecoms 
carriers entering the US to provide international services. Third, the FCC 
determined the nature of other countries’ telecommunications markets 
through application of its domestic standard on entry of foreign carriers 
into the US market (ECO test), and forbade the entry of foreign suppliers 
whose country of origin did not provide ‘effective market access’ to other 
foreign entrants. Fourth, the FCC influenced foreign countries’ rates for 
international services through setting benchmarks (maximum rates) for 
which US domestic operators are allowed to agree to in their settlement 
rates agreements with other countries’ operators as part of the 
international accounting rate system (Benchmark Order 1997).
272 The US aims to achieve this through “global, regional, and bilateral trade agreements; 
encouraging developing countries’ multilateral integration; building support for open trade; 
encouraging sustainable development and core labor standards; and fostering greater 
transparency*. WTO, US TPR: Report by the Government, W T/TPR /G /88, 20 August 2001, 
p. 23.
273 See the FCC’s Market Entry Order 1995 and the Bench Mark Order 1997, below 
Sections V I.3 and VI.5.
99
The relevance of these FCC procedures to the international aspect of 
telecoms liberalization was the significant effect US domestic policies had 
on the negotiations of the GATT and the WTO to obtain greater 
liberalization commitments from other WTO member countries.
1. Regulation of Foreign Carriers in the US Telecoms Sector
The two legal bases for FCC regulation of foreign carrier provision of 
telecommunications services in the US telecommunications market are 
Sections 214 and 310 of the Communications Act 1934. Section 214, the 
US licensing provision for common carriers, deals equally with domestic 
and foreign carriers. It states that no carrier - including foreign carriers 
wishing to provide telecommunications services in the US - can construct 
new lines or extend existing lines, or acquire or operate any line, without 
first obtaining authorization from the FCC.274 The FCC must find that 
granting such a license would serve the “public convenience and 
necessity.”275
The 1996 Act did not make changes to Section 214. Nonetheless, in 
1999, the FCC has modified its rules to grant blanket entry certificate to 
all domestic carriers to provide,
domestic, in terstate services to any domestic point and to construct, acquire, or 
operate any domestic transm ission line as long as it  obtains a ll necessary 
authorizations from  the Com m ission for use of radio frequencies.276
274 Discontinuance of services also requires FCC approval. Section 214(a), 1934 Act (47 
U.S.C. 214).
275 Section 214(a) Communications Act 1934.
276 In the Matters o f Implementation o f Section 402(b)(2)(A) of the Telecommunications Act of 
1996: Forbearance o f the Independent Telephone & Telecommunications Alliance, Report and 
Order, CC Dkt. No. 97-11, Second Memorandum Opinion and Order in AAD File No. 98-43, 
released June 30, 1999, Appendix B Final Rules. The FCC has chosen to confer blanket 
authority instead of using its power of forbearance from exercising its Section 214 
jurisdiction.
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These deregulatoiy provisions do not, however, apply to foreign 
carriers or to international services. Nonetheless, the FCC could use its 
forbearance authority under Sections 10 and 11 of the amended 
Communications Act to its regulation of international services and foreign 
carriers wishing to enter the US market. It could promote competition in 
the US telecoms market through finding that forbearing from restricting 
entry of foreign carriers would promote competitive conditions in the US 
telecommunications market.
The other provision the FCC uses to control entry of foreign carriers 
into the US domestic market is Section 310 of the Communications Act of 
1934 which deals solely with foreign carriers. Section 310(b) prevents a 
carrier that is more than 20 per cent foreign-owned, or a carrier affiliated 
with a carrier that is more than 25 per cent foreign, from holding a 
broadcast or common carrier radio license in the US. Section 310 does 
not apply to wire line,277 or to non-common carrier (satellite systems) 
services. Section 310 contains the only restrictions on foreign investment 
in the Communications Act.278 There are no prohibitions on foreign 
entities from investing in companies that hold Section 214 
authorizations.279 The 1996 Act thus provides for substantial domestic 
liberalization of services and allows entry of foreign carriers to many areas 
of business, but maintains some restrictions on direct foreign ownership, 
as well as discretionary power regarding indirect foreign ownership.
277 For example, fibre optic cable, cable television, telephone lines.
278 WTO, NGBT, US Response to Questionnaire, S /N G B T/W /3/A dd .l3 , 21 October 1994, 
para. 6.
279 Such foreign entities may operate on a resale basis, build their own non-radio facilities 
or operate a mixture of the two.
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2. Introducing Competition into the International Telecommunications 
Market: the International Competitive Carrier Policies
The FCC’s first major attempt to promote competition in international 
telecommunications was in 1985 in the form of the International 
Competitive Carrier Policies.280 The ICC Policies were an extension into 
international telecommunications services of the Competitive Carrier 
proceeding, consisting of six reports and orders over five years,281 which 
dealt with the loosening of regulation of non-dominant carriers (carriers 
without market power) in the US market. The FCC initiated the 
Competitive Carrier proceeding in 1979 in the aftermath of a number of 
Commission decisions, discussed above, which permitted entry into the 
domestic market by new service providers, and led to the deregulation of 
US telecommunications and the divestiture of AT&T.282
The importance of the Competitive Carrier line of decisions is in the 
finding by the FCC that, in a competitive environment, market forces could 
protect the public against unreasonable high rates and undue 
discrimination.283 That is, marketplace forces could replace regulation.
280 In the Matter o f International Competitive Carrier Policies, Report and Order, CC Dkt. No. 
85-107, 102 FCC 2d 812 (1985); In the Matter o f International Competitive Carrier Policies, 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CC Dkt. No. 85-107, 100 FCC 2d 1270 (1985). (Hereinafter 
ICC Policies).
281 These reports and orders are collectively known as the Competitive Carrier Rulemaking: 
First Report and Order, 85 FCC 2d 1 (1980); Second Report and Order, 91 FCC 2d 59 
(1982), recon. FCC No. 83-69, released March 21, 1983; Third Report and Order, Mimeo No. 
012, released October 6, 1983, 48 Fed. Reg. 46, 791 (October 15, 1983); Fourth Report and 
Order, 95 FCC 2d 554 (1983); Fifth Report and Order, FCC No. 84-394, released August 27, 
1984, 49 Fed. Reg. 34824, September 4, 1984; Sixth Report and Order, FCC No. 84-566, 
released January 4, 1985, 50 Fed. Reg. 1215 (January 10, 1985).
282 See Section III.2 .
283 ICC Policies, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CC Docket No. 85-107 (1985), para. 3.
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Less regulation, moreover, allows carriers to respond to consumer desires 
at the lowest price on a timely basis.284
In the context of the liberalization of telecommunications services, 
the Competitive Carrier decisions illustrate that the process began in the 
US as early as 1980 while most developed countries’ telecommunications 
were still monopolies. With each Report and Order on competitive 
carriers, the FCC in the early 1980s introduced deregulatory policies and 
progressive competition to US domestic telecoms. This gave the US 
experience, which it later brought to the negotiating tables of the GATT 
and WTO.
The FCC’s Competitive Carrier decisions created two classes of 
carriers for interstate and international long-distance services: “dominant” 
and “non-dominant”.285 The FCC classified dominant carriers as those 
that have “market power” -  the ability to affect price or availability of 
service.288 The FCC in determining “dominant” status considered a 
number of factors, including market share, control of bottleneck facilities, 
rate of return, and actual or potential competition.287 The FCC classified 
as dominant AT&T, the Baby Bells, Comsat and telephone companies in 
US “offshore points”, such as the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. Carriers 
that were found to be dominant were subject to the full panoply of 
regulatory rules because market forces could not be expected to exert the 
necessary restraint on carrier facility decisions and pricing practices.288 
Dominant domestic carriers are required to file cost-supported tariffs (for
284 Ibid., para. 9.
285 Cf. the EC’s equivalent of operators with ‘significant market power’ (SMP) and the WTO 
Reference Paper’s ‘major supplier’.
286 Competitive Carrier Rulemaking, First Report and Order (1980), 85 FCC 2d 1.
287 ICC Policies, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (1985), para. 32.
288 Competitive Carrier Rulemaking, First Report and Order (1980).
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their service) on 45 days advance notice. The FCC must authorize 
dominant carriers, acquisition of transmission capacity.
Non-dominant carriers, on the other hand, did not have market 
power or the ability to set price. Therefore, the FCC reasoned, regulation 
of these carriers could be streamlined.2®9 it followed that the FCC no 
longer required non-dominant domestic carriers to obtain specific 
authorization to construct new or additional lines. Because AT&T was 
subject to strong competition in its business services, the FCC has 
streamlined its regulation of those services and treats AT&T as a non­
dominant carrier for business services. Tariffs of non-dominant carriers 
are presumed lawful, need not be cost-supported, and only require 14 
days advance notice.290
In 1985, the FCC decided that the time was ripe to reconsider the 
regulation of international services market and that there were adequate 
reasons for reducing regulation for some international service providers. 
The FCC applied the dominant/non-dominant distinction to the 
international services market with the adoption of the International 
Competitive Carrier Policies, which streamlined its regulation of non­
dominant international carriers.291 They reasoned that firms lacking 
market power do not have the ability to maintain prices unreasonably
2»9 Ibid., p. 20.
290 To recall, the FCC, in 1999, finally deregulated entry requirement for all domestic 
interstate carriers. See Section VI. 1.
291 Report and Order, 102 FCC 2d 812 (1985).
In this context, ‘international carriers’ are US (domestic) carriers providing international 
telecoms services - distinct from foreign-owned carriers providing international services, 
which were still subject to full S. 214 regulation. See 102 FCC 2d 812, 842 (1985).
In 1992, the FCC, in a deregulatory move, modified this policy to regulate international 
carriers - US and foreign-owned - “as dominant only on those routes where their foreign 
affiliates has the ability to discriminate unaffiliated US international carriers through 
control of bottleneck services and facilities in the foreign market." Regulation of 
International Common Carrier Services, CC Dkt. No. 91-360, 7 FCC Red 7331 (1992).
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above or below cost. Thus, non-dominant international carriers were 
required only to obtain an initial authorization under Section 214 and 
thereafter could add or discontinue circuits on a route without prior 
specific authorization.
In the ICC Policies, the FCC analyzed the international services 
market and concluded that there were two separate and distinct product 
markets: IMTS (international message telephone services -  basically 
international voice telephony) and non-IMTS (e.g. telex, telegram, high and 
low speed data, private line and video). The FCC concluded that due to 
the limitations of carriers to freely provide international services to a given 
country and difficulties in shifting facilities to serving one country to 
serving another, there were substantial restraints which lim it the provision 
of international service to a country-by-country basis.292 Each country 
was a separate geographic market - unlike domestic services which 
operate in a single market.293
Having found that each nation constitutes a separate geographic 
market and that the product markets are defined as IMTS and non-IMTS, 
the FCC considered whether any firm was dominant in a given market. 
The FCC used the traditional anti-trust analysis in terms of “the power to 
control prices or exclude competition”,294 and used its analysis in the 
Competitive Carrier decisions for the international services market to 
determine dominance. A finding of dominance for any firm would lead the 
FCC to conclude that the marketplace would not ensure either that 
services would be priced competitively or that operators would employ
292 icc , Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (1985), para. 29.
293 ibid.
294 icc, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (1985), para. 31.
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practices consistent with the Communications Act. Consequently, the 
FCC concluded that a finding of dominance would justify the continued 
application of full regulation under Title II (Common Carrier) of the 1934 
Act. In addition, all carriers providing non-IMTS were deemed by the FCC 
to be non-dominant and subject to stream-lined regulation.295 The
importance of the ICC Policies to the WTO context lies in its analysis of 
dominant and non-dominant suppliers and the effects such categorization 
have on determining the nature of foreign domestic markets.
The ICC Policies, however, covered only the regulation of domestic 
international service providers, and not foreign providers wishing to enter 
the US market to provide international services. No clear rules or 
standards existed in this area, until the FCC adopted the controversial 
ECO test in 1995.
3. The ECO Test (Market Entry Order)
In November 1995, the FCC issued the Market Entry Order296 and adopted 
the effective competitive opportunities (ECO) test, which became effective 
in January 1996, as the standard for regulation of entry of foreign carriers 
into the US international telecommunications services market. The 
significance of the FCC policy in the Market Entry Order is in its 
extraterritorial effect.
295 Ibid., para. 49.
296 Market Entry and Regulation of Foreign-Affiliated Entities, IB Docket No. 95-22, Report 
and Order, 11 FCC Red. 3873 (1995). (Hereinafter “Market Entry Order”).
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(a) Application of the ECO test and criteria to be met
The FCC created a two-step *barrier’ process for foreign carrier entry 
application in the Market Entry Order. In addition to obtaining a Section 
214 authorization from the FCC, a foreign carrier must now first pass the 
ECO test before it is given authorization to enter the US international 
telecoms services market, either directly or through an “affiliation” with 
either a US facilities-based or resale carrier.297 The ECO test is specifically 
applied in cases of foreign applicants with market power in the destination 
market.29* There are a number of criteria to satisfy before a foreign carrier 
can pass this new standard.
First, there must be effective market access in the primary market, or 
markets, of the foreign carrier seeking entry.299 The FCC defines effective 
market access as the ability of US carriers to provide basic, international 
facilities-based telecommunications services in these markets,*" and the
297 In general, for the purposes of applying the ECO test under Section 214 of the Act, the 
FCC considers an applicant to be affiliated with a foreign carrier when a foreign carrier 
owns a greater than 25 percent interest in, or controls, the applicant. Market Entry Order, 
para. 4.
298 Market Entry Order, para. 19. It applies to applications for international facilities- 
based, switched resale, and non-interconnected private line resale under Section 214. The 
ECO test is also applied to common carrier radio applicants or licensees that seek to 
exceed the 25 per cent indirect foreign ownership benchmark contained in Section 
310(b)(4).
299 Market Entry Order, para. 23.
3" ibid.
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FCC will consider six factors it believes to be indicative of effective market 
access.301
Second, the FCC would assess other public interest factors relevant 
to entry of a foreign carrier in the US international market.302 These “other 
public interest factors” include the general significance of the proposed 
entiy to the promotion of competition in the US communications market, 
and any national security, law enforcement, foreign policy and trade 
concerns raised by the Executive Branch.303 In addition, the presence of 
cost-based accounting rates is one of the factors the FCC must consider as 
part of the ECO analysis of foreign applicants.304 According to the FCC, 
there may be occasions when the public interest requires that these 
additional factors override an ECO determination to allow or deny entry.303
(b) Why adopt the ECO test standard?
So why did the FCC adopt the ECO test standard for regulating the entiy 
of foreign carriers into the US telecommunications market? The primary 
purpose emphasized by the FCC was “to promote effective competition in 
the US telecommunications services market, particularly the market for
301 These factors are: “(1) Whether US carriers can offer in the foreign country international 
facilities-based services substantially similar to those that the foreign carrier seeks to offer 
in the United States; (2) whether competitive safeguards exist in the foreign country to 
protect against anti-competitive and discriminatory practices, including cost-allocation 
rules to prevent cross-subsidization; (3) the availability of published, nondiscriminatory 
charges, terms and conditions for interconnection to foreign domestic carriers’ facilities for 
termination and origination of international services; (4) timely and nondiscriminatory 
disclosure of technical information needed to use or interconnect with carriers’ facilities; (5) 
the protection of carrier and customer proprietary information; and (6) whether an 
independent regulatory body with fair and transparent procedures is established to enforce 
competitive safeguards." Market Entry Order, para. 40
302 Market Entry Order, para. 56.
303 Market Entry Order, para. 62.
304 Ibid.
303 Ibid.
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international telecommunications services.”306 The Commission therefore 
adopted rules that were intended to constrain the market power of foreign- 
affiliated carriers that control bottleneck facilities in the destination 
market. Through the ECO test, the FCC hoped to accomplish its three 
goals for regulation of international telecommunications services: 1) to 
promote effective competition in the US telecommunications service 
market; 2) to prevent anti-competitive conduct in the provision of 
international services or facilities; and 3) to encourage foreign 
governments to open their telecommunications markets.307
The important question is what was the real reason for the adoption 
of the ECO test? One argument is that the extended negotiations in the 
WTO on basic telecommunications that were taking place at the same time 
as the process for adopting the Market Entry Order had an influence. The 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for the ECO test was released in 1995 - 
about a year after the extended negotiations on basic telecoms commenced 
in the WTO.308 The Order itself was then released in November 1995. 
These were significant periods in the WTO negotiations on basic telecoms. 
By September 1995 (over a year since the negotiations began) only 8 draft 
offers on basic telecoms had been tabled (US among them) out of 27 
participants in the Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications 
(NGBT). 27 participants out of more than 130 WTO Members at that time 
was a small number. The ECO Test Order could have been an indication 
that the US was frustrated by the lack of commitment by other WTO 
Member States to the liberalization of telecommunications.
306 Market Entry Order, para. 8.
307 Market Entry Order, para. 6.
308 See Chapter 4.
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Even by November 1995, five months before the NGBT was scheduled 
to conclude, only 14 draft offers had been received. The US, through the 
FCC, may have adopted the ECO test to encourage or exert pressure on 
foreign governments to adopt multilateral commitments to promote 
competition in their respective telecoms markets.399 in any case, by the 
end of the NGBT in April 1996, a total of 34 draft offers were tabled, an 
increase of more than 100% since November 1995. The US’s unilateral
efforts had paid off. 310
An alternative perspective was that the US wanted to transplant into 
WTO law its domestic regulatory framework on telecommunications. In 
particular, the Market Entry Order contained the regulatory principles of 
“reasonable and non-discriminatory charges, terms and conditions for 
interconnection”, “the existence of competitive safeguards”, and “the 
existence of an effective regulatory framework.” In fact, these principles 
constituted the ECO test.311 The same principles are also found in the US 
paper to the WTO entitled “Pro-competitive Regulatory and Other 
Measures for Effective Market Access in Basic Telecommunications 
Services”3^  which was presented to the NGBT in February 1995 and 
became the ‘prototype’ for the Reference Paper. This was not coincidence.
309 Some commented that the ECO test was issued to improve the US’s negotiating position 
in the NGBT. The FCC itself stated in its Order: “If  the Executive Branch succeeds in 
negotiating greater market access for U.S. carriers in exchange for still greater liberalization 
of the U.S. basic telecommunications market, then we would gladly amend the rules we 
adopt today as necessary.” Market Entry Order at 3965, para. 240.
310 In January 1996, only 17 per cent of the world’s top 20 telecommunications markets 
were open to US companies (see below Foreign Participation Order 1997, para. 7). The US 
hoped that this would improve dramatically with the entering into force of the ABT together 
with the FCC’s international policies incorporated in the International Settlement Rates 
Order and the Foreign Participation Order (see below).
311 See Market Entry Order 1995, paras. 46-55, and supra n. 301.
312 WTO, NGBT, Comrrmnication from the United States, S /N G B T/W /5, 9 February 1995.
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(c) Criticisms of the ECO Test
Foreign carriers and foreign governments, however, saw the ECO test as a 
barrier to market access. They thus made elimination of the ECO test a 
major objective of the WTO negotiations on basic telecoms. One 
commentator argues that the ECO test is significantly flawed for three 
reasons: 1) the FCC’s authority to perform such an analysis is unclear; 2) 
the analysis causes the FCC to inappropriately interfere with US trade 
policy; 3) the results are likely to have a chilling effect on the flow of 
investment capital into the US telecommunications market, which would 
be harmful to the public interest.313
The first criticism is shared by many foreign government 
commentators. The FCC, however, argued that it had jurisdiction to adopt 
the ECO test under Section 214 and Section 310(b)(4) of the 1934 Act:
The fact that Congress did not require us to consider specifically the openness of 
foreign markets under Section 214 in no way implies that this factor is not 
relevant under the broader concept of the public interest, convenience and 
necessity.314
On the second point, the FCC also rejected arguments that it was 
engaging in trade issues outside its mandate. It insisted that the Order is,
fully consistent, not only with [its] responsibility to promote the US public interest, 
but also with the responsibility of the Executive Branch to formulate and execute 
US international trade policy.315
313 Eric Schmidt, “International Telecommunications Transactions: a Critique of the FCC’s 
‘Effective Competitive Opportunities’ Analysis", 7 Duke Journal o f Comparative and 
International Law  (Spring 1997), p. 629 at 629. See also Market Entry Order, paras. 220- 
244.
314 Market Entry Order, para. 227.
315 Ibid. para. 239. Emphasis added.
I l l
On the third point, accusations have been made that the ECO test 
was in substance a reciprocity requirement. Reciprocity, in trade policy, 
implies opening domestic markets only on condition that trade partners 
open theirs. This is against the spirit of open trade and could have the 
effect of chilling trade in telecommunications services. The FCC, however, 
denied this. In addition, the WTO Secretariat in its Report on the Trade 
Policy Review of the United States stated that the overall picture of reform 
in the US, mainly through adoption of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, 
was positive despite the concerns expressed by other countries with regard 
to reciprocity considerations.316 However, the Secretariat did stress that 
excessive restrictions on dominant carriers, abilities to expand their 
services could lead to inefficiencies and that artificial barriers to entry 
must be used in a careful and selective manner so that they do not 
prevent competition. The Report concluded that the US had been applying 
such policies in “a careful and transparent manner.”317
To summarize, the FCC adopted the ECO test as standards to ensure 
the promotion of effective competition in the US market for international 
services. This policy sought to influence the global liberalization of 
telecommunications services through extraterritorial application of its 
domestic policies. A new Order regulating foreign carrier entry into the US 
market was however adopted two years later, after the successful 
conclusion of the WTO negotiations on basic telecommunications.
316 WTO, US TPR, Report by the Secretariat, W T/TPR /S /16, 21 October 1996, p. 158, para. 
CVII.
317 ibid.
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4. The Foreign Participation Order 1997
The FCC adopted the Foreign Participation O rders Gn 25 November 1997 
to take into account developments on basic telecommunications in the 
WTO. It implemented the US commitments in the WTO Agreement on 
Basic Telecommunications (ABT). This Order adopted a new standard for 
foreign telecommunications carriers wishing to enter the US market. 
Effectively it abolished the ECO test for applicants from WTO Member 
countries and adopted an open entry standard for such applicants.31*1 The 
open entry standard consists of a presumption that a license should be 
granted to a carrier from another WTO Member State unless it is shown 
that this carrier poses a high risk to competition in the US.320
In adopting this change the FCC reasoned that the commitments 
made in the ABT, an increasingly competitive environment and the FCC’s 
improved regulatory tools would enable the FCC to adopt a deregulatory 
approach that presumed entry was in the public interest.321 The FCC 
places confidence in safeguard measures, their own and those of their 
trading partners within the WTO framework, to act as sufficient protection 
against the danger of anti-competitive behaviour resulting from foreign 
entry into the US market. It was therefore unnecessary to maintain the 
ECO test as a public interest standard for entry of foreign carriers from 
WTO Member countries.
318 Rules and Policies on Foreign Participation in the US Telecommunications Market, IB 
Docket Nos. 97-142 and 95-22, Report and Order and Order on Reconsideration, 12 FCC 
Red. 23 (1997). (Hereinafter “FPO”).
3 19 FPO, para. 2.
32<> FPO, para. 13.
321 FPO, para. 9.
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Although the FCC stated that it adopted the open entry standard for 
WTO Member applicants due to the open commitments that WTO 
Members have made in the ABT, the FCC has taken steps to revise their 
competitive safeguards. The Foreign Participation Order has adopted 
more narrowly tailored safeguards in order to enhance the FCC’s ability to 
detect and prevent foreign carriers with market power from distorting 
competition in the US telecommunications market. The Order narrowed 
the “No Special Concessions” rule to prohibit US carriers from entering 
into exclusive arrangements only with foreign carriers with more than 50% 
of market share in the foreign market.322 The Order also revised the 
safeguards that apply to US carriers classified as dominant, owing to an 
affiliation with a foreign carrier possessing sufficient market power at the 
foreign end of a US international route. The FCC adopted a rebuttable 
presumption that foreign carriers with less than 50 per cent market share 
in each relevant market on the foreign end lack sufficient market power to 
affect competition adversely in the US market so that their US affiliates 
should be treated as non-dominant.
The three main goals in the Market Entry Order323 continue to be the 
goals of the Foreign Participation Order. Moreover, the FCC stated that 
the Foreign Participation Order would better serve these three goals for 
international telecommunications services than the approach outlined in 
that Order (which used the ECO test on all foreign entry applicants).324
322 FPO, para. 17. The No Special Concessions rule prohibits all US international carriers 
from agreeing to accept special concessions from any foreign carrier or administration.
323 See Section VI.3(b) above.
324 FPO, para. 11.
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First, the FCC believes that removing barriers to entry and focusing 
on competitive safeguards will promote effective competition in the US 
telecommunications services market. Second, the FCC believes that their 
new approach will enable them to prevent anti-competitive conduct in the 
provision of international services or facilities by relying on more effective 
and targeted safeguards. Third, the FCC finds that this approach will 
encourage foreign governments to implement their commitments to open 
their telecommunications markets by showing that open markets and 
minimal regulation are beneficial to consumers and industry.326 This 
marks a significant departure from two years before when the FCC issued 
the Market Entry Order and adopted the ECO test, and supports the 
theory that the adoption of the ECO test was the US response to the slow 
progress in the WTO negotiations on basic telecommunications.
The open entry standard for WTO Member States is not, however, 
applicable to applicants from non-WTO countries. Applicants from non- 
WTO countries must continue to satisfy the ECO test.326 In the FCC’s 
view, challenged by some commentators,
It  continues to serve the public interest to m ain tain  policies directed a t 
encouraging non-W TO m em ber countries to open th e ir telecom m unications 
m arkets to com petition.327
In general, the FCC has liberalized its foreign entry policy through 
the Foreign Participation Order and abolished the ECO test for applicants 
from WTO Member States. This is a clear demonstration of US leadership
326 Ibid.
326 FPO, para. 15.
327 FPO, para. 125.
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role in the liberalization of telecommunications services, which is crucial 
to the multilateral trading system generally.328
The streamlined procedure of the open entry standard meant that 
Section 214 applications could be processed within 35 days instead of 90 
days using the ECO test standard.328 In the first 90 days of the Foreign 
Participation Order rules, the FCC granted over 200 applications to 
provide international services.338 From January to May 1998, the FCC 
granted 26 applications from foreign telecommunications carriers to enter 
the US market, including 13 applications from carriers with market power 
in their home market, which would otherwise have been subject to a 
lengthy ECO analysis.331 Since the adoption of the Foreign Participation 
Order, the FCC significantly reduced the workload in the licensing arena, 
providing it with the ability to focus its resources on actual cases of anti­
competitive behaviour, rather than the theoretical possibility in every 
application.332
In the same year as the adoption of the Foreign Participation Order 
and the signing of the WTO ABT, the FCC issued another Order on 
international telecommunications services, the International Settlement 
Rates Order.333 The FCC stated that the Foreign Participation Order and
328 For further reading on this subject, see James Bacchus, “The Bicycle Club: Affirming 
the American Interest in the Future of the WTO”, 37(3) JWT (2003), 429-441; and Speech 
by the WTO Director-General, Dr Supachai Panitchpakdi, to the National Press Club in 
Washington, D.C., “American Leadership and the World Trade Organization: What is the 
Alternative?” (26 February 2004), available at http://www.wto.org .
328 FPO, para. 21.
330 FCC, Public Notice, 14 May 1998. Available at http: /  / www.fcc.gov/ib/pd/pf/wto.htm l.
331 Ibid.
332 Paul Kenefick, 8 CommLaw Conspectus (2000), p. 43 at 50.
333 In the Matter o f International Settlement Rates, IB Docket No. 96-261, Report and Order, 
FCC 97-280, adopted 7 August 1997 and released 18 August 1997. (Hereinafter ISR 
Order).
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the International Settlement Rates Order substantially completed their 
plan to,
restructure the economics of the market for US international telecommunications 
services [and that this] restructuring will promote the low cost, technologically 
innovative interconnectivity serving all the world’s consumers that should be the 
hallmark of a Global Information Infrastructure.334
Unlike the Foreign Participation Order, which was welcomed by WTO 
Member States, the ISR Order met with fierce objections and legal action 
against the FCC.
5. FCC International Settlement Rates Order 1997
An important element of international telecommunications services is the 
international settlement rate, which is part of the international accounting 
rate system.333 The system was established for the making of payments for 
the carriage of international telecommunications traffic. The international 
accounting rate system consists of the “accounting rate” and the 
“settlement rate”. The accounting rate is the privately negotiated internal 
price between originating and terminating carriers. The carriers then 
agree to a settlement rate -  usually half of the accounting rate -  to hand- 
off and terminate traffic to each other.
The FCC established its policy for international settlement rates in 
the 1930s when it adopted the Uniform Settlements Policy (USP), as a
334 ISR Order, para. 1.
333 The international accounting rate regime was developed in 1865 by twenty European
countries to provide for a standard, common method to divide the revenues for 
international telecommunications service between originating and destination countries. 
The principles of the international accounting rate system are contained in the ITU’s 
International Telecommunications Regulation Article 6 and elaborated in a series of ITU
Recommendations. The system operates through bilateral contractual agreements between 
telecommunications operators in each jurisdiction. (ITR 88, Art. 6.2.1).
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result of its first case on accounting rates.336 The case addressed the issue 
of “whipsawing”337 of US telegraph carriers. In 1986, the FCC changed the 
name of the USP to the International Settlements Policy (ISP).338 The ISP 
provides a regulatory framework within which US carriers negotiate with 
foreign carriers to provide bilateral US-intemational telecoms services. It 
was designed to ensure non-discriminatory treatment of US carriers by 
foreign carriers with market power.33**
In addition to non-discriminatoiy treatment, the US has always been 
very concerned with high above-cost international accounting rates. With 
the international accounting rate system if there is an equal amount of 
traffic exchanged between the originating market and the destination 
market, then the originating and terminating carriers, “settlement of 
accounts” will be zero. However, the problem emerges when countries 
with generally more outbound traffic than incoming traffic for nearly eveiy 
international route (e.g. the US) incur huge deficits in the accounting 
system of that country. The problem is exacerbated when the accounting 
rate is set far above the actual costs of terminating a call, which is often 
the case where the foreign carrier is a monopoly or in a dominant position.
This poses a problem for the US because in the US, one of the most 
competitive markets in the world, rates are lower than in many other 
countries and therefore a substantial amount of world telecommunications
336 Mackay Radio & Telegraph Company, Inc., 2 F.C.C. 592 (1936), affd. sub. nom. Mackay 
Radio and Telegraph Co., Incv. FCC, 97 F.2d 641 (D.C. Circuit 1938).
337 Whipsawing is an anti-competitive behaviour that generally involves the abuse of 
market power by a foreign carrier to play US carriers against one another in order to gain 
unduly favourable terms and benefits. Whipsawing could lead to higher costs for US 
carriers and result in higher calling prices.
338 Codified at Sections 43.51 (47 C.F.R. section 43.51 (1996)) and 64.1001 (47 C.F.R. 
section 64.1001 (1996)) of the FCC’s rules.
339 The ISP stipulates three conditions US carriers must undertake when entering into 
agreements with foreign carriers. See 47 C.F.R. Section 43.51 (e).
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traffic is routed through the U S .3 4 0  Partly as a result of these traffic 
routing patterns, the US settlement deficit continued to grow steeply in the 
1990s. In 1996, US settlement deficit totaled $5.4 billion, double what it 
was in 1990.341
The FCC therefore adopted the International Settlement Rates Order 
in August 1997 to lim it the level of the US net settlement benefits. But 
more significantly, the point of the ISR Order is to export the liberalization 
of telecommunications services by compelling other countries to do away 
with their monopolistic practices. The FCC argues that the Order is 
necessary because under the current international accounting rate system 
the settlement rates US carriers pay foreign carriers to terminate US- 
originated traffic are in most cases substantially above the costs foreign 
carriers incur to terminate that traffic. These significant margins are then 
used to subsidize telecommunications services within the foreign country 
at a cost to US consumers who pay artificially high prices for international 
s e r v ic e s .3 4 2  This imbalance also discourages foreign carriers from 
introducing effective competition and cost-based pricing for all telecoms 
services, and can be used to finance strategies that create competitive 
distortions in the market for US international services.
The Order establishes benchmarks to govern the international 
settlement rates that US carriers may pay foreign carriers to terminate 
international traffic originating in the US. It requires US carriers to lower
340 Technology has allowed innovative ways to re-route international calls to seem like it 
originated in another country other than the country that the call was physically being 
made. As the US has one of the cheapest rates, customers were using such services as 
call-back to change the originating country for settlement purposes to the US instead of 
most other countries which had monopoly markets and therefore high non-competitive 
international rates.
341 ISR Order, para. 13.
342 ISR Order, para. 2.
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the international settlement rates paid to foreign carriers for terminating 
calls to a level commensurate with the economic development of the 
country where calls terminated. It also prohibits US carriers from 
engaging in international simple resale343 unless 50% of the traffic on a 
particular route is settled at or below the benchmark settlement rates. All 
US-licensed carriers are subject to the Order, while foreign-affiliated 
operators’ compliance is a condition of obtaining FCC approval for the 
provision of long-distance services to the home jurisdiction.344
The FCC categorized countries into three groups and set the initial 
benchmark rates as follows: $0.15 per minute for upper income countries; 
$0.19 per minute for upper middle income and lower middle income 
countries; and $0.23 per minute for lower income countries.343 The FCC 
remarked that these rates are still above foreign carriers’ costs of providing 
international termination services, but they will nonetheless substantially 
reduce the excess in current settlement rates. The Order requires that US 
carriers obtain commitments from foreign correspondents in settlement 
rates equivalent to or below the benchmark level. The FCC had also set a 
transition schedule intended to take into account the need to ensure a 
smooth transition from previous settlement rates to the FCC benchmarks 
as an immediate reduction of the settlement rates to the benchmark rates 
could result in undue disruption of foreign carriers’ operations.343
343 International simple resale involves routing switched traffic over international private 
lines that connect to the public switched network at either end-point.
344 ISR Order, para. 207.
345 ISR Order, para. 19. These rates will be revised periodically as necessary in order to 
keep pace with cost reductions that may occur in the ftiture as well as to encourage further 
movement toward cost-based settlement rates. ISR Order, para. 112.
346 ISR Order, para. 22.
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The ISR Order is a unilateral action by the US with extraterritorial 
effects. Not surprisingly, the Order generated opposition in many 
countries over the potential impact on domestic operator revenues.347 In  
addition, the EC and Japan raised concerns about the compatibility of the 
Order with the US’s commitments under the GATS, specifically the 
principle of MFN. Many urged the FCC to work through multilateral 
organizations, especially the ITU, to achieve accounting rate reform.343
The FCC, however, reasoned that their contribution to multilateral 
efforts does not have to be an exclusive means of addressing accounting 
rate reform. The Commission believes they can take this action to fulfill 
their statutory commitments to ensure US consumers receive 
telecommunications services at reasonable rates and to address the 
potential for competitive distortions in the US market for international 
services. Moreover, although the ITU has adopted accounting rate reform 
(ITU-T Recommendation D.140)349 which called for carriers to adopt non- 
discriminatory, cost-oriented and transparent accounting rates within five 
years of its adoption in 1992, progress on implementation of those 
principles has been s lo w .33*) And with the ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ among 
WTO Members to leave international settlement rates out of the WTO’s 
multilateral system and therefore not subject to dispute settlement, the 
FCC’s unilateral action was necessary to tackle the problem of artificially 
high settlement rates.
347 Petitions for Enforcement of International Settlement Rates Benchmark Rates (4 August 
2000); see Walden in Walden and Angel (2001), p. 368.
348 ISR Order, para. 18 and footnote 23.
349 ITU-T D.140, “Charging and Accounting in International Telecommunication Services: 
Accounting Rate Principles for International Telephone Services*, Telecommunication 
(07/98) Standardization Sector of ITU. Available at 
h ttp ://w w w .itu .in t/o sg /sp u /in tse t/itu -t/d l40 /d l40  e rev.html (8 March 2004).
350 ISR Order, para. 17.
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In 1998, Cable & Wireless brought an action before the US courts 
challenging the legality of the ISR Order. Over 100 other petitioners and 
interveners -  national governments, regulators and operators -  joined the 
case on both sides. The main complaint was that the FCC had exceeded 
its authority through the extraterritorial nature of the Order’s 
provisions.351 The court found overwhelmingly in favour of the FCC in 
1999, holding that it had the requisite powers to make decisions 
regulating the actions of US-licensed operators, including contractual 
arrangements entered into for international settlement rates and that “the 
Commission does not exceed its authority simply because a regulatory 
action has extraterritorial consequences.”352
The FCC has asserted that the ISR Order has resulted in a decrease 
in international settlement rates. Within a year and a half of the Order’s 
adoption, carriers from 24 countries had reduced their settlement rates to 
levels at or below their respective benchmark rates, and 14 more countries 
have agreed to do so within the timeframe prescribed.353 Moreover, in 
1998 competitive rates that consumers pay for calls from the US to the top 
10 international destinations have fallen on average by 25 per cent.354 
From 1997 to 2002, the average settlement rate for all US-outbound traffic 
fell from $0.35 to $0.11, and the average cost of international calls has 
dropped from $ 0.67 to $ 0.27.355 Thus, the benchmark policy together 
with increased competition in the US market has led to dramatic decline in
351 Cable 8s Wireless et al. v FCC, 166 F. 3d 1224 (DC Cir. 1999). See 
http: /  / www.fcc.gov/ogc/documents/opinions/1999 /  cable.html.
352 Ibid. See also Kenefick (2000), p. 10.
353 FCC News, 5 February 1999.
354 Ibid.
355 In the Matter o f International Settlements Policy Reform, International Settlement Rates 
Order, First Report and Order, 19 FCC Red 5709, 43, adopted 11 March 2004 (2004 Order), 
para. 72.
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international settlement and calling rates. The ISR Order has produced 
effective results.
In March 2004, the FCC, in response to changes in the international 
services market, adopted new deregulatory rules which reformed the 
ISP.356 The 2004 Order importantly removes the ISP from bench-mark 
compliant routes.357 It also eliminated the International Simple Resale 
(ISR) Policy and associated filing requirements,358 but maintains certain 
competitive safeguards on all routes.35* The deregulation of the ISP should 
give US carriers more flexibility to negotiate arrangements with foreign 
carriers, and encourage market-based agreements that will result in more 
cost-based rates.360 The benchmarks policy however is not removed by the 
2004 Order.361 Currently, routes between the US and 142 countries are 
exempt from the ISP.362
V II. Concluding Remarks
This chapter looked at one hundred years of the US telecommunications 
industry and its policies -  from domestic to international. The US was the 
birth place of modem regulation of telecommunications as we know it 
today. The enactment of the 1934 Communications Act adopted a
356 Ibid. These changes include increasing competition and participation in international 
services resulting in lower rates, and greater liberalization and privatization in foreign 
markets. See 2004 Order, paras. 2,18, 21, and 23.
357 2004 Order, para. 27.
358 2004 Order, para. 31 and Appendix B.
359 2004 Order, paras. 24-25, 40.
360 2004 Order, para. 2.
361 2004 Order, paras. 82, 85.
362 The US-India route obtained exemption in November 2004. See FCC, Public Notice, DA 
04-3518, 4 November 2004.
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regulatory system whereby the US telecommunications industry was run 
by a private, as opposed to state-owned, telecommunications operator and 
kept in check by an independent regulator. At the time, regulation of the 
telecommunications industry in the US was based on the theory of natural 
monopoly. As technology advanced and led to the development of the 
telecommunications sector whereby maintaining a monopoly, albeit 
regulated to ensure efficiency, was not optimal nor providing the benefits 
or meeting consumer and business demands, the US telecommunications 
industry experienced a wave of changes in regulatory policies during the 
1970s. The changes led to a domino effect that resulted in the divestiture 
of AT&T and the introduction of competition into the long-distance and 
international telecommunications sectors.
Beginning in the mid-1980s and continuing into the 1990s US 
telecommunications policies were moving towards liberalization and 
promotion of competition. The enactment of the 1996 
Telecommunications Act opened up all sectors, most importantly the local 
sector, of the US telecommunications industry to competition. The FCC 
continues to be the most important institution in promulgating 
telecommunications policies which today are based on market principles 
and competition rules. However, the implementation of these rules and 
policies has proved difficult for the FCC. The problem lies, as it did during 
the monopoly years, in the legislation itself.
The obvious remedy is to enact a new telecommunications law: one
that will truly take account of the convergence of the telecommunications
industry, and remove the strict distinctions that divide the different
telecommunications markets (for instance, local, long-distance) and the
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different technologies (wireless, wireline, for example). The new Act should 
be technology neutral. The new legislation should also address the issue 
of state-federal divide. Most importantly, it should adopt clear, concrete 
policy guidelines for direction of the FCC.363 A first step would be to review 
the public interest standard. These changes would reduce the number of 
cases brought to court and the regulatory process of enabling effective 
competition would not be time and time again hampered by protracted 
litigation.
Nonetheless, with over one hundred years of regulation in the 
telecommunications industry, from a monopoly to liberalization and 
competition, the US prides itself on having the most open 
telecommunications market.364 The US thus brought its liberalization, 
competition and regulatory policies on telecommunications services to the 
negotiating tables of the GATT Uruguay Round and later the WTO 
negotiations on basic telecommunications.
a®3 R. May (2001), p. 427 at 455.
364 As remarked by the US, “Competition and reliance on private investment have been 
major factors underlying the U.S. market’s strong performance." WTO, CTS, Communication 
from the US, S /C /W /9 1 , 16 December 1998, p. 2.
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Chapter 3 
The Liberalization of Trade in Services
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) provides the main 
international regulatory framework governing trade in services, including 
telecommunications services. The WTO is the key international institution 
through which its Member countries, in particular the US, have developed 
telecommunications liberalization. For this reason, this chapter will 
explore the historical development of the liberalization process of trade in 
services in the GATT and the WTO, and the provisions of the GATS itself.
The services sector has grown over the past two decades to become 
the largest part of developed countries' GDP and employment.1 No doubts 
remain today as to the importance of services to the world economy. 
However, services as an independent economic activity from the 
production of goods only began to be recognized in the late 1970s, in the 
US. Throughout the early 1980s the US services sector had been growing 
steadily, becoming an engine of growth for the US economy by the time the 
Uruguay Round of GATT multilateral negotiations began in 1986. The 
domestic growth at an increasing rate of the service sector, especially 
financial and telecommunications services, led to a desire to expand this 
activity beyond the national borders as trade. The US thus led the way 
towards broadening the agenda of the multilateral trade negotiations to 
include, for the first time, discussions on trade in services.
1 For example, the US service sector today accounts for over sixty percent of GDP and 80% 
of employment. USTR, Press Release, “U.S. Offers to Expand Access to the Already Open 
American Services Sector in WTO Trade Talks”, 31 March 2003; USTR, “Free Trade in 
Services: Opening Dynamic New Markets, Supporting Good Jobs”, 31 March 2003.
126
The debate on the creation of a multilateral framework for trade in 
services similar to the one already in place for trade in goods (the GATT), 
took centre stage during the Uruguay Round negotiations. The US was 
the vigorous champion for a multilateral framework, with Europe and 
other developed countries like Japan and Canada lending support. 
However, fierce opposition to a multilateral system of rules governing trade 
in services came from developing countries, led by India and Brazil. Their 
main fear was that liberalization of trade in services through a multilateral 
system would destroy developing countries’ fledgling service economies.
An agreement by all parties, reached in the last minutes leading up 
to the commencement of the Uruguay Round, to include trade in services 
in the negotiations of the new GATT round was only made possible by a 
“compromise” in which trade in services negotiations would be conducted 
on a “separate track” to that of goods negotiations. At the conclusion of 
the GATT Uruguay Round in 1994, the first multilateral agreement on 
trade in services - the General Agreement on Trade in Services -  was 
adopted and became an integral part of the new multilateral trading body 
of the World Trade Organization.2
This chapter focuses on two areas. First, it examines the process of 
the liberalization of trade in services in the GATT/WTO system, 
particularly the development of trade in services from being only incidental 
to trade in goods to establishment of an international agreement of its own 
described as “perhaps the most important single development in the 
multilateral trading system since the GATT itself came into effect in 
1948”.3 It begins by examining the definition of services. Next, it
2 Although there were other international agreements on services before the GATS, for 
example the NAFTA and EC Treaties, these agreements are ‘regional’ agreements whereas 
the GATS is a potentially world-wide agreement.
3 WTO Secretariat, An Introduction to the GATS (October 1999), p. 1.
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considers the theories as to why the service sector has grown so 
dramatically. These explain why developed countries push so hard for 
trade in services to be liberalized. We will discuss the reasons behind the 
US’s role in pushing a multilateral framework for liberalization of trade in 
services, and the arguments in favour of and against such a framework. 
Second, we will examine the GATS, and the application of the GATS 
framework to the liberalization of trade in telecommunications services.
I. Growth in  Services Dom estically
Until recently, the service sector has played “a seldom recognized role as a 
necessary and critical ingredient in all economic growth.”4 Before 
discussing how trade in services has become a dynamic force in world 
trade, this section will examine the meaning of services, and describe the 
growth of the service sector domestically.
1. Definition of Services
It has never been easy to define services unambiguously, and services 
include service products and service activities. Economists have 
attempted to define services in many different ways based on 
characteristics, forms of transactions and kinds of activity. Some have 
listed different services or classified them into different groups.
4 Dorothy Riddle, Service-Led Growth: The Role o f the Service Sector in World Development 
(1986), p. 2.
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The Penguin Dictionary of Economics defines services as “intangible, 
non-transferable economic goods5 as distinct from physical commodities”.6 
This definition refers to service products. Service products, in other words 
outputs of the production process, are, for example, a haircut and a 
concert. This definition describes services in terms of their ‘invisible’ 
nature and as something “you cannot drop on your foot”.7 It is a limited 
definition, however, as some services do involve the provision and use of 
tangible goods, such as construction or computer software services.
The traditional definition of service activities, on which official 
statistics are based, is a negative one in which services are seen as a 
residual: service activities are those which do not produce physical goods.8 
Under this definition, service activities are those activities that are not 
agriculture, mining or manufacturing. This definition may be convenient 
for national accounting purposes but has come under heavy criticisms in 
recent years. One main criticism is that this definition does not have 
much of an analytical basis.9 This is because service activities cover an 
extremely wide range. This definition of service activities as residual, 
encompassing as it does such a large and heterogeneous sector, does not 
give us much of a framework for deeper analysis of services as a sector of 
the economy.10 Moreover, services are today understood to be ‘products’ 
in their own right and not simply the effort of producing.11
5 An economic good is any physical object, natural or man-made, or service rendered, 
which could command a price in the market. Services defined in terms of an economic 
good is therefore not to be confused with goods which mean physical commodities. 
Bannock, Baxter and Davis, Penguin Dictionary o f Economics (1998), p. 377.
6 Ibid.
7 The Economist as cited in Sven Illeris, The Service Economy: A Geographical Approach 
(1996), p. 12.
8 Sven Illeris (1996), p. 12.
9 Neela Mukheijee, GATT Uruguay Round, Developing Countries and Trade in Services 
(1995), p. 27.
10 Ibid.
11 J. Nusbaumer, Services in the Global Market (1987), p. 7.
129
The absence of any clear theoretical basis for grouping services 
industries results in differences found among empirical studies. Two 
criteria have been identified by Fuchs as the most frequently used.12 One 
is closeness to the consumer, and the other is the intangible character of 
services. In summary, however services are defined, the main 
characteristics that describe services, as compared to the manufacturing 
sector of the economy, are that they are more heterogeneous, mostly 
intangible, and more labour-intensive.
Services remain difficult to define today.13 As we will see below in the 
section on the GATS, there is no definition of services in the GATS as 
such. The GATS restricts itself to describing “trade in services” in terms of 
the four different ways in which they could be supplied: cross-border, 
consumption abroad, commercial presence and presence of natural 
persons.14 The difficulty in defining services, however, has not affected the 
fact that services have grown dramatically over the last century and plays 
an ever increasing, influential role in the world economy.
2. Theories on the Growth of Services
The growth of services domestically generated the growth of trade in 
services. The growth in the US service industry comprises more than half 
of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) and as such accounts in
12 Victor Fuchs, The Service Economy (1968), p. 15.
13 How should services be defined was one of the hotly argued issues in the debates on 
whether services should be placed on the agenda of the Uruguay Round. During the 
Uruguay Round negotiations itself, almost two years was spent on dealing with the 
definition of services and how statistical data on services should be determined. See WTO, 
Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and Investment, Communication from  
UNCTAD, W T/W G TI/W /21, 6 January 1998; GATT, GNS, Note on the Meeting o f 23-25 
February 1987, MTN.GNS/7 20 March 1987; GATT, GNS, Note on the Meeting o f 29 June-2 
July 1987, MTN.GNS/9, paras. 5, 16. The WTO today is still finding ways to systemize 
services data collection which is problematic due to the difficulty of defining services.
14 GATS Article 1:2.
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large part for the US’s desire to expand its trade in services through trade 
liberalization. Similar trends in the growths of the service sectors in 
Europe and in other developed economies like Japan induced these 
developed countries to follow the US in the drive for the liberalization of 
trade in services.15
There are a number of theories to explain the growth of the service 
economy. The four main theories of service industry growth are: the three- 
stage development theory; growth in services as a result of increases in 
consumer demand for services; growth as a result of increases in producer 
demand for services; and growth due to lower productivity levels in the 
services sector than in that of agriculture and industry. We look at these 
theories for a background understanding as to how services have become 
so important to the economy not only domestically but also worldwide.
The conventional theory of service industry growth is the three-stage 
theory developed by Fisher and Clark.16 This theory explains that there 
are three developmental stages in the economy. The primary production 
stage is that of agriculture. As countries developed, they moved to the 
second industrial stage where GDP and employment were largely involved 
in manufacturing. Higher personal income generated from this second 
stage then becomes the main factor contributing to the growth of the 
service sector, explained in terms of the higher elasticity of demand for 
services rather than goods. This last, and most mature, stage of the 
economy is the “service” or “post-industrial” economy, the tertiary 
production stage in the Fisher/Clark theory.
15 In the United Kingdom, for example, the service economy comprised 54.9 per cent of the 
GDP in 1979, rising to 61.5 per cent of the GDP in 1989, while Japan’s service economy 
comprised 54.1 per cent of the GDP in 1979 and 56.5 per cent of the GDP in 1989. (World 
Bank 2000).
16 Allan Fisher, “Primary, Secondary and Tertiary Production", Economic Record (June 
1939), p. 136; Colin Clark, The Conditions of Economic Progress (1951).
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The three-stage theory, however, does not adequately provide an 
explanation for the growth of the service industry since it merely describes 
“a process of economic and/or social change that results in services 
becoming the largest single group of economic activity or employment by 
occupation”.17 Other theories explain the expansion of the service 
industry in relation to increases in demand for services. Fuchs identifies 
two types of demand that could possibly account for services growth: a 
more rapid growth in ‘final’ demand for services, and a relative increase in 
‘intermediate’ demand for services.18
The former refers to consumer demand for services, and the 
expansion of the service economy is explained in terms of the relationship 
of consumer spending patterns and levels of income. Services are said to 
be income elastic: they are affected by changes in tastes and priorities and 
by changes in income. As disposable income increases, so does consumer 
demand for services, i.e. as people grow richer, their consumption of 
services such as tourism, education and health, expands more rapidly 
than their demand for manufactured and agricultural products. Fuchs 
points out, however, that an examination of cross-sectional buying 
patterns, and of trends in out-put over time, suggests that the growth in 
income and a consequent shift in demand has not been a major source of 
the relative growth of service employment.19 Gershuny and Miles also 
reached a similar conclusion after having examined data from several 
European countries.20
17 P.W. Daniels, Sendee Industries in the World Economy (1993), p. 15.
is Fuchs (1968), p. 3.
19 He discovered that, measured in dollars of constant purchasing power, the service 
sector’s share of output is the same in 1965 as in 1929. And if measured in current 
dollars, it grew only from 47 to 50 per cent. Ibid.
20 Gershuny and Miles used data from several European countries to show that the real 
consumption of privately purchased services was in decline during the 1960s and 1970s. 
J. Gershuny and I. Miles, The New Service Economy (1983), as cited in P.W. Daniels (1993),
p. 16.
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Services growth has also been explained by the growth of 
intermediate (or producer) services. Producer services are those used by 
primary, secondaiy and tertiaiy activities in the process of production of a 
good or service rather than by final consumers. Division of labour and 
specialization within the production process have encouraged the demand 
for producer services, aided by the restructuring of production within 
enterprises and increased extemalization of functions such as advertising, 
security, design, packaging and computer programming. The analysis 
made by Fuchs21 over 1947 and 1958, and by Elfring22 from 1960-1973, 
however, both reveal that accelerating demand for producer services 
provides only a partial explanation for service sector expansion, and not a 
principal source for the growth.
Fuchs identifies another cause for the expansion of the service 
sector: that the productivity level was lower in the services sector than 
that of agriculture and industry.23 Therefore, even if demand is spread 
uniformly across all sectors of an economy, services will require an ever 
larger share of the labour force. He believes this to be the major 
explanation for the move in labour to services. This slower growth in 
output per person in the service sector was due to three factors: there was 
a greater decline in hours worked per person in the service sector than in 
the industry sector; there was a much more rapid increase in the quality 
of labour in industry than services; and there was the differential trend in 
physical capital per worker.
21 Fuchs’s findings show that service employment change attributable to increasing 
demand for producer services was less than 10 per cent of the total change. Fuchs (1968),
p. 4 .
22 t .  Elfring, “New Evidence on the Expansion of Service Employment in Advanced 
Economies,* Review of Income and Wealth, series 35, 4, (1989), pp. 409-40 as cited in P.W. 
Daniels (1993), p. 17.
23 Fuchs (1968), p. 4.
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It would seem that a comprehensive explanation for the growth of the 
service economy over the last decades cannot be accounted for by a single 
theory. The Council for Trade in Services of the WTO suggests that the 
expansion of the services sector can be attributed to the income-elasticity 
of demand for services, the lower productivity growth in many services 
sectors than in manufacturing and agriculture, and the organizational 
changes in an economy.24 All these factors contributed to the growth of 
the service economies of different countries around the world.
Today, the three largest players in world trade25 are the US, Europe 
and Japan. Until recently, the US was the world leader in international 
trade without strong competition from Europe or Japan both seriously 
crippled by the Second World War. Having emerged from the war in a very 
favourable economic position, the US was the only major country to 
increase its international commerce without undue strain on its balance of 
payments.26 The US moreover has continually developed its service 
industry through greater specialization in the different service sectors27 
and consequently became the world’s first “service economy”.28 These 
events explain why the impetus to liberalize trade in services originated in 
the US.
24 WTO, CTS, “Economic Effects of Services Liberalization", S /C /W /2 6 , 7 October 1997, p.
1.
25 This includes both trade in goods and services.
26 A.G. Kenwood and A.L. Lougheed, The Growth o f the International Economy 1820-1990 
(1992), p. 241.
27 For example, there was rapid growth in the financial, transportation and 
telecommunications sectors.
28 That is, more than half of the employed population is not involved in the production of 
tangible goods like food, automobiles, etc. Fuchs (1968).
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II. Liberalizing Trade in  Services: The Role o f the US in  
Prom oting Services In tern atio n ally
The road towards a multilateral system of open trade and global 
liberalization can be traced back to US-led efforts after the Second World 
War. The US led the conferences on establishing an international 
monetary organization and a trade order. The former was successful in 
the form of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), but the latter, in the 
form of a proposed International Trade Organization (ITO) failed, partly as 
a result of domestic politics within the US which led to the Senate failing 
to ratify the ITO agreement, and partly because the urgency to restructure 
international trade subsided.29 Nonetheless, the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), intended as an interim agreement, emerged by 
default to become the focus of legal efforts to liberalize the world’s trading 
regime. The Protocol of Provisional Application (PPA), an agreement which 
was intended to permit the implementation of GATT obligations until the 
ITO came into being, provided the legal basis for the legal applicability of 
the GATT, so
The GATT allowed countries that were Contracting Parties to trade 
under a system of rules aimed at open trade in goods through the 
reduction of tariffs and the elimination of other barriers to trade. At this 
early stage in the multilateral trading system, no such scheme existed for 
services. It was not until the 1970s that the US -  virtually unique in this
29 John H. Jackson, The World Trading System (1997), p. 38.
30 Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 
October 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 308.
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regard -  recognized the growing significance of trade in this ‘other sector* 
of the economy.
1. Services Recognized
By the 1970s the US had developed into a service economy. In 1965, the 
service sector share of GDP in the US was 59 per cent, with an average 
annual growth of 3.4 per cent between 1965-1980.31 By 1980 this figure 
rose to 66 per cent.32 The three-stage theory33 would explain that the US 
had moved beyond the primary and secondary stages of development and 
is now in the final mature stage of services. In 1979, for example, 
agriculture accounted for only 3 per cent of the GDP (dropping to 2 per 
cent in 1989) and industry accounted for 33.6 per cent of the GDP 
(dropping to 28.9 per cent in 1989), while services made up 63.4 per cent 
of GDP.34
As the world’s strongest service economy, the US became the largest 
exporter and importer of private services.35 As a consequence, a few large 
US service companies, in particular insurance, financial services, travel 
and tourism, and information-based service sectors began lobbying for 
negotiations aimed at removing restrictions to trade in services.36 These 
companies and multinational firms also formed an ad hoc group to
31 World Bank (1988) as cited in B. Hoekman (1990), pp. 28-9.
32 Hoekman (1990), p 31.
33 See Section 1.2 of this chapter.
34 World Bank (Development Economics central database), 2000.
35 Based on IM F balance of payments statistics and national sources in the year 1970 as 
cited in Hoekman (1990), p. 37.
36 J.V. Reyna, “Services*, in The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History, Volume 2 
(T.P. Stewart, ed.) (1993), p.2343; Rivers, Slater and Paolini, “Putting Services on the Table: 
The New GATT Round*, 23 Stanford Journal o f International Law  (Spring 1987), p. 13 at 16; 
Geza Feketekuty, International Trade in Services: An Overview and Blueprint fo r Negotiations 
(1988), pp. 299-300.
establish an international framework of rules governing trade in services. 
The mounting pressure resulted in the Trade Act of 1974.37
By stating that “the term ‘international trade' includes trade in both 
goods and services”,38 the Act for the first time gave recognition to services 
as being internationally “tradable” and therefore mandated trade 
liberalization in services.39 The Act authorized the participation of the US 
in the GATT Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations which 
commenced in 1973, and directed US negotiators to seek the reduction or 
elimination of non-tariff barriers to international trade in both goods and 
services. In addition, it established an advisory committee to assist the US 
Government during international trade negotiations.40 Furthermore, 
Section 301 granted the US President the authority to retaliate against 
countries that maintained or imposed unreasonable or unjustifiable 
restrictions on US goods and services.41 By not making any distinction 
between goods and services, Section 301 acknowledged not only the 
growing importance of trade in services but also that trade in goods and 
trade in services are linked both commercially and politically and cannot 
be separated in the management of trade policy.42
Armed with the authority granted by the 1974 Act, and later the 
1979 Trade Agreements Act,43 the Carter and later the Reagan 
administrations vigorously took on the mission of having trade in services 
inscribed on the agenda of world trade. During the final stages of the
37 Public Law 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1974) (codified at 19 U.S.C. Sec. 2411 (1990)).
38 Trade Act of 1974, Section 102(g)(3).
39 Bela Balassa, “The United States” in P.A. Messerlin and K.P. Sauvant, (1990), p. 129. See 
also Feketekuty (1988) p. 301.
40 See Feketekuty (1988), pp. 5, 70.
41 Trade Act of 1974, Section 301. “Section 301’ is shorthand for Chapter 1 of Title III of 
the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, which covers some 10 sections: section 301 through 
310.
42 Feketekuty (1988), p. 198.
43 Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Public Law 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979).
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Tokyo Round of the GATT multilateral trade negotiations in 1979, the US, 
led by Ambassador Robert Strauss, its Special Trade Representative, made 
an effort to introduce services trade issues, intending to lay ground work 
for future negotiations.44 The Tokyo Round referred to services in the 
Agreement on Government Procurement, the Standards Code and the 
Subsidies Code, but only to the extent that services were incidental to the 
supply of goods.
Although the Tokyo Round did little to satisfy the US ambition of a 
legal framework to govern international trade in services, the US effort 
expanded international awareness of the importance of services. 
Furthermore, the US significantly obtained an informal commitment from 
other industrialized countries to undertake a comprehensive study of trade 
in services in the Committee of the OECD.45 The objective was to 
determine if it was possible to identify issues in services that would lend 
themselves to negotiation in future trade agreements. The study revealed 
trade in services to be substantial, though still impeded by trade barriers, 
and provided the groundwork for the inclusion of trade in services in 
multilateral trade negotiations.46
2. Efforts to Introduce Trade in Sendees on the Multilateral Level
No sooner had the Tokyo Round been concluded than the need for another 
round of multilateral trade negotiations to include trade in services 
became apparent. Other developed countries gradually came to realize the 
importance of trade in services to their economies. In March 1980, the
44 The Tokyo Round began in September 1973.
45 Feketekuty (1988), p. 304.
46 Reyna (1993), p. 2345.
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GATT Consultative Group of Eighteen met and considered a Secretariat 
document which analyzed the link of certain services with trade in goods. 
The Group determined that the document “demonstrated an essential link 
between trade in goods and certain services” and suggested that trade in 
services might be a “proper concern of the GATT”.47 This was the first 
substantive discussion of trade in services within GATT.48
Although the developed countries recognized the significance of trade 
in services, they could not yet agree on which organization would best 
determine and enforce the rules that would govern a multilateral trade 
system for services. Possible choices included the GATT, UNCTAD and 
OECD forums. The US preferred the GATT, while developing countries 
preferred UNCTAD where they possessed greater voting power compared to 
that of the US.
At the GATT Ministerial Meeting in Geneva in 1982, the US argued 
that the most important task was to establish a work programme on 
services to prepare the technical base for multilateral negotiations. The 
US however found only limited support among developed countries and 
outright opposition from most developing countries.49 At that stage, other 
GATT members were not prepared to start negotiations on services. They 
lacked the necessary economic knowledge, and in consequence were 
unable to identify what their national interests would be in such 
negotiations.50 The US, on the other hand, was the world’s largest
47 Ibid.
48 B. Hindley, “Principles in Factor-related Trade in Services" in Messerlin and Sauvant 
(1990), note 1, p. 25.
49 The results of the Tokyo Round left many developing countries disappointed, and thus 
they were not prepared to enter into trade negotiations on services let alone on any “new 
subjects".
50 John Croome, Reshaping the World Trading System: A History o f the Uruguay Round 
(1995), p. 16.
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exporter of services and the most advanced in data collection.51 It was 
therefore not surprising that the US should be the initiator of the 
liberalization process of trade in services.
Despite real enthusiasm on the part of the US to revitalize the GATT 
with fresh ideas and initiatives to further liberalize trade, the Ministerial 
Declaration on Services merely recommended that each GATT Contracting 
Party undertake national research into trade in services, exchanging this 
information and considering whether multilateral action was 
appropriate.52 It was for individual Contracting Parties if they so wished to 
conduct such research. The 1982 Geneva Declaration on Services fell far 
short of the US objective of a framework for multilateral negotiations in 
services.
3. Growth in Protectionism and Decline in the Multilateral Trading 
System
Its lead in the development of the services sector alone does not suffice to 
explain the vigorous efforts of the US in trying to introduce trade in 
services to the agenda of multilateral negotiations.53 The US 
determination stemmed from additional factors.
One of these was the US’s growing economic dependence on the rest 
of the world and the erosion of US dominance of the international trading 
system.54 By the 1980s, both Europe and Japan had recovered from the 
Second World War and developed into strong economies. While the US
51 Steven F. Benz, “Trade Liberalization and the Global Service Economy”, 19 JWTL (1985), 
p. 95 at 98.
52 The Ministerial Declaration dealt with services in three short paragraphs. GATT, 
Ministerial Declaration, adopted on 29 November 1982, GATT Doc. No. L /5424.
53 In 1982, services accounted for 69 per cent of the US GNP, and 86 per cent of the job 
growth in the US since 1960 has occurred in the service sector. Steven Benz (1985), p. 97.
54 Joan Spero and Jeffrey Hart, The Politics o f International Economic Relations (1997), pp. 
62-71.
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remained the world’s largest economy and largest trading power, the rise 
of Europe and Japan as key players in world trade brought competition for 
the US. In addition, the US was experiencing declining competitiveness of 
its manufacturing industries and an energy crisis which resulted in 
increased payments to the oil exporting countries.55 On the other hand, 
international trade in services was growing in importance to the US. To 
ensure that it did not fall behind Europe and Japan in world trade power, 
the US turned its energies to secure a multilateral framework of rules for 
trade in services. This was to provide the US with a legal system in which 
to guarantee the global expansion and growth of its services trade.
Second, a multilateral legal system to provide stability for the US 
expansion of trade in services world-wide seemed imperative when 
protectionism was alarmingly on the rise, even, and perhaps especially, 
with the conclusion of the Tokyo Round. US businesses dealing in 
services could not compete effectively in countries where trade-restrictive 
barriers applied.56 The Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR), 
relying on complaints of American companies abroad, compiled a list of 
more than 2000 specific barriers to trade.57 Because of the growing 
economic importance of the service sector, this proliferation of barriers to 
international trade in services was of deep concern to the US. The US
55 Philip H. Gold, “Legal Problems in Expanding the Scope of GATT to Include Trade in 
Services", 17 The International Trade Law Journal (1982-1983), p. 281 at 283; see also G. 
Feketekuty, Next Steps in U.S. Trade Policy (1981).
56 Gold (1982-1983), p. 281. See also US Dept, of Commerce, US Industries in World 
Markets (1976) for a comprehensive analysis of the participation and problems of US 
service industries in international commerce. See also A. Sapir and E. Lutz, Trade in 
Services: Economic Determinants and Development-Related Issues, World Bank Staff 
Working Paper 480 (1981), p. 46 and Chapter 3 on protectionism generally.
57 These include discriminatory practices as deliberate protectionist measures as well as 
legitimate ones for achieving national economic and social polity goals. P. H. Gold (1982- 
1993), p. 281.
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sought expansion of the scope of GATT to include trade in services to 
reduce barriers to free trade.58
By the next meeting of the GATT Council of Ministers in November 
1984, only thirteen national studies on trade in services, none from 
developing countries, had been submitted by individual GATT Contracting 
Parties in response to the 1982 Ministerial Declaration.59 These studies, 
however, showed that a clear definition of trade in services was lacking 
and that trade in services data was incomplete, that heavy regulation was 
common in service industries, that a wide variety of trade barriers 
impeded trade in services, and that the importance of services required 
countries to reassess the role which trade in services played in the 
formulation of trade policy.60 The need for a multilateral system to govern 
trade in services was becoming apparent to developed countries. The US 
and the United Kingdom specifically called for negotiations of a 
multilateral framework similar to the GATT for trade in services.61
At the 1984 Ministerial Meeting, the US suggested an establishment 
of a working party on trade in services. This proposal was supported by 
Sweden, Canada and Israel. India, joined by Argentina, Egypt and Cuba, 
opposed such a move. Despite the growing realization of the importance of 
trade in services, discussions continued on an informal basis until late 
1985 when the Preparatory Committee was formed in the GATT to prepare 
for new multilateral negotiations to be launched in 1986.62 The US finally
58 BaUassa in Messerlin and Sauvant (1990), pp. 127-131.
59 These national studies were submitted by the US, Canada, Japan, the European 
Communities, the United Kingdom, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, 
Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden and Norway. Reyna (1993), p. 2347.
60 US International Trade Commission, 4 International Economic Review (1985) as cited in 
Reyna (1993), p. 2347.
61 Reyna (1993), p. 2347-8; Croome (1995), p. 122.
62 The Preparatory Committee, however, only first addressed services during the third 
meeting held on February 25-26, 1986. GATT, Note on the Third Meeting, GATT Doc. No. 
PREP.COM(86)3, March 7, 1986, at 49.
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achieved its long sought after objective when the next GATT Round was 
launched in Punta del Este in September 1986. This decision to 
undertake formal work on trade in services by the GATT was, however, 
subject to heated debate between the US and developing countries.63
I I I .  The Uruguay Round and the GATS
The primary focus of the Uruguay Round was, like other rounds before it, 
improvement of the GATT. However, for the first time the discussions 
sought to liberalize trade in services. This section looks at the negotiating 
history of the GATS during the Uruguay Round in order to provide us with 
a background understanding into the creation of the first multilateral 
framework on trade in services.
1. Services on a “Separate” Track
The reality of having trade in services within the GATT Uruguay round of 
multilateral trade negotiations, after years of determined efforts by the US, 
was only made possible by the concession to have services negotiated on a 
“separate track” to that of goods. Up to the launching of the Round, 
developing countries refused to enter into discussion of how international 
rules might be developed for the sector, and of how trade in services might 
be liberalized.64 Without this separate track, the developing countries
63 Reyna (1993), p. 2354.
64 Croome (1995), p. 122.
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would have continued to refuse cooperation in considering services trade 
issues,65 and the US might have withdrawn from the GATT altogether.66
A Group of Negotiations on Services (GNS) was established for 
negotiations on services trade, separate from the simultaneous 
negotiations on trade in goods.67 The developing countries insisted on this 
“dual-track’’ arrangement to ensure that they could not be forced to trade 
off concessions on services simply to retain their access to developed 
countries’ markets for goods.68
The Uruguay Round Declaration laid out the objectives of the service 
negotiations as follows:
Negotiations in this area shall aim to establish a multilateral framework of 
principles and rules for trade in services, including an elaboration of possible 
disciplines for individual sectors, with a view to expansion of such trade under 
conditions of transparency and progressive liberalization and as a means of 
promoting economic growth of all trading partners and the development of 
developing countries. Such framework shall respect the policy objectives of 
national laws and regulations applying to services and shall take into account the 
work of relevant international organizations.69
This marked the first step in the realization of a multilateral system that 
would liberalize international trade in services.
2. Why Liberalize Trade in Services: the Case of Liberalization v 
Protectionism
Services in recent years have become more tradable, due to rapid 
technological advances, the growing importance of multinational business 
activities and the world-wide trend towards deregulation.70 Consequently,
65 Not one developing country carried out a national study of their services sector and 
submitted it to the GATT as suggested by the 1982 Ministerial Declaration.
66 Reyna (1993), p. 2354.
67 The GNS, like the Group of Negotiations on Goods, was to report to the Trade 
Negotiations Committee, the GATT’s main negotiating committee. GATT, Ministerial 
Declaration on the Uruguay Round, Part I I  (20 September 1986).
68 Mario Kakabadse, International Trade in Services: Prospects fo r Liberalization in the 
1990s, Atlantic Paper No. 64 (1987), p. 61.
69 GATT, Ministerial Dedaration on the Uruguay Round, Part I I  (20 September 1986).
70 M. Kakabadse, “Trade in Services and the Uruguay Round*, 19(2) Georgia Journal of 
International and Comparative Law  (1989), p. 384.
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the tradability of services has resulted in the growth of international trade 
in services. The expansion of trade in services, however, has been 
confronted with a variety of barriers and restrictions to trade throughout 
the globe.
This could be explained by the fact that the governing of service 
sectors has traditionally been an internal matter. For various reasons 
service industries are highly regulated in most countries. Even the US, as 
we have seen, regulated its service industries including airlines, banking 
and telecommunications. Liberalization of trade in services would mean 
the elimination of discriminatory regulatory policies. The belief is that 
freer trade in services, like freer trade in goods, will benefit all, developed 
and developing countries alike, and will ultimately increase the total world 
welfare.
(a) For Liberalization
The classic theory in favour of international trade is that of Ricardo’s 
theory of “comparative advantage”.71 No two countries are exactly alike in 
natural resources, climate or work force. The theory of comparative 
advantage states that a country would export the product in which it had 
the greater advantage, or a comparative advantage, and import the 
commodity in which its advantage is less, or in which it had a comparative 
disadvantage. This would therefore allow each country to concentrate on
71 David Ricardo, The Principles o f Political Economy, first published in 1817. Ricardo had 
improved on Adam Smith’s theory of absolute advantage. Then in the 1920s another 
theory, the Heckscher-Olin Theorem, emerged that revised Ricardo’s theory. For further 
reading on international trade theories, see Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (1776); J.S. 
Mill, Principles of Political Economy (1848); Raymond Vernon, “International Investment and 
International Trade in the Product Cycle,” Quarterly Journal o f Economics, 1966, Vol. 80, 
190; Raymond Vernon, “The Product Cycle Hypothesis in a New International Economic 
Environment," Oxford Bulletin o f Economic Statistics, 1949, Vol. 41, 255.
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doing what they do best and thereby maximize their income. The 
argument is that international trade would thus promote the efficient 
allocation of resources, a desirable economic objective.
The comparative advantage theory has been the standard argument 
for the opening of markets.72 Through trade, there would be a sharing of 
resources, expertise and wealth. These exchanges would then spur on 
industrial and technological innovation.73 Liberalization of trade in goods 
through the GATT, for instance, has resulted in economic growth world­
wide, the technological advances which have seen the rise of Europe and 
Japan as economic powers in competition with the US, and the emergence 
of newly-industrialized countries (NICs). The argument is that 
liberalization of international trade in services would like-wise promote 
economic growth.74
Furthermore, in a market economy, which is the economic system in 
the majority of the world’s states, private profitability is the driving force in 
determining the allocation of production within and between firms, sectors 
and countries. In  addition, open markets would “encourage quality 
improvement and product and process innovation; reduce the scope for 
waste and rent-seeking; constrain the economic power of any individual 
actor; and ensure users of the continued availability of the relevant good
72 The free trade theory (classical trade theory) as espoused by Adam Smith and Ricardo 
was that unilateral trade liberalization would result in benefits to that country that 
liberalized even if other countries did not. However, there are qualifications to the classical 
theory, namely: passive reciprocity, aggressive reciprocity, infant industries, strategic trade 
policy, revenue-raising considerations, national security, and objections to free trade which 
include the impact of free trade on wages and employment, cultural diversity and political 
sovereignty. See Trebilcock and Howse, The Regulation o f International Trade (1999) pp. 7- 
14.
73 GATT, Trade Policies for a Better Future: Proposals for Action (Geneva, March 1985), p.5.
74 For one of the first studies to suggest that concepts of comparative advantage also work 
for trade in services as they do for goods, see M.A. Katouzian, “The Development of the 
Service Sector: A New Approach,” 22(3) Oxford Economic Papers (November, 1970), 362-82. 
See also Sapir and Lutz (1981).
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and services”.75 Liberalization is the means that would realize the 
reduction and eventual elimination of restrictions in order to allow the 
uninhibited workings of private forces and decision-making.
This is also the case for services. Liberalization of services has led to 
greater choice of products and cheaper services. Take, for example, the 
United Kingdom. The UK’s liberal policy towards the participation of 
foreign financial services companies in the UK has helped to maintain the 
UK as one of the three leading financial centres in the world.76 In utilities 
such as telecommunications and energy, the UK pioneered privatization, 
trends that are now being followed worldwide. In the telecommunications 
sector, private investment has led to enormous growth in the sector and 
the emergence of new services.
(b) Against Liberalization
Developing countries, although most are market economies, have reasons 
against liberalization of trade in services. These stem from their concerns 
in three main areas: firstly, developing countries do not have a 
comparative advantage in service industries; secondly, they consider that 
their infant service industries need to be protected; and thirdly, that 
liberalization would impinge on national security and sovereignty.77
75 WTO, CTS, Economic Effects of Services Liberalization, S /C /W /2 6 , 7 October 1997, p.2.
76 DTI, Liberalising Trade in Services: A New Consultation on the World Trade Organization 
GATS Negotiations, October 2002, p. 67.
77 See Jeffrey J. Schott and Jacqueline Mazza, “Trade in Services and Developing 
Countries’ , 20 JWTL (1986), p. 253; A.F. Ewing, “Why Freer Trade in Services is in the 
Interest of Developing Countries’ , 19 JWTL (1985), p. 147; Richard Cooper, “Why 
liberalization meets resistance’ , in The Uruguay Round: A Handbook on Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations (Finger and Olechowski, eds.) (1987); Jagdish Bagwati, “Services’ , in Finger 
and Olechowski (1987). In some service areas, such as audiovisual services and 
educational services, developing countries also have concerns for the preservation of 
cultural identity.
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As explained above, the theory of comparative advantage justifies 
trade. Today, the validity of this theory in terms of trade in goods is well 
established. There are arguments, however, as to whether the 
comparative advantage theory also works for trade in services. The 
developing countries especially believe that they have a comparative 
disadvantage in all service areas, and therefore have little to gain from 
liberalization of trade in services. Analyses on services reveal that many 
traded services are technology and capital intensive -  areas where 
developed countries clearly have a comparative advantage.78 
Understandably, developing countries fear that lib era liz in g  trade in 
services could hurt their economy badly through a surge in imports, 
exacerbating current account deficits, and harming their infant service 
industries.
Schott and Mazza, however, suggest that although comparative 
advantage in trade in services does seem to lie with the developed 
countries, this does not mean that developing countries have little to gain 
from liberalization.79 The argument is that liberalizing trade in services 
provides improved efficiency from specialization and increased trade flows 
from which developing countries benefit.80 Through liberalization of trade 
in services, a developing country could gain from the expertise that come 
with imported services and use it to develop its own service economy. It 
can then export those services they have strengthened. Some developing 
countries have in fact proven to be successful exporters of services: for
78 Bagwati in Finger and Olechowski (1987); A. Sapir, “North-South Issues in Trade in 
Services", 8 The World Economy (March 1985), pp. 27-41.
79 Schott and Mazza (1986), p. 259.
89 Ibid,
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example, Korea in construction and engineering services,81 Singapore in 
transport and financial services,82 and India in software services.83
Ewing, in one of his arguments as to why freer trade in services is in 
the interests of developing countries, also suggests that potential benefits 
could accrue to developing countries due to the dynamic nature of 
comparative advantage.84 He explains this in the context of the “three- 
stage” theory:
To argue th a t developed countries s till enjoy com parative advantage in  most 
services and are losing it  in  more and m ore industries is not to revert to a  three 
successive sectors theo iy of the developm ent process or to condemn the 
developing countries to the lowest ru n g .85
He argues that in all three conventional sectors of agriculture, industry 
and services, comparative advantage is changing constantly and 
consequently developing countries could also achieve comparative 
advantage in services.86 For instance, labour is cheaper in developing 
countries than developed countries. There are services that require inputs 
which are labour intensive, for example, hotel operations, tourist services 
and operations in construction and engineering services. Developing 
countries have a comparative advantage in some labour-intensive services. 
By expanding these service industries through the liberalization of trade in 
services developing countries would be able to exploit this advantage.87 In 
fact, as UNCTAD stresses,
81 Sooyong Kim, “The Korean Construction Industry as Exporter of Services", 2(2) The 
World Bank Economic Review (May 1988), p. 225.
82 Schott and Mazza (1986), p. 260.
83 WTO, TPRB, “Trade Policy Review: India, Report by the Secretariat", W T/TPR /S /100, 22 
May 2002, pp. 134-6.
** A.F. Ewing, (1985), p. 158.
85 Ibid. See above Section 1.2 on the three-stage theoiy.
86 Ewing (1985), p. 158. Cf. J. Melvin, Trade in Services: A Theoretical Analysis (1989) 
where Melvin explains the “ephemeral nature" of comparative advantage in services.
87 See Kenneth Heydon, “Developing Country Perspectives”, in Messerlin and Sauvant 
(1990), pp. 163-164.
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For m any developing countries, the export o f services is th e ir only means of 
diversification, and the only way they can move away form  excessive dependence 
on export o f prim ary com m odities.8*
What about comparative advantage in telecommunications services 
for developing countries? It could be argued that as services 
infrastructures and capacity of developing countries’ increase, they will be 
able to take advantage of the improved access opportunities the GATS 
provides. Therefore it is in the interests of developing countries to 
liberalize their telecommunications sector which, as an infrastructure, 
provides the backbone of the economy: developing countries will need 
strong and liberalized infrastructural service industries to enable them to 
place themselves in an advantageous and competitive position to export 
other services as well as goods.
Developing countries do recognize the importance of trade in 
services. It is precisely because they realize how crucial this is to their 
economy that they are determined to protect their service industries from 
encroachment by stronger foreign service providers and from dependence 
on them. They are apprehensive about the implications of liberalization of 
trade in services on their economies, especially on their infant service 
industries. The potential threat to these industries was the argument 
repeatedly asserted by developing countries, particularly by India and 
Brazil, against the liberalization of trade in services.
With many traded services such as banking, insurance and 
telecommunications dominated by large, multinational firms, developing
88 UNCTAD, Assessment o f Trade in Services o f Developing Countries, 
UNCTAD/ITCD/TSB/7, 26 August 1999.
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countries feel their firms are at a distinct disadvantage, lacking the capital 
resources and the experienced personnel to compete effectively. 
Developing countries argue that the protection of emerging infrastructure 
services is necessary for the development of an intemationally-competitive 
economy.89 Without protection, developing countries fear their infant 
service industries will be severely damaged by foreign competitors. This in 
turn generates suspicion of the reach of foreign multinational corporations 
in their local economy: with infrastructure service industries damaged by 
foreign competition, they could end up being victims of decisions taken by 
multinational corporations which are effectively beyond national control.90
This takes us to the third main concern of developing countries about 
liberalization of trade in services: that opening up their service markets to 
foreign competition could impinge on their national security and 
sovereignty in three main ways.91 First, liberalizing trade in services 
would mean an influx of transnational corporations into traditionally 
domestic sectors, such as banking, telecommunications, and health 
services.92 Many developing countries lack the trained personnel and the 
administrative capacity effectively to regulate foreign corporations, 
especially if they have no experience of regulating an equivalently sized or 
structured firm, or of regulating certain types of enterprise (as with
89 Schott and Mazza (1986), p. 261. Even the US and Canada used the infant industry 
argument to maintain a high tariff policy throughout most of the 1800s and the first half of 
the 1900s. Japan and South Korea also practiced heavy protectionist measures in order to 
strengthen their economies. Trebilcock and Howse (1999) p. 9. India especially has been 
using the infant industry argument since its independence. India also had one of the 
highest tariff structures in the world with rates around 125 to 175 per cent. Surijit S. 
Bhalla, “India”, in Finger and Olechowski (1987), p. 191.
99 Kakabadse (1987), P- 62.
91 Cf. John H. Jackson, “The WTO ‘Constitution’ and Proposed Reforms: Seven ‘Mantras’ 
Revisited”, 4(1) JIBL (March 2001), p. 67-78.
92 See Surijit S. Bhalla (1987), pp. 192-195 on India’s domestic policies and arguments 
against services trade liberalization.
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insurance or transport services).93 As foreign corporations have less at 
stake in the local economy, they may be less concerned with the 
development of the local economy than in the enlargement of the firm’s 
profitability, and developing countries fear that they might make decisions 
detrimental to the national interest (e.g. exporting capital; retaining 
technology in-house). In addition, foreign participation in the media, arts 
and entertainment, for example, would have social and cultural, and even 
political, consequences for the local State.
Second, liberalization of trade in services could involve the removal of 
certain controls on foreign investment. This could impinge on the 
sovereignty and autonomy of smaller countries to determine the role of 
services in their infrastructures.94 Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a 
very sensitive issue for developing countries, explained in part by the 
historical root of investments during colonial times, as well as by new 
fears of overseas enterprises’ compliance with issues of labour standards 
or environmental requirements, for example.95 This is understandable 
from the developing countries’ perspective. However, foreign investment 
often involves the setting up of subsidiary companies for the domestic 
production of goods or supply of services. This often means an increase in 
jobs for the domestic economy and consequential stimulation of growth. 
Furthermore, FDI provides managerial skills, new technology and 
marketing networks, and much needed capital.
Third, state-owned or controlled firms would be subject to greater 
international competition, which over time could drive state-controlled 
firms out of business. Developing country policy makers would certainly
93 United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, Transnational Corporations, 
Services and the Uruguay Round, (1990), p. 17.
94 Kakabadse (1987), p. 62.
95 Schott and Mazza (1986), p. 262.
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not want to lose the political and economic control that comes with state 
ownership, particularly in new, high technology sectors.96
It has been pointed out, however, that the fears of developing 
countries may have been misplaced.97 Infrastructure and technological 
services play a central role in the development process.98 Heavy protection 
by developing countries could mean forgoing the opportunities for the 
transfer of much needed technology and expertise.99 For example, the 
newly industrialized countries such as Singapore and Korea have been 
acquiring comparative advantage in certain services as they accumulate 
organizational and technological skills, partly through the import of 
modem services.100 The creation of a multilateral agreement on trade in 
services might not affect developing countries immediately, and freer trade 
would probably open up markets initially in the rich OECD countries.101 
In the long-run, however, liberalization of trade in services would bring 
economic growth and development to developing countries, and the first 
multilateral agreement on trade in services, the GATS, would establish the 
guiding rules to achieve this end.
Ten years after the WTO came into force developing countries’ views 
on the liberalization of trade in services are changing. Developing 
countries now recognize the importance of liberalized services. However, 
they emphasize that they need time to assess the impact of liberalization
96 Ibid. See also the case of India’s state-owned telecoms operators in Chapter 5 below.
97 Kakabadse (1987), p. 62.
98 Esohe Aghastise, “Services and the Development Process: Legal Aspects of Changing 
Economic Determinants", 24(5) JW T[1990), p. 103 at 106.
99 See also B. Hindley, “Service Sector Protection: Considerations for Developing Countries", 
2(2) The World Bank Economic Review (May 1988), p. 205-224 for further analyses on 
domestic services protection and the costs of protection to developing countries.
100 Kakabadse (1987), p. 62
101 Kakabadse (1987), p. 63.
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and implement changes.102 In addition, developing countries are 
demanding more openness on the part of developed countries for services 
of export interest to developing countries such as tourism and the 
movement of natural persons.103 In the current GATS 2000 negotiations 
(now part of the Doha Round) these two issues are the focus of the 
developing countries’ demands on the developed countries. Developed 
countries must also be willing to open up services supplied through the 
movement of natural persons if the liberalization of trade in services by 
developing countries is to be truly beneficial to them. The important factor 
in the liberalization of services for both developed and developing countries 
alike is the ability to “disentangle legitimate national regulations from 
protection”.104 The GATS provides the multilateral framework to achieve 
such an end.
IV . Liberalizing Trade in  Services through GATS Principles
After years of negotiations, and threats by the US to pull out of the 
multilateral system, the first set of principles, standards and rules on 
trade in services were formulated in one multilateral agreement. The 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) is one of the greatest 
achievements to come out of the Uruguay Round. In creating the GATS, 
the Members resolve to expand trade in services under “conditions of
102 See WTO, CTS, “Communication from Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, India, Kenya, 
Pakistan, Peru, Uganda, Venezuela and Zimbabwe: Assessment of Trade in Services", 
S/C SS/W /114, 9 October 2001; WTO, CTS, Assessment o f Trade in Services: Compilation 
of Relevant Statements and Submissions, S /C SS /W /104, 28 September 2001; Asoke 
Mukeiji, “Developing Countries and the WTO: Issues of Implementation," 34(6) JWT 
(2000), p. 33 at pp. 58-64.
103 See WTO, CTS, Communication from India: Proposed Liberalisation o f Movement of 
Professionals under General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), S /C S S /W /12, 24 
November 2000.
104 Ewing (1985), p. 156.
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transparency and progressive liberalization”.105 The GATS is binding on all 
Members of the WTO.106
However, the WTO Secretariat correctly points out the following:
[It] m ust be borne in  m ind th a t the Uruguay Round services package is only a  
beginning. The GATS rules are not complete, and are largely untested. The 
process of filling  the gaps w ill require several more years of negotiations, and  
experience w ill no doubt show a  need to improve some of the existing rules. Each  
governm ent’s schedule of liberalization  com m itm ents for trade in  services is also 
only a firs t step, com parable no t w ith  its  GATT schedule of 1994, b u t ra th er w ith  
the in itia l lim ited tariff-cu ttin g  undertaken when the GATT was launched h a lf a 
century ago.107
The GATS consists of six parts and eight annexes. The first part is 
scope and definition; the second contains general obligations and 
disciplines; the third specific commitments;108 the fourth provisions for 
progressive liberalization;109 the fifth part is institutional provisions; and 
the sixth final provisions. The GATS, modelled on the GATT, consists of a 
three-part structure: first, broad principles, which apply to all services; 
second, additional agreements and annexes, which set out the rules for 
particular service sectors; third, schedules of commitments, which list an 
individual Member’s commitments on market access and national 
treatment.110
However, unlike the GATT, the GATS is divided into general 
obligations (Part I) and specific commitments (Part II). General obligations, 
contained in Articles II to XV, are binding on all WTO Members. Specific
105 GATS Preamble.
106 Article 11:2 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, also 
referred to as “The WTO Agreement". The GATS is Annex IB  of the WTO Agreement.
107 WTO, Secretariat, Guide to the Uruguay Round Agreements (1999), pp. 161-2. {WTO 
Guide).
108 See Section IV.2 below.
109 The GATS provisions on progressive liberalization require more negotiations on trade in 
services after the completion of the Uruguay Round. The goal is to take the liberalization 
process further by increasing the level of commitments in Members’ schedules.
no WTO Secretariat, Understanding the WTO (September 2003), p. 23.
155
commitments in the GATS, on the other hand, are individual country’s 
commitments to open markets in specific service sectors. GATS specific 
commitments are in Articles XVI on market access, Article XVII on 
national treatment and Article XVIII on additional commitments. Specific 
commitments are negotiated among WTO Members and are recorded in 
national schedules which are attached to, and form an integral part of, the 
GATS.111 In essence, a Member’s schedule of commitments state how 
much access into that Member’s market foreign service providers have for 
specific service sectors.
The GATS rules on specific commitments, which form the most 
important rules of the service agreement, give a much more sectoral focus 
to trade liberalization in services than for goods under the GATT because 
they apply only when commitments are made.112 The scheduling of 
commitments by a Member is thus one of the most fundamental aspects of 
the liberalization of trade in services. To determine how open a Member’s 
market is, to ascertain what commitments for which service sectors have 
been made and whether a Member has violated its GATS obligations, we 
must look to its schedule of commitments. Section IV.2 below discusses 
the complexity of schedules of commitments.
The GATS has as one of its main objectives the “achievement of 
progressively higher levels of liberalization of trade in services through 
successive rounds of m ultilateral negotiations”113 that aim to attain the 
reduction of barriers to trade. However, barriers to trade in services,
m  GATS Article XX.
112 WTO, An Introduction to the GATS (1999); George Verikios and Xiao-guang Zhang, Global 
Gains from Liberalising Trade in Telecommunications and Financial Sendees (October 2001), 
p. 3.
“ 3 GATS Preamble.
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unlike those for goods, are mostly found within the borders of a country 
and take the form of domestic regulations. This makes it difficult to 
identify restrictions to trade in services and as a result, constructing the 
GATS itself has been a particularly complicated task.114 In addition, 
services can be traded through four different types of supply, not just by 
crossing the border like trade in goods. Furthermore, governments 
generally regulate their service sectors more than they do manufacturing, 
so that domestic regulations often lim it trade even if they do not explicitly 
discriminate against foreign providers. All these factors add to the 
difficulty in creating an international agreement for the liberalization of 
trade in services. By adopting the framework, rules and principles of the 
GATT, albeit adapted to meet the challenges posed by the complexities of 
trade in services, the architecture of the GATS is flawed.115
The WTO rules that affect Members’ commitments on trade in 
telecommunications services are to be found in the GATS, the Annex on 
Telecommunications and the Fourth Protocol along with the attached 
schedules of commitments and they will be discussed in the next chapter. 
But first, we turn to consider the scope of the GATS and the definition of 
trade in services.
1. Scope and Definition of Trade in Sendees 
GATS Article 1:1 states:
This Agreement applies to m easures by Members affecting trade in  services.
114 Geza Feketekuty, “Assessing and Improving the Architecture of GATS”, in Sauve and 
Stem, eds., GATS 2000: New Directions in Services Trade Liberalization (2000), p. 90.
us ibid., p. 92.
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It has been held that this provision gives the GATS a “broad reach” as 
any measure that has “an effect on” trade in services is covered by the 
provisions of the GATS.116
We briefly examined the definition of services earlier on in section 1.1 
of this chapter. Services are intangible and mostly non-storable, and often 
require interaction between the user and the provider of the service. 
Moreover, any given service is continuously changing in content and 
characteristics due to technological advances. This is why the drafters of 
the GATS concluded that no practical purpose could be served by an 
attempt to define “services”.117 Instead the GATS, in Article 1:2, contains a 
definition of trade in services:
For the purposes of th is Agreem ent, trade in  services is defined as the supply of a  
service:
(a) from  the territo ry  of one Mem ber into the territory of any other Member;
(b) in  the territo ry  of one Mem ber to the service consum er of any other 
Mem ber;
(c) by a service supplier o f one Member, through com m ercial presence in  
the territo ry of any other Member;
(d) by a service supplier of one Member, through presence of n atu ra l 
persons of a M em ber in  the territory of any other M em ber.118
This definition of trade in services formulates four different modes of 
supply: cross-border (mode l) ,119 consumption abroad (mode 2),120 
commercial presence in the consuming country (mode 3),121 and presence 
of natural persons (as service providers in the consuming country) (mode
116 WTO, Appellate Body, European Communities -  Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Banana W T/DS27/AB/R , para. 220; see also Panel Report 
(W T/DS27/R/ECU, W T/DS27/R /G TM , W T/DS27/R /HND, W T/D S27/R /M EX, 
W T/DS27/R/USA), paras. 7.280 and 7.285; both reports adopted 25 September 1997. {EC- 
Bananas).
117 Aly Abu-Akeel, “Definition of Trade in Services under the GATS: Legal Implications”, 
32(2) The George Washington Journal o f International Law and Economics (1999), p. 189 at 
190; see also GATT, GNS, Note on the Meeting of 23-25 October 1989, MTN.GNS/26, 17 
November 1989, para. 86.
118 GATS Article 1:2.
GATS Article I:2(a).
120 GATS Article I:2(b).
121 GATS Article I:2(c).
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4).122 In defining trade in services through modes of supply, the GATS 
covers all services and thus takes account of any new form of services that 
might arise in the future. Although this approach of defining trade in 
services into four modes is useful for analytical purposes, it has, however, 
made the listing of commitments more complex than necessary. This 
difficulty is apparent in the scheduling of market access and national 
treatment commitments which we examine below and in the next chapter 
when we look at the WTO dispute settlement case of Mexico -  
Telecommunications.123
The first mode of delivery of services, cross-border trade, is the most 
straightforward, and it corresponds to the normal form of trade in goods. 
Examples of cross-border services are services supplied through 
telecommunications or mail, for instance banking services transmitted via 
such means.124 The supply of services through the first mode does not 
require either the supplier or the consumer to travel to one another in 
order for trade of such service to take place. Although normally 
straightforward, this mode of delivery has proved a subject of contentious 
arguments between Mexico and the US in Mexico -  Telecommunications.125
The second mode of supplying services, consumption abroad, covers 
situations where a service consumer or his property moves into another 
Member’s territory to obtain a service (e.g. tourism, attending an 
educational establishment abroad or ship repair abroad).126 Like cross­
122 GATS Article I:2(d).
123 WTO, Mexico -  Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services, Panel Report, 
W T/DS204/R , adopted 1 June 2004. (Mexico-Telecommunications).
124 WTO, Guidelines fo r the Scheduling of Specific Commitments under the GATS, adopted by 
the Council for Trade in Services on 23 March 2001, S /L /92 , p. 9, para. 28. (Scheduling 
Guidelines).
125 Mexico-Telecommunications, Panel Report; and see Chapter 4.
126 Scheduling Guidelines, para. 29.
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border supply, consumption abroad is a straightforward form of trade 
where the service supplier does not need to be admitted to the consuming 
country. The bindings undertaken for this mode are thus considerably 
more liberal than those for the other three modes, with 50% of market 
access entries being marked without limitations.127
Commercial presence, the third mode of delivery, means:
any type of business or professional establishm ent, including through (i) the 
constitution, acquisition or m aintenance of a ju rid ica l person, or (ii) the creation  
or m aintenance of a branch or a  representative office, w ith in  the territo ry of a  
Mem ber for the purpose o f supplying a  service.128
This is probably the most important mode of supply of services in terms of 
future development, as well as raising the most difficult issues for host 
governments and GATS negotiators.129 Examples of this mode of service 
supply are hotel chains, insurance companies and telecommunications 
providers. Trade in services through commercial presence is closely 
related to FDI and may overlap with it. Thus, bearing in mind the 
developing countries’ sensitiveness to FDI,130 trade in services through 
commercial presence raises many issues and concerns for them.
The fourth mode, the supply of services through the presence of 
natural persons (i.e. the admission of foreign nationals to another country 
to provide services there), can assume two forms under the GATS.131 The 
first relates to the situation where a mode 3 foreign supplier employs some 
foreign staff, such as foreign managers or specialist or engineer to the 
foreign branch from the parent company. The second form relates to the
127 WTO, Market Access: Unfinished Business, Special Studies 6 (2002), p. 4.
128 GATS Article XXVIII(d).
129 WTO, An Introduction to the GATS (1999), p. 3.
130 See above Section 111.2(b).
131 P. Chang, G. Karsenty, A. Mattoo and J. Richtering, “GATS, the Modes of Supply and 
Statistics on Trade in Services", 33 (3) JWTL (1999), p. 93 at 96.
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presence of foreign natural persons independently of foreign commercial 
presence. This could involve independent persons who are themselves 
service suppliers and present on a temporary basis in foreign markets for 
the supply of their services, such as foreign consultants, or employees of a 
foreign service supplier. The bindings on mode 4 services are the least 
liberal of the four.
Compared to trade in goods, the definition for trade in services is 
broader as it encompasses not only cross-border trade but also movement 
of natural persons. This comprehensive definition of trade in services is 
intended in order for the GATS to apply in principle to all services, except 
those supplied in the exercise of governmental authority.132 Trade in 
services will mostly be in the forms of cross-border supply and supply 
through commercial presence. These are the two main forms of how 
telecommunications services are traded.
A salient feature of trade in services is that,
U nlike m arket access for shipm ent o f goods going from  one country to another, 
w hich is principally a m atter o f custom s duties and other form alities a t the 
border, the ab ility  to provide a service to another country depends on governm ent 
regulations th a t m ay be quite d ifferent for one of the four modes of supply than  
for another.133
Consequently, the precise scheduling of market access and national 
treatment commitments in a Member’s services schedule is crucial to the 
extent of market liberalization of trade in services, including 
telecommunications services.
132 GATS Article I:3(b) states: ‘ “services" includes any service in any sector except services 
supplied in the exercise of governmental authority.’ And “a service supplied in the exercise 
of governmental authority" means any service which is supplied neither on a commercial 
basis nor in competition with one or more service suppliers’. GATS Article I:3(c).
133 WTO Guide (1999), p. 165.
161
2. The Scheduling o f Commitments
The specific commitments are fisted in national “schedules of 
commitments” that detail the service sectors being opened, the extent of 
market access given in those sectors, and any limitations on national 
treatment. By virtue of Article XX of the GATS, every signatory must 
attach to the GATS its national schedule. Any commitment can be 
modified or withdrawn “at any time after three years have elapsed from the 
date on which that commitment entered into force”.134 Nonetheless, the 
modifying Member must enter into negotiations with affected countries, if 
the latter so request, with a view to reaching an agreement on any 
necessary compensatory adjustments.135
Services schedules are complex, and very different from GATT 
schedules.136 A GATS schedule has four columns. The first column 
contains the classification of services which are broken down into sectors 
and sub-sectors. According to the WTO, there are twelve categories of 
services sectors that could be fisted in a schedule: business (including 
profession and computer) services; communication services; construction 
and related engineering services; distribution services; educational 
services; financial (insurance and banking) services; health-related and 
social services; tourism and travel-related services; recreational, cultural 
and sporting services; transport services; and other services not included
134 GATS Article XXI: 1(a).
133 GATS Article XXI:2(a).
136 A GATT schedule, known as “schedule of concessions", consists of a long list of 
numbers identifying different products and specifying a Member’s binding commitments on 
tariffs for goods -  a maximum import duty chargeable on each listed product -  and quotas 
for some agricultural goods.
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elsewhere.137 It is up to each Member to decide which service sectors it 
wishes to open up to foreign suppliers: listing a service sector in its 
schedule indicates the Member is legally bound in that service sector. 
Thus, unlike the GATT schedule, the GATS scheduling of sectors adopts a 
“positive-list” approach.
The second column is the market access column, and the third 
column is for national treatment. Under the market access and national 
treatment columns, Members inscribe their commitments as broken down 
into the four modes of delivery of a service (cross border, consumption 
abroad, commercial presence and movement of natural persons). 
Scheduling “none” against a mode of supply means there are no 
limitations to market access or national treatment that apply to that mode: 
the Member undertakes full commitments to market access or national 
treatment to that particular mode. Scheduling “unbound” against a mode 
of supply means that the Member has undertaken no commitments in that 
particular mode of supply, and the Member remains free to introduce 
restrictions. If a measure is inconsistent with both market access (Article 
XVI GATS) and national treatment (Article XVII GATS), it should be 
inscribed in the market access column. In such a case, the inscription 
will be considered to provide a condition or qualification to Article XVII as 
well.138 The scheduling of market access and national treatment 
commitments has proved very complicated and confusing for many WTO 
Members, particularly developing-country Members.
137 WTO, Services Sectoral Classification List, Note by the Secretariat, M TN.G NS/W /120, 10 
July 1991. The telecommunications services sub-sector is listed under the communications 
services sector as sub-sector 2.C.
138 GATS Article XX:2.
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The last column is additional commitments, where Members list any 
further commitments not covered by the market access and national 
treatment provisions. Additional commitments, expressed in the form of 
“undertakings”, not limitations, could include, but are not limited to, 
undertakings with respect to technical standards, licensing requirements 
and other domestic regulations that are consistent with Article XVI.139 An 
example of additional commitments which has contributed to the 
liberalization process of a services sector is the “Reference Paper” on basic 
telecommunications.140 Thus, GATS scheduling adopts a “hybrid” 
approach: a positive list approach for the sector column and additional 
commitments column, and a negative list approach for market access and 
national treatment columns.
The importance of scheduling services commitments as extensively, 
precisely and clearly as possible is imperative to the liberalization of trade 
in services. In the next Chapter we will examine the first WTO dispute 
settlement case on telecommunications services, which hinges on the 
interpretation of Mexico’s Schedule of Commitments.
The liberalization of trade in services, including telecommunications 
services, is achieved through sectoral liberalization, through specific 
commitments on market access and national treatment, and through the 
general obligations in Part II of the GATS.
139 GATS Article XVIII; Scheduling Guidelines, para. 19.
140 See Chapter 4.
164
3. GATS Rules and Principles
There are five fundamental principles that form the foundation of the 
multilateral trading system, and of the main agreements of the WTO, 
including the GATS.141 These include:142
(i) non-discrimination between trading partners (MFN principle);143
(ii) non-discrimination between foreign and domestic products, 
service suppliers, and trademarks (national treatment);144
(iii) freer trade through reduction of barriers,145 binding of 
commitments and greater transparency;146
(iv) promotion of competition through rules on non-discrimination, 
anti-dumping and subsidies;147 and
(v) encouragement of economic reform and development through 
greater accommodation of the needs of developing and 
particularly least-developed countries.148
The two major non-discrimination principles of most-favoured-nation 
(MFN) and national treatment remain at the heart of the international 
trading system for trade in services as for trade in goods. In  addition, 
GATS provisions on market access, domestic regulation and transparency 
complete the general framework for the liberalization of trade in services. 
We examine these GATS provisions below and discuss the dispute
141 WTO, Understanding the WTO (September 2003), pp. 10-13. The other two agreements 
are the GATT and the TRIPS (Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights).
See WTO, Understanding the WTO (2003), pp. 10-13.
GATS Article II.
144 GATS Article XVII.
“ 5 GATS Articles V I, XVI-XXI.
146 GATS Articles III, V I, V III, XV I-XVIII, XX-XXI.
147 GATS Articles II, V III, XV.
“ 8 GATS Articles IV, XIX, XXV.
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settlement cases brought before the WTO Panel and the Appellate Body 
and the legal reasoning and interpretations delivered in relation to the 
GATS. Since the creation of the WTO, there have only been four cases149 
that resulted in reported rulings on GATS provisions by the dispute 
bodies.
4. Most-favoured-nation Treatment
The MFN principle has been the standard used under the multilateral 
trading system of the GATT 1947 to liberalize trade in goods for more than 
fifty years, and remains the foundation of the multilateral trading system 
of the WTO. The importance of the MFN non-discrimination principle lies 
in the historical purpose of the GATT to replace a proliferation of bilateral 
trade agreements with a m ultilateral one. It applies not only to goods, but 
also to services and intellectual property.
The MFN treatment as found in GATT 1994, and in GATT 1947, is 
unconditional.150 What this means is that each contracting state is 
obliged to treat all other contracting states similarly. This is set out in 
Article I of the GATT as follows:
149 European Communities -  Regime fo r the Importation, Sale and Distribution o f Banana, 
Panel Report (W T/D S27/R /EC U , W T/DS27/R /G TM , W T/D S27/R /H N D ,
W T/D S27/R /M E X, W T/D S27/R /U SA ), and Appellate Body Report (W T/DS27/AB/R), 
adopted 25 September 1997 (EC-Bananas); Canada -  Certain Measures Affecting the 
Automotive Industry, Panel Report, W T/DS 139 /R, W T/D S142/R , and Appellate Body 
Report, W T/D S139/AB/R, W T/D S 142/A B /R , adopted 19 June 2000 (Canada-Automotive); 
Mexico-Telecommunications, W T/D S204/R , adopted 1 June 2004 (although the Panel 
considered the GATS Annex on Telecommunications, it was not required to examine any of 
the substantive provisions in the main GATS); and United States -  Measures Affecting the 
Cross-Border Supply o f Gambling and Betting Services, Report of the Panel, W T/D S285/R , 
released 10 November 2004 (not yet adopted - US appealed to the Appellate Body on 7 
January 2005 (W T/D S285/6, 13 January 2005)), (US-Gambling).
150 For an argument in favour of a conditional MFN for the GATS, see Tycho H.E. Stahl, 
“Liberalizing International Trade in Services: The Case for Sidestepping the GATT," The Yale 
Journal o f International Law, Vol. 19, 1994, p. 405.
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W ith  respect to custom s duties and charges of any k ind  im posed on or in  
connection w ith  im portation or exportation or imposed on the in tern atio nal 
transfer of paym ents for im ports or exports, and w ith  respect to the m ethod of 
levying such duties and charges, and w ith  respect to a ll ru les and form alities in  
connection w ith  im portation and exportation, and w ith  respect to a ll m atters  
referred to in  paragraphs 2 and 4 of A rticle III,*  any advantage, favour, privilege or 
im m unity granted by any contracting p arty to any product orig inating in  or 
destined for any other country shall be accorded im m ediately and unconditionally  
to the like product orig inating in  or destined for the territories of a ll other 
contracting p arties .151
MFN treatment under the GATT implies that a Member is not 
permitted to grant any advantage to a product of a third country, whether 
a WTO Member or a non-Member, without according the same advantage 
to a like product of another WTO Member. If the product in question is not 
a “like” product, there is no violation of the most-favoured-nation 
treatment obligation under GATT Article I. Thus, the determination of 
“like” products is crucial to ascertaining a Member’s obligation under the 
GATT MFN. There is however no definition of “like product” in either GATT 
1947 or GATT 1994. The Panel therefore has had to determine the issue 
of “like product” on a case-by-case basis.152
The concept of like products appears in other provisions of the GATT 
1994, such as Article III paragraphs 2 and 4 on national treatment. It is 
agreed, however, that the term “like product” should not necessarily be 
interpreted in the same way in each of these provisions.153 The Panel and 
the Appellate Body reiterated this in the case of Japan -  Taxes on Alcoholic 
Beverages•
151 Article 1:1 of GATT 1994.
152 See GATT, Panel Report, Spain -  Tariff Treatment o f Unroasted Coffee, adopted on 11 
June 1981, BISD 102 (1982); GATT, Panel Report, Japan -  Tariff on Import o f Spruce-Pine- 
Fir (SPF) Dimension Lumber, adopted on 19 July 1989, BISD 167 (1990), (Japan-Dimension 
Lumber).
153 WTO, WGTCP, “The Fundamental WTO Principles of National Treatment, Most- 
Favoured-Nation Treatment and Transparency”, W T/W GTCP/W /114, 14 April 1999, para. 
48.
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The term  “like product” appears in  various GATT provisions. The Panel [...] noted 
th a t it  did not necessarily follow th a t the term  had to be in terpreted in  a uniform  
w ay.154
This, however, leaves open the question of how the meaning of the term  
should vary from clause to clause. It has been suggested that in terms of 
the MFN, the term “like product” should be construed broadly “so as to 
strike down discriminatory measures wherever possible.”155 However, it 
would seem that GATT panels have tended to adopt a narrow approach to 
the term under GATT Article I with regard to tariff issues.156
In the GATS, the MFN treatment principle is set out in Article II: 1 as 
follows:
W ith  respect to any m easure covered by th is Agreem ent, each M em ber shall 
accord im m ediately and unconditionally to services and service suppliers of any  
other M em ber treatm ent no less favourable than  th a t it  accords to like services 
and service suppliers of any o ther country.
The concept of “like products” in the GATS is in the form of “like services 
and service suppliers”.157 The concept of “like services and service 
supplier” is even more difficult to identify and define than GATT “like 
products”. Services can be delivered in four ways, while “service supplier” 
is defined as any person that supplies a service.158 Furthermore, “person” 
means either a natural person or juridical person,159 and “supply of a 
service” includes the production, distribution, marketing, sale and delivery
154 Japan -  Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Panel Report (W T/DS8/R , W T/D S10/R , 
W T/D S11/R ), para. 6.20; Appellate Body Report, (W T/DS8/AB/R , W T/D S10/A B /R , 
W T/DS 11 /A B /R ), adopted 1 November 1996, p. 20. (Japan-Alcoholic Beverages).
155 Jackson, Davey, and Sykes, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations (1995), 
p. 449.
156 Japan-Dimension Lumber.
157 GATS Article II and GATS Article XVII.
158 GATS Article XXVIII(g).
159 GATS Article XXVIII(j).
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of a service.160 There are thus more layers in trying to determine “like 
services and like service suppliers” than for that of “like products”.161
“Like services and service suppliers” was first considered by the Panel 
in EC -  Bananas.162 The case against the EC was brought before the WTO 
Panel by Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and the US alleging that 
the EC's banana import regime and licensing procedures for the 
importation of bananas in the regime were inconsistent with its obligations 
under GATT 1994 and the GATS. The issue of “like services and service 
suppliers” involved wholesale trade services, in this case of bananas, and 
the Panel first determined this with regard to the national treatment 
principle in GATS Article XVII. Surprisingly, the Panel dedicated little 
attention, and at best provided “summary reasoning”, to this important 
issue.163 The Panel stated:
... in our view, the nature and the characteristics of wholesale transactions as 
such, as well as of each of the different subordinated services mentioned in the 
headnote to section 6 of the CPC, are “like” when supplied in connection with 
wholesale services, irrespective of whether these services are supplied with respect 
to bananas of EC and traditional ACP origin, on the one hand, or with respect to 
bananas of third-country or non-traditional ACP origin, on the other. Indeed, it 
seems that each of the different service activities taken individually is virtually the 
same and can only be distinguished by reference to the origin of the bananas in 
respect of which the service activity is being performed. Similarly, in our view, to 
the extent that entities provide these like services, they are like service suppliers.164
This analysis of “like services and suppliers” was then applied to 
GATS Article I I.165 Thus, the Panel in EC-Bananas used the same
iso GATS Article XXVIII(b).
161 See Nicolaldis and Trachtman in Sauve and Stem (2000), pp. 252-255, where they ask 
the question: what makes two services like? Is Internet telephony, for example, “like* 
standard telephone service? More fundamentally, is it permissible to make distinctions 
between services on the basis of the identity and structure of the service supplier as well as 
the way the service appears to the consumer? Nicolaldis and Trachtman indicate that there 
is a distinction between services and service providers. Another distinction is between 
mode 1 supply (which occurs outside the importing state) and mode 3 supply (which 
occurs within die importing state).
162 Panel and Appellate Body Reports, adopted 25 September 1997.
163 Wemer Zdouc, “WTO Dispute Setdement Practice Relating to the GATS*, 2 JIEL (1999), 
p.295 at 331.
164 EC-Bananas, Panel Report, W T/D S27/R /USA, para. 7.322. (Emphasis added).
165 EC-Bananas, Panel Report, para. 7.346.
169
interpretation of “like services” for the two different provisions of Article II 
and XVII in the GATS. The Appellate Body did not add further to the 
Panel’s interpretation.
In a second and only other WTO dispute case to date where the Panel 
and Appellate Body had to interpret “like services” is Canada -  Certain 
Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry.166 In this case, Japan and the 
EC brought a case to the WTO alleging that Canada’s legislation 
implementing an automotive products agreement between the US and 
Canada violated GATT 1994 and the GATS. More specifically, the parties 
contended that under this legislation only a limited number of motor 
vehicle manufacturers were eligible to import vehicles into Canada duty 
free and to distribute the vehicles in Canada at wholesale and resale 
distribution levels. This duty-free treatment is contingent upon two 
requirements: 1) a Canadian value-added (CVA) content requirement that 
applies to both goods and services, and 2) a manufacturing and sales 
requirement. With regard to the GATS, the parties alleged that the 
measures were inconsistent with Articles II, VI and XVII.
Once again, little attention was given to this issue of “like services”. 
The Panel held:
The com plainants argue, and  Canada does not contest, th a t m anufacturer 
beneficiaries and non-m anufacturer-beneficiaries provide “like” services and are 
“like” service suppliers, irrespective of w hether th e ir services are supplied w ith  
respect to m otor vehicles im ported by the m anufacturer beneficiaries or w ith  
respect to m otor vehicles im ported by non-m anufacturer-beneficiaries, and  
regardless of w hether or not they have production facilities in  C anada ... W e agree 
th a t to the extent th a t the service suppliers concerned supply the same services, 
they should be considered “like” for the purpose of th is  case.167
One reason why the Panels and Appellate Body in both EC-Bananas and 
Canada-Automotive dedicated little consideration to analyzing “like
166 Canada-Automotive, Panel and Appellate Body Reports.
167 Canada-Automotive, Panel Report, para. 10.247.
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services and suppliers” was the fact that the Parties to the disputes 
themselves did not concentrate on this issue. As can be seen from the 
above quote, for example, Canada did not contest the complainants’ 
assertion that the manufacturers in question were like service suppliers.
A second element of the GATS MFN is the “treatment no less 
favourable” standard, similar to that found in the GATT and GATS 
national treatment provisions, but which is not also found in GATT MFN. 
In EC-Bananas the Panel encountered this problem of interpreting 
“treatment no less favourable” in the GATS MFN clause.
The Panel in interpreting “treatment no less favourable” in GATS 
Article 11:1 referred to GATS Article XVII (national treatment), as the latter 
contains the same wordings “treatment no less favourable” and in addition 
provides in its second and third paragraphs clarification as to how 
Members may ensure non-discrimination.168 Such clarification is not 
provided in GATS Article II. The Appellate Body, however, criticized this 
reasoning of the Panel:
A rticle I I  o f the GATS relates to M FN  treatm ent, not to national treatm en t ... The 
Panel w ould have been on safer ground had it  com pared the M FN obligation in  
A rticle I I  o f the GATS w ith  the  M FN and M FN-type obligations in  the GATT
1 9 9 4 . 1 6 9
The Appellate Body itself, however, did not explain why it should be 
more appropriate to interpret the MFN clause of GATS Article II along the 
lines of the differently worded MFN treatment clause of GATT Article I.170 
It did not even provide a sufficient break down in its interpretation of 
“treatment no less favourable” in GATS Article II. The Appellate Body 
merely stated that,
168 EC-Bancmas, Panel Report, para. 7.301.
169 EC-Bananas, AB Report, para. 231.
170 Zdouc (1999), p. 345.
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The GATS negotiators chose to use different language in  A rticle II  and A rticle X V II 
of the GATS in  expressing the obligation to provide “treatm ent no less favourable* 
[...] The possibility th a t the two Articles m ay not have exactly the same m eaning  
does not im ply th a t the in ten tion  of the drafters of the GATS was th a t a  de ju re , or 
form al, standard should apply in  A rticle I I  o f the GATS [...] The obligation im posed 
by A rticle II  is unqualified . The ordinary m eaning of th is provision does not 
exclude de facto  d iscrim in ation .171
Thus, the Appellate Body held that “‘treatment no less favourable’ in 
Article II: 1 of the GATS should be interpreted to include de facto, as well 
as de jure, discrimination”.172 The Appellate Body nonetheless came to the 
same conclusion as the Panel -  that the EC’s various licensing measures 
were inconsistent with Articles II and XVII of the GATS.
Another case where the Appellate Body was asked to review the 
Panel’s findings on the MFN obligation in the GATS is Canada- 
Automotive.173 The Panel found that the manner in which Canada 
conditioned access to the import duty exemption was inconsistent with the 
MFN obligation of GATS Article 11:1. The Appellate Body, however, 
reversed this finding due to the error made by the Panel in its legal 
analysis leading to this conclusion.
In its reasoning, the Appellate Body established a procedure whereby
the consistency of a measure with GATS Article II: 1 should be analyzed:
First, a threshold determ ination  m ust be made under A rticle 1:1 th a t the m easure 
is covered by the GATS. T h is  determ ination requires th a t there be “trade in  
services* in  one of the fo ur modes of supply, and th a t there be also a  m easure 
w hich “affects” th is  trade in  services. I f  the threshold determ ination is th a t the  
m easure is covered by the GATS, appraisal of the consistency o f the m easure w ith  
the requirem ents o f A rticle II: 1 is the next step. The text o f A rticle II: 1 requires, in  
essence, th a t treatm ent by one M em ber of “services and service suppliers* o f any  
other M em ber be com pared w ith  treatm ent of “like* services and service suppliers  
of “any other countiy*. Based on these core legal elem ents, the Panel should firs t 
have rendered its  in terp retatio n  o f Article II: l . 174
171 EC-Bananas, AB Report, para. 233.
172 EC-Bananas, AB Report, para. 234.
173 Canada-Automotive, Panel Report and Appellate Body Report.
174 Canada-Automotive, AB Report, paras. 170-171.
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And applying this analysis to the case before it, the Appellate Body stated:
[The Panel] should then  have m ade the factual findings as to treatm ent of 
wholesale trade services and service suppliers o f m otor vehicles o f d ifferent 
M em bers com m ercially present in  Canada. F inally , the Panel should have applied  
its  in terpretation  of A rticle 11:1 to the facts as it  found them . The Panel did none 
of th is .175
Reversing the Panel’s finding, the Appellate Body concluded:
In  reaching its  conclusions under A rticle II: 1 o f the GATS, the Panel has neither 
assessed the relevant facts [...] nor has it interpreted A rticle I I  o f the GATS and  
applied th a t in terpretation  to the facts it  found.176
Despite having set out the steps to be taken in analyzing a measure’s 
consistency with the GATS MFN obligation and addressing the fact that 
“claims made under the GATS deserve close attention and serious 
analysis”, the Appellate Body did not apply its suggestions to the case but 
instead declared that they were to “leave interpretation of Article II of the 
GATS to another case and another day.”177
Because the liberalization of trade in services in the WTO functions 
through the provisions of the GATS, and the MFN treatment is one of its 
core principles it is imperative that the interpretation of the MFN clause of 
GATS Article 11:1 be clarified in future dispute settlement cases. This 
might take time, however, due to the complexity of the nature of trade in 
services and the newness of the obligations. As seen above, the problems 
of interpreting the MFN treatment in the GATS arise from the fact that it is 
parallel to the MFN provision as found in Article 1:1 of the GATT but is 
worded differently due to the various differences in the nature of trade in 
services from that of trade in goods. The GATS MFN obligation, therefore,
175 Canada-Automotive, AB Report, paras. 171-172.
176 Canada-Automotive, AB Report, para. 181.
177 Ibid., para. 184.
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cannot be applied in identical fashion to that applied in the GATT. In  
contrast to the GATT, the GATS MFN principle does not have tariffs or any 
other form of direct taxation of goods as its focal point.
The MFN obligation in GATS Article 11:1 is broad in nature and 
includes all measures affecting trade in  services.178 There are, however, 
some exceptions and exemptions to the general and unconditional GATS 
MFN obligation. MFN treatm ent for trade in services is qualified by GATS 
Article 11:2, which permits Members to m aintain measures inconsistent 
with Article 11:1 as long as such measures are listed in  and meet the 
conditions of the Annex on Article II Exemptions.179 The Annex on Article 
II Exemptions gave Members a once only opportunity to lis t measures 
inconsistent w ith the MFN obligation before the GATS entered into force. 
After that date, any new exemptions are to be dealt w ith through the more 
stringent procedures for waivers provided in Article IX  of the WTO 
Agreement. These exemptions are subject to review by the Council for 
Trade in Services, and not to last more than ten years.180
In  any case, all the commitments set out in  a country’s schedule 
have to be fulfilled on an MFN basis. The MFN exemption can only be 
used to grant more favourable treatm ent than that provided for in  the 
schedule of specific commitments and only to the Members or countries 
specified in  the exemption. The inclusion of exceptions and exemptions in  
the GATS were necessary to get Member countries to accept a general 
obligation of an unconditional MFN clause that bound them to provide 
MFN treatm ent to every measure concerning trade in services, and not ju st
178 Aly Abu-Akeel, “The MFN as it Applies to Service Trade: New Problems for an Old 
Concept”, 33(4) JW T(\999), p. 103 at 128.
GATS Article 11:2.
iso This one-off opportunity is also available to new Member countries on their accession to 
the WTO.
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measures in certain service sectors. During the Uruguay Round, it was 
agreed that liberalization of trade in  services subject to some temporary 
MFN exceptions would be preferable to no liberalization at a ll.181
As a general obligation, the MFN principle encourages progressive 
liberalization of trade in services through non-discrim ination treatm ent 
between WTO trading partners in regard to any service in any sector. W ith 
regard to telecommunications, the MFN obligation is particularly relevant 
and im portant to the international system of settlement rates. At the end 
of the Uruguay Round and the Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications, 
Members agreed in a “gentleman’s agreement” that the international 
accounting rate system is excluded, for now, from the GATS MFN 
obligation.182 The subject of this moratorium on accounting rates is 
currently being discussed in  the GATS 2000 (Doha Round) negotiations.
5. National Treatment Principle
The core of the national treatm ent principle is that foreign products, 
services or service suppliers should not be discriminated against in  
regards to opportunities to compete w ith like domestic products or 
services. Unlike the MFN obligation in the GATS and unlike its GATT 
national treatm ent counterpart, the GATS national treatm ent principle is 
not a general obligation. Instead, national treatm ent under GATS Article 
X VII is a specific commitment and therefore applies only to the service 
sectors inscribed in individual Member’s schedule of commitments.183 
This is in  part due to the fact that for trade in  services it is generally more
181 WTO, An Introduction to the GATS (1999), p. 4.
182 See WTO, GBT, S /G B T/4, 15 February 1997.
183 GATS Article XVII. On the scheduling of commitments, see above Section IV.2.
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difficult to make a distinction between border measures and internal 
measures, and thus making it more difficult to determine when national 
treatm ent obligation should come into play.184 In  the case of services, 
there are few measures which are applied at the “border”, and most 
restrictions arise from internal measures. The national treatm ent 
obligation as found in the GATS is therefore somewhat different to the 
GATT national treatm ent.
The first noticeable difference is the briefness in the GATS national 
treatm ent provision, compared to the GATT. A more significant distinction 
is that the GATS provision is wider in  scope than the GATT but is more 
lim ited in its application.185 It is wider in scope because, whereas the 
GATT national treatm ent obligation is concerned only w ith measures 
affecting products per se, and not the treatm ent of persons of other 
Members, the GATS national treatm ent includes measures affecting 
services and service suppliers of other Members. In  addition, GATS 
national treatm ent covers all measures affecting the supply of services and 
not ju st internal measures as in  the GATT.186 However, as seen above, the 
GATS national treatm ent is lim ited in application because it applies only 
to scheduled service sectors, and not to all services. Members have the 
freedom to tailor the extent of their commitments on services.187
This application of national treatm ent only to those scheduled service 
sectors lim its the liberalizing effect of the national treatm ent principle to 
trade in services. The reason lies once again in the nature of trade in
184 For trade in goods, border measures would be subject primarily to the disciplines of 
Article II (MFN) and Article X I (General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions) of the 
GATT, while internal measures would be dealt with by the national treatment obligation of 
GATT Article III.
185 Aaditya Mattoo, “National Treatment in the GATS: Corner-stone or Pandora’s Box*, 31(1) 
JWT (1997), p. 107 at 107.
186 GATS Article XVII: 1.
187 WTO, Secretariat (Trade in Services Division), “The GATS: Objectives, Coverage and 
Disciplines*, October 1999, p. 4.
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services. There are four different modes of supplying services, and the 
means for regulating vary widely between modes. The complexity of trade 
in services and their close involvement in domestic regulation led states to 
conclude during the Uruguay Round that a general obligation for national 
treatm ent for trade in services on the same lines as that for trade in goods 
would not be appropriate. Essentially, the negotiators decided to exercise 
restraint in  the liberalization of trade in services through the national 
treatm ent principle which they believed could impinge upon a state’s right 
to regulate domestic services.188
There are three main elements to GATS national treatm ent. First, as 
stated above, GATS national treatm ent applies only to service sectors 
inscribed in a Member’s schedule. Second, GATS national treatm ent 
applies to all measures affecting the supply of services. Third, national 
treatm ent in  the GATS means that treatm ent no less favourable must be 
accorded to foreign services and service suppliers as those accorded to its 
own like services and service suppliers.189
In  EC-Bananas the Panel for the first time considered the GATS 
national treatm ent principle. The Panel set out to determine the 
consistency of the EC’s measures at issue in the case using the three steps 
as in the above paragraph. The Panel found that the EC did make 
commitments on national treatm ent w ith regard to the services at issue 
(first element), and that the EC measures were measures “affecting the 
supply of services” at issue in  the case (second element).190 To determine 
the third element, there are two criteria to address: 1) like services and
188 The GATS Preamble states that the WTO recognizes “the right of Members to regulate, 
and introduce new regulations, on the supply of services within their territories in order to 
meet national policy objectives*.
189 See also EC-Bananas, Panel Report, para. 7.314.
190 EC-Bananas, Panel Report, paras. 7.315-7.316.
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service suppliers; and 2) treatm ent no less favourable. We consider these 
two im portant criteria in turn.
As already discussed in the previous section on MFN, in EC-Bananas, 
both the Panel and the Appellate Body gave little  attention to interpreting 
the concept of “like services”, and the same interpretation of like services 
was applied by the Panel for both the MFN and national treatm ent 
provisions.191 In  the second case on services, Canada-Automotive, the 
Panel also dealt w ith the issue of “likeness” briefly and without setting out 
a systematic guideline as to how this legal point should be determined in  
future cases.192 The Panel held, but restricted to the purposes of the case 
before it, that services supplied through different modes can be “like” 
services. In  this case, services supplied in Canada through modes 3 and 4 
are “like” services to those supplied from the territory of other Members 
through modes 1 and 2 .193
In  GATT jurisprudence, the Panel in Japan -  Alcoholic Beverages 
emphasized that whether two products are “like products” should be 
evaluated on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the GATT provision 
involved. The Panel noted that various criteria had been used in  the past 
to determine likeness. In  the case before them, the Panel considered that 
the term  “like product” should be interpreted narrowly in respect of its use 
in  Article 111:2, first sentence, because of the relationship between Articles 
II and III and because Article 111:2, second sentence, was applicable in  
cases involving directly competitive or substitutable products.194
191 See above Section IV.4.
192 See Canada-Automotive, Panel Report para. 10.289.
193 Canada-Automotive, Panel Report, para. 10.307.
194 Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, Panel Report, para. 6.21
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Accordingly, the Panel concluded that like products should have 
common end-uses and essentially the same physical characteristics.195 
This could be determined by examining relevant factors such as the 
product’s end-use in a given m arket, consumer’s tastes and habits, and 
the product’s properties, nature and quality.196 All in all, the central 
problem of determining “like products” has never been solved on a general 
basis w ithin GATT. The GATT and WTO dispute systems, having resolved 
to use the case-by-case analysis, have thus not been able to provide a 
predictable and consistent approach to determining when two products 
are “like”.
The problem in the interpretation of GATS Article X V II issue of 
“likeness” is that, in  contrast to GATT Article III,197 GATS Article X V II does 
not refer to “directly competitive or substitutable” services but only to 
“like” services and service suppliers. In  this respect, GATS Article X V II is 
sim ilar to GATT Article 111:4.
There is still a long way to go before GATS Article XV II can be tackled 
in  such a way as to provide a clear definition of “like” services and service 
suppliers or at least guidelines as to its scope. A good starting point 
would be to refer to the “Services Sectoral Classification List”.198 The lis t is 
intended to help classify the different existing types of services. In  
determining “like services and service suppliers” we first identify into 
which sector or sub-sector the service falls under. Then we look at the 
characteristics of the service. In  EC-Bananas, for example, the 
characteristics of wholesale trade services include such activities as 
sorting, redistributing, delivering or promoting (the bananas in this case).
195 Ibid., para. 6.22.
196 Ibid.
197 Ad Article III( paragraph 2) in Annex I of GATT 1994.
M TN.GNS/W /120, 10 July 1991. See also Section IV.2 above.
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It is hard to imagine how these transactions could be different in any 
significant way simply because the bananas with respect to which they are 
being supplied are of different origin.199 Hence, the Panel’s conclusion 
that the wholesale services supplied in that case were “like services”.200 
After determining that services are like, suppliers that provide “like 
services” are therefore “like service suppliers”.
It thus remains that in order to determine what are “like services and
service suppliers”, the interpretation must be made on a case-by-case
basis. As the Appellate Body in  Japan -  Alcoholic Beverages stated:
There can be no precise and absolute defin ition of w hat is “like”. The concept of 
“likeness” is a  relative one th a t evokes the image of an accordion. The accordion 
of “likeness” stretches and squeezes in  d ifferent places as different provisions of 
the WTO Agreem ent are applied. The w id th  of the accordion in  any one of those 
places m ust be determ ined by the p articu la r provision in  w hich the term  “like” is 
encountered as w ell as by the context and the circum stances th a t prevail in  any 
given case to w hich the provision apply.201
Perhaps the Council for Trade in Services could provide some clear 
guidance as to which criteria, factors and characteristics should serve as a 
basis for a determination of “likeness”. It appears, however, that this is 
not on the agenda of the GATS 2000 negotiations.
The second im portant criterion to the GATS national treatm ent 
obligation is the standard of “treatm ent no less favourable”. The GATS 
national treatm ent provision, unlike the GATT, has an inbuilt 
explanation/clarification of “treatm ent no less favourable” in paragraphs 2 
and 3 of Article X VII. Paragraph 2 states:
A M em ber m ay m eet the requirem ent o f paragraph 1 by according to services and  
service suppliers of any o ther M em ber, either form ally identical treatm ent or 
form ally d ifferent treatm ent to th a t it accords to its  own like services and service 
suppliers.
199 EC-Bananas, Panel Report, para. 7.322.
200 ibid.
201 Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, AB Report, pp. 20-1.
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And Paragraph 3 defines the criteria in  paragraph 2 as follows:
Form ally identical or form ally d ifferent treatm en t shall be considered to be less 
favourable if  it  m odifies the conditions o f com petition in  favour of services or 
service suppliers of the M em ber com pared to like  services and service suppliers of 
any other Mem ber.
The provisions in GATS Article X V II paragraphs 2 and 3 incorporate
the evolution of GATT jurisprudence of the “treatm ent no less favourable”
standard determined and interpreted over the years by dispute settlement
cases. It has been established that this standard refers to the modification
of competition: the interpretation of no less favourable treatm ent standard
is one of ensuring no less favourable conditions of competition. Article
111:4 of the GATT obliges WTO Members to accord “treatm ent no less
favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect
of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting internal sale, offering
for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.” The Panel
interpreted this provision in United States -  Section 337  as follows:
The words ‘treatm ent no less favourable’ in  paragraph 4 [of GATT A rticle III] call 
for effective equality o f opportunities for im ported products in  respect o f the  
application of laws, regulations and requirem ents [...]202
The standard prohibits measures that might adversely affect the 
conditions of competition facing imported products relative to domestically 
produced goods. Thus there can be differential treatm ent, as long as this 
does not result in the imported product being in a less favourable position 
to compete in the domestic m arket. Other GATT cases have held that 
“treatm ent no less favourable” means equal conditions of competition 
between domestic products and imported ones,203 and that it protects
202 United States -  Section 337 o f the Tariff Act o f 1930, Panel Report, , BISD 36S /345, 
L/6439, adopted 7 November 1989,para. 5.11. Emphasis added.
203 Italian Discrimination against Imported Agricultural Machinery, BISD 7S /60, 64, L /833, 
adopted 23 October 1958, paras. 11-13.
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expectations of the contracting parties rather than specific outcomes.204 
The WTO panels and Appellate Body have endorsed these interpretations 
of the GATT panels.205
The provisions of Article III as a whole together ensure that imported 
products are not subject to discrim inatory internal measures. The 
national treatm ent obligation under GATT Article III is “a general 
prohibition on the use of internal taxes and other internal regulatory 
measures so as to afford protection to domestic production.”206 Article III 
protects “expectations not of any particular trade volume but rather of the 
equal competitive relationship between imported and domestic 
products”.207
In  EC-Bananas, the Panel had to consider GATS Article X V II with 
respect to the different EC licenses.208 The Panel found them all to be 
inconsistent w ith GATS national treatm ent. The Panel straightforwardly 
applied paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article XV II to determine “treatm ent no less 
favourable” and confirmed that “formally identical treatm ent” may be 
considered to be less favourable treatm ent if  it adversely modifies 
conditions of competition for foreign services and services suppliers in  
favour of like domestic ones. Thus the Panel applied the provision to 
determine whether the EC licensing rules in question have an impact on 
the conditions of competition for foreign service suppliers.209 The Panel 
found that all the licenses in  question create less favourable conditions of
204 US-Taxes on Petroleum, BISD 34S /136, L /6175, adopted 17 June 1987, para. 5.1.9.
205 See Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, Panel and Appellate Body Reports.
206 Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, AB Report, p. 17.
207 Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, AB Report, p. 15.
208 See Section IV.4 above for facts of the case.
209 EC-Bananas, Panel Report, para. 7.327.
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competition for like service suppliers of foreign origin therefore they were
inconsistent with GATS Article XVII.210
The Appellate Body also examined the consistency of the EC 
measures w ith GATS Article X V II and agreed w ith the Panel’s analyses and 
conclusions and thus upheld all of the Panel’s conclusions with regard to 
GATS Article X V II.211 In  addition, the Appellate Body rejected the EC’s 
argument that the “aims and effects” of a measure should be considered in  
determining whether a measure modifies the conditions of competition and 
thus inconsistent w ith GATS Article X V II.212
There are difficulties in  the interpretation of the GATS national 
treatm ent principle which are not sim ilarly present in  regard to goods. 
The first is raised by the difference between the text of Article X V II and the 
manner in which commitments on national treatm ent are scheduled.213 
The question is whether the national treatm ent obligation extends across 
all four modes of supply, or do Members retain the freedom to discriminate 
between identical services supplied in their territory through different 
modes -  for instance in the situation where a Member may have inscribed 
national treatm ent commitments for modes 1 and 2 but have not done so 
under modes 3 and 4.?214
Mattoo observes that the structure of the schedules implies that a 
Member’s commitments are mode-specific.215 The wording for GATS 
Article XV II does not refer to modes of supply, as does the specific
210 EC-Bananas, Panel Report, paras. 7.341, 7.368, 7.380.
211 See EC-Bananas, AB Report, paras. 241, 243-244, 246, 248.
212 EC-Bananas, AB Report, para. 241.
213 A. Mattoo, 31(1) JWT (1997), at p. 119. Another difficulty with GATS national treatment 
obligation is that to determine the precise limitations scheduled on national treatment, we 
must also look to the market access column and determine what limitations on market 
access has been scheduled in cases of overlap. This is due to the nature of scheduling 
commitments on services as specified in Article XX:2 of the GATS (see Section IV.2 above). 
This adds to the confusion and difficulty in interpreting a Member’s services schedule.
2“  Ibid.
2is ibid.
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obligation of market access in GATS Article XVI.216 Members’
commitments to provide national treatm ent have, however, been specified 
mode by mode. Mattoo points out that this approach to scheduling 
commitments,
necessarily im plies a  fragm entation o f the national treatm ent obligation in  a way 
th a t is not anticipated in  the text o f the Agreem ent -  for a M em ber m ay reta in  the 
rig h t to discrim inate between identical services supplied through different modes 
by not guaranteeing national treatm ent w ith  respect to each m ode.217
In  the case of Canada-Automotive,218 the Panel decided that a 
Member cannot m aintain discrim inatory measures between like services 
supplied through different modes. The Panel stated:
We note th a t the CVA requirem ents in  the MVTO 1998 and SROs do not 
discrim inate between dom estic and foreign services and service suppliers 
operating in  C anada under modes 3 and 4. This observation, however, does not 
suffice to conclude th a t the requirem ents o f A rticle X V II are m et. In  our view, it  is 
reasonable to consider for the purposes of th is  case th a t services supplied in  
C anada through modes 3 and 4 and those supplied from  the territo ry  o f other 
M em bers through modes 1 and 2 , are “like” services. In  tu rn , th is  leads to the 
conclusion th a t the CVA requirem ents provide an  incentive for the beneficiaries of 
the im port duty exem ption to use services supplied w ith in  the C anadian territo ry  
over “like” services supplied in  or from  the territo ry  of other M em bers through  
modes 1 and 2, thus m odifying the conditions o f com petition in  favour o f services 
supplied w ith in  Canada. A lthough th is  requirem ent does not d istinguish between 
services supplied by service suppliers o f Canada and those supplied by service 
suppliers of other M em bers present in  Canada, it  is bound to have a  
discrim inatory effect against services supplied through modes 1 and 2, w hich are 
services o f other M em bers.219
It  is im portant to note here that the Panel has compared services 
supplied through modes 3 and 4, which include those supplied by both 
domestic and foreign suppliers, to foreign services that are supplied 
through the different modes of 1 and 2 and found them to be “like 
services”. In  this way the Panel determined that Canada violated its GATS 
national treatm ent obligation because the CVA requirements on
218 See GATS Article XVI: 1.
217 A. Mattoo, 31(1) JWT (1997), at p. 121.
218 See Section IV.4 above for facts of the case.
219 Canada-Automotive, Panel Report, para. 10.307.
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m anufacturer beneficiaries accord less favourable treatm ent to services of 
other Members supplied through modes 1 and 2.220
Article XVII: 2 of the GATS makes it clear that lim itations on national 
treatm ent cover both de jure and de facto discrimination. The Panel, in  
the finding quoted above, essentially found that there was de facto 
discrim ination because although there was no discrim ination regarding 
services supplied through modes 3 and 4 between Canadian and non- 
Canadian suppliers, there was potential for discrim ination of like services 
supplied through modes 1 and 2, which were services of other Members.
The national treatm ent obligation has often been a source of 
complaint or dispute in the GATT and the WTO. This is m ainly because it 
refers to domestic regulatory measures, and is therefore intim ately related 
to various governmental measures (such as taxation) that may be based 
on legitimate policy reasons that are not necessarily designed to restrict 
imports.221 The fact is that “striking an appropriate balance between, on 
the one hand, allowing regulators the freedom to make distinctions 
between services products and, on the other, preserving liberal trading 
conditions, w ill be even more difficult in services than it has been in 
goods.”222
220 Canada-Automotive, Panel Report, para. 10.308. Canada did not 
appeal on this point when the case came before the Appellate Body, and therefore the 
opportunity did not arise for the Appellate Body to decide on the Panel’s legal reasoning.
221 John H. Jackson, The World Trading System (1997), p. 213.
222 A. Mattoo, 31(1) JWT (1997), p. 107.
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6. Market Access
Another im portant GATS specific commitment provision is Article XVI on 
m arket access. Like the national treatm ent provision, Article XVI only 
applies to measures affecting those services sectors inscribed in  a 
Member's schedule of specific commitments and are negotiated as 
m ultilateral packages.223 M arket access is not specifically defined in the 
GATS, but in  the WTO framework m arket access outlines “the 
government-imposed conditions under which a product may enter a 
country under non-discrim inatory conditions".224 In  the case of trade in  
services, m arket access is expressed through governmental regulations 
w ithin the borders of the domestic m arket. Article XVI: 1 extends m arket 
access with regard to the commitments made in the schedules on an MFN 
basis, subject to any terms, lim itations and conditions specified in the 
schedule.
Article XVI establishes the provisions to deal w ith trade-restrictive 
regulatory measures. The second paragraph of the GATS m arket access 
provision contains an exhaustive lis t of measures that are inconsistent 
w ith m arket access commitments which cannot be m aintained or adopted 
in  a service sector where m arket access commitments are undertaken, 
unless they are otherwise specified in  a schedule.225 There are six types of 
restrictions expressly stipulated in Article XVI:2 as being contrary to the 
m arket access obligation: (i) lim itations on the number of service
223 See GATS Articles XVI, X IX  and XX.
224 Walter Goode, Dictionary o f Trade Policy Terms (2003), p. 222.
225 in contrast, GATS Article XV II on national treatment does not contain such a list. Thus, 
under Article XVII, any measure which affects conditions of competition to the detriment of 
foreign services or suppliers, in committed service sectors, must be scheduled.
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suppliers; (ii) lim itations on the value of services transactions or assets; 
(iii) lim itations on the number of service operations or quantity of service 
output; (iv) lim itations on the number of natural persons that may be 
employed; (v) lim itations on the forms of legal entity; and (vi) lim itations on 
the participation of foreign capital.226
Members can avoid scrutiny of this provision by deciding not to 
inscribe certain sectors. In  the service sectors which they do inscribe, 
they may list lim itations as defined in Article XVI:2. The question arises 
as to the situation regarding measures that lim it m arket access but do not 
fall into one of the six categories in paragraph 2: do these measures need 
to be scheduled? A number of sources suggest that the only lim itations on 
m arket access allowed to be scheduled are those listed in Article XVI:2.227 
The WTO Guide states that the six elements set out in Article XVI:2, 
between them, cover a ll the aspects of lim itation of m arket access that 
may be specified in national schedules.228 The Council for Trade in  
Service’s Scheduling Guidelines also states that the list is exhaustive.229
In  addition, although the Panel in  Mexico-Telecommunications did not 
state explicitly on the exhaustiveness of Article XVI:2 list, from its analysis 
of Mexico’s scheduled lim itations in respect of Article XVI:2 we can infer 
that the Panel was of the view that Article XVI:2 lis t is exhaustive.230 The 
Panel stated:
[Article X V I:2] contains six categories o f m easures th a t restric t m arket access ... 
M exico’s routing restriction has three m ain  elem ents ... We assess each of these 
elem ents in  tu rn , w ith  respect to th e ir relevance to the six categories o f m arket 
access m easure set out in  A rticle X V I:2 .231
226 Patrick Low raises the question whether the list in Article XVI:2 is in fact exhaustive. 
He suggests the provision is unclear on the matter (see comment by Patrick Low in Sauve 
and Stem (2000), p. 137). Most analysts take the view that the list is exhaustive.
227 Low and Mattoo (2000), p. 454; WTO Guide (1999), p. 171.
228 WTO Guide (1999), p. 171.
229 See WTO, Scheduling Guidelines, adopted 23 March 2001, S /L /9 2 , 28 March 2001, 
para. 8. (Scheduling Guidelines).
230 See Panel Report, W T/D S204/R , paras. 7.77-7.78; see Chapter 4.
231 Ibid. Emphasis added.
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The Panel in  the most recent WTO case on trade in services, US-Gambling, 
also determined that Article XVI:2 list is exhaustive:
The ordinary m eaning of the words, the context o f A rticle X V I, as w ell as the 
object and purpose of the GATS confirm  th a t the restrictions on m arket access 
th a t are covered by A rticle X V I are only those listed in  paragraph 2 of th is  
A rticle .232
A number of clarifications on the scheduling of commitments under 
m arket access and national treatm ent are expounded in the WTO 
Guidelines on Scheduling.233 First, if a measure -  for instance approval 
procedures or licensing and qualification requirements -  is non- 
discrim inatoiy in nature, it should not be scheduled under Article XV II 
national treatm ent. Second, if it does not contain any of the lim itations 
listed in Article XVI:2, it should also not be scheduled under Article XVI on 
m arket access. If  the measure is discriminatory, but does not contain the 
lim itations listed in Article XVI, it should be scheduled under national 
treatm ent. If, however, it is discriminatory and contains any of the 
lim itations listed in XVI, it should be scheduled as m arket access 
lim itations even if  it may also contain lim itations on national treatm ent.234 
If  the measure is non-discrim inatory and contains any of the lim itations 
listed in XVI:2, then it m ust be scheduled under the m arket access 
column. Thus all measures falling under any of the categories listed in  
Article XVI:2 must be scheduled under market access, whether or not they 
are discriminatory according to the national treatm ent standard of Article 
X V II.233
232 WTO, US -  Measures affecting the Cross-Border Supply o f Gambling and Betting Services, 
Report of the Panel, W T/D S285/R , 10 November 2004 (US-Gambling), para. 6.318; see also 
paras. 6.292-6.317. The Panel Report has not yet been adopted because the US has 
appealed the decision, see WTO, US-Gambling, Notification of an Appeal by the United 
States, W T/D S285/6, 13 January 2005.
233 Scheduling Guidelines, S /L /92 .
234 See GATS Article XX:2.
235 See Scheduling Guidelines, paras. 8-18.
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Furthermore, minimum requirements such as those common to 
licensing criteria, for example minimum capital requirements for the 
establishment of a corporate entity, do not fall w ithin the scope of Article 
XVI. If  such a measure is discriminatory w ithin the meaning of Article 
XVII and, if it cannot be justified as an exception, it should be scheduled 
as a lim itation on national treatment. There are certain government 
measures not subject to scheduling. Domestic regulations which do not 
fall under the six categories of lim itation in Article XVI: 2 and which do not 
discriminate against foreign suppliers are not subject to scheduling. Most 
of them are subject to the disciplines of GATS Article VI on domestic 
regulation, in particular Article V I:5.236 Such measures, if  cannot be 
justified as exceptions, m ust be brought into conformity w ith Article 
V I:5.237
All quantitative lim its on services and service providers are dealt w ith 
under Article XVI and include both discriminatory and non-discrim inatory 
measures.238 GATS national treatm ent, as explained, is defined in the 
same way as in the GATT: the non-discriminatory application of domestic 
regulations to foreign services and service providers. It thus follows that 
quantitative lim its placed on foreign services or providers fa ll under both 
the m arket access and national treatment provisions. This creates a 
situation of overlap between the two provisions on m arket access and 
national treatment.
To avoid the duplication of scheduling the same lim itations in both 
the m arket access and national treatm ent columns, Article XX:2 states
236 There are, however, some regulations, such as competition law, which do not fall under 
either Articles XVI, XVII nor VI of the GATS. WTO, Market Access: Unfinished Business, 
Special Studies 6, p. 103.
237 Scheduling Guidelines, para. 11.
238 See Scheduling Guidelines, paras. 8-18.
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that measures inconsistent w ith both Articles XVI and X V II are to be 
inscribed in the column relating to m arket access, and the inscription in  
this case w ill be considered to provide a condition or qualification to 
Article XV II as well.239 Although Article XX:2 was intended to clarify the 
situation, Feketekuty points out that the provision “introduces a 
discrepancy between the text of the provisions in Article XVI and XV II on 
the one hand, and the content of the m arket access and national 
treatm ent columns in the national schedules on the other.”240 This has 
led some countries to believe wrongly that national treatm ent 
commitments become operative only after they have made a commitment 
in m arket access.241
Does this overlap create a hierarchy between Articles XVI and XVII 
commitments in relation to Article XX:2?242 In  other words, is a national 
treatm ent commitment subsidiary to a market access commitment or 
whether once granted, does national treatment apply to all future m arket 
access commitments?243 Substantive discussions on the issue first took 
place in the Council for Trade in  Services in June 2002, lasting for one 
year, after which it was handed over to the Committee on Specific 
Commitments (CSC).244 The CSC discussed this issue for the first time at
239 GATS Article XX:2.
240 Feketekuty (2000a), p. 96.
241 Ibid.
242 See reports of the meetings of the Committee on Specific Commitments from September 
2003 to March 2004: WTO, CSC, Report o f the Meeting Held on 29 September 2003, 
S /C S C /M /30 , 1 December 2003, paras. 28-44 (CSC 1st meeting); WTO, CSC, Report o f the 
Meeting Held on 4 December 2003, S /C S C /M /31, 14 January 2004, paras. 31-74 (CSC 2nd 
meeting). See also Low and Mattoo (2000), pp. 450-1.
243 See CSC 2nd meeting, S /C S C /M /31, paras. 33-72.
244 The CSC discussed the issue over one informal and three formal meetings between 
September 2003 and March 2004. The CSC reported back to the Council for Trade in 
Services in March 2004. See WTO, CSC, Report o f the Meeting Held on 22 March 2004, 
S /C S C /M /32, 25 May 2004, para. 60 (CSC 3rd meeting); WTO, CTS, Consideration of 
Issues Relating to Article XX:2 o f the GATS: Report by the Chairman o f the Committee on 
Specific Commitments, S /C /W /237 , 24 March 2004 (Chairman’s Report); WTO, CTS, Report 
of the Meeting Held on 25 March 2004, Note by the Secretariat, S /C /M /7 2 , 29 April 2004, 
paras. 25-35.
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its meeting on 29 September 2003. The meetings showed continuing 
differences among the delegations as to the interpretation of the two 
overlapping GATS Articles. Some believed that a clear and consistent 
interpretation of the overlap could be found while others remained 
doubtful.245
To summarize, the commitments on m arket access and national 
treatm ent listed in a Member’s schedule contain the negotiated and 
guaranteed conditions for conducting international trade in services. The 
m arket access and national treatm ent commitments act in tandem -  the 
former relating to assisting entry into the m arket and the latter to 
subsequent treatm ent once new entrants are operating in the m arket. 
Market access and national treatm ent are often cited together when 
referring to a Member’s specific commitments in the GATS.
As a general rule m arket access and national treatm ent 
commitments offered by the m ajority of WTO Members are subject to 
lim itations. Thus, to determine how open a country’s m arket is, we have 
to look to its detailed services schedule and determine what m arket access 
and national treatm ent commitments it has made in the specific sectors as 
well as how many service sectors has it listed in  its schedule. To recall, 
not listing a service sector, for example audio visual services, in  its 
schedule means that that country has not made any commitments to open 
its m arket to foreign competition in that particular sector. Thus, the more 
service sectors listed in a Member’s schedule, the more efforts have been 
made towards liberalization of trade in services. And the most open 
regime for foreign service providers is obtained when no lim itations to 
either m arket access or national treatm ent for any of the technically
245 Chairman’s Report, S /C /W /237 , para. 4.
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feasible modes of supply are entered in the schedule. In  this case, the 
government undertakes to remove all measures lim iting cross-border 
supply, consumption abroad, commercial presence or the temporary entry 
of natural persons.
What is m arket access in the context of telecommunications 
liberalization? The more sub-sectors on telecommunications services 
listed in a Member's schedule, the greater the effort is towards 
telecommunications liberalization. And listing the lim itations in both 
m arket access and national treatm ent columns as “none” for all four 
modes of supply entails fu ll commitments towards liberalization of trade in  
telecommunications services. The current services negotiations are 
seeking to achieve as many commitments as possible. Most developed 
countries have committed extensively to telecommunications services in  
three of the four modes of supply. Regrettably, most Members, developed 
and developing countries alike, have made no commitments towards the 
liberalization of telecommunications services through the movement of 
natural persons (except as indicated in their horizontal commitments).
Liberalization is not equated with deregulation. The GATS 
specifically recognizes the right of Members to regulate their service 
industries. So a scheduled commitment does not necessarily imply 
liberalization. The m ajority of commitments negotiated and scheduled in  
the Uruguay Round were “standstill bindings”, committing the country 
concerned only to m aintain the current level of access. More 
liberalization, however, took place in the post-Uruguay negotiations on 
basic telecoms and financial services. Nonetheless, stand-still bindings 
have value. They provide traders and investors w ith the assurance that
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the conditions on which their economic and business decisions are based 
w ill not be overturned by later policy changes.
7. Domestic Regulation
The GATS recognizes each Member State’s right to regulate according to 
its needs, for instance the need to regulate in the public interest.246 
However, domestic regulation could be restrictive to trade. The GATS, 
particularly Article V I, thus require that regulatory measures are 
transparent, non-discrim inatory and not unnecessarily restrictive to trade.
GATS Article VI on domestic regulation is, as Feketekuty puts it,
the essential th ird  leg o f a  three-legged stool, along w ith  A rticle X V I on m arket 
access and A rticle X V II on n atio n al treatm ent. W hile A rticle X V I disciplines the 
use of quantitative restrictions, and Article X V II disciplines d iscrim inatory  
treatm ent of foreign services and service providers, A rticle V I disciplines m ore 
hidden form s of protection buried in  domestic regulations and th e ir 
adm in istration .247
Article V I has six paragraphs, four of which only come into play in  
sectors where specific commitments have been undertaken.248 The two 
most im portant provisions of Article VI are paragraphs 4 and 5.249 GATS 
Article VI:4 stipulates that disciplines on measures relating to qualification 
requirements and procedures, technical standards and licensing 
requirements, not falling w ithin the scope of Articles XVI and X V II, shall be
246 See Preamble to the GATS. In  Mexico-Telecomrminications, the Panel stated precisely, 
before going into their decision, that their findings “do not adversely affect the degree of 
regulatory autonomy which WTO Members, individually and collectively, retain under the 
GATS, including the right to modify specific GATS commitments pursuant to the 
procedures and conditions set out in Article XXI of the GATS.” Panel Report, W T/DS204/R , 
para. 7.3.
247 Feketekuty (2000a), p. 101.
248 Namely, GATS Article VI, paragraphs 1, 3, 5 and 6.
249 For more in depth analyses on Articles VI:4 and VI:5, see Nicolaldis and Trachtman in 
Sauve and Stem (2000), pp. 257-264. They discuss Article V I:5 and the two criteria 
needed to be satisfied before the disciplines in Article VI:5 can be applied. The criteria 
include nullification and impairment (imported from the GATT concept) and the necessity 
test (the “measure should not be more burdensome than necessary").
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established by the Council for Trade in Services. The idea of Article V I is 
that disciplines adopted under paragraph 4 should ensure that domestic 
regulations relating to qualification requirements and procedures, 
technical standards and licensing requirements are not unnecessary and 
do not pose barriers to trade in services.
Meanwhile, Article VI:5 applies the objectives listed in Article VI:4(a)- 
(c) to any new measures that might im pair or nullify commitments made 
in  the schedules, pending the negotiations of the disciplines called for in  
Article V I:4. To date, the only regulatory disciplines to have been 
developed under GATS Article VI:4 are the Accountancy Disciplines, in  
which sector the WTO’s work on domestic regulation discipline have been 
focused.250
From the work done on this sector, it is clear that Article VI is 
concerned only w ith non-discrim inatory measures of regulation.251 The 
effect of this in  practice is that if a Member has not scheduled a national 
treatm ent commitment in  a sector, there is little  that Article V I can do by 
way of imposing disciplines in  that sector.252 Thus, under the current 
GATS structure, improvements in market access and national treatm ent 
need to go hand in hand w ith efforts to strengthen the rules on domestic 
regulation.253
A M inisterial Decision on Professional Services established the 
Working Party on Professional Services (WPPS) on 4 April 1995 to deal 
with GATS Article V I. The WPPS’s role was to implement Article V I:4, for 
which it gave priority to the accountancy sector and the Accountancy
250 WTO, Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in the Accountancy Sector, adopted 14 
December 1998, S /L /6 4 , 17 December 1998.
251 See also Scheduling Guidelines, S /L /9 2 , paras. 11 and 14.
252 Low (2000), p. 138.
253 Ibid.
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Disciplines adopted in December 1998. In  April 1999, the Working Party 
on Domestic Regulation (WPDR) was formed and replaced the WPPS. The 
WPDR’s emphasis is on the development of generally applicable disciplines 
for all service sectors.254 The issues under consideration in the WPDR are 
the necessity test (obligation not to create ‘unnecessary barriers to trade’), 
transparency (requirements in addition to general transparency 
provisions), equivalence (consideration of professional, education 
experience, etc. obtained abroad) and international standards (as 
benchmarks).255 In  the current Doha Round of negotiations, the 
negotiating guidelines for trade in  services adopted on 28 March 2001 
states: “Members shall aim to complete negotiations under Article VI:4 ... 
prior to the conclusion of negotiations on specific commitments.”256
The provisional nature of Article VI requires that attention should be 
turned towards clarifying and strengthening this GATS provision.257 In  the 
Doha Round, the WPDR is currently working on the development of 
disciplines under Article V I:4 and the representatives have been 
discussing Japan’s proposed paper on an Annex on Domestic 
Regulation258 and the EC’s proposal for disciplines in licensing 
procedures,259 as well as the Secretariat’s paper on the necessity test.260 
The work of the WPDR also consists of the issue relating to regulatory 
disciplines for professional services.
254 In other words, a horizontal approach. Regulatory policies in individual service sectors 
are constantly evolving, thus the focus is on work on horizontal elements of Article VI:4.
255 Hamid Mamdouh, Director of Trade in Services Division in the WTO, “The GATS and 
Domestic Regulation: Introduction", power point presentation at the WTO Workshop on 
Domestic Regulation from 29-30 March 2004. Available at http: /  / www.wto.org.
256 WTO, Guidelines and Procedures fo r the Negotiations on Trade in Services, S /L /9 3 , 29 
March 2001, para. 7.
257 L o w  (2000), p .  137.
258 JOB(03)/45 and JO B (03)/45/R ev.l.
259 WTO, WPDR, Communication from the EC -  Proposal on Disciplines on Licensing 
Procedures, S /W PD R /W /25, 10 July 2003.
260 WTO, WPDR, *Necessity Tests" in the WTO, Note by the Secretariat, S /W PD R/W /27, 2 
December 2003.
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It is im portant that government regulations are not more 
burdensome than necessary. This is particularly relevant to 
infrastructural services such as telecommunications. As seen in Chapter 
2, the telecommunications industry, like most other infrastructural 
industries, was heavily regulated for decades. In  recent years, following 
the initiative begun in the US, countries have deregulated and privatized 
their telecommunications industries or have introduced competition in the 
supply m arket while m aintaining regulation w ith regard to access to and 
use of telecommunications networks in order to ensure competition. 
Regulatory disciplines on trade in telecommunications services have been 
developed in the WTO in the form of the “Reference Paper”.261
Feketekuty observes that in sectors where regulation tends to be 
heavy, for instance telecommunications, some degree of international rule- 
making on a sectoral basis would be inevitable, particularly if regulation 
lim its competition or competitive entry.262 However, he cautions that the 
WTO should not establish highly detailed regulations, but instead should 
focus on “establishing legally binding obligations centered on some key 
principles and procedures, while leaving much of the substantive detail to 
other international organizations, national governments, and voluntary 
private bodies.”263 To this end, the telecommunications Reference Paper 
could provide a good model from which to begin establishing WTO 
frameworks on regulatory disciplines for other service sectors, as the 
elements of flexibility are there in the Reference Paper for which Member 
governments have room to commit themselves to regulatory principles on 
telecommunications established by the Reference Paper and at the same
261 See Chapter 4.
262 Geza Feketekuty, “Regulatory Reform and Trade Liberalization in Services", in Sauve 
and Stem (2000b), pp. 238-9.
263 Ibid., p. 239.
196
time retain the freedom to dictate the precise domestic laws to apply 
w ithin their borders.
However, it has been observed that both the accountancy and 
telecommunications experience in domestic regulatory principles still 
leaves unresolved the question of the desirability and feasibility of 
horizontal versus sectoral approaches to the domestic regulation/m arket 
access interface.264 Mattoo and Sauve points out that,
Key questions consulting services negotiators today, therefore, are to w hat extent 
can focusing on the various rationales for regulatory intervention provide the 
basis for developing m eaningful horizontal disciplines on dom estic regulation  
under the GATS, and w here m ay it  be necessary to take a sector-specific 
approach.265
A number of principles could help governments formulate sound 
laws and regulations. Most of these are principles of good governance and 
of a sound legal structure.266 Each country must decide how best to 
incorporate these principles into their own domestic laws and regulations. 
These principles include the following: transparency of laws and 
regulations; due process in  the administration of laws and regulations; 
predictability; non-discrim ination; transparency of regulatory objectives; 
use of m arket mechanisms; and minimizing the scope of regulations.267 
The last principle holds that,
governm ents should only regulate activities directly related to the achievem ent of 
the regulatory objective. Reducing the scope of regulations to the m in im um  
necessary to achieve the desired social objective helps to m inim ize the economic 
cost of such regulations.268
This principle is particularly relevant to infrastructural services such as 
telecommunications.
264 A. Mattoo and P. Sauve, Domestic Regulation and Services Trade Liberalization, World 
Bank Trade and Development Series (1 October 2003), p. 4.
265 Ibid.
266 Feketekuty (2000b), p. 228.
267 For a detailed analysis of these principles, see Feketekuty (2000b), pp. 228-234.
268 Feketekuty (2000b), p. 233.
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Feketekuty suggests that negotiators dealing with regulatory issues 
during the current services negotiations in the Doha Round should follow 
a three-prong approach: 1) they should endeavour to strengthen Article V I 
of GATS, 2) negotiate sectoral agreements in heavily regulated sectors 
along the lines of the telecom agreement, and 3) improve commitments 
incorporated in national schedules.269 According to Feketekuty, this 
approach would serve a number of purposes:
It  would keep the degree o f in trusion  by in ternational ru le-m aking  in  each sector 
to the m inim um  necessary to provide a  viable fram ew ork for m arket entry and  
would open cross-border com petition; it w ould provide a pragm atic basis for 
developing the most effective route to liberalizing trade in  regulated sectors w hile  
preserving national preferences to the extent possible; and it  w ould provide 
alternative m eans for m aking progress. Negotiating strengthened disciplines in  
Article V I is likely to prove an adequate basis for m inim izing regulatory barriers to 
trade in  m any services sectors, p articu larly  the newer professional services and  
services related to the inform ation econom y.270
Article V I is an im portant provision in the liberalization of 
telecommunications services. Measures on telecommunications services 
not subject to scheduling under either market access or national 
treatm ent w ill come under the regulation of Article V I on domestic 
regulation. Thus, for example, a non-discrim inatoiy measure regarding 
licensing not falling under one of the six categories in Article XVI:2 must 
be “administered in a reasonable, objective and im partial manner” (Article 
VI: l) ,271 the application for which must be dealt w ith w ithin a reasonable 
period of time (Article V I:3),272 and must not nullify or im pair the specific 
commitments undertaken (Article V I:5).
As we have seen in this section and the sections on national 
treatm ent and m arket access, the relationship between scheduled
269 Feketekuty (2000b), p. 234.
270 ibid.
271 The Panel in US-Gambling held that Article VI: 1 applies to the administration of 
measures of general application, but does not apply to these measures themselves. Panel 
Report, para. 6.432.
272 Paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article VI thus contain disciplines of a procedural nature. Ibid.
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commitments and domestic regulation is a three-way network between 
Articles XVI and XV II and Article V I. These three-way inter-locking paths, 
however, require that there is a distinction between measures falling 
under Articles XVI and X V II which need to be scheduled, and those falling 
under Article V I, which cannot be scheduled. As we have seen above, if  a 
measure restricts m arket access and falls under one of the categories 
listed in paragraph 2 of Article XVI, it must be listed in the m arket access 
column. If, however, a measure is discriminatory in nature, and does not 
fall under the Article XVI:2 lis t, it must be inscribed in the national 
treatm ent column. All other non-discriminatory measures on domestic 
regulation are subject to the disciplines of Article VI.
However, although Article V I is a general obligation under the GATS, 
certain provisions of Article V I do not apply unless specific commitments 
have been undertaken.273 Thus, there is a lim itation to the scope of GATS 
Article V I as an effective tool in  regulating domestic measures to ensure 
that they are not more restrictive to trade than necessary. Low and 
Mattoo identify the following significant point:
W hile it  m ight be argued th a t the application of regulatory disciplines 
independently of the existence of specific com m itm ents w ould be desirable 
because it  would enhance the conditions of com petition in  the m arket, as a  
practical m atter the value o f regulatory disciplines in  the absence of trade 
liberalization com m itm ents w ould be very lim ited. The legal device o f m aintain ing  
Articles X V I and X V II en tire ly  separate from  Article V I facilitates in terpretation  but 
does not a lte r the fact th a t in  the absence of specific com m itm ents, lim itations on 
m arket access and nation al treatm ent can render A rticle V I disciplines ineffective. 
This conclusion suggests the need for a parallel approach to regulation and  
liberalization .274
273 See GATS Article VI, paragraphs 1, 3, 5 and 6.
274 Low and Mattoo (2000), pp. 455-6.
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8. Transparency Obligations
The other general obligation im portant to the telecommunications sector, 
and one of the cornerstones of the m ultilateral trading system, is 
transparency. Article III of the GATS requires that Members publish all 
relevant laws and regulations affecting trade in  services, including 
international agreements to which they are signatories.275 Each Member 
must also respond prom ptly to any other Member’s request for specific 
information on any of its measures, and enquiiy points must be 
established by each Member to provide specific information on matters of 
a Member’s laws and regulations.276 These provisions are intended to 
provide the WTO and a ll its Members adequate information about 
Members’ practices.
This obligation is specifically extended to telecommunications in the 
GATS Annex on Telecommunications. The Annex transparency obligation 
requires that relevant inform ation on conditions affecting access to and 
use of public telecommunications transport networks and services is 
publicly available.277 This requirement means that information on the 
telecommunications sector of a Member country such as tariffs, 
specifications of technical interfaces, and regulatory bodies that have 
previously been made available in only a few countries, must now be 
published and readily obtainable. W ith transparency obligations, a foreign 
investor hoping to start up a business in telecommunications in a WTO
275 GATS Article 111:1.
276 GATS Article 111:4. The GATS, however, makes clear that a Member is not required to 
disclose confidential information which would impede law enforcement, is contrary to the 
public interest, or which would prejudice legitimate commercial interests of particular 
enterprises. Article III bis.
277 Section 4 Annex on Telecommunications.
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Member country could be assured, at least in theory, of being able to 
acquire the necessary information on the m arket it seeks to enter.
The transparency principle is one of the key elements for promoting a 
rules-based approach to trade policy and domestic measures, and to 
facilitate the monitoring of compliance with WTO obligations with a view to 
avoiding disputes and thereby contribute to the stability and predictability 
of the international trading system.278 Through stability and predictability 
of the markets, the liberalization of telecommunications services can also 
be advanced.
278 See WTO, WGTCP, W T/W G TCP/W /114, 14 April 1999, para. 57.
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Chapter 4
The Liberalization of Telecommunications Services in
the WTO
The liberalization of trade in  telecommunications services took on a new 
global dimension when a m ultilateral framework governing trade in  
telecommunications services was adopted in the WTO. The Agreement on 
Basic Telecommunications (ABT), which entered into force on 5 February 
1998, is the result of the successful conclusion of the extended WTO 
negotiations on basic telecommunications services held after the Uruguay 
Round.
The Agreement on Basic Telecommunications, as it is commonly 
known, is the Fourth Protocol to the GATS. Annexed to this Protocol are 
Schedules of Specific Commitments and Lists of GATS Article II 
Exemptions. It is not a single agreement of trade rules on 
telecommunications services as such. In  addition to the ABT, the 
negotiations on basic telecommunications also generated a paper 
containing guidelines on regulatory principles known as the Reference 
Paper. The Reference Paper is the key to the liberalization of 
telecommunications services and the process of promoting and 
m aintaining competition in  the telecommunications sector.
Although an international organization on telecommunications has 
existed since 1865, there has been no international framework of rules 
that governed trade in telecommunications services on the global scale
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that the WTO does.1 Not only has the WTO adopted an agreement 
regulating trade in telecommunications services, global trade in  
telecommunications services is now subject to the dispute settlement 
procedures of the WTO. The consequence of this is a more open, 
transparent, enforceable and predictable environment in  
telecommunications trade.
The first section of the chapter sets out the history of the m ultilateral 
negotiations on telecommunications services from the Uruguay Round 
until the adoption of the Fourth Protocol. This section also examines the 
characteristics of the telecommunications sector and the tradeability of 
telecommunications services, focusing in particular on the distinction 
between the two types of telecommunications services, basic and value- 
added. The second section provides an analytical examination of the 
liberalization of telecommunications services in the WTO by examining the 
ABT, together with the Reference Paper on regulatory principles, and the 
GATS Annex on Telecommunications. In  the final section, we analyze the 
Panel’s decision on the WTO’s first dispute case on telecommunications 
services and evaluate the Panel’s interpretation of the WTO rules on 
telecommunications services.
1 On 17 May 1865, twenty European countries established the International Telegraph 
Union -  one of the oldest world-wide international organizations -  to oversee cross-border 
telegraphy. The successor to the International Telegraph Union is the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) which was founded in 1932 and became a specialized 
agency of the United Nations in i947. The role of the ITU in the governing of international 
telecommunications has in recent years been over-shadowed by other regional bodies and, 
more importantly, the WTO.
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I. The GATT/WTO Negotiations on Telecommunications 
Services (1986-1997)
Negotiations on telecommunications services in the Uruguay Round of 
m ultilateral trade negotiations began in 1989, three years after the Round 
commenced. It was decided during the m id-term  review meeting of the 
Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) in Montreal in December 1988 that 
the Group on Negotiations on Services (GNS) should proceed with its plans 
to undertake sectoral discussions on the applicability of GATT principles 
and rules to trade in services, alongside the main negotiations on trade in 
services.2 A working group on telecommunications services (WGTS) was 
instructed by the GNS to hold discussions, over four meetings, on the 
specific service sector of telecommunications.3 It was mandated to assess 
whether a specific annex, in  addition to a general agreement on services, 
was or was not necessary for the telecommunications sector, and to 
identify the issues/provisions that might need to be annotated and the 
nature and content of a possible annotation.4 However, in  the absence of 
an agreed overall framework on trade in services, it was not easy for the 
WGTS to cany out these tasks.
During these sector-specific negotiations on telecommunications, a 
number of im portant concerns were identified. First, there was the issue 
of whether telecommunications services are merely a mode of delivery or
2 J.V. Reyna, “Services", in The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (Volume 2) (T.P. 
Stewart, ed.) (1993), p. 2369; GATT, Mid-term Review, GATT Doc. No. MTN.TNC/11, 21 
April 1989.
3 There were also working groups for each of the following service sectors: financial services 
(also had 4 meetings); construction and engineering services; tourism services; transport 
services; professional services (which gave priority to accounting services); audiovisual 
services; and labour mobility.
4 GATT, GNS, Note on the Meeting o f 22 October 1990, MTN.GNS/39, 5 December 1990, 
para. 2.
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whether it is a service sector in  its own right. This issue pertains to the 
dual-role of telecommunications services. Second, there was the issue 
concerning the distinction between “basic” and “non-basic” 
telecommunications services.5 These issues warrant further analysis due 
to the influence they had on the telecommunications negotiations during 
and after the Uruguay Round.
1. Telecommunications: A Dual Role
It is no longer disputed that telecommunications has a “dual role as a 
distinct sector of economic activity and as the underlying transport means 
for other economic activities.”6 In  the early stages of the Uruguay Round 
negotiations, it was not yet accepted that telecommunications was a 
service sector in its own right meriting an annex with rules specific to the 
sector, let alone a m ultilateral agreement such as the ABT.7
Three main inter-linking factors help to explain this dual role. 
Firstly, developments in technology and changing regulatory frameworks 
have caused the telecommunications industry to move from traditionally
5 The latter is now referred to as either “value-added* or “enhanced" telecommunications 
services. “Enhanced" telecommunications services is the US terminology. Other terms 
used for basic/non-basic telecommunications services included reserved/competitive, 
infra-structural/super-structural, excluded/covered, to name but some. GATT, WGTS, Note 
on the Meeting o f 9-11 July 1990, MTN.GNS/TEL/2, 6 August 1990, para. 104. The WGTS 
did not produce precise definitions for the two different telecommunications services. 
Although different terminology was used by delegations during the discussions in the 
working group, there was a general agreement on the distinction between these two types 
of telecommunications services. Even during the extended negotiations on basic 
telecommunications (1994-1997), negotiators chose not to develop a definitive listing of 
what constitutes basic telecommunications, but agreed that the negotiations will cover any 
and all telecommunications services that involve simple transmission (i.e. without adding 
value).
6 GATS Annex on Telecommunications, Section 1.
7 See the report of the first meeting of the WGTS: GATT, WGTS, Note on the Meeting of 5-6 
June 1990, MTN.GNS/TEL/1, 27 June 1990. Some Contracting Parties, Hungary and Chile 
for instance, argued that the general rules and principles in the negotiating GATS cover all 
services and thus were also sufficient for telecommunications services; See ibid., para. 65 
and GATT, WGTS, MTN.GNS/TEL/2, para. 110.
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regulated or state-owned monopolies providing lim ited and largely 
undifferentiated services to an advanced, fast-moving industry supplying 
an increasing diversity of services and products.8 This has been the trend 
since the early 1980s in most developed countries, particularly the US and 
Europe.9 Rapid technological advancement in telecommunications 
coupled with pro-competitive policies further resulted in the blurring of 
definitions and neat categorization of telecommunications services and 
products. This is described as convergence, the second factor contributing 
to telecoms’ dual role.
Convergence in the telecommunications industry means that a clear 
demarcation line between for example broadcasting, traditional voice 
telephony and computer services can no longer be maintained. 
Convergence allows the telecommunications industry to supply more 
differentiated, fast and efficient services. This enables telecommunications 
to provide an underlying means of transport for other economic activities, 
in particular services. Bank transactions, for example, can now be done 
over the phone, the Internet or the television. The development and 
changes in the telecommunications industry over the past decades, 
creating more and better services and fusing them, have allowed for the 
increased tradeability of telecommunications services.
The increased tradeability of telecommunications services is a third  
contribution to the duality of telecommunications as an underlying 
transport mode for other services and as an economic sector in its own 
right. The globally interconnected telecommunications networks 
contribute to this tradeability and in turn provide for a m ultitude of other
8 GATT, Note by the Secretariat, Trade in Telecommunications Services, M TN.GNS/W /52, 19 
May 1989.
9 See Chapter 2 on the evolution of the US telecommunications industry.
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service sectors such as financial services, professional services and 
insurance services.10
2. Basic and Value-Added Telecommunications
The distinction between the two types of telecommunications services, 
basic and non-basic (or value-added), was raised as an im portant issue 
during the negotiations because the US, the largest telecommunications 
m arket in the world at the tim e,11 applied this distinction in its 
telecommunications industries and insisted upon applying the distinction 
in the GATT negotiations. As a consequence, this issue structured the 
debate on telecommunications during the Uruguay Round that resulted in  
the diversity of commitments made in telecommunications and the 
extended negotiations on basic telecommunications after the Round. An 
examination of the origin of this distinction can provide us w ith a 
historical grounding and understanding of the GATT/WTO negotiations on 
telecommunications and their outcome with respect to the commitments 
made.
The two distinct areas of basic and value-added telecommunications 
services arose from the advancement in telecommunications technology 
and was applied for regulatory purposes.12 Technological developments 
have allowed for innovative ways to provide traditional telecommunications 
services and to develop entirely new telecommunications services. As 
telecommunications services became increasingly diverse and
10 GATT, Trade in Telecommunications Services, M TN.GNS/W /52 (1989), para. 3.
11 Since July 2004, China is now the world’s largest telecommunications market, with 305 
million cellular subscribers and 295 million fixed-line users. The Economist, “Telecoms in 
China: Disconnected", 28 August-3 September 2004, p. 59.
12 GATT, MTN.GNS/W /52 (1989), paras. 6-11.
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sophisticated, governments and inter- governmental organizations 
responded by developing different classifications of telecommunications 
services. The International Telecommunications Union (ITU), for instance, 
considered the telecommunications sector as comprising traditional 
services and value-added telecommunications services. Traditional 
telecommunications services, according to the ITU, included voice 
telephony, message telegraphy, telex, facsimile, data transmission and 
those telecommunications services lim ited essentially to transmission and 
switching13 functions. These are essentially basic telecommunications 
services. Value-added services, on the other hand, had additional 
functions beyond transmission and switching, for example data storage, 
incorporated into the services and these were distinguished from 
traditional services.
In  the US, the distinction between basic and enhanced 
telecommunications services could be traced back to the 1956 Consent 
Decree which created an operating barrier for AT&T.14 As explained in  
Chapter 2, the barrier which prevented AT&T from entering the computers 
m arket relied upon a technological distinction between 
telecommunications and data processing, and the corresponding boundary 
between common carrier and non-common carrier activities. The 1956 
Decree, a result of the US Department of Justice’s anti-trust actions 
against AT&T, was intended as a check on the monopolistic powers of the 
telecom operator.
13 “switched” -  “relates to a telecoms network comprising at least one exchange and capable 
of routing signals and messages from one line to all other lines comprised in the network”. 
Oftel Glossary at
http:/ /www.ofcom.org/static/archive/oftel/publications/glossarv/index.htm. See also
Chapter 2.
14 See Chapter 2, Section III. 1.
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The FCC later confirmed the significant distinction between the two 
categories of telecoms services in the Second Computer Inquiry case,15 
where the distinction was made by the FCC in order to determine its 
jurisdiction in regulating the telecoms services in question.16 It  was an 
attempt by the FCC to separate those telecommunications services which 
could be considered as common carriage, and therefore subject to 
restrictions, from those which could be offered competitively.17 When 
telecommunications were provided by national monopolies, 
telecommunications services have typically included local and long­
distance voice telephony over the public-switched network,18 and the bulk 
of international telecommunications activity was m ainly voice 
telecommunications, which is classified as basic telecommunications.19 
There were few if any value-added services and no resale or sharing of 
telecommunications capacity. As seen in Chapter 2, the changes in the 
US telecommunications industry were brought about by advances in  
technology, the inventions of microwave and computers for instance, 
which allowed the emergence of competition in an industry once 
dominated by a single firm .
15 FCC, In the Matter o f Amendment o f Section 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and 
Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking, 61 FCC 
2d 103 (1976); Final Decision, 77 FCC 2d 584 (1980).
16 The Second Computer Inquiry revisited the issue of value-added services, which first 
arose before the FCC in First Computer Inquiry, due to confusion arising from that 
decision. FCC, In the matter o f Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the 
Interdependence o f Computer and Communications Services and Facilities (First Computer 
Inquiry), Final Decision and Order, 28 FCC 2d 267 (1971). See also FCC, Second Computer 
InquiryI (1986).
17 As explained by Bronckers and Larouche, the distinction between basic and value-added 
services stems from “the idiosyncrasies of U.S. telecommunications regulation* and does 
not reflect any inherent differences between the two groups of telecommunications services. 
Marco Bronckers and Pierre Larouche, “Telecommunications Services and the World Trade 
Organization*, 31(3) JWT (June 1997), p.5 at 17-18.
18 “public switched telephone network" -  “a telecoms network used, in whole or in part, for 
the provision of publicly available telecoms services.* - Oftel Glossary at 
httn: /  / www.ofcom.org/static/archive/oftel/publications/glossarv/index.htm.
19 GATT, MTN.GNS/W /52 (1989), paras. 6-11.
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The distinction between basic and value-added telecommunications 
services became one of the highlighted issues during the meetings of the 
WGTS. It  was discovered that although the distinction between basic and 
value-added telecommunications services was made for the purposes of 
regulation, there were differences as to how basic telecommunications 
services were defined in the national markets of the Contracting Parties. 
The US telecommunications regulatory system, although distinguishing 
between these two types of telecommunications services, does not contain 
an express definition of basic telecommunications services. Instead, the 
FCC has equated them w ith traditional common carrier services, and that 
they are lim ited to the simple transmission of customer inform ation.20 In  
Japan, on the other hand, the concept of “basic” telecommunications 
services is not provided for as such in the regulatory framework.21 Japan 
does not regulate its telecommunications industry on the basis of a 
distinction between basic and value-added services but on the distinction 
between operators.22 Operators in Japan are divided into Type I and Type 
II carriers. Type I carriers are operators who provide services through 
their own transmission facilities while Type II carriers provide services 
through leased transmission facilities.23
Even in the WTO agreements, the terms basic telecoms services and 
value-added services are not form ally defined in the GATS or in any of the
20 Second Computer Inquiry, Final Decision (1980) at para. 93; WTO, NGBT, 
Communication from the United States, Response to Questionnaire on Basic 
Telecommunications, S /N G B T /W /3 /A d d .l3 , 21 October 1994, para. 1.
21 WTO, NGBT, Communication from Japan, Response to Questionnaire on Basic 
Telecommunications, S /N G B T /W /3 /A dd .l7 , 25 October 1994.
22 GATT, WGTS, M TN.GNS/TEL/1, para. 17.
23 The former is known as “facilities-based" operators and the latter, “non-facilities based* 
operators.
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agreements on telecommunications.24 There are a few places in the WTO 
framework where a “description” of basic telecommunications can be 
found. The Decision on Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications 
referred to basic telecommunications as “telecommunications transport 
network and services”.25 In  the Annex on Telecommunications, “public 
telecommunications transport services”, which are equivalent to what the 
US call “common carrier basic services”,26 is defined as,
Any telecommunications transport service required ... by a Member to be offered 
to the public generally. Such services may include, inter alia, telegraph, 
telephone, telex, and data transmission typically involving the real-time 
transmission of customer-supplied information between two or more points 
without any end-to-end change in the form or content of the customer’s 
information.27
Examples of basic telecommunications services are listed in Sections
2.C(a)-(g) of the Services Sectoral Classification List28 and these include 
voice telephone services, packet-switched data transmission services, 
circuit-switched data transmission services, telex services, telegraph 
services, facsimile services, private leased circuit services. Due to rapid 
advancements in technology, however, new telecommunications services 
are developed all the tim e and commitments for these services could be 
made under the category of “other” in  the Sectoral Classification List.
24 On the WTO website, basic telecommunications services are described as including “all 
telecommunication services, both public and private that involve end-to-end transmission 
of customer supplier information.* Meanwhile, value-added services are 
“telecommunications for which suppliers ‘add value’ to the customer’s information by 
enhancing its form or content or by providing for its storage and retrieval." See, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/serv e/telecom e/telecom coverage e.htm#basic. 
Even the ITU had no provisions distinguishing between categories of services or facilities 
sometimes categorized as basic or enhanced. GATT, WGTS, M TN.GNS/TEL/2, para. 109.
25 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, Decision on Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications, 15 April 1994, para.
1.
26 GATT, WGTS, M TN.G NS/TEL/1, para. 23.
27 GATS Annex on Telecommunications, Section 3(b).
28 WTO, Note by the Secretariat, Services Sectoral Classification List, M TN.G NS/W /120, 10 
July 1991.
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Examples of telecommunications services listed under this category are 
mobile data services, paging, and teleconferencing.
As for “enhanced” or “value-added” services, these are defined in the 
US regulatory system by the FCC as,
services, offered over common carrier transmission facilities used in inter-State 
communications, which employ computer processing applications that act on the 
format, content, code protocol or similar aspects of the subscriber’s transmitted 
information; provide the subscriber additional, different, or restructured 
information; or involve subscriber interaction with stored information.29
Examples of value-added services are listed in sections 2.C(h)-(n) of the 
Services Sectoral Classification List and they include electronic m ail, voice 
m ail, on-line inform ation and data base retrieval, electronic data 
interchange, enhanced facsimile services, code and protocol conversion, 
and on-line data inform ation and/or data processing.
The incorporation of the US distinction between basic and value- 
added services into the negotiations on telecommunications had a central 
and complicating influence on the negotiations from 1986 u n til the 
adoption of the Fourth Protocol in  1997. In itia l difficulties arose in the 
WGTS meetings when the US objected to the application of the MFN 
principle to basic telecommunications for fear of “free-riders” abusing the 
US’s open telecommunications m arket.30 Allowing the MFN principle to 
apply to basic telecommunications would mean that operators from other 
countries, including non-liberalized ones, who have signed up to the GATS 
could take advantage of the open and liberalized telecommunications 
m arket of the US. These “free-riders” would be able to gain immediate 
access to the US basic telecommunications m arket while denying US
29 47 CFR Sec. 64.702(a). (Section 64.702(a) of the FCC's Rules and Regulation, Code of 
Federal Regulations).
30 See the WGTS’s note on the fourth and last meeting: GATT, WGTS, Note on the Meeting of 
15-17 October 1990, M TN.GNS/TEL/4, 30 November 1990.
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operators entry into their basic telecommunications markets which for the 
most part are provided through monopolies.31
The US pointed out that it had opened its m arket to all suppliers, 
including foreign ones, but that this was not reciprocated in the rest of the 
world. The US argued that,
Given this highly asymmetrical situation between the US basic 
telecommunications market and that in most of the rest of the world, an MFN 
obligation on basic telecommunications services would have a negative impact on 
the US.32
This recurring ‘‘free-rider’* problem could be solved, according to the 
US, if  other governments liberalized basic telecommunications in their 
respective states. The US thus submitted a proposal on liberalizing basic 
long-distance services in December 1991 whereby all GATT members 
would have had to remove all existing m arket entry barriers on basic 
telecommunications services for foreign suppliers.33 Most countries, 
including the industrialized countries of the EC, Japan and Canada, were 
not prepared to adopt such a far-reaching move at the time and the US 
withdrew its proposal.34
The Uruguay Round therefore concluded without an agreement on 
basic telecommunications. W hat was successfully accomplished in
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid., para. 16.
33 M. Fredebeul-Krein and A. Freytag, “Telecommunications and WTO Discipline: An 
assessment of the WTO agreement on telecommunication services", 21(6) 
Telecommunications Policy (1997), at p. 483.
34 Ibid., p. 483; Reyna (1993), p. 2422. During the Uruguay Round negotiations, it seemed 
that the US was the only major industrialized country that favoured liberalization in basic 
telecommunications. This could be explained by the fact that the US was the most 
advanced country in terms of telecommunications liberalization at the time and whose 
telecommunications companies were therefore looking to expand the market beyond the 
borders of the US. The US had begun to liberalize’ its telecoms industry since the 
divestiture of AT&T in 1984 (see Chapter 2). Europe, on the other hand, had only begun to 
consider liberalization of telecoms in the late 1980s, with the release of the Commission’s 
1987 Green Paper. Although the UK was the first to embark on a liberalization’ process of 
telecoms with the privatization of BT in 1981, no other country in Europe did the same 
until the 1990s on the initiative of the Commission. As argued above by the US, its 
liberalized market is a target for free-riders unless other countries liberalize their respective 
basic telecommunications markets.
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telecommunications at the end of the Round was the Annex on 
Telecommunications, attached to the GATS, in  which Members agreed on 
the objective of “elaborating upon the provisions of the Agreement w ith 
respect to measures affecting access to and use of public 
telecommunications transport networks and services”.35 The Annex, 
however, does not oblige Members to make m arket access commitments in  
basic telecommunications and thus fails to liberalize trade in  
telecommunications services. We w ill take a closer look at the Annex on 
Telecommunications in Section II.2 below.
Commitments in the telecommunications sector were nonetheless 
made by Members in 48 of the submitted schedules.36 22 of these include 
some commitments in basic telecommunications, but the scope of 
commitments is narrow and the terminologies used vary considerably.37 
Most of the commitments by Members were for value-added services. 
Negotiating m arket access commitments for value-added services did not 
face nearly as difficult a process as for basic telecoms because value- 
added services emerged as a result of more recent technological 
advancements in telecommunications and were not traditionally provided 
by national monopolies as basic services were. Value-added services were 
left to competition while basic services remained heavily regulated. The 
political difficulties therefore did not exist in the negotiations for value- 
added services as they did for basic telecommunications.
35 GATS Annex on Telecommunications, Section 1.
36 WTO, NGBT, Note by the Secretariat, Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications, 
TS/N G B T/W /1, 2 May 1994, para. 9.
57 Ibid.
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Due to the lack of commitments on basic telecoms, the US suggested 
an extension of the negotiations on basic telecommunications.38 The 
Trade Negotiations Committee at the M inisterial Meeting in Marrakesh on 
14 April 1994 adopted the Decision on Negotiations on Basic 
Telecommunications which established the Negotiating Group on Basic 
Telecommunications (NGBT) to carry out the negotiations for a further two 
years after the conclusion of the Uruguay, to close no later than 30 April 
1996.39 The Uruguay Round therefore failed to obtain commitments 
sufficient to liberalize trade in telecommunications services. It took a 
further three years to achieve the m ultilateral framework that now governs 
the global liberalization of trade in telecommunications, both basic and 
value-added services.
3. The Extended Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications
The objective of the extended negotiations on basic telecommunications, 
part of the GATT/WTO principle of progressive liberalization, was to secure 
market-opening commitments from as many countries as possible.40 
Developing countries, however, were hesitant to participate in the 
extended negotiations on basic telecommunications due to the fact that 
basic telecommunications services in developing countries were provided 
by state monopolies. The two largest and most influential developing 
countries during the Uruguay Round, India and Brazil, for instance did
38 Taunya L. McLarty, “Liberalized Telecommunications Trade in the WTO: Implications for 
Universal Service Policy," 51(1) Federal Cornmunicatioris Law Journal (December 1998), p. 
17.
39 Decision on Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications, paras. 3 and 5.
40 WTO, Press Release, “Next Great Challenge Facing WTO Governments is Liberalization of 
Trade in Telecommunications -  says Director-General Ruggiero", 3 October 1995.
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not join the NGBT as participants until its fifth  and seventh meeting, 
respectively.41
The extended negotiations on basic telecommunications, which 
began on 6 May 1994, were on a voluntary basis and covered all basic 
telecommunications services.42 Participation, in terms of numbers, 
however, was low. In  the first meeting of the NGBT, which was open to all, 
only twenty delegations had expressed their intention to participate - a 
small proportion of the WTO’s 123 Members at the tim e.43 The number of 
participants increased to only 27 after more than a year of negotiations, 
but doubled by the last meeting of the NGBT. For the most part of the 
two-year negotiations, the number of observing states exceeded the 
number of active participants: perhaps an indication that most countries 
were considering w ith great caution the liberalization of basic 
telecommunications.
B ilateral negotiations among participants were held, mostly by 
industrialized countries, alongside the main negotiations conducted by the 
NGBT. In itia lly  characterized as “positive, productive and useful”,44 
disappointments grew over the bilateral meetings and there were calls of 
urgency in the NGBT for more and better offers of commitments to be
41 WTO, NGBT, Report on the Meeting o f27-28 February 1995, S /NG BT/5, 10 March 1995 
(fifth meeting); WTO, NGBT, Report on the Meeting o f 12-13 July 1995, S /N G BT/7, 17 
August 1995 (seventh meeting).
42 Decision on Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications, paras. 1 and 2. The negotiations 
thus did not formally include value-added telecoms services.
43 For subsequent meetings, governments must indicate whether to take part as full 
participants or as observers. WTO, NGBT, Report o f the Meeting o f 6 May 1994, 
TS/NG BT/1, 10 June 1994, para. 2.
44 WTO, NGBT, seventh meeting, S /NG B T/7 (1995), para. 3.
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made as well as for the level of participation to increase.45 Auspiciously, 
by the end of the negotiations in April 1996, a total of 34 draft offers were 
received, of which 21 were revised offers. Talks broke down, however, 
when the US refused to conclude an agreement on basic 
telecommunications due to the poor quality and lack of commitments by 
other Members, particularly those of the developing countries.46 At the 
tim e, only the US and ten other governments47 had made offers to provide 
unlim ited m arket access in basic telecommunications.48 This did not 
cover a “critical mass” of the world telecommunications m arket and, 
according to the US, did not therefore provide sufficient effective 
competitive opportunities for a meaningful agreement.49
Despite the breakdown of the negotiations under the NGBT, the 
results that had been achieved so far were preserved with the adoption of 
the Fourth Protocol to the GATS along with the list of Schedules of 
Commitments and lists of Article II Exemptions. The Decision on 
Commitments in Basic Telecommunications, simultaneously adopted upon 
the closing of the work of the NGBT and which incorporated the three
45 See the Reports on the Meetings of the NGBT from 26 January 1996 -  17 April 1996, 
S/NG BT/12, S /NG BT/13, S /NG B T/14, S/NGBT/15. By the eighth meeting of the NGBT 
in September 1995, only eight draft offers on basic telecoms commitments had been tabled. 
The draft offers were received from Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Japan, Mexico, New 
Zealand, Slovak Republic, and the US. WTO, NGBT, Report o f the Meeting o f 20 September 
1995, S /NG BT/8, 28 September 1995, para. 3. This period coincided with the FCC’s 
adoption of the ECO test which created a two-step ‘barrier’ process for the entry of foreign 
carriers into US market; See Chapter 2, Section VI.3.
46 Bronckers and Larouche (1997), p.9; McLarty (1998), p. 18.
47 The other ten governments were Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, and United Kingdom. Laura B. 
Sherman, “Wildly Enthusiastic about the First Multilateral Agreement on Trade in 
Telecommunications Services*, 51(1) Federal Communications Law Journal (1998), p. 88.
48 Unlimited market access meant providing open market access for all domestic and 
international services and facilities and allowing 100% foreign investment.
«  McLarty (1998), p. 18.
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main objectives made in the Director-General’s proposal,50 established the 
Group on Basic Telecommunications (GBT) to conduct the extended 
negotiations un til the new deadline of 15 February 1997.51
The GBT commenced extended negotiations in July 1996 and decided 
to open the negotiations to all Members of the WTO.52 By 15 February 
1997, the GBT had achieved significant improvements in m arket access 
commitments and in the number of WTO Members adopting the regulatory 
principles in the Reference Paper. The total number of schedules 
submitted had increased from 34 in April 1996 to 55 (counting as one the 
offer of the European Communities and their Member States) at the 
conclusion of the GBT. Nine governments submitted lists of Article II 
Exemptions.53 These schedules and lists of exemptions were attached to 
the Fourth Protocol in replacement of those attached on 30 April 1996.54 
The Fourth Protocol came into force on 5 February 1998.
50 The WTO Director-General, Renato Ruggiero, ‘rescued’ the negotiations from total failure 
when, at the last meeting of the NGBT, he made three proposals in his statement to the 
Group: first, to preserve, as far as possible, the results achieved so far; second, to preserve 
the economic value of the negotiation by maintaining the implementation date of 1 January 
1998; and third, to provide greater flexibility to the talks by allowing a one-month period 
during which participants could re-examine their positions and supplement or modify their 
offers to liberalize. WTO, NGBT, Report on the Meeting o f 30 April 1996, S /N G B T/17, 8 May 
1996, para. 2.
51 WTO, Decision on Commitments in Basic Telecommunications, S /L /1 9 , 30 April 1996.
52 WTO, GBT, Report of the Group on Basic Telecommunications to the Council on Trade in 
Services, S /G B T/2, 23 October 1996, para. 5.
53 They were Antigua & Barbuda, Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, India, Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka, Turkey and the US. The US, for instance, submitted an MFN exemption list on 
telecommunications services involving one-way satellite transmission of direct-to-home, 
direct broadcast satellite and digital audio transmission services because it was not 
satisfied with the quality of commitments made in these areas by other participants. See 
WTO, Communication from the United States: List o f Article I I  Exemptions, S /G B T/W /9, 15 
February 1997; Bronckers and Larouche (1997), p. 5 at p. 35. In its initial services offer 
tabled in the Doha Round on 31 March 2003, the US has removed the MFN exemptions to 
all these telecommunications services. See the US’s In itial Offer, 31 March 2003, p. 112 
available at http: /  / www.ustr.gov. On GATS MFN obligation and exemptions, see Chapter 3, 
Section IV.4. The GATS Annex on Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications allowed 
Members to legally make Article II exemptions on basic telecommunications that were not 
listed at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round and before the entry into force of the WTO 
Agreement.
54 WTO, Decision on Commitments in Basic Telecommunications, S /L /1 9  (1996), para. 3.
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I I.  Telecommunications Liberalization through the WTO 
Discipline
Liberalization of trade in telecommunications services involves the ability 
of foreign service providers to have access to other WTO Member’s 
domestic telecommunications m arket. After eleven years of negotiations 
(1986-1997), the liberalization process of telecommunications services is 
now incorporated under the WTO m ultilateral framework. On the signing 
of the Fourth Protocol to the GATS, 69 governments submitted schedules 
of specific commitments on basic telecommunications.55 Today, w ith the 
addition of more Members making unilateral or new accession 
commitments there are a total of 83 governments that have submitted 
commitments on basic telecommunications, and a total of 70 Members 
have made commitments in value-added services.56 This covers more than 
90% of the world’s telecommunications revenue.57 Since the date of entiy 
into force of the ABT,
the vast bulk of the world market, measured in revenue terms, is subject to open 
markets for the supply of basic telecom services whether on the basis of simple 
resale or over a supplier’s own infrastructure.58
55 Counting the Member States of the European Communities individually, these 
governments include: Antigua & Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, 
Belgium, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Hong Kong, 
Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Korea, 
Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Senegal, Singapore, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Thailand, Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela.
56 WTO website at
h ttn ://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/serv e/telecom commit exempt list e.html and 
WTO, CTS, S /C /W /7 4 , para. 19.
57 WTO, News, “Ruggiero congratulates governments on landmark telecommunications 
agreement*, Press/67, 17 February 1997.
58 WTO, CTS, Telecommunication Services, Background Note by the Secretariat, S /C /W /7 4 , 
8 December 1998, para. 5.
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The WTO now governs an industry w ith an estimated m arket revenue that 
totaled $1,010 billion (US) in  2001.59
Although over half of the WTO Members have made commitments to 
open some or all basic telecommunications services to foreign competition, 
not all are opening their markets at the same time. About 40%, have 
subjected their commitments to a phase-in period.60 This means that 
while the schedule of a Member formally entered into force on the date of 
entiy into force of the Fourth Protocol as a whole, the actual 
implementation w ill be on the date specified in the schedule. Thailand, for 
example, w ill liberalize mode 3 market access of its public 
telecommunications services in  2006.61 Meanwhile, Barbados w ill take 
un til 2012, when monopoly exclusivity expires, before it liberalizes voice 
telephony, data transmission and private leased circuit services offered to 
the general public.62 It is m ainly developing countries which have lim ited 
their commitments through phasing-in.
1. Liberalizing Telecoms through Regulatory Principles: the Reference 
Paper
The most significant product of the extended negotiations is the Reference 
Paper, a set of pro-competitive principles on the regulatory framework for 
basic telecommunications services.63 It is unique: no other WTO 
agreement has a sim ilar set of sector-specific principles to discipline
59 ITU at h ttp ://w w w .itu .in t/ITU -D /ict/statistics/at glance/KevTelecom99.html.
60 WTO website at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/serv e/telecom highlights commit exempt__e.html.
61 WTO, Trade in Services, “Thailand: Schedule of Specific Commitments, Supplement 2”, 
GATS/SC/85/Suppl. 2, 11 April 1997.
62 WTO, Trade in Services, “Barbados: Schedule of Specific Commitments, Supplement 1”, 
GATS/ SC/ 9 / Suppl. 1, 24 February 1998.
63 For the full text of the Reference Paper, see Appendix V.
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domestic regulatory policies. Not even the financial services sector, 
comparable to telecommunications due to its dual role as tradable services 
in its own right and as an underlying means for trade, obtained such a set 
of regulatory principles as the Reference Paper during sim ilar extended 
negotiations on financial services in the WTO after the Uruguay Round.
It was recognized earlier on in the negotiations on basic 
telecommunications that a development of a set of safeguards against 
anti-competitive practices was needed in order to achieve the objective of 
liberalizing the telecommunications sector.64 These safeguards would 
ensure that monopolies or dominant suppliers of basic 
telecommunications could not exploit their dominant positions to distort 
m arket forces and impede the ability of competitors to supply networks or 
services covered by the new commitments. In  addition, the prim ary 
characteristic of trade in telecommunications services is that it takes place 
predominantly through the interconnection and interoperability of national 
telecommunications systems. The ability to interconnect w ith public 
switched networks thus becomes a crucial element of enabling m arket 
access by foreign suppliers.
The process of drafting the Reference Paper began in February 1995 
during the extended negotiations65 with the US distribution of a paper 
entitled, “Pro-competitive Regulatory and Other Measures for Effective 
Market Access in Basic Telecommunications Services”.66 The paper 
addressed four regulatory issues: interconnection of competing basic
64 WTO, NGBT, Note by the Secretariat, Review of Outstanding Issues, TS /N G B T/W /2, 8 
July 1994, para. 15.
65 WTO, NGBT, fifth meeting, S/N G B T/5 (1995), para. 6 .
66 WTO, NGBT, Communication from the United States, S /N G B T/W /5, 9 February 1995 
(US: Pro-Competitive Measures). The US brought to the WTO its experience in the regulation 
of telecommunications. In  its communication, the US stated: T h e  experience of the United 
States, in moving its domestic regime from monopoly to the competitive supply of basic 
telecommunications services, has made clear the need for a pro-competitive regulatory 
system.’  Ibid., p. 1.
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telecommunications supplier; competitive safeguards on dominant service 
suppliers; transparency of regulatoiy processes; and the independence of 
regulators.67 The US negotiators later convened a meeting of selected 
delegates to begin dialogue on these high-lighted regulatory objectives.68 
This select group met regularly thereafter, and assisted by the 
contributions of the US, Canada, Australia and the EC, Japan developed a 
composite set of regulatory principles in October 1995 for discussion by 
the Room A Group,69 and circulated a non-paper in the NGBT at its 
eleventh meeting on 15 December 1995. This non-paper became known 
as the Reference Paper.
The Reference Paper, however, did not have legal status per se. It 
was to be used as a guideline for the scheduling of additional 
commitments.70 Only what was explicitly inscribed in the schedule of 
commitments would be legally binding.71 Thus, if  a Member wished to be 
bound by the principles drafted out in the Reference Paper, they can 
inscribe these under the additional commitments column of its national 
schedule. Although the Reference Paper was never form ally adopted as a 
WTO document, at the conclusion of the basic telecommunications 
negotiations, 63 governments inscribed commitments on regulatory 
disciplines in the additional commitments section of their schedules; and 
57 of these committed to the Reference Paper in its entirety or w ith a few
67 WTO, US: Pro-Competitive Measures, S /N G B T/W /5, (1995).
68 Sherman (1998), p. 71.
69 This group was known as the “Room A Group," after the room at the WTO where it first 
met. Subsequent meetings, informally chaired by the chief Japanese delegate to the NGBT, 
met at the Japanese Embassy. Initial participants represented the US, Australia, New 
Zealand, Japan, Korea and the EC. Participants from Brazil, Singapore, Chile, Mexico and 
the Philippines joined the original participants in later sessions. Sherman (1998), p. 71.
70 WTO, NGBT, Report on the Meeting o f 22 March 1996, S /NG BT/14, 29 March 1996, para. 
5. The Chairman of the NGBT described the Reference Paper as “a tool to help participants 
arrive at an understanding of the kinds of commitments they might undertake on 
regulatory matters." WTO, NGBT, Report on the Meeting of 26 January 1996, S /NG BT/12, 
14 February 1996, para. 6.
71 WTO, S /NG BT/14, para. 5.
222
modifications.72 As with any commitments listed in a Member’s schedule, 
the commitments to the Reference Paper are subject to the dispute 
settlement system of the WTO. This is one of the remarkable 
achievements of the extended negotiations on basic telecommunications.
The Reference Paper, w ith its regulatory disciplines which define the 
role of the regulator vis-a-vis the incumbent telecommunications 
operators, is the key to promoting and m aintaining a competitive 
telecommunications m arket. These disciplines, set out in  six sections, 
detail the principles on competitive safeguards, interconnection, universal 
service, public availability of licensing criteria, independent regulators, 
and the allocation and use of scarce resources. The three core principles 
on anti-competitive safeguards, interconnection and establishment of an 
independent regulator are designed to ensure that the advantages of the 
former monopoly operator are not used to the detriment of new entrants to 
the telecommunications m arkets, and that competition and 
interconnection obligations are enforced. As it is, it is exceedingly difficult 
for new entrants to gain sufficient market share, particularly in relation to 
access to the final customer73 and the provision of fixed local service 
generally.74 In  the UK, for example, the incumbent operator British 
Telecommunications (BT) made the situation of its would-be rivals as 
difficult as possible, so that many gave up.75 Effective regulatoiy 
safeguards, especially in relation to competition and interconnection, are 
indispensable.
72 WTO website at:
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/serv e/telecom e/telecom history e.html.
73 To recall, this access to the final customer is also known as the “local loop”, see Chapter 
2, Section V .l(b ).
74 WTO, Telecommunication Services, S /C /W /7 4 , para. 30.
75 The Economist, “Broadband: the Price is Wrong*, 24-30 November 2001, p. 37.
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(a) Competitive Safeguards
Section 1 of the Reference Paper contains competitive safeguards. It states 
that appropriate measures should be maintained for the purpose of 
preventing major suppliers from engaging in or continuing anti­
competitive practices. An illustrative, though not exhaustive, list of anti­
competitive practices is in  Section 1.2 of the Paper. Engaging in anti­
competitive cross-subsidization is one example.
A criticism  of this provision of the Reference Paper is that for cross­
subsidization to be effectively prevented, an appropriate regulatory 
framework must be developed whereby the major supplier in question 
creates separate subsidiaries w ith independent adm inistration and 
accounting operations, w ith regular reporting and disclosure 
requirements.76 The Reference Paper, however, does not provide for such 
a requirement.
If  the Reference Paper appears brief, it is due to its drafting history 
during the negotiations. This concise document on regulatory principles 
was drawn up to provide a guideline to Members making domestic 
regulatory policies. From the beginning the Reference Paper did not refer 
to obligations of a “WTO Member” because the negotiators decided they 
were developing a “reference paper” and not something binding on any 
Member.77 As a result, negotiators wrote the Reference Paper in the 
passive voice without any indication as to who was to carry out the 
obligations.
76 Bronckers and Larouche (1997), p. 27; Fredebeul-Krein and Freytag (1997), p. 489.
77 Sherman (1998), p. 72.
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Some see this as a weakness,78 but others have pointed to the 
strength in adopting such flexibility.79 This flexibility was necessary due 
to the different regulatory regimes of each Member. New Zealand, for 
example, did not have a separate telecommunications regulator, and its 
representative during the NGBT thus objected to efforts to have the 
document of the Reference Paper refer to a “regulator” as the responsible 
entity.80 The guideline approach in  the Paper was aimed at striking a 
balance between the two objectives of international m arket openness and 
national sovereignty.81
(b) Interconnection
The second section of the Reference Paper on interconnection disciplines is 
the core of the Paper. Allowing non-discrim inatoiy interconnection is vital 
to the liberalization and opening up of telecommunications markets. New 
entrants in the m arket need to be able to link to the incumbent's networks 
in  order to provide services to their customers, as new entrants would not 
yet have enough rolled-out networks. Interconnection is a m atter of
78 See, for example, Bronckers and Larouche (1997); Fredebeul-Krein and Freytag (1997); 
Fredebeul-Krein and Freytag, “The Case for a More Binding WTO Agreement on Regulatory 
Principles in Telecommunications Markets,* 23 Telecommunications Policy (1999), pp. 625- 
644.
79 See C. Blouin, “The WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications: a reevaluation*, 24 
Telecommunications Policy (2000), p. 135.
80 Sherman (1998), p. 72. See Section II. 1(e) below on independent regulators.
New Zealand had no sector-specific regulatory body for telecoms since the industry’s 
deregulation in 1987 by the enactment of the Telecommunications Act 1987. The only 
‘regulation’ of the industry was through effective competition, to be secured through the 
application of the 1986 Commerce Act. New Zealand preferred this light-touch approach 
and generally re-regulation was unwarranted. However, regulation and an independent 
telecoms regulator were re-introduced to New Zealand’s telecoms industry by the adoption 
of the Telecommunications Act 2001 which has as its stated purpose “to regulate the 
supply of telecommunications services* (S. 3(1) 2001 Act). The Telecommunications Act 
2001 is available on the New Zealand government’s website at 
http://www.legislation.govt.n2 /browse vw.asp?content-set=pal statutes. For further 
reading, see J. Laffont and J. Tirole, Competition in Telecommunications (2001), pp. 33-34; 
C. Long, Telecommunications Law and Practice, (1995), Chapter 26, pp. 564-589. 
si C. Blouin (2000), at p. 140.
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commercial negotiation between the parties concerned, and the incumbent
telephone operator holds the power to interconnect.
The Reference Paper provisions on interconnection, which are more
specific than those on competitive safeguards, set out to ensure
telecommunications suppliers are able to link w ith one another,
in order to allow the users of one supplier to communicate with users of another 
supplier and to access services provided by another supplier.82
The disciplines on interconnection in the Reference Paper broadly reflect 
the most recent legislative efforts in the US and the EC.83 Section 2 of the 
Reference Paper contains the core principles of non-discrim ination, 
transparency, reasonable terms and conditions and cost-oriented rates.
The provision’s transparency requirement entail that the procedures 
for interconnection to a major supplier must be made publicly available. 
Major suppliers should also make publicly available either their 
interconnection agreements or a reference interconnection offer. This 
provides a competitive and informed environment for telecommunications 
suppliers negotiating the terms and conditions of their interconnection
82 Section 2.1 Reference Paper.
83 See also Chapter 2. For US legislation on interconnection, see Sections 251 and 252 of 
the 1934 Communications Act, as amended, (47 U.S.C. 251 and 47 U.S.C. 252 
respectively). The elements of non-discrimination, transparency and cost-oriented rates 
central to Section 2 of the Reference Paper were also found in the EC Directive on 
Interconnection (Directive 9 7 /3 3 /EC ) that was part of the old EC regulatory framework on 
telecommunications liberalization. Furthermore, the EC Interconnection Directive likewise 
had a provision to deal with the settlement of disputes over interconnection issues. See 
Directive 97 /33 /E C , OJ L 199/32, 26 July 1997 (Interconnection Directive), in particular 
Articles 1, 2, 6, 7 and 17. The new and current EC telecoms regulatory framework 
replaced the Interconnection Directive with the Access Directive which has its application 
extended to include not only basic telecommunications services but also cable television, 
broadcasting, satellite and Internet Protocol networks. The Access Directive builds on the 
principles set out in the previous Interconnection Directive (97 /33 /EC) and the TV 
standards Directive (95/47/E C ). It  establishes rights and obligations for operators and for 
undertakings seeking interconnection and/or access to their networks or associated 
facilities. It also sets out the objectives for national regulatory authorities (NRAs) with 
regard to access and interconnection. Like in the previous framework, the NRAs are given 
powers under the new Access Directive to intervene to resolve disputes, but they are given 
more pro-active powers to intervene in order to impose obligations on market players. The 
Directive continues the important theme of the basic principles of transparency, non­
discrimination and objectivity. See Directive 2 0 0 2 /19/EC, OJ L 108/7, 24 April 2002 
(Access Directive), in particular Articles 5, 9, 10 and 12.
226
agreements. Furthermore, the Reference Paper interconnection provisions 
require that interconnection w ith a major supplier at any technically 
feasible point in the network to be provided under non-discrim inatoiy 
terms. To achieve this, network operators are also required to unbundle 
network components, to disclose information on technical standards, and 
to guarantee the quality they provide for their own services.
Finally, consistent w ith the US and EC legislation on interconnection, 
the Reference Paper also provides that dispute settlement mechanisms be 
available to resolve disputes regarding appropriate terms, conditions and 
rates for interconnection.84 It does not, however, further elaborate on 
what constitutes ‘‘resolving” the dispute, i.e. whether a settlement can be 
imposed on the parties or not.85
(c) Universal Service
Section 3 of the Reference Paper covers universal service. This provision 
does not provide any definition of parameters for universal service. 
Members are left to define freely the kind of universal service obligation 
they wish to m aintain. The phrase “such obligations w ill not be regarded 
as anti-competitive per seT was in response to India’s concern that any 
universal service system could be attacked as anti-competitive regardless 
of the way it was implemented; the Reference Paper was not intended to 
lim it the scope of universal service obligations.86 The right to m aintain 
domestic policies on universal services is of particular concern for 
developing countries whose telecommunications industry still requires
84 See EC Interconnection Directive (97/33/E C ) and Access Directive (2 0 0 2 /19/EC); See 
also Section 252 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, (47 U.S.C. 252).
85 Bronckers and Larouche (1997), p. 30.
86 Sherman (1998), p. 84.
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continued development of needed infrastructure and the roll-out of 
affordable telecoms services in particular to the more deprived rural areas.
(d) Public Availability of Licensing Criteria
Section 4 of the Reference Paper provides for the transparency of 
government regulation on licensing by providing that all licensing criteria 
and the terms and conditions of individual licenses be made publicly 
available. An applicant is also entitled to the reasons for denial of a 
license upon request. It  is believed that this transparency requirement for 
licensing w ill have considerable effect on the opening of 
telecommunications m arkets.87
(e) Independent Regulators
The rules dealing w ith independent regulators are one of the most 
im portant elements, along with competitive safeguards and 
interconnection, of the regulatory principles. This is particularly so from  
the US perspective. To recall, the modem form of state regulation, 
whereby the operation of the telecommunications industry is 
predominantly left to m arket forces but is also overseen by an independent 
government regulator, originated in the US.88 The US historical experience 
in independent regulation began in the late nineteenth century when the 
Interstate Commerce Commission regulated long-distance 
telecommunications prior to the enactment of the 1934 Communications
87 Fredebeul-Krein and Freytag (1997), p. 490.
88 See Chapter 2.
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Act and the establishment of the FCC, and continues into the competition 
era today.89 Meanwhile in  Europe, where regulatory experience is behind 
the US, the UK was the first to create a telecommunications independent 
regulator in 1984 and at the European level, the concept of independent 
regulators for telecommunications did not emerge un til the adoption of the 
Leased Lines Directive in 1992.90 There has been evolution from the 
necessity for an independent regulator to govern a natural monopoly to the 
independent regulator tasked with the duties to promote competition. 
This trend, evident in developed countries, is growing constantly even 
among developing countries.
The fifth section of the Reference Paper sets out in two sentences the 
discipline for an independent regulator. WTO Members who have made 
fu ll commitments on the Reference Paper must guarantee the separation 
of the regulatory authority from any supplier of basic telecommunications 
services.91 The independent regulatory bodies must also be im partial w ith 
respect to all m arket participants. Although GATS Articles VI and V III 
provide general rules covering Domestic Regulation and Monopolies and 
Exclusive Service Suppliers respectively, the US drew attention to the 
importance of additional commitments to ensure the effective 
independence of the regulator, particularly in basic telecommunications.92 
This Reference Paper discipline is intended to safeguard against potential 
situations of conflict of interests, for instance where governments are 
owners of the incumbent telecoms operator. This Reference Paper
89 Ibid.
99 Council Directive 92 /44 /E E C  of 5 June 1992, OJ L165/27, 19 June 1992. Under the EU 
framework on telecoms, independent regulators, known as national regulatory authorities 
(NRAs), have the duty to monitor the implementation and functioning of EC regulatory 
legislation on telecommunications; there is no central European regulatory authority.
91 A point to note is that the provision does not require that the regulator be independent of 
any government ministry. Sherman (1998), p. 86.
92 WTO, US: Pro-Competitive Measures, S /N G B T/W /5 (1995), p. 4.
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provision calling for countries to establish autonomous regulators is thus 
crucial to the liberalization and competition of telecommunications 
m arkets.93
(f) Allocation and Use of Scarce Resources
The last section of the Reference Paper covers the allocation and use of 
scarce resources stating:
Any procedure for the allocation and use of scarce resources, including 
frequencies, numbers and rights of way, will be carried out in an objective, timely, 
transparent and non-discriminatoiy manner.
Rules on the actual policies of allocating these resources are not, however, 
provided by this provision. It requires that the current state of allocated 
frequency bands are made publicly available, but for national security 
reasons, detailed identification of frequencies allocated for specific 
government uses is not required.
The strengths of the Reference Paper lie in its “guideline structure” and its 
flexibility. Some, however, have criticized it as vague and lacking in  
precision.94 This criticism  fails to appreciate the very reasons for the 
intended “lack of precision” by the drafters. On the contrary, the provision 
on interconnection, for instance, is detailed for a set of principles meant to 
be a “guideline” on regulatory disciplines. Moreover, the interconnection 
provision, as well as the rest of the Reference Paper, is essentially a
93 In the Mexico-Telecomrnunications case, for instance, the US alleged that the Mexican 
independent telecoms regulator, Cofetel, was not effective in controlling the incumbent 
Telmex’s powers and ensuring a competitive environment in Mexico’s telecommunications 
market. See Section III below.
94 See Bronckers and Larouche (1997).
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transplantation of US and EC legislation on telecommunications.95 In  
both the regulatory regimes of the US and the EC, the frameworks are 
drafted in a manner to allow scope for the relevant regulatory authorities 
to hammer out the details. In  sim ilar fashion, the Reference Paper is 
intended as a set of guideline principles whereby WTO Members who have 
committed to them are left to legislate domestically on basic 
telecommunications consistently w ith their WTO commitments.
The flexibility that characterizes the Reference Paper is more 
im portantly an acknowledgment of,
the right of Member States to regulate, and to introduce new regulations, on the 
supply of services within their territories in order to meet national policy 
objectives and, given asymmetries existing with respect to the degree of 
development of services regulations in different countries, the particular need of 
developing countries to exercise this right.96
WTO Members, particularly developed countries including the US and the 
EC, although desiring these additional commitments on regulatory 
principles to ensure effectiveness of market access commitments, 
nonetheless recognize the need to retain flexibility and allow countries to 
provide their own details on basic regulation.97 In  many cases, the 
provisions in the Reference Paper draw upon the principles set out in
95 See Chapter 2, and Section 11.1(b) of this Chapter.
96 GATS Preamble. This WTO recognition of the right of Members to regulate their domestic 
policies on telecommunications, where necessary, can also be found in the Annex on 
Telecommunications, Section 5(e) and (f). Section 3 of the Reference Paper, for instance, 
recognizes the right of Members to regulation of their domestic policies on universal 
service.
97 See WTO, NGBT, Report on the Meeting o f 22 March 1996, S /NG BT/14 (1996), para. 5, 
where delegates have stressed that regulatory principles as proposed in the Reference 
Paper “should take into account the different stages of liberalization and that the varied 
nature of the regulatory systems and structures of each country required that a flexible 
and gradual approach should be adopted*. Flexibility was also intended to ensure that 
developing countries would not be discouraged from taking on such regulatory 
commitments. See WTO, NGBT, S/NG BT/12 (1996), para. 6.
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GATS Article VI:498 and add greater specificity or, in some instances, may 
expand upon the existing coverage and scope of Article V I.99
In the current negotiations on trade in services, as part of the Doha 
Round, Members have been tabling proposals on trade in services, 
including telecommunications. Australia, the US and the EC, for instance, 
have made proposals on improving and strengthening the Reference Paper. 
Proposals included the following: that all Members adopt the Reference 
Paper in full; that meaningful WTO commitments on telecommunications 
require full adherence to pro-competitive regulatory principles contained 
in the Paper; and that the Reference Paper should be strengthened 
through clarification of its provisions on competitive safeguards, 
interconnection, transparency, the independence of regulators and the 
allocation of resources.100 At the end of 2004, there has been no 
indication of a revised Reference Paper and Members who have fully 
committed to the Reference Paper in the previous round of negotiations 
have attached to their initial services offers tabled in the WTO in March 
2003101 the same set of regulatory disciplines contained in the Reference 
Paper drawn up in the NGBT.102
98 These principles are transparency, objectivity and necessity.
99 Lee Tuthill, “The GATS and New Rules for Regulators’ , 21(9/10) Telecommunications 
Policy (1997), p. 783 at 789-790.
100 See WTO, CTS (Special Session), Communication from Australia, Negotiating Proposal 
for Telecommunication Sen/ices, S /C SS /W /17, 5 December 2000; WTO, CTS (Special 
Session), Communication from the United States, Market Access in Telecommunications and 
Complementary Services: the WTO’s Role in Accelerating the Development of a Globally 
Networked Economy, S /C S S /W /30, 18 December 2000; WTO, CTS (Special Session), 
Communication from the European Communities and their Member States, GATS 2000: 
Telecommunications, S /C S S /W /35, 22 December 2000; WTO, CTS (Special Session), 
Communication from Switzerland, GATS 2000: Telecommunications, S /C S S /W /72, 4 May 
2001.
101 As mandated by the WTO Guidelines and Procedures fo r the Negotiations o f Trade in 
Services, S /L /9 3 , 29 March 2001, para. 11; and agreed at the WTO Ministerial Conference 
in Doha in November 2001 (WTO, Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, Ministerial 
Declaration, adopted 14 November 2001, W T/M IN (01)/D EC /1, 20 November 2001, para. 
15).
102 See, for example, the US Initial Offer submitted to the WTO on 31 March 2003, available 
at http: /  / www.ustr.gov; (see Appendix VI), and the EC Initial Offer submitted to the WTO 
on 29 April 2003, at http:/ /europa.eu.int/com m /trade/services/pr290403 en.htm.
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The Fourth Protocol package, including the Reference Paper, provides 
an indispensable set of multilateral framework and regulatory principles to 
promote the liberalization of telecommunications services. But it must be 
recalled that although the Fourth Protocol is an agreement specific to the 
telecommunications sector, trade in telecommunications services are also 
subject to all the obligations and disciplines of the GATS which have been 
discussed extensively in the previous chapter. Moreover, Members still 
incur the obligations contained in the Annex on Telecommunications 
concluded in the Uruguay Round.
2. Annex on Telecommunications
The GATS Annex on Telecommunications is the result of the negotiations 
on telecommunications during the Uruguay Round. Although the 
contents of the Annex were discussed during the WGTS as part of its 
mandate, it was the US who in 1990 originally made the proposal for an 
annex.103 While the US emphasized the necessity of an annex on 
telecommunications,104 some parties, like Chile, did not see the need, their 
argument being that the multilateral framework on trade in services being 
negotiated would cover the issues in this service sector.105
The Annex on Telecommunications establishes the right of Members 
to make use of public telecommunications networks and services. The 
Annex applies to,
103 GATT, Communication from the United States: Annex, Access to and the Use o f Public 
Telecommunications Transport Sendees, M TN.GNS/W /97, 23 March 1990.
104 GATT, WGTS, MTN.GNS/TEL/4, (1990), para. 11.
!os GATT, WGTS, MTN.GNS/TEL/2, para. 110; see also Section 1.1 above.
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all measures of a Member that affect access to and use of public 
telecommunications transport networks and services.106 (emphasis added)
The main objective is to ensure that Members can have access to and use
of public telecommunications transport networks and services of other
Members for the supply of trade in services. The Annex, however, leaves
open whether “access to and use o r also covers “interconnection”. In
technical terms on telecommunications, a difference is usually made
between interconnection and access. As an example, in the EU
communications framework “access” is defined in the Access Directive as,
the making available of facilities and/or services, to another undertaking, under 
defined conditions, on either an exclusive or non-exclusive basis, for the purpose 
of providing electronic communications services. It covers inter alia: access to 
network elements and associated facilities, which may involve the connection of 
equipment, by fixed or non-fixed means (in particular this includes access to the 
local loop and to facilities and services necessary to provide services over the local 
loop), access to physical infrastructure including buildings, ducts and masts; 
access to relevant software systems including operational support systems, access 
to number translation or systems offering equivalent functionality, access to fixed 
and mobile networks, in particular for roaming, access to conditional access 
systems for digital television services; access to virtual network services.107
There is a separate definition for “interconnection” in the same Directive 
which describes interconnection as,
the physical and logical linking of public communications networks used by the 
same or a different undertaking in order to allow the users of one undertaking to 
communicate with users of the same or another undertaking; or to access services 
provided by another undertaking. Services may be provided by the parties 
involved or other parties who have access to the network. Interconnection is a 
specific type of access implemented between public network operators.108 
(emphasis added)
From this definition on interconnection, the EU describes interconnection 
as a type of access specific to public network operators. Thus,
106 GATS Annex on Telecommunications, Section 2(a). In the footnote to this provision, it 
states: “This paragraph is understood to mean that a Member shall ensure that the 
obligations of this Annex are applied with respect to suppliers of public telecommunications 
transport networks and services by whatever means are necessanf (emphasis added). See 
Appendix I.
107 Access Directive (2 0 0 2 /1 9 /EC) Article 2(a).
108 Access Directive (2 0 0 2 /19/EC) Article 2(b).
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interconnection would not be used to describe the situation whereby a 
customer is connected to the public telecommunications network at a 
termination point, such as a phone, or to use the services provided 
generally by telecommunications operators. On the other hand, 
interconnection applies to public telecommunications operators being able 
to connect -  physically and logically link -  their networks with one 
another.109
Although the Annex contains the obligation to allow WTO Members 
access to one another’s public telecommunications networks, it does not 
open up telecommunications markets to competition from foreign 
suppliers. Its impact on liberalizing national telecommunications market 
is therefore limited as it does not oblige Members to make market access 
commitments in basic telecommunications.110 It must be recalled that the 
stated objective of the Annex, unlike the ABT, is not to open up 
telecommunications markets.111 Liberalization per se was never the 
intended goal for the Annex, not even during the negotiations on 
telecommunications in the Uruguay Round.112
Nonetheless, the Annex guarantees that suppliers of services of WTO 
Members will have fair and non-discriminatory access to public 
telecommunications networks and services that they need in order to cany 
out their business, which is the supply of services as specified in 
Members’ schedules.113 This obligation is contained in the seven 
paragraphs of Section 5 of the Annex on Telecommunications, and
109 See also Chapter 2; and US Code of Federal Regulations, Title 47, 47 CFR Ch. 1 Section 
51.5 (October 1, 2003 edition), available at http: /  /wireless.fcc.gov/rules.html.
no Frdebeul-Krein and Freytag (1997), p. 485.
111 See GATS Annex on Telecommunications, Section 1.
112 See notes on the Uruguay Round meetings on telecommunications: GATT, WGTS, 
M TN.GNS/TEL/1; GATT, WGTS, MTN.GNS/TEL/2; GATT, WGTS, MTN.GNS/TEL/3; GATT, 
WGTS, MTN.GNS/TEL/4; GATT, GNS, Note on the Meeting o f 10-25 July 1991, 
MTN.GNS/44, 28 August 1991, paras. 31-42.
113 GATS Annex on Telecommunications, Section 5.
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provides the core of the Annex. The Section 5 obligation applies only for 
the supply of a service included in a Member’s schedule. For example, 
where a Member has listed architectural services in its schedule of 
commitments that Member must ensure that another Member wishing to 
supply architectural services to its country is “accorded access to and use 
of public telecommunications transport networks and services on 
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions” for the supply of 
that other Member’s architectural services.114 In this scenario, even 
though the Annex does not guarantee the right to provide and supply 
public telecommunications networks and services, if basic 
telecommunications services are inscribed in a Member’s schedule, it 
follows that there is an obligation by that Member to accord reasonable 
and non-discriminatoiy access to and use of its public 
telecommunications networks and services for the supply of basic 
telecommunications by other WTO Members.115 The Annex does therefore 
have some power to effect liberalization of trade in telecommunications 
services.
However, since the conclusion of the ABT, it has been said that the 
Annex on Telecommunications has lost some significance.116 Nonetheless, 
the Annex still remains relevant to telecommunications services in three 
main situations. The first is when a given WTO Member has not made any 
commitments under the Fourth Protocol.117 Even if a Member does not 
commit in its schedule to liberalize telecommunications services, it must 
nonetheless guarantee the use and access of its public
114 GATS Annex on Telecommunications, Section 5(a).
115 The Panel decision in Mexico-Telecommunications takes this interpretive approach to 
Section 5 Annex. See Section 111.4(f) below.
116 Bronckers and Larouche (1997), p 32.
“ 7 Ibid.
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telecommunications transport networks and services as underlying 
transport services for other services.
A second situation is when a given WTO Member has made 
commitments under the Fourth Protocol but has not or not fully 
committed itself to the principles in the Reference Paper.118 The Annex 
could provide some protection to suppliers of basic telecommunications. 
Because even if a Member has not committed itself to the Reference Paper 
but has nonetheless committed to basic telecommunications in its 
schedule, the Annex obliges that Member to allow access to and use of its 
public telecommunications networks and services by a basic 
telecommunications supplier of another Member.
A third situation where the Annex is relevant to the liberalization of 
telecommunications services is with respect to suppliers of value-added 
telecommunications services whose governments have made commitments 
on these services.119 The Reference Paper only applies to basic 
telecommunications services, so value-added service suppliers will have to 
rely on the regulatory principles contained in the Annex.
In the next section we examine the first WTO dispute settlement case 
on telecommunications, applying the analyses undertaken in this and the 
previous chapters on the GATS, the Annex on Telecommunications and 
the ABT, in particular the Reference Paper on pro-competitive regulatory 
principles.
118 Ibid.
119 Ibid.
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I I I .  WTO Dispute Settlem ent on Telecom m unications 
Services: US v Mexico
Under Section 1377 of the Omnibus Act 1988, the Office of the United 
States Trade Representative (USTR) conducts annual reviews of foreign 
countries’ compliance with international trade agreements, such as the 
WTO agreements. Through its Section 1377 review, the USTR each year 
identifies countries believed to restrict market access of 
telecommunications services and urges these countries to fulfill their 
responsibilities to address the problems highlighted by the USTR. The Act 
authorizes the USTR to take action against any country determined to be 
conducting unfair trade practices in the telecommunications sector. One 
country that had consistently been on the USTR review list of persistent 
violators was Mexico. The US took the decisive step of compelling Mexico 
to address its telecommunications trade commitments by bringing a case 
against it in the WTO dispute settlement system.120
1. Events Leading Up to Dispute Resolution in the WTO
The US action against Mexico on telecommunications began in 1997 when 
the US Trade Representative, Charlene Barshefsky, announced that the 
US would move aggressively against Mexico’s former monopoly 
telecommunications supplier, Telefonos de Mexico, S.A. de C.V. (Telmex), 
in an effort to pry open its monopolistic hold on the telecommunications
120 WTO, Mexico -  Measures Affecting Telecorrrniunicatioris Services, Panel Report, 
W T/DS204/R , adopted 1 June 2004. Hereinafter Mexico-Telecommunications.
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sector in Mexico. Mexico had committed to liberalize its 
telecommunications market when it signed up to the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that entered into force on 1 Januaiy 1994. 
Mexico further promised to open up its basic telecommunications market 
when, in February 1997, it signed the GATS Fourth Protocol and 
scheduled the full Reference Paper as additional commitments. But by 
2000, Telmex was still abusing its monopoly power to restrict competition 
and the Mexican regulator Cofetel seemed unable to efficiently challenge 
Telmex’s behaviour. Eventually these events led the US to bring charges 
against Mexico to the WTO dispute settlement system.
The case against Mexico is extremely important to the US 
telecommunications industry because Mexico is the US’s biggest market 
for exports of its telecommunications services: US carriers sent 5.5 billion 
minutes of telephone calls from the US to Mexico in 2000 -  the world’s 
largest one-way international traffic on any route.121 And according to the 
US, Mexico’s violations of its WTO commitments cause the US to lose over 
$500 million in potential trade each year.122
2. The Mexican Telecommunications Industry
Telmex is Mexico’s incumbent telecommunications operator. It was 
formed in December 1947 as a private company. Over the years it 
developed into a powerful Mexican corporation with strong political ties.
121 FCC, 2000 Section 43.61 International Traffic Data Report, December 2001, Table A l, 
http: /  /  www.fcc.gov/wcb/iatd /intl.htm l; also Mexico - Measures Affecting 
Telecommunications Services, First Written Submission of the US, 3 October, 2002, 
W T/DS204, paragraph 4 (USFirst Written Submission).
122 USTR, 2003 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, 31 March 2003, 
p. 278. (2003 Trade Barrier Report).
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In 1972, the Mexican government acquired 51% share of Telmex and 
nationalized it in March 1976.
In 1990, Telmex was privatized with the selling of fifty-one per cent 
share to strategic alliances with international entities. The concession was 
awarded for fifty-one years and granted a virtual monopoly for six years. 
After its privatization, Telmex underwent periods of serious modernization 
of its service infrastructure, dropping the waiting period for installing 
telephone lines from up to 2 years in 1990 to about 27 days in 1999. 
Telmex’s financial performance places it among the top technology 
companies in the world.123
In the 1990s, the government established two new executive agencies 
to monitor and regulate the anticipated growth in the sector: the Federal 
Competition Commission (CFC),124 established in June 1993, which has 
oversight over companies that may be engaging in monopolistic practices, 
and the Federal Telecommunications Commission (Cofetel),125 Mexico’s 
independent telecommunications regulatory authority established under 
the Federal Telecommunications Law of 1995 (FTL) on 9 August 1996.126 
The FTL, enacted to coincide with Mexico’s entrance into full participation 
in the NAFTA, provides the legal framework for Mexico’s 
telecommunications regulation. It superseded nearly all laws and 
regulations formerly governing the telecommunications sector and
123 l uz Nagle, “Anti-trust in the International Telecommunications Sector", 33 U. Miami 
Inter-Am.L.Rev. (2002), p. 183 at 191; Elizabeth Malkin, “Mexico’s 800 Pound Gorilla”, 
Business Week, 18 June 2001, at 113.
124 Comision Federal de Competencia.
125 Comision Federal de Telecomunicaciones.
126 Federal Telecommunications Law (“Ley Federal de Telecomunicaciones”), published in 
the Federal Gazette (“Diario Oficial de la Federation”) on 7 June 1995, entered into force on 
8 June 1995.
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includes almost all aspects of the telecommunications industry.127 The 
WTO case against Mexico stemmed from, among others, the FTL 1995.
Similar to the US FCC, Cofetel is charged with both implementing the 
FTL and promulgating regulations based upon the FTL. Unlike the FCC, 
however, Cofetel is located wholly within the executive branch of the 
government, being an administrative unit of the Secretariat of 
Communications and Transportation (SCT),128 although enjoying technical 
and operational autonomy. In addition, Cofetel must work closely with the 
SCT on competition policy and licensing matters. Cofetel has assumed 
much of the duties originally assigned to the SCT, but the SCT has 
exclusive power to issue permits and concessions to install, establish, 
operate and exploit networks, stations and telecommunications services. 
For the first few years, many considered Cofetel a powerless and 
ineffectual body that more often than not turned a blind eye on Telmex’s 
attempts to dominate the telecommunications sector.129
Mexico began to introduce competition into its telecommunications 
industry during the 1990s, with foreign competition entry permitted after 
10 August 1996. The careful transition from privatization to competition 
of the Mexican telecommunications industry was in many ways a textbook 
example of reform.130 There remain, however, at least three significant 
problems as competition got underway: 1) the problems with the Mexican 
regulatory process, 2) rate rebalancing and 3) interconnection policy.131
127 The FTL superseded the Law of General Routes of Communications 1939, 
Communications Law 1940 and the Telecommunications Regulations of 1990.
128 Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Transporte.
129 Nagle (2002), p. 183 at 207. .
130 Peter Cowey and Mikhail M. Klimenko, The WTO Agreement and Telecommunications 
Policy Reforms, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, Report No. WPS 2601, 31 May 
2001, p. 40.
131 Ibid.
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These very issues were the bases of the US complaint against Mexico in 
the WTO dispute settlement system, as will be seen.
3. Competition and Business with the US
The Mexican government ended Telmex’s monopoly concession for 
domestic and international long-distance services on 1 January 1997, 
when 6 entrants initiated service in 60 of Mexico’s largest cities. Local 
services opened to competition on 29 December 1998. Telmex’s primary 
long-distance competitors are Avantel and Alestra. MCI WorldCom (now 
MCI) -  a US telecoms firm -  has a forty-five percent stake in Avantel, and 
Alestra is forty-nine percent owned by AT&T. Since 1996, when the two 
companies entered the long-distance market, Alestra and Avantel together 
have taken over thirty percent of the long-distance market from Telmex.132 
Telmex, however, still retains control of around 97% of the local 
telecommunications market.133 It continues to dominate long-distance 
service, as well as Internet service and other aspects of Mexico’s $12 
billion telecommunications market.134
The introduction of foreign competition to Mexico’s 
telecommunications market in 1997 prompted Telmex to reduce its 
connection fee by half. The new rate, however, was still high and since 
then the US applied pressure on the Mexican government to compel 
Telmex to further reduce the rate. Telmex had agreed to comply with the
132 Nagle (2002), p. 233. Since 2000, however, Telmex has increased its share of the 
Mexican domestic long-distance market and is now reported to control roughly 90% of 
Mexico’s lines; Mexico -  Telecommunications, Second Written Submission of the US, 
February 5, 2003, para. 10 (US Second Written Submission); see also Dow Jones Business 
News, Mexico’s Antitrust Commission Rules Against Telmex, Again, January 15, 2003.
133 Jim Landers, “Making a tough call on Telmex -  US ready to take Mexico’s phone giant 
before WTO again*, The Dallas Morning News, 18 February 2002.
134 Ibid.
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FCC benchmark rate of 19 cents per minute for international settlement 
rates but refused to make any significant reductions before January 2000 
-  the transition date set by the FCC when the benchmark rates will take 
effect for upper middle income countries with which Mexico has been 
classified.135
While the USTR was pressuring the Mexican government to address 
this situation, the telecoms operators themselves were in negotiations. In  
May 2001, Avantel’s parent company, MCI WorldCom, and Telmex agreed 
to a settlement rate of 15.5 cents per minute rate from the US to Mexico 
for 2001, retroactive to 1 January 2001. The rate would go down further 
in 2002 to 13.5 cents per minute and down again to 10 cents per minute 
in 2003.
AT&T, unlike MCI WorldCom, did not agree to the rates. AT&T 
claimed that the new rates were still too high, far exceeding the cost of less 
than 4 cents per minute for completion of a call from US to Mexico. On 20 
June 2001, AT&T, along with Concert, an international joint venture with 
British Telecom, filed a complaint with the FCC contending that the 
agreement between WorldCom and Telmex did not meet Mexico’s WTO 
commitments. Moreover, AT&T criticized Telmex’s style of negotiating only 
with the US carrier which it believes it may obtain the most advantageous 
agreement and then pressuring other US carriers to accept the same 
agreement. Eventually, both US telecoms companies came to an 
agreement with Telmex for the settlement rate of 14 cents per minute 
which, according to AT&T, was still well above the cost of interconnection. 
Despite the agreement reached by the private parties, the US nonetheless
135 See Chapter 2, Section VI.5 on the ISR Order 1997.
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brought a case against Mexico before the WTO dispute settlement 
system.136
Trade figures between the US and Mexico explain the US’s action. 
Mexico is the second largest trading partner of the US after Canada, 
having overtaken Japan in 1999.137 Two-way trade between the US and 
Mexico grew from $81.5 billion in 1993 to $232.2 billion in 2002. US 
exports of private commercial services to Mexico were $14.6 billion in 2001 
and US imports were $11.0 billion. Sales of services in Mexico by 
majority-owned US affiliates were $6.7 billion in 2000, while sales of 
services in the US by majority-Mexico owned firms were $500 million. US 
foreign direct investment in Mexico in 2001 was $52.2 billion up from 
$32.9 billion in 2000.138
In terms of telecommunications trade figures, virtually all of Mexico’s 
international telephone and fax traffic is with the US.139 So heavy is this 
traffic that it constitutes the second largest international route for the 
US.140 The amount of traffic originating in the US is about three times 
greater than the traffic originating in Mexico. The high rates coupled with 
trice the traffic originating in the US resulted in the US paying over $ 1 
billion to Mexico in 2000 for the termination of calls.141 These trade 
figures demonstrate the sheer size and significance of trade between the 
US and Mexico, including trade in telecommunications services which are 
traded in themselves and also provide the underlying transport means for 
other economic activities.
136 The Mexican government was outraged by the US persistence to take it to the WTO’s 
DSB, claiming that this action by the US was “dark*. Reuters, “Mexico slams US over WTO 
telecoms complaint*, 18 April 2002.
137 USTR, 2003 Trade Barrier Report, p. 271.
Ibid.
139 Cowey and Klimenko (2001), p. 41.
140 Ibid.
141 US First Written Submission, p. 1.
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4. The Mexico -  Telecommunications Case: Legal Issues and Panel 
Decision
The Mexico -  Telecommunications case began when the US filed a request 
in the WTO for consultations with Mexico on 17 August 2000, a month 
after Vicente Fox became Mexico’s President.142 After two consultations 
and one failed attempt by the US to request the establishment of a panel, 
a panel was established at the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) meeting on 
17 April 2002.143 The Panel issued a report on its decision of the case on 2 
April 2004, and the DSB adopted it on 1 June 2004.144
(a) Summary of the Case
In Mexico-Telecommunications, the US alleged that Mexico violated its 
commitments in the GATS Annex on Telecommunications and its 
Reference Paper through Mexico’s “International Long-Distance Rules” 
(ILD Rules)145 and other actions.146 The US complaint stated specifically: 
1) Mexico’s measures fail to ensure that Telmex provides interconnection 
to US cross-border basic telecommunications suppliers on reasonable 
rates, terms and conditions (required by Mexico’s Reference Paper Sections
142 WTO, Mexico -  Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services, Request for 
Consultations by the United States, W T/D S 204/1, S /L /8 8 , 29 August 2000.
143 WTO, Mexico-Telecommunications, Constitution of the Panel Established at the Request 
of the United States, W T/D S 204/4, 30 August 2002.
144 WTO, Mexico -  Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services, Panel Report, 
W T/D S204/R , adopted 1 June 2004 (Mexico-Telecommunications); W T/D S204/8, 9 June 
2004.
145 Reglas para prestar el Servicio de Larga Distancia Intemacional que deberan aplicar los 
concesionarios de redes publicas de telecomunicaciones autorizados para prestar este 
servicio, 11 December 1996. Hereinafter the “International Long-Distance Rules" (ILD 
Rules). Available at http:/  / www.cft.gob.m x/htm l/9 publica/reglas/1 ldic96.htm l.
146 WTO, Mexico -  Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services, Request for the 
Establishment of a Panel by the United States, W T/D S 204/3, 18 February 2002.
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2.1 and 2.2 obligations); 2) Mexico’s measures do not prevent Telmex from 
engaging in anti-competitive practices (Section 1 of the Reference Paper); 
and 3) Mexico’s measures fail to ensure US basic telecommunications 
supplier reasonable and non-discriminatory access to and use of public 
telecommunications networks and services (Section 5 of GATS Annex on 
Telecommunications).147
The government measures at issue in the case were: 1) the Federal 
Telecommunications Law (FTL),148 2) the ILD Rules,149 3) the Rules for 
Long-Distance Service,150 and 4) the SCT Agreement.151
(b) Issues of interpretation
Mexico-Telecommunications is the first WTO case involving trade in 
telecommunications services as well as the first WTO case purely on trade 
in services. The Panel was called upon to provide interpretations into the 
terms used in the Reference Paper, the GATS and the Annex on 
Telecommunications Services as well as clarifying the way services 
commitments should be scheduled. The Panel, however, held that the 
legal findings were limited to this particular case so that their 
interpretations on telecommunications services do not apply to other 
service sectors:
147 Ibid. The US request also contained a fourth complaint, that Mexico’s measures did not 
provide national treatment to US-owned commercial agencies (GATS Article XVII). This 
point was however later dropped in the US’s First Written Submission to the Panel (3 
October 2002, W T/DS204).
148 Supra n. 126.
149 Supra n. 145.
150 Reglas del Servicio de Larga Distanda published by the SCT on 21 June 1996.
151 The "Agreement of the SCT establishing the procedure to obtain concessions for the 
installation, operation or exploitation of interstate public telecommunications networks, 
pursuant to the Federal Telecommunications Law" (Acuerdo de la SCT por el que se 
establece el procedimiento para obtener concesidn para la instalacixHn, operation o 
explotacidn de redes publicas de telecomunicaciones interestatales, al amparo de la Ley 
Federal de Telecomunicaciones) published on 4 September 1995.
246
The limited legal task of dispute settlement findings [...] is to decide on the legal 
claims, in a particular dispute, based on the “ordinary meaning* of the WTO 
provisions concerned “in their context* and in light of the “object and purpose* of 
the agreement. Our legal findings are thus limited to the dispute meaning and 
scope of certain GATS obligations and commitments of Mexico in the veiy 
particular context of this bilateral dispute, and do not go beyond what we consider 
indispensable for deciding on the legal claims submitted to the Panel. Our focus 
on telecommunications services may mean that certain elements of our findings in 
this particular services sector may not be relevant for other services sectors with 
different legal, economic and technical contexts.152
In its interpretation of the issues and Mexico’s commitments in the 
case, the Panel applied the general rules of interpretation set out in the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969.153 Article 3.2 of the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) provides that panels are to 
clarify the provisions of the WTO agreements in accordance with 
customary rules of interpretation of public international law. In the WTO 
case US -  Gasoline, the Appellate Body established that the fundamental 
rules of treaty interpretation as set out in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 had “attained the legal status of a 
rule of customaiy international or general international law* and “forms 
part of the ‘customary rules of interpretation of public international 
law*’.154 The Panel stated that since the commitments provided for in 
Mexico’s Schedule are part of the terms of the treaty (GATS), the general 
rules of interpretation set out in the VCLT apply.155
Some of the terms whose interpretation is at issue in the case 
include:
152 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.3
153 Hereinafter the VCLT.
154 WTO, Appellate Body Report, United States -  Standards fo r Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline, W T/D S2/A B /R , adopted 20 May 1996, p. 17.
155 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.15. GATS Article XX:3.
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• “none” or “unbound” when scheduling commitments for 
market access;156
• “facilities” as being broader than just “international ports” and 
perhaps embracing a variety of means that might be used to 
terminate cross-border traffic, including private leased 
circuits;
• “interconnection” in the context of Section 2 of the Reference 
Paper and whether it includes international interconnection 
and thus the international accounting rate regime;
• “reasonable” in the context of interconnection agreements in 
Section 2 of the Reference Paper whether ‘reasonable’ should 
be interpreted according to its ordinary English meaning (“in 
accordance with reason; not irrational or absurd; within the 
limits of reason”), so that terms and conditions of an 
interconnection agreement are reasonable if they are 
appropriate or sensible or rational;157
• “cost-based” when determining interconnection rates; and
• “anti-competitive practices” in terms of Section 1 of the 
Reference Paper.158
156 The WTO Panel had to decide on the way commitments are scheduled for services -  
which is not straight forward like for that of goods. The panel had to clarify that 
scheduling “none" means that there are no limitations to market access and that the 
market of the scheduled sector is fully open. The panel also had to resolve the argument, 
asserted by Mexico, that a limitation scheduled under one mode of supply can be “read 
together" or “in combination" with another limitation listed under a different mode -  the US 
claimed that this line of argument is without any legal support.
157 US Second Written Submission, para. 73.
158 The Reference Paper does not define “anti-competitive practices" but there is a non- 
exhaustive list of what constitutes anti-competitive practices. The US contended that anti­
competitive practices includes, at the very least, horizontal price-fixing agreements. US 
Second Written Submission, para. 80.
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(c) Issues of scheduled commitments: the services at issue
Before determining whether a Member has violated its GATS commitments 
in a particular case, the Panel must first establish what commitments the 
Member has made. Where specific commitment obligations are concerned, 
the Member’s individual schedule must be consulted. In  Mexico- 
Telecommunications, the Panel had to determine whether Mexico had made 
commitments for the supply of basic telecommunications services through 
modes 1 and 3.
We recall from Chapter 3 that the cross-border supply of services 
(mode 1) is, in most cases, straightforward because it does not involve the 
movement of either supplier or consumer to travel to one another in order 
for trade to take place. However, in Mexico-Telecommunications this mode 
of delivery has proved to be a subject of contentious arguments between 
Mexico and the US:
The United States’ claims regarding the services at issue relate to the GATS mode 
of supply known as cross-border supply of these services. However, the parties do 
not agree that the services at issue are actually being supplied by this mode of 
supply.159
The Panel’s first task was thus to determine whether the 
telecommunications services at issue in the case are in fact supplied 
cross-border.
Mexico argued that the services at issue could not be interpreted to 
be supplied cross-border because an operator who simply “hands off” 
telecommunications traffic at the border to another operator would not be 
supplying cross-border within the meaning of GATS Article I:2(a) because
159 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.24.
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this “handing-off” amounts to a “half-circuit” provision of the 
telecommunications services -  only “full-circuit” or “end-to-end” provision 
by the same operator constitutes cross-border supply.160
The Panel rejected Mexico’s arguments after citing definitions of basic 
telecommunications services from the Annex on Telecommunications and 
the description of “public long distance voice telephone services” in the 
CPC161 and came to the conclusion that basic telecommunications services 
are services supplied “between two or more points”, whereby the 
undertaking of the transmission between the points does not have to be 
done by a single supplier, and that long-distance telephone service 
consists of giving a customer access to both “the supplier’s and connecting 
operator’s entire telephone network”.162
Thus, the Panel concluded that the definition of basic 
telecommunications services does not imply or require “end-to-end” 
service by one and the same operator but in fact anticipated the 
“interworking of both operating networks in order for the service to be 
performed.”163 Furthermore, the Panel stated:
It would be unreasonable to assume that the definition of telecommunications 
services applies only where a telecommunications supplier itself owns or controls 
a complete global infrastructure allowing it to reach every potential “point” 
requested by its customer. Had WTO Members intended this to be the case, they 
surely would have made it explicit in the definition.164
The Panel thus found that the services at issue in Mexico- 
Telecommunications, in which US telecommunications suppliers link their 
networks at the border with those of Mexican suppliers for termination of
160 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.27.
161 The CPC is the abbreviation for the UN Provisional Central Product Classification. UN, 
Statistical Papers, Series M No. 77, Provisional Central Product Classification, 1991.
162 Mexico-Telecommunicatioris, paras. 7.30-7.36
163 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.36.
164 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.34.
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the service in Mexico, without US suppliers operating, or being present in 
any way, in Mexico, are services which are supplied cross-border within 
the meaning of GATS Article 1:2(a).165
The Panel then had to establish whether Mexico had undertaken 
commitments on the cross-border supply of basic telecommunications 
services at issue in the case. This required examining Mexico’s Schedule 
of specific commitments (see Appendix X ).166 In  the first column of 
Mexico’s Schedule (the services sector column), Mexico has inscribed the 
following:
Telecommunications services supplied by a facilities-based public 
telecommunications network (wire-based and radio-electric) through any existing 
technological medium, included in subparagraphs (a), (b), (c), (f), (g) and (o).167 
(emphasis added)
The Panel interpreted the term “facilities-based” in this introductory 
heading in Mexico’s sector column, according to its ordinary meaning. 
The Panel determined that the term suggests “infrastructure, or the 
physical elements by means of which the service is supplied”168 and that 
therefore “on its face suggest that the telecommunications services 
committed in Mexico’s Schedule must be supplied [...] by an operator over 
its own infrastructure, and not over infrastructure leased from another 
operator.”169
The Panel consulted supplementary documents to confirm the 
meaning of “facilities-based”, in particular three important documents
165 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.45.
166 See also Chapter 3, Section IV.2.
167 The subparagraphs include voice telephony, packet-switched data transmission 
services, circuit-switched data transmission services, facsimile services, private leased 
circuit services, and other (including commercial agencies), respectively. See Appendix X.
168 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.55
169 Mexico-Telecommunications, paras. 7.55-7.56.
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used by Members as guidance in drawing up their schedules, namely: the 
Draft Model Schedule,170 the related Note by the Chairman of the GBT,171 
and the Scheduling Guidelines.172 From analyzing the supplementary 
documents, the Panel established that,
The word “facilities-based* [...] contained in the introductory heading to Mexico’s 
telecommunications commitments means that Mexico has undertaken 
commitments for the services at issue supplied only on a facilities basis over such 
networks -  and not by resale or leased capacity.173
Having established the telecommunications services listed in 
Mexico’s sector column, the Panel determined what cross-border 
commitments Mexico has undertaken with respect to these services. In  
the market access column under mode 1, Mexico has inscribed “none” 
except international traffic must be routed through the facilities of an 
enterprise that has a concession from the SCT. The Panel, disagreeing 
with the US,174 found that, due to the committed services in Mexico’s 
sector column, this “routing requirement” on market access for mode 1 is 
a limitation within the categories of GATS Article XVI:2(a), (b) and (c) for 
the supply of telecoms services through leased-lines capacity in Mexico.175 
However, the Panel held that,
while this limitation prohibits services that originate on a facilities basis from 
being terminated over leased circuits, it does not prevent these services from 
being supplied when they fall within the facilities-based category with respect to 
termination.”176
170 See WTO, NGBT, Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications, Note by the Secretariat, 
TS/N G B T/W /1, 2 May 1994.
171 WTO, GBT, Notes fo r Scheduling Basic Telecommunications Services Commitments, Note 
by the Chairman, Revision, S /G B T /W /2 /R e v .l, 16 January 1997.
172 WTO, Guidelines fo r the Scheduling of Specific Commitments under the GATS, adopted 23 
March 2001, S /L /92 ; and GATT, Scheduling Initial Commitments in Trade in Services: 
Explanatory Note, M TN.G NS/W /164, 3 September 1993.
173 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.71.
174 See Mexico-Telecommunications, paras. 4.109, 4.113, 7.46.
175 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.85.
176 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.85.
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The Panel found overall that,
the inscription in Mexico’s Schedule of the routing requirement prohibits market 
access for the supply of the services at issue on a non-facilities basis (over 
capacity leased by an operator) in Mexico, but allows full access for the services at 
issue supplied on a facilities-basis (not over capacity leased by an operator) in 
Mexico -  subject to routing the traffic through Mexican enterprises that have a 
“concession”.177
Having established Mexico’s telecoms services commitments as inscribed 
in its Schedule, the Panel then proceeded to determine whether Mexico 
has fulfilled its commitments under Sections 2.1 and 2.2 of the Reference 
Paper with regard to the cross-border supply of the basic 
telecommunications at issue.
(d) Issues of interconnection and accounting rates: Section 2 of 
the Reference Paper
There is a two-step process to determining whether Mexico has fulfilled its 
commitments under Sections 2.1 and 2.2 of the Reference Paper. First, 
the Panel had to determine whether Mexico has undertaken commitments 
under Section 2 of the Reference Paper in the first place. If  the answer 
was yes, the Panel then had to decide whether Mexico had fulfilled those 
commitments.
The most important part of the US case against Mexico revolved 
around the issue of interconnection rates. The focus of the argument was 
whether interconnection rate in Section 2 of the Reference Paper is 
synonymous with international accounting rate -  the traditional form of 
settling costs for the termination of international calls between carriers of
177 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.91; and see paras. 7.77- 7.91.
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one country and those of another.178 The Reference Paper does not 
contain any reference to the term “accounting rate”, but the section on 
interconnection rates requires that interconnection rates are reasonable 
and based on costs.
The US argument was that interconnection rates and termination 
rates and accounting rates are different terms about the same things -  the 
price privately negotiated by telecommunications carriers to terminate one 
another’s calls. The US claimed that the rate US carriers had to pay 
Mexican carriers was not reasonable and not cost-based but was in fact 
well above costs. This, the US claimed, was a violation of Mexico of its 
WTO commitments.
Mexico’s response was that it did not undertake a specific 
commitment in its Schedule to permit the supply of cross-border supply of 
basic telecommunications services. In any case, the obligations of the 
Reference Paper extended only to “domestic interconnection”. According to 
Mexico, “international interconnection” or “accounting rate regimes” is not 
“interconnection” as defined in Mexico’s Reference Paper.179 Mexico also 
argued that the US had failed to show that Mexico’s interconnection rates 
were not “basadas en costos” (cost-oriented) or that the terms and 
conditions of interconnection were unreasonable.
The Mexican telecommunications law at the centre of the US case is 
contained in the ILD Rules, more specifically the rules on the “uniform  
settlement rate” system, which the US argued prohibit competition.180 ILD 
Rule 13 allows the long-distance operator with the highest volume of 
outgoing traffic on a particular international route, which has always been
178 See also Chapter 2, Section V I.5.
179 Oral Statement of the US at the First Panel Meeting, 17 December 2002, para. 19.
iso ILD Rules 10 and 13.
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Telmex, to have the exclusive right to establish the terms and conditions 
for the termination of all international calls. What this means is that 
Telmex alone can negotiate the terms and conditions, including the 
settlement rates and termination rates, with a foreign carrier in another 
country, for instance the US, and under ILD Rule 10, other Mexican 
carriers providing international services must adopt these terms and 
conditions agreed by Telmex with the foreign carriers.
The interpretation of “interconnection rate” was important to both the 
US and Mexican cases and to international telecommunications generally.
1) The meaning of “interconnection”
The Panel needed to determine the meaning of “interconnection” as found 
in the Reference Paper in order to establish whether Mexico had 
undertaken commitments under Section 2 of the Reference Paper. The 
Panel applied the rules of treaty interpretation as set out in Articles 31 
and 32 of the VCLT as follows. First, the Panel determined the ordinary 
meaning of “interconnection”, thus applying the first element of Article 
31(1) of the VCLT. Second, the Panel looked at the context provided by the 
term “interconnection”, thereby applying Article 31(1) of the VCLT, second 
element -  “in their context”. Third, the Panel examined other contextual 
elements. Fourth, the Panel determined the object and purpose of the 
treaty (the GATS), applying the third element of Article 31(1) VCLT. Fifth, 
the Panel took into account “supplementary means” of interpretation -  in 
this case the “Understanding on Accounting Rates” -  applying Article 32 
VCLT. Sixth, the Panel examined “other supplementary means” which 
may be relevant by looking at the drafting history of the Reference Paper.
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a) “Ordinary meaning”
In determining the ordinary meaning of “interconnection”, the Panel found 
as follows: 1) Section 2 of the Reference Paper could not be read to exclude 
suppliers outside Mexico from “linking” to public telecommunications 
transport networks and services in Mexico;181 2) the term “interconnection” 
is used in Mexico for interconnection between domestic networks, and 
between domestic and foreign networks;182 3) from a commercial 
perspective, domestic and international interconnection do not differ 
significantly thus disagreeing with Mexico’s argument that international 
interconnection under a traditional, “joint service” regime is distinctive 
because the two operators cooperate, and do not compete for the same 
customers as they do in domestic interconnection;183 4) from a contractual 
perspective, there are no significant differences between the domestic and 
international interconnection arrangements, including through accounting 
rate regimes;184 and 5) from a technical perspective, the “mid-point” cross- 
border link-up, which Mexico argued is particular to international 
interconnection, arises also in certain situations of domestic 
interconnection,185
Having found the above, the Panel concluded that “interconnection” 
in Section 2 of the Reference applies to both domestic and international 
interconnection, including, significantly, the accounting rate regimes. 
This is,
181 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.105.
182 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.110.
183 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.113.
184 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.114.
185 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.116.
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confirmed by an exam ination of any “special meaning” that the term 
“interconnection” may have in telecommunications legislation, or by taking into 
account potential commercial, contractual or technical differences inherent in 
international interconnection. We find that any “special meaning” of the term 
“interconnection” in Section 2 of Mexico’s Reference Paper does not justify a 
restricted interpretation of interconnection, or of the term “linking”, which would 
exclude international interconnection, including accounting rate regimes, from the 
scope of Section 2 of the Reference Paper.186
b) “Object and purpose” of the treaty
The Panel turned to the “object and purpose” of the treaty -  the GATS -  to 
find further support for the interpretation of “interconnection” derived 
from the examination of the ordinary meaning of the term in its context, 
and in so doing applied the third element of Article 31(1) of the Vienna 
Convention. In its reasoning, the Panel stated:
Article 1:1 of the GATS provides that the agreement extends to “measures affecting 
trade in services”. Trade in services is defined in Article 1:2 to include the cross- 
border supply of a service “from the territory of one Member into the territory of 
any other Member” [...] Since the GATS deals specifically with international trade 
in services by four modes of supply that are considered comprehensive, it would 
indeed be unusual for interconnection disciplines not to extend to an obvious and 
important mode of international supply of telecommunications services -  cross 
border.187
c) Supplementary means
The Panel, applying Article 31(2) VCLT, undertook further to examine 
“supplementary means” to find additional support for the interpretation of 
interconnection. The Panel examined the “Understanding on Accounting 
Rates” and the drafting history of the Reference Paper to “confirm the 
meaning” resulting from the application of the primary means of 
interpretation.188 Mexico had based extensive arguments on these
186 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.117.
187 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.121.
188 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.122.
257
supplementary means to support its case that the reading of the term  
“interconnection” to include interconnection with foreign suppliers and 
networks would lead to a result which is “manifestly absurd and 
unreasonable”.189
The Panel first set out to state that the “Understanding” cannot 
directly affect the scope of Mexico’s obligations under Section 2 of the 
Reference Paper because the Understanding was non-binding and 
contains no substantive obligations.190 The Panel concluded that, “any 
interpretive value of the Understanding lies only in the guidance it might 
give in determining the scope of the interconnection provision in Section 2 
of Mexico’s Reference Paper.”191
The “Understanding” is contained in a Report of the Group on Basic 
Telecommunications adopted at the end of the extended negotiations on 
basic telecoms on 15 February 1997.192 It is not a binding agreement, but 
a “gentleman’s agreement” with respect to the application of differential 
accounting rates to telecommunications services and service suppliers of 
other Members, as set out in paragraph 7 .193 The “Understanding” states:
In light of the fact that the accounting rate system established under the 
International Telecommunications Regulations is the usual method of terminating 
international traffic and by its nature involves differential rates, and in order to 
avoid the submission of further such [MFN] exemptions, it is the understanding of 
the Group that:
the application of such accounting rates would not give rise to action by 
Members under dispute settlement under the WTO; and 
that this understanding will be reviewed not later than the commencement 
of the further Round of negotiations on Services Commitments due to 
begin not later than 1 Januaiy 2000.194
189 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.123.
190 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.126.
191 Ibid. Emphasis added.
192 WTO, GBT, Report o f the Group on Basic Telecommunications, S /G B T/4, 15 February 
1997.
193 Ibid.
194 Ibid.
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Thus, the “Understanding” is not to bring dispute cases to the WTO with 
regard to differential rates of accounting, which would otherwise be in 
conflict with the GATS MFN obligation of Article II.
The Panel stated that,
The main interpretative issue arising from the Understanding is whether the non­
binding decision to exclude from the scope of the WTO dispute settlement 
“differential’' accounting rates “established under the International 
Telecommunications Regulations” for the purposes of the MFN obligation, implies 
also an intent to exclude from the substantive scope of the Reference Paper 
international interconnection -  in particular, the international linking of the 
networks of Mexican and United States suppliers.195
In order to determine the scope of the “Understanding”, in other words the 
accounting rate system established under the International 
Telecommunications Regulations, the Panel examined the International 
Telecommunications Regulations, its Appendix,196 and relevant non­
binding Recommendations on the international accounting rate system 
made by a special ITU study group (ITU-T Study Group 3).197 The Panel 
came to the following conclusion:
Read together, the Regulations, its Appendix, and the related Recommendations 
result today in a number of different ways in which operators in different 
countries can be compensated for international traffic exchanged between them, 
ranging from traditional methods to more modem alternatives. Regardless of 
whether the traditional or new alternative arrangements are being used, the ITU 
instruments require that the arrangements be cost-oriented and non- 
discriminatory.
We therefore conclude that the accounting rates described in the Understanding 
should be understood to be limited to: (a) a traditional accounting rate that is not 
cost-oriented; (b) that can be interpreted as a measure of a Member, or that 
triggers a Member’s obligations under Article VIII on monopolies; and (c) that 
applies discriminatory rates on the basis of the national origin of the cross-border 
traffic, and thus may be inconsistent with the MFN principle in Article II.198
195 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.128.
196 International Telecommunications Regulations (ITR), forming part of the Final Acts of the 
World Administrative Telegraph and Telephone Conference, Melbourne, 1988 (WATTC-88); 
ITR Appendix 1.
197 itu -T  Recommendation D.140, Accounting Rate Principles fo r International Telephone 
Service, July 1998; ITU-T Recommendation D.150, New System fo r Accounting in 
International Telephony, June 1999.
198 Mexico-Telecommunications, paras. 7.135 and 7.136.
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From this analysis of accounting rates, the Panel went on to state that:
First, not all international interconnection pricing was excluded from dispute 
settlement by the Understanding, only traditional accounting rate regimes with 
“differential rates". Second, the exclusion was from dispute settlement, not from 
the substantive obligations of the GATS, including its schedules of commitments. 
Third, the explicit aim of the exclusion was the MFN obligation under GATS 
Article II. Other obligations or specific commitments in the GATS, such as Section 
2 of Mexico’s Reference Paper were not specified. Fourth, not all traditional 
accounting rate regimes would be MFN inconsistent, even if they were not cost- 
oriented [...] Finally, the existence of the Understanding demonstrates that, even 
though negotiators considered at length the issue of rates for international 
interconnection, they chose not to adopt wording that would have expressly 
excluded certain types of interconnection from the scope of the Reference 
Paper.199
And from this, the Panel came to the conclusion that,
In sum, the Understanding seeks to exempt a very limited category of measures, 
temporarily, and on a non-binding basis, from the scope of WTO dispute 
settlement. Simply because Members wished to shield a certain type of cross- 
border interconnection from dispute settlement, because of possible MFN 
inconsistencies (with respect to differential rates), it does not follow that they 
wished to shield all forms of cross-border interconnection from dispute 
settlement. The clear intention to do so is not expressed in the Understanding. 
This suggests that the content and purpose of the Understanding is of limited 
assistance in interpreting the scope of application of the term "interconnection" in 
Section 2.1 of Mexico's Reference Paper.200
Thus, the Understanding on Accounting Rates did not help Mexico’s 
cause, and the conclusion on the interpretation of “interconnection’’ so as 
to include interconnection of international telecoms services is not affected 
by the Understanding.
The Panel thus held that Section 2 of Mexico’s Reference Paper 
applies to the interconnection of cross-border suppliers. Furthermore, the 
Panel had earlier determined that Mexico has undertaken market access 
and national treatment commitments in is Schedule with respect to the 
cross-border supply of the facilities-based services at issue; and these 
com m itm e n ts  can provide the basis for interconnection commitments in
199 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7. 137.
200 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.138.
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Section 2.2(b) of Mexico’s Reference Paper.201 The Panel therefore found 
overall that Section 2.2(b) of Mexico’s Reference Paper applies to US 
service suppliers supplying or seeking to supply the services at issue.202
The Panel next determined whether Mexico has fulfilled its 
commitment in Section 2.2(b) of its Reference Paper.
2) Has Mexico fulfilled its Reference Paper Section 2.2(b) 
commitment?
Section 2.2(b) of Mexico’s Reference Paper states:
Interconnection w ith  a m ajor supplier w ill be ensured a t any technically feasible 
point in  the netw ork. Such interconnection is provided:
(b) in  a tim ely fashion, on term s, conditions (including technical standards and  
specifications) and cost-oriented rates th a t are transparent, reasonable, having  
regard to economic feasib ility, and sufficiently unbundled so th a t the supplier 
need not pay for netw ork com ponents or facilities th a t it  does not require for the 
service to be provided.
The Panel thus determined the relevant elements of Section 2 of Mexico’s 
Reference Paper in order to find whether Mexico has fulfilled its 
commitments.
a) Is Telmex a major supplier?
To determine whether an operator is a major supplier involves a three-step 
process.
201 Mexico-Teleoommunications, paras. 7.91 and 7.95; see also Section 111.4(c) above.
202 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.144.
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i) What is the “relevant market” for the telecoms services at 
issue in the case?
The Panel decided, agreeing with the US, that the relevant market in this 
particular case is the market for the termination of the services at issue in 
Mexico (i.e. cross-border basic telecoms services from US to Mexico).203 
The Panel reasoned as follows:
[T]he notion o f dem and substitu tion  -  [...] w hether a consum er w ould consider 
two products as “substitu table” -  is central to the process of m arket defin ition as 
it  is used by com petition au thorities. Applying th a t princip le, we fin d  no evidence 
th a t a domestic telecom m unications service is substitutable for an in ternatio n al 
one, and th a t an  outgoing call is considered substitutable for an incom ing one. 
One is not a practical a lternative to the other. Even if  the price difference between 
domestic and in tern atio nal interconnection would change, such a  price change 
would not m ake these d ifferent services substitutable in  the eyes o f a  
consum er.204
Sidak and Singer, however, remark that this determination by the 
Panel was incorrect on economic grounds, being inaccurately narrow in 
scope.205 They argue that the relevant market is point-to-point long­
distance international service between the US and Mexico, and the key to 
the proper market definition in this case is to recognize that a southbound 
call is a substitute for a northbound call.206 Thus, according to Sidak and 
Singer, the Panel, by identifying incorrectly the relevant market, 
determined erroneously that Telmex is a major supplier because in the 
point-to-point market Telmex does not have market power.207 In any case 
they argue that even if the relevant market were termination of services
203 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.152
204 Ibid.
205 J. Gregory Sidak and Hal J. Singer, “Uberregulation without Economics, The World 
Trade Organization’s Decision in the US-Mexico Arbitration on Telecommunications 
Services", (Draft) (August 2004), p. 24.
205 Ibid.
207 Ibid., pp. 27-34
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Telmex does not have market power even in that market and is thus not a 
major supplier.208
ii) Does Telmex have “the ability to materially affect the 
terms of participation (having regard to price and supply) 
in that market? If yes,
iii) Does the ability result form “control over essential
facilities” or “use of its position in the market”?
W ith regard to the second criterion, the Panel had no difficulty in 
determining that Telmex has “the ability to materially affect the terms of 
participation (having regard to price and supply) in the relevant market” by 
way of the Mexican ILD Rules which accord Telmex special powers. ILD 
Rule 13 in particular grants to the long-distance licensee with the highest 
volume of outgoing traffic on a particular international market the sole 
right to negotiate settlement rates which, under Rule 10, all other 
operators must apply. And since Telmex has always had the largest share 
of outgoing traffic in every international market, including the US, it is,
and has consistently been under the Rules, the “licensee authorized to
negotiate settlement rates”. The Panel thus found,
In  these circum stances, since Telm ex is legally  required to negotiate settlem ent 
rates for the entire m arket for term ination of the services a t issue from  the U nited  
States, we find  th a t it  has patently  m et the defin itional requirem ent in  M exico’s 
Reference Paper th a t it  [has] the “ab ility  to m aterially  affect the term s of 
partic ipation”, p articu larly  “having regard to price”.209
The Panel further found that Telmex’s ability to impose its negotiated 
settlement rate for an international route on its competitors, which is
208 Ibid., p. 34.
209 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.155.
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granted to it under the ILD Rules, is the use of Telmex of its special 
“position in the market”. Thus, the Panel’s findings in each of the three 
criteria led them to conclude that Telmex is a major supplier with respect 
to termination of the services at issue in the case.210
b) Are Telmex interconnection rates cost-oriented?
i) “having regard to economic feasibility”
This phrase qualifies the term “cost-oriented” rates, and confirms that 
interconnection rates should cover “both direct costs and should permit a 
reasonable rate of return on the investor’s investment”.211
ii) LRAIC method to determine cost-oriented rates
The Panel determined that the ordinary meaning of “cost-oriented” rates 
means that rates,
are brought into a  defined relation to known costs or cost principles. Rates th a t are 
“cost-oriented* w ould not need to equate exactly to cost, b u t should be founded on 
cost. The degree o f flex ib ility  inherent in  the term  “cost-oriented* suggests, 
m oreover, th a t m ore th an  one costing methodology could be used to calculate  
“cost-oriented* rates.212
The Panel also went further and looked at the “special meaning” of “cost- 
oriented” since it is a technical term that may have such a meaning in the 
telecoms sector. Having resorted to ITU studies, in particular
210 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.159.
211 See US Second Written Submission, para. 68 and Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 
7.161.
212 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.168.
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Recommendations D.140 and D.150 which deal with accounting rates for 
international telephone services, the Panel concluded that the special 
meaning of “cost-oriented”, in the context of the ITU which require that the 
cost elements and the cost model both be clearly related to the cost of 
delivering the service, is consistent with the ordinary meaning of the term  
as it appears in Mexico’s Reference Paper.213
The Panel thus accepted the US argument that the ordinary meaning 
of cost-oriented is relevant to the costs incurred in supplying the 
service.214 This meaning is amplified by the use of this term in many WTO 
Members’ telecommunications laws and regulations (e.g. the EC and even 
Mexico). Mexican law, in particular, requires the use of long-run average 
incremental cost (LRAIC) principles, which are consistent with 
interconnection rates that relate to the cost of providing that service. The 
Panel thereby found that,
the increasing and w ide-spread use o f increm ental cost methodologies among 
W TO M em bers supports the in terpretation  of the term  “cost-oriented” as m eaning  
the costs incurred  in  supplying the service, and th a t the use of long term  
increm ental cost m ethodologies, such as those required in  M exican law , is 
consistent w ith  th is  m eaning.215
In determining the qualifying terms of “reasonable” and “having 
regard to economic feasibility”, the Panel first considered the term  
“reasonable” and concluded that this term suggests that the 
interconnection rates should be “suitable to the circumstances or 
purpose”, in other words, “reflect the overall objectives of the provision 
that the rates represent the costs incurred in providing the service”.216 
The word “reasonable” thus emphasizes that the application of the cost
213 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.174.
214 Mexico-Telecommunications, paras. 7.177 and 7.160.
215 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.177.
216 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.182.
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model chosen by the Member reflects the cost incurred for the 
interconnection service.217 The Panel reasoned therefore that the word 
“reasonable” would not permit costs that were not incurred in the supply 
of the interconnection service to be included in the rate. Thus, the Panel 
rejected Mexico’s suggestion that the general state of the telecoms 
industry, the coverage and quality of the network, and whether rates were 
established under the accounting rate regime needed to be considered 
when determining cost-oriented rate. These criteria, the Panel ruled, are 
not relevant to determining cost-oriented rate.218
As to the phrase “having regard to economic feasibility”, the Panel 
accepted the US and EC interpretations that this means the major 
supplier is entitled to rates that allow it to undertake interconnection on 
an “economic” basis, that is, to make a reasonable rate of return, and does 
not take into account a countiy’s policy goals, such as universal service, 
or the needs of the operator, as Mexico argued.219
Having determined the meaning of cost-oriented rates, the Panel had 
to determine whether Telmex interconnects US suppliers at these rates. 
As Mexico did not offer its comments on the specific methods of evaluating 
costs and settlement charges presented by the US, nor submitted its own 
calculations, the Panel based its decision on the US methodology and 
found that it provides a useful indication of the costs incurred by Telmex 
in interconnecting US suppliers and terminating calls in Mexico.220 The 
Panel accepted in principle the US method for determining the difference 
between interconnection rates charged by Telmex to US suppliers of the
217 Ibid.
218 Mexico-Telecommunicatioris, para. 7.183.
219 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.184, and see Mexico’s second written submission 
paras. 87-97.
220 Mexico-Telecommunications, paras. 7.188 and 7.191.
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services at issue, and the aggregate costs for relevant network 
components.221
The Panel found that it is a justified presumption that any 
substantial difference between the two figures was evidence that Telmex’s 
interconnection rates were not “cost-oriented” in the context of Section 
2.2(b) of Mexico’s Reference Paper.222 On the evidence that the blended 
average difference in costs and rates charged by Telmex is around 77% 
(based on US calculations, and uncontested by Mexico),223 the Panel found 
that,
[TJhe interconnection rates charged by Telm ex to U nited States suppliers of the 
services a t issue are not “cost-oriented” w ith in  the m eaning of Section 2.2(b) of 
M exico’s Reference Paper, since by any of the methodologies presented to the  
Panel by the U nited States, they are substantially higher than  the costs w hich are 
actually incurred in  providing the interconnection.224
The Panel therefore found that Mexico has failed to fulfil its 
commitments under Section 2.2(b) of its Reference Paper by fa ilin g  to 
ensure that a major supplier in terms of Section 2.2 of the Reference Paper 
(Telmex) provides interconnection to US basic telecoms suppliers of the 
services at issue on a facilities basis under cost-oriented rates.225
(e) Issues of anti-competitive behaviour: Section 1 of the 
Reference Paper
The US’s second allegation against Mexico was that Mexico’s ILD Rules 
violate Section 1 of the Reference Paper because instead of preventing
221 The Panel accepted the evidence presented by the US, and uncontested by Mexico, that 
the relevant network components of Telmex used to interconnect US cross-border suppliers 
include: international transmission and switching, local links, subscriber line, and long­
distance links. Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.196.
222 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.203.
223 Mexico-Telecommunications, paras. 7.202-7.203.
224 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.216.
225 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.216.
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anti-competitive practices, the Rules actually promote anti-competitive 
behaviour. To determine this, the Panel had to consider the following 
questions: 1) Is Telmex a “major supplier”? 2) What are “anti-competitive 
practices”? 3) Do the ILD Rules require a major supplier to engage in anti­
competitive practices? 4) Has Mexico maintained “appropriate measures” 
to prevent anti-competitive practices by a major supplier?
The first question was answered by the Panel when they considered 
Section 2 of Mexico’s Reference Paper -  yes, Telmex is a major supplier.226
1) What are anti-competitive practices?
The Panel noted that “anti-competitive practices” is not defined in the 
Reference Paper. The Panel determined, consistent with its ordinary 
meaning, that “anti-competitive practices” is broad in scope and suggests 
actions that “lesson rivalry or competition in the market”.227 The Panel 
confirmed that the list of anti-competitive practices in Section 1 of the 
Reference Paper is non-exhaustive -  and includes horizontal price-fixing 
and market-sharing agreements by suppliers.228 The Panel determined 
that, from examining competition laws of WTO Members, practices that 
are unlawful under the competition laws of Members included cartels or 
collusive horizontal agreements between firms, such as agreements to fix 
prices or share markets, in addition to other practices such as abuse of a 
dominant position and vertical market restraints.229
The Panel held that practices endorsed/required by a Member’s law, 
and not freely undertaken by a major supplier, can be anti-competitive
226 See Section 111.4(d)(2)(a) above.
227 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.230.
228 Mexico-Telecommunications, paras. 7.232 and 7.237-8.
229 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.235.
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within the meaning of the Reference Paper.230 The Panel reasoned that 
Reference Paper commitments undertaken by a Member are international 
obligations owed to all other WTO Members and domestic laws cannot be 
used to undermine international commitments made: Article 27 of the 
VCLT established the principle that a requirement imposed by a Member 
under its internal law cannot unilaterally erode its international 
commitments.231 Thus, Mexican law can be ‘‘anti-competitive” practices 
w ithin the meaning of Section 1 of Mexico’s Reference Paper.232
2) Do the ILD Rules require a major supplier to engage in 
anti-competitive practices?
Next, the Panel had to determine whether Mexico’s ILD Rules do in fact 
require a major supplier to engage in anti-competitive practices. The 
Panel determined that the ILD Rules require Telmex and other Mexican 
operators to apply a uniform settlement rate (Rule 13) and to ensure a 
proportionate return of incoming calls, compared to outgoing calls (Rules 
16 and 2:XIII).
In sum, the ILD Rules impose two main requirements on Telmex on 
the US-Mexico route. First, Telmex must negotiate a settlement rate for 
incoming calls with suppliers in other markets wishing to terminate calls 
in  the Mexican market and apply, subject to approval by the Mexican 
authorities and in common with the other Mexican suppliers, that single
230 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.245.
231 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.244.
232 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.245. As the US correctly pointed out, “anti­
competitive practices do not change their nature simply because they are required by 
national laws and regulations ... and the provision would be self-defeating and meaningless 
if  a Member could easily avoid the obligation to maintain appropriate measures to prevent 
anti-competitive practices by formally requiring such practices”. Mexico- 
Telecommunications, para. 7.240.
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rate to interconnection for incoming traffic from the US (“uniform  
settlement rate system”). Second, Telmex must give up traffic to, or accept 
traffic from, other suppliers depending on whether the proportion of 
incoming traffic surpasses, or falls short of, its proportion of outgoing 
traffic (“proportionate return system”). To this end, Telmex may enter into 
“financial compensation agreements” with other operators, which are to be 
approved by Mexican authorities (ILD Rule 17).
The Panel agreed with the US argument that “the removal of price 
competition by the Mexican authorities, combined with the setting of the 
uniform price by the major supplier, has effects tantamount to those of a 
price-fixing cartel”.233 As the Panel had earlier determined that horizontal 
practices such as price-fixing among competitors are “anti-competitive 
practices” under Section 1 of Mexico’s Reference Paper, the Panel thus 
found that the uniform settlement rate under the ILD Rules requires 
practices by a major supplier that are anti-competitive within the meaning 
of Section 1 Reference Paper.234 The Panel’s line of reasoning adopted the 
US approach as follows:
[AJnti-com petitive price fixing by telecom m unications suppliers cannot be 
u n ila tera lly  exem pted from  the scope of Section 1 by a  governm ent requirem ent 
im posing such price fixing. To find  otherw ise w ould enable W TO Mem bers 
u n ila tera lly  to detract from  the effectiveness o f th e ir Section 1 obligations to 
m ain ta in  com petitive safeguards by requ iring  such anti-com petitive practices.235
With regard to Mexico’s “proportionate return” system, the Panel 
found that this has effects tantamount to those of a market arrangement 
between suppliers, which the Panel found earlier to be “anti-competitive 
practices” within the meaning of Section 1 of the Reference Paper. Thus
233 MexicchTele<x>mmunications, para. 7.262. 
23< Ibid.
233 Ibid.
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the proportionate return system under the ILD Rules requires practices by 
a major supplier that lim it rivalry and competition among competing 
suppliers and are therefore “anti-competitive” within the meaning of 
Section 1 Reference Paper.236
3) Has Mexico maintained “appropriate measures”?
Having determined that the practices were anti-competitive, the Panel 
examined whether Mexico has maintained “appropriate measures” to 
prevent them. The Panel held that since Mexico maintained measures 
which legally required anti-competitive conduct by a major supplier, 
Mexico has failed to maintain appropriate measures to prevent such 
practices.237 Mexico has thus failed to fulfill its obligations under Section 
1 of its Reference Paper.238
The Panel, however, was careful to stress that their interpretation of 
Section 1 of the Reference Paper does not unduly lim it the broad 
regulatory autonomy of WTO Members.239 They pointed out that Mexico’s 
case with respect to the ILD Rules that required anti-competitive practices 
were exceptional and that different WTO Members may interpret “anti­
competitive practices” in Section 1 of the Reference Paper differently. 
Thus, the Panel stated that its finding is limited to the interpretation of 
Mexico’s GATS obligations under Section 1 of its Reference Paper, with 
respect to the US, and with respect to the very specific anti-competitive
236 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.264.
237 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.266.
238 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.269.
239 See also Chapter 3, Section IV .7 on GATS and domestic regulation.
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measures in the relevant market for telecommunications services 
discussed in this particular dispute.240
Nonetheless, the Panel had to decide on competition law issues. This 
called for suggestions that a WTO framework for competition law is more 
pressing now than it was because there is need for some rule of law in the 
WTO on the matter. Otherwise WTO panels would be left to rule on 
competition policy issues despite the absence of a comprehensive set of 
international rules on competition, and thereby creating situations of ad 
hoc rulings by panels.241
(f) Issues of access to and use of public telecommunications 
transport networks and services: GATS Annex on
Telecommunications
The US’s third allegation against Mexico was that Mexico failed to ensure 
that US service suppliers have access to or use of “public 
telecommunications transport networks and services” (PTTNS) in Mexico 
on reasonable terms and conditions, within the meaning of Section 5(a) of 
the Annex on Telecommunications. The US also claimed that Mexico 
failed to ensure the US facilities-based operators and commercial 
agencies242 have access to and use of private leased circuits as required 
under Section 5(b) of the Annex.
240 Mexico-Telecommunications, paras. 7.267-8.
241 See Rajeev Sharma and Jason Roshychuk, “The Collision of Trade and Competition 
Law: Assessing the Aftermath of the WTO Telmex Decision", 25 June 2004, 
httn: /  / www.heenanblaikie.com: and R.D. Anderson and Peter Holmes, “Competition Policy 
and the Future of the M ultilateral Trading System", 5(2) JIEL (2002), pp. 531-563.
242 Commercial agencies are defined in Mexico’s Schedule as “[ajgencies which, without 
owning transmission means, provide third parties with telecommunications services by 
using capacity leased from a public network concessionaire". Commercial agencies are 
thus equivalent to non-facilities based telecommunications suppliers. See Appendix X.
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To determine whether Mexico has met its obligation under Section 5 
of the Annex on Telecommunications, two main questions needed to be 
answered: 1) Whether the Annex imposes obligations on Mexico to ensure 
access to and use of PTTNS for the supply of the basic telecommunications 
services scheduled by Mexico? 2) If yes, then whether Mexico has fulfilled 
its obligations under Section 5 of the Annex?
1) Whether the Annex imposes obligations on Mexico?
a) Does the Annex apply to the supply of basic telecoms services?
The issue is whether the Annex applies to access to and use of PTTNS for 
the supply of basic telecoms services or only for access to and use of 
PTTNS as a transport means for other economic activities and not for the 
supply of basic telecoms services? The Panel established the scope of the 
Annex by interpreting Section 2 of the Annex which provides that the 
Annex shall apply to “all measures of a Member that affect access to and 
use of public telecommunications transport networks and services”. The 
Panel came to the conclusion that since Section 2 of the Annex does not 
specify that the provision is limited to measures affecting access to and 
use of PTTNS by only certain services or service sectors, Section 2 suggests 
“the scope of the Annex includes all measures that affect access to and 
use of [PTTNS] with regard to all services, including basic 
telecommunications services”.243
Furthermore, Section 1 of the Annex recognizes the dual role of 
telecommunications services and the language of Section 1 does not
243 Mexico-Telecornmunications, para. 7.278.
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suggest that the Annex covers only access to and use of PTTNS as an 
underlying means of transport for other services and not also for the 
supply of basic telecoms services.244 More specifically, however, Section 5 
of the Annex explicitly seeks to ensure that access to and use of PTTNS is 
granted “for the supply of a service included in [a Member’s] Schedule”. 
Thus, if a Member listed basic telecoms in its schedule, Section 5 dictates 
that the Annex applies to basic telecoms. The Annex does not exclude 
basic telecoms from its scope, as Mexico argued, but the Annex applies to 
measures of a Member that affect access to and use of PTTNS by basic 
telecommunications suppliers of any other Member.245
b) Does Section 5 of the Annex apply to basic telecoms commitments 
scheduled by Mexico?
The Panel found that Section 5 of the Annex only applies to access to and 
use of PTTNS for the supply of a service included in a Member’s 
Schedule,246 and nothing in the Annex shall be construed to “require a 
Member to authorize a service supplier of any other Member to establish, 
construct, acquire, lease, operate or supply telecommunications transport 
networks or services, other than as provided for in its Schedule?.2*7 Thus 
the Annex does not create a right to supply a service where no 
commitments for that service exist.248
The Panel’s earlier examination of Mexico’s Schedule found that 
Mexico committed to basic telecoms services supplied cross-border on a 
facilities-basis, but Mexico did not commit to cross-border supply of
244 Mexico-Tetecomrrmnications, para. 7.280. See also Sections 1.1 and II.2  above.
245 Mexico-Telecommunicatioris, para. 7.288.
246 Annex on Telecommunications, Section 5(a).
247 Annex on Telecommunications, Section 2(c)(i)), (emphasis added).
248 Mexico-Telecommunicatioris, para. 7.293.
274
telecoms services supplied over private-leased lines (non-facilities basis).249 
Mexico has also committed to basic telecoms services supplied on a non­
facilities basis through commercial presence (mode 3) in Mexico.250 Thus, 
Section 5 of the Annex applies to Mexico’s scheduled commitments on the 
cross-border supply of basic telecoms services on a facilities-basis251 and 
the supply of basic telecoms on a non-facilities basis through commercial 
presence.252
2) Has Mexico fulfilled its obligations under Section 5 of the 
Annex?
To determine whether Mexico has fulfilled its obligations under the 
Section, the Panel embarked on a lengthy interpretation of Section 5 of the 
Annex.
The Panel held that the structure of Section5 of the Annex is such 
that paragraphs (a) through (f) of Section 5 inform each other, and that 
each paragraph cannot be determined in isolation of the others. Thus, the 
analysis of a claim under paragraph (a) requires an examination of 
whether any conditions that are imposed on access to and use of PTTNS 
are “necessary” in the meaning of Section 5(e) of the Annex.253 Section 5(e) 
only allows conditions that are “necessary” to achieve the three policy 
objectives set out in subparagraphs (i) to (iii) of that Section. Paragraph (f) 
contains an illustrative list of types of regulatory conditions that may be 
imposed if “necessary” to achieve a policy goal mentioned in paragraph (e). 
The Panel inferred that whenever a condition is “necessary” under
249 Mexico-Telecoirmwnicatians, para. 7.91. See Section 111.4(c) above.
250 Mexico-Telecommunications, paras. 7.377-7.378, 7.381. See Appendix X.
251 Mexico-Telecommunications, paras. 7.294-5.
252 Mexico-Telecommunicatioris, para. 7.378.
253 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.309.
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paragraph (e), it must, in addition, be “reasonable and non-discriminatory"’ 
under paragraph (a). Conversely, if a condition is not “necessary” to fulfill 
at least one of the three policy objectives set out under subparagraphs (i) 
to (iii), paragraph (e) prohibits the imposition of such a condition, which 
suggests that there may be no need to analyse in that case whether that 
condition would otherwise be “reasonable and non-discriminatory”.254
The Panel also concluded that an obligation arises for a Member 
under paragraph 5(b) subject to any term or condition that a Member may 
impose in a manner consistent with the provisions of paragraphs (a) and 
(e).255
a) US claims under Section 5(a)
The US had three major claims under Section 5(a) of the Annex. First, the 
US claimed that Mexico has failed to ensure that cross-border suppliers of 
facilities-based basic telecoms services from the US into Mexico were 
accorded access to and use of PTTNS on reasonable terms and condition. 
Second, this failure on Mexico’s part was due to the charging of above-cost 
rates to foreign suppliers for access to and use of the networks and 
services provided by Mexico’s long-distance operators, thus amounting to 
“unreasonable terms and conditions”. Third, the failure was also 
attributable to the requirement that foreign suppliers must negotiate 
exclusively with Mexico’s long-distance licensee with the greatest 
percentage of out-going long-distance market share over the preceding six 
months and prohibiting foreign suppliers from concluding alternative
254 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.306.
255 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.309.
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terms and conditions with other Mexican suppliers of such networks and 
services,256 all amounting to “unreasonable terms and conditions”.
There are four elements to Section 5(a) with respect to the granting of 
“access to and use o r referred to in this provision.
i) “any service supplier of any other Member”
The Panel held that facilities based suppliers (such as AT&T, 
WorldCom/MCI and Sprint) as well as commercial agencies (non-facilities 
based suppliers) supply or are seeking to supply the services at issue, and 
are suppliers of “any other Member”, in this case, the US.257
ii) with respect to “public telecommunications transport networks and 
services”
Mexico’s Schedule requires that the cross-border supply of telecoms 
services be routed through the facilities of a Mexican concessionaire. The 
Panel held that Mexican concessionaires are clearly “public 
telecommunications transport networks and services” as defined in 
Section 3 of the Annex. Thus the facilities of the Mexican concessionaires 
which are relevant to the US claim with respect to access and use are 
“public telecommunications transport networks and services”.258
256 il d  Rules 3, 6, 10, 13, 22 & 23.
257 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.314.
258 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.315.
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iii) “for the supply of a service included in its Schedule”
The Panel had earlier found that Mexico has made market access 
commitments, subject to a routing requirement, and full national 
treatment commitments on the supply of basic telecommunications 
services. Therefore, even under a restrictive reading of the obligation 
under paragraph (a), these services are included in Mexico’s Schedule. 
Furthermore, the Panel had found that the Annex applies to the access to 
and use of PTTNS for the supply of all transportation services, including 
basic telecoms services. The nature of the basic telecoms services at issue, 
as inscribed in Mexico’s scheduled, includes services which require 
suppliers to link their networks to those of other suppliers. The definition 
of public telecoms transport service in Section 3(b) of the Annex also 
speaks of a transmission “between two or more points”. Thus the Panel 
held that foreign suppliers of basic telecoms services require access to and 
use of PTTNS for the supply of their services.259
iv) “on reasonable terms and conditions”
The US claim of unreasonableness concentrated on the rates charged for 
access to and use of PTTNS, although Section 5(a) Annex does not contain 
the term “rates”, unlike Section 2 of the Reference Paper.
The Panel pointed out that although paragraph (a) speaks of “terms 
and conditions”, paragraph (e) refers only to “conditions”. But since 
paragraphs (a) and (e) inform each other, the Panel analyzed whether
259 Mexico-Telecommunications, paras. 7.317 and 7.319.
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“rates” are “terms”, or whether they are “conditions”. Building on their 
earlier analysis, the Panel stated that if the rates are terms, they would 
have to meet the “reasonable” standard in Section (a); if they are 
“conditions” they would, in addition, have to meet the “necessary” 
standard in Section (e).
The Panel determined that although the words “terms” and 
“conditions” are closely related, and are frequently used concurrently, the 
ordinary meaning of the word “terms” suggests that it would include 
pricing elements, including rates charged for access to and use of public 
telecoms transport networks and services.260 However, according to the 
Panel, pricing measures do not appear to fit within the meaning of the 
language of section 5(f), which lists examples of “conditions”.261 Thus, the 
Panel determined that rates charged for the access to and use of PTTNS 
are “terms” within the meaning of Section 5(a), but not “conditions” within 
the meaning of Section 5(e).262
Furthermore, the Panel disagreed with Mexico’s argument that a 
reading of a pricing element into the analysis of reasonable terms in 
Section 5(a) would render parts of Section 2.2(b) of Mexico’s Reference 
Paper inutile: reasoning that although there are differences in the scope, 
level of obligations and specific detail provided, the Reference Paper and 
the Annex overlap to a certain degree and the Reference Paper 
commitments do not subtract from the Annex or render it redundant.263 
The Panel therefore held that access to and use of PTTNS on “reasonable” 
terms includes questions of pricing of that access and use.264
260 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.325.
261 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.326.
262 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.327.
263 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.332-3.
264 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.333.
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The Panel held that “reasonable” pricing must be determined on a 
case-by-case basis.265 In Mexico’s case, the Panel held that rates for 
access to and use of PTTNS may still be reasonable even if generally higher 
than cost-oriented interconnection rates in terms of Section 2.2(b) of the 
Reference Paper. The Panel reasoned that if this were not the case, then it 
would have been redundant for Members to have made commitments 
additional to Annex obligations on access, especially on cost-oriented rates 
for interconnection, one of the most important forms of access. 
Furthermore, those Members who took Reference Paper commitments did 
so in order to establish specific disciplines only for major suppliers, and 
especially for interconnection. This would not have been necessary if 
Members already had an obligation to ensure that all suppliers, major or 
not, would have to provide cost-based access and use, including 
interconnection.266
Having earlier found that the rates charged to interconnect US 
suppliers of the services at issue to PTTNS in Mexico exceeded cost- 
oriented rates by a substantial margin (70%), and whose uniform nature 
excludes price competition in the relevant market of the telecoms services 
bound under Mexico’s Schedule, the Panel held that these rates do not 
provide access to and use of PTTNS “on reasonable ... terms”. Thus, 
Mexico has failed to meet its obligations under Section 5(a) of the GATS 
Annex by failing to ensure that service suppliers of the US are accorded 
access to and use of PTTNS in Mexico on reasonable terms.267
However, the Panel failed to determine by what margin a rate exceeds 
cost-based rates would it then constitute “unreasonableness”. Mexico’s
265 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.328.
266 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.334.
267 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.335.
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margin was, as determined by the Panel, by about 70%.268 What if it was 
by 60% or 45%, would they be “unreasonable”? The Panel did not provide 
a yard stick to measure what could be deemed “reasonable” rates. The 
issue of cost-oriented rates is crucial and central to the liberalization and 
promotion of competition in telecommunications. The Panel having based 
its decision on such an important issue predominantly on US 
methodologies of calculating cost-oriented rates calls for the suggestion 
that a WTO-negotiated and agreed formula on cost-based calculation 
would provide a useful tool to future dispute cases on telecommunications 
-  one that would add to the clarity of WTO rules and commitments.
b) US claims under Section 5(b)
The US claimed that Mexico has failed to ensure that non-facilities based, 
commercially present suppliers (commercial agencies) have access to and 
use of private leased circuits, and are permitted to connect these circuits to 
PTTNS or with circuits of other service suppliers.
There are five elements to Section 5(b) of the Annex to which the 
Panel had to consider. First, whether Mexico committed in effect to allow 
commercial agencies to supply the services at issue through commercial 
presence. Second, whether Mexico’s commitments on the supply of the 
services at issue by commercial agencies through commercial presence 
include the supply of international telecoms services (from Mexico to US) 
through mode 3. Third, whether Mexico has ensured access to and use of 
private leased circuits. Fourth, whether Mexico permits interconnection of
268 See Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.203
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private leased circuits. Fifth, Section 5(b) obligation is subject to Sections 
5(e) and (f).
i) whether Mexico has a commitment in effect to allow commercial 
agencies to supply the services at issue through commercial 
presence
Mexico has included mode 3 commitments in its Schedule with respect to 
services supplied by “commercial agencies”. It has entered “none” in the 
national treatment column, and inscribed limitations in the market access 
column as follows:
A perm it issued by the SCT is required. Only enterprises set up in  accordance 
w ith  M exican law  m ay obtain such a  p e rm it... The establishm ent and operation of 
com m ercial agencies is invariab ly subject to the relevant regulations. The SCT 
w ill not issue perm its for the establishm ent of a com m ercial agency u n til the 
corresponding regulations are issued.269
Mexico argued that this limitation established a “zero quota” on mode 3 
access for commercial agencies, which amounts to a market access 
limitation under GATS Article XV:2(a).270
It is commonly understood that the list of limitations in GATS Article 
XVI:2(a) is exhaustive.271 The Panel did not confirm this in explicit terms 
but it could be inferred from the Panel’s analysis that it took the view that 
the list is exhaustive.272 The Panel determined whether Mexico’s 
inscription in its market access column did indeed amount to a limitation 
on market access by examining whether Mexico’s inscription falls into one 
of the six categories of limitations in Article XVI:2(a), without considering
269 Mexico: Schedule of Commitments, G ATS/SC/56/Suppl.2. See Appendix X.
270 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.349.
271 See discussion on market access in Chapter 3, Section IV.6.
272 See Mexico-Telecommunications, paras. 7.354-7.361.
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whether if it did not fall within the six categories the inscription could still 
amount to a limitation on market access.
The Panel held that the wording of Mexico’s inscription in its market 
access column, that “permits for the establishment of a commercial agency 
[will not be issued] until the corresponding regulations are issued” does 
not specify that a numerical quota was to be imposed on the issuance of 
permits. But rather the sentence, the Panel held, seems to introduce a 
temporal qualification as to when establishment will be permitted -  
namely, after the issuance of the regulations.273
The Panel found that temporal qualification to market access -  such 
as dates for entiy into force or for the implementation of commitments -  
does not fall within the six categories in GATS XVI:2(a), and thus suggests 
that temporal limitations cannot constitute limitations to market access 
under GATS Article XVI:2.274 The Panel further supported its finding as 
follows:
The separate lis ting  of tem poral elem ents of entry into force and im plem entation  
in  A rticle XX: 1 confirm s, in  our view, th a t tem poral elem ents are not p art o f the  
substantive elem ents th a t can be m arket access lim itations under A rticle X V I:2 .275
Consequently, the Panel found that Mexico’s scheduled requirement that 
commercial agencies obtain permits, and that these permits are based on 
regulations, is a temporal limitation that is not a market access limitation 
within the meaning of Article XVI:2(a).276
The Panel then proceeded to determine what meaning the inscription 
does have. The Panel held that since Mexico has not included a date in its 
Schedule to indicate that its specific commitment on commercial agencies
273 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.357.
274 Mexico-Telecommunications, paras. 7.357-8.
275 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.361.
276 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.362.
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was to enter into force at a different date from 5 February 1998 (date of 
entry into force of ABT), Mexico’s entry relates to the time-frame for 
implementation, and not the entry into force of commitments.277 The Panel 
further went on to interpret that a time-frame is not open-ended and does 
not leave the time of the occurrence in doubt.278 GATS Article XX: 1(d) 
requires, with respect to sectors where commitments are undertaken, that 
each schedule specify “where appropriate the time-frame for 
implementation of such commitments.”
The Panel held that this provision, the objective of which is to ensure 
clarity and precision with regard to the scheduling of commitments, 
cannot be interpreted to allow a window of discretion with regard to 
temporal aspects of these commitments that could erode the practical 
value of a commitment.279 Thus, GATS Article XX: 1(d) requires the 
specification of a time-frame for implementation should a Member wish to 
implement a commitment after its entry into force. Where a Member does 
not specify a time-frame, implementation must be deemed to be 
concurrent with the entry into force of the commitment. Thus, with regard 
to Mexico’s Schedule, the Panel found that,
The entry in Mexico's Schedule does not contain language that expresses a 
condition "whether" regulations and permits would be issued, but only "when" the 
permits would be issued [...] Even if Mexico had needed time to complete the 
issuance of the regulations beyond the time of entry into force of its commitment 
on 5 February 1998, Mexico should, at the very minimum, have initiated that 
process leading to the issuance of the regulations. There is no evidence, however, 
that Mexico has taken any steps to comply with its commitment. We do not 
consider it necessary to rule on the length of a time period within which the 
implementation of Mexico's commitment might reasonably have been concluded, 
as more than five years have passed since the entry into force of Mexico's 
commitment, and Mexico still has indicated no date by which it intends to issue 
the relevant regulations and permits. Therefore, we find that Mexico's refusal to 
authorize the supply of services by commercial agencies is inconsistent with the 
market access commitment inscribed in its schedule.280
277 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.364.
278 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.366.
279 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.368.
280 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.371.
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The Panel’s finding reinforces the importance of precision and clarity in 
scheduling commitments, discussed in Chapter 3, Sections IV.2, IV.5 and 
IV.6:
Mem bers m ust be able to in fer from  each schedule the precise conditions for 
m arket access, national treatm ent and, where inscribed in  the schedule, any  
additional com m itm ents a  M em ber has undertaken. By the same token, 
specificity as to w hen a com m itm ent enters in to  force and when it  has to be 
im plem ented is equally im portant. A m arket access com m itm ent th a t leaves in  
doubt when a  com m itm ent takes effect is of little  practical value. U n like for the  
im plem entation o f GATT ta riff reductions w hich entered in to  force on 1 Janu ary  
1995, and for w hich paragraph 2 o f the M arrakesh Protocol provided a  tim e-fram e  
for im plem entation, the dates of entry in to  force and im plem entation o f specific 
com m itm ents under the GATS coincide in  princip le.281
ii) whether Mexico’s commitments on the supply of the services at 
issue by commercial agencies through commercial presence include 
the supply of international telecoms services (from Mexico to US) 
through mode 3.
The Panel held that the definition of commercial presence as defined in 
GATS Article XXVIII and the supply of services through commercial 
presence as defined in GATS Article I:2(c), make explicit the location of the 
service supplier -  that is, in the territory of any other Member. The Panel 
further reasoned that the definition is silent with respect to any other 
territorial requirement (as in cross-border supply under mode 1) or 
nationality of the service consumer (as in mode 2, consumption abroad). 
Thus, the supply of a service through commercial presence would 
therefore not exclude a service that originates in the territory in which a 
commercial presence is established (such as Mexico), and is delivered into 
the territory of any other Member (such as the US).282
281 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.367.
282 Mexico-Telecomnmnications, para. 7.375.
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The Panel held that since Mexico did not exclude international 
telecoms services in its sector column, or elsewhere in its Schedule, from 
the scope of services that commercial agencies may supply, it can be 
assumed that Mexico’s mode 3 commitment at issue includes the supply 
of basic telecommunications within Mexico, and from Mexico into any 
other country.283
iii) access to and use of private leased circuits
The Panel then considered whether Mexico fulfilled its obligations in 
Section 5(b) Annex to ensure that suppliers of any other Members have 
access to and use of any PTTNS offered within or across Mexico’s border, 
including private leased lines. The Panel found that Mexico has
committed to allow commercial agencies to use leased capacity for the 
supply of the services at issue. And as Mexico indicated no restriction on 
the geographic market (local, long-distance, international) for the services 
that may be supplied by the commercial agencies established in Mexico, 
and no routing restriction was inscribed (as in the case of cross-border 
supply) for the supply through commercial presence, the Panel considered 
that Mexico has undertaken commitments on the supply of the services at 
issue by commercial agencies through commercial presence, for which 
access to and use of private leased circuits is not only relevant but, by 
Mexico’s own definition in its Schedule, is essential.284
283 Mexico-Telemmmunications, para. 7.377.
284 Mexixx>-Telecommunications, para. 7.381.
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Therefore the Panel found that Mexico has failed to ensure access to 
and use of private leased circuits for the supply of the committed services 
in a manner consistent with Section 5(b) of the Annex.285
iv) interconnection of private leased circuits 
This involves Mexico’s ILD Rule 3 which states:
O nly international gatew ay operators shall be authorized to interconnect directly  
w ith  the public telecom m unications networks of other countries’ operators for the  
purpose of carrying in tern ation al traffic , (em phasis added)
ILD Rules require that “international gateway operators” be a facilities- 
based supplier, and must always be a “concessionaire”. However, a 
commercial agency, by its definition in Mexico’s Schedule, can never be a 
concessionaire and thus a commercial agency can never be an 
international gateway operator. The Panel therefore found that ILD Rule 3 
prohibits commercial agencies to interconnect “directly with the public 
telecommunications networks of other countries’ operators for the purpose 
of carrying international traffic.”286
v) obligation of section 5(b) Annex is subject to provisions of sections 
5(e) and (f)
The Panel found that Mexico has undertaken mode 3 commitment on the 
supply of telecoms services at issue by commercial agencies. This 
commitment does not exclude the supply of non-facilities based service 
from Mexico into any other country. The Panel noted that the obligation in 
Section 5(b) is subject to Sections 5(e) and (f). However, the Panel found
285 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.381.
286 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.384.
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that ILD Rule 3 does not impose a condition ‘‘necessary” to achieve the 
objective set out in Section 5(e) (iii), but instead it prevents interconnection 
to private leased circuits for a service on which a specific commitment has 
been undertaken. Thus, the Panel held that ILD Rule 3 is inconsistent 
with Mexico’s obligations under Section 5(b) Annex.287
c) Invocation of Section 5(g) of the Annex
Mexico argued that it is necessary to condition access to its networks for 
the purpose of strengthening its domestic infrastructure in accordance 
with Section 5(g) of the Annex. This is a developing country provision: it 
allows developing countries, consistent with their level of development, to 
place reasonable conditions on access to and use of PTTNS - such 
conditions must be specified in a Member’s schedule.
The Panel held that Mexico did not inscribe any limitations referring 
to Section 5(g) of the Annex in its Schedule therefore Section 5(g) does not 
permit Mexico to depart from specific commitments which it made.288
The Panel’s decision is particularly negative for developing countries. 
The Panel stated that in order to benefit form Section 5(g) of the Annex, 
countries would have had to refer to it or have named their development 
objectives when they made their telecoms commitments.289 According to 
Gould, since virtually no developing country has done this, the Panel 
rendered the provision effectively useless.290 It must be pointed out
287 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.385.
288 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.388.
289 Ibid.
290 Ellen Gould, “Telmex Panel Strips WTO of Another Fig Leaf, CCPA Briefing Paper Trade 
and Investment Series, Vol. 5(2), July 2004.
288
however that Section 5(g) clearly states that “such conditions shall be 
specified in a Member’s Schedule”. The Panel’s decision, although harsh 
from a developing country perspective, is merely upholding the provisions 
of Section 5(g).
The Panel held that Mexico has failed to meet its obligations under 
Section 5(b) of the Annex by failing to ensure that commercially present 
commercial agencies of the US have access to and use of private leased 
circuits and are permitted to interconnect those circuits to public telecoms 
networks and services or with circuits of other service suppliers.291
The consequence of this ruling by the Panel is that foreign 
competitors could now enter the Mexican telecoms market, through 
commercial presence, and rent Telmex’s equipment to provide competing 
services. This will make it easier for smaller foreign companies to enter 
the Mexican market using existing infrastructure. The result of this is 
greater competition for Mexico’s telecommunications services.
In summary of Mexico-Telecommunications, the Panel found that 
Mexico has failed to meet its GATS commitments under Section 2.2(b) of 
its Reference Paper, Section 1.1 of its Reference Paper and Section 5(a) of 
the Annex with respect to cross-border supply of basic 
telecommunications services on a facilities-based. Mexico has also failed 
to meet its obligations under Section 5(b) of the Annex by not permitting 
commercially present suppliers from accessing private leased lines within 
or across Mexico’s border and to interconnect these circuits to PTTNS. 
The Panel, however, held that Mexico did not violate its commitments in 
Section 2.2(b) of its Reference Paper and Sections 5(a) and (b) of the Annex
291 Mexico-Telecommunications, para. 7.389.
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with respect to cross-border supply of basic telecommunications services 
on a non-facilities basis.
5. Concluding Remarks
The decision in  Mexico-Telecommunications has implications for both 
developed and developing WTO Member countries. First, the crucial 
significance of the decision is that it was based and won almost entirely on 
the Reference Paper and the Annex on Telecommunications. In  addition, 
the Reference Paper is based on “competition law* principles, but the WTO 
contains no agreement or guideline on competition law. The Panel in  
Mexico-Telecommunications thus “seized jurisdiction over some competition 
law issues”.292 For instance, the Panel decided that cartel behaviours of 
price fixing are equivalent to anti-competitive practices although not listed 
in  Section 1 of the Reference Paper. The Panel also had to determine the 
“relevant m arket” according to competition law principles.
The Panel, however, had to rule on competition issues because they 
were called upon to do so -  and more instances w ill arise in the future 
where cases w ill be brought before the WTO whereby there w ill be 
elements of competition law that require interpretation by the Panel 
presiding over the case. Because this interpretation is left to panels with 
no guidelines to follow, developing countries and developed countries alike 
could lose faith in  the ability of the WTO to achieve effective trade 
liberalization in telecommunications services through m ultilaterally agreed 
rules.
292 R. Sharma and J. Rosychuk, (2004).
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It has been suggested that the Mexico-Telecommunications decision 
should convince “nations which have u n til now resisted codifying trade 
and competition principles” that there should be renewed negotiations on 
an agreement on competition policy.293 This agreement would at least 
provide a more “concrete agreement on competition policy” which arguably 
is more preferable to panel judicial interpretations which may be far less 
satisfactory.294 Thus future developments in the WTO could require a 
guideline or framework on competition law and policies to work alongside 
telecommunications liberalization as ultim ately, it is crucial to be able to 
interpret correctly the im portant but flexibly-worded pro-competitive 
principles when making WTO commitments on telecommunications and 
when adjudicating on the disputes arising from them.
Second, Mexico-Telecommunications demonstrates the possibility of 
the WTO becoming an “uberregulator”295 of telecommunications trade. 
This could force developing countries to hold back from fully committing to 
the WTO framework on telecommunications liberalization, in  particular 
the pro-competitive principles of the Reference Paper. Worse still, the 
effectiveness of the WTO system could be undermined by developing 
countries, such as India, refusing to make further liberalization 
commitments on trade in  services for fear of being held accountable in the 
WTO dispute settlement system (as Mexico was) -  and fear of having their 
domestic policies (such as universal service and its funding through cross­
subsidization from high accounting rates) overruled by international 
commitments.
293 Ibid.
294 Jbid.
295 j .g . Sidak and H.J. Singer (2004).
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Third, the Panel’s ruling on international interconnection and the 
accounting rate regime w ill have significant implications to in particular to 
developing countries’ policies on international telecommunications, 
especially w ith regard to the traditional accounting rate regimes. The 
Panel’s decision, for instance, w ill affect those WTO Members who have 
fully committed to the Reference Paper but still m aintains accounting 
rates that are significantly above costs. These Members would have to 
ensure that no government measures are in place which permits above­
cost interconnection rates. The Panel’s decision w ill particularly have an 
impact on developing countries’ hard currency revenue earned from high 
accounting rates. Mexico, for example, received around $1 billion in  
settlement payments from the US each year since 2000.296 The Panel’s 
decision required Mexico to make major changes to its current 
international settlement rates regime and reduce the accounting rates it 
currently charges to near cost-based in  line w ith its WTO commitments. 
Nonetheless, it is hoped that the competitive commercial negotiation of 
international settlement rates resulting from the revised ILD Rules, 
implementing the ruling, w ill result in  reasonable and cost-oriented rates.
Fourth, developing countries are going to find themselves 
incorporating/im plem enting US and EC policies and legal concepts on the 
liberalization of telecommunications services and competition law if  they 
commit fully to the WTO rules on services liberalization and in particular 
to the principles contained in the Reference Paper. This is one of the 
consequences of the Panel decision in  Mexico -  Telecommunications, where 
they used US competition law to decide whether Telmex was a major
296 Supra n. 141.
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supplier or not in the “relevant m arket”,297 and used interpretations of 
certain telecoms terms -  such as “interconnection” -  found in US and EC 
telecoms regulatory frameworks. However, this should not be a reason for 
developing countries not to commit fully to the WTO liberalization of 
telecommunications services.
Mexico-Telecommunications raises some interesting questions for 
consideration. The US brought the case against Mexico for alleged 
violations by Mexico of its WTO commitments in basic 
telecommunications. However, there are other countries, for example 
Canada and Japan, whose policies on telecommunications might not be 
wholly consistent.298 The US has not brought a case against these 
countries. Why is that the case? W hat was the goal of the US for bringing 
the case against Mexico? Was the US trying to enforce compliance with 
WTO rules on basic telecommunications through the WTO dispute 
settlement system? Or perhaps was it trying to use the WTO dispute 
settlement system to provide jurisprudence or set precedents in the area of 
telecommunications services? Or was the goal of the US in bringing the 
case to get the WTO to fill the gaps and resolve ambiguities in the treaty 
text? Or was the US using this case against Mexico to get a WTO ruling in  
favour of the US and thereby provide a reasoned judgment to enhance 
broader public acceptance of the applications and development of the 
rules for the liberalization of trade in telecommunications services.299
It would seem that all the goals above underpinned the US’s move in  
bringing a case against Mexico before the WTO panel and thus seeking 
resolution to the US-Mexico telecoms dispute saga that began in 1997.
297 See Mexico-Telecommunications, paras. 7.149-7.152.
29» See USTR, Results o f2003 “Section 13779 Review.
299 These goals underpinning dispute settlement systems are from John Jackson’s draft 
outline given at the 3rd Annual WTO Conference, 14 May 2003, Senate House, London, UK.
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The last goal is achieved by the Panel’s decisions in favour of the US which 
give credibility to US’s regulatory policies and principles on competitive 
safeguards, the independent regulator and most im portantly for telecoms, 
the concept of cost-oriented interconnection rates.
The US was certainly trying to enforce compliance of WTO rules on 
basic telecommunication services. It has always been a strong advocate of 
liberalization of telecommunications services, the opening up of Member 
countries’ telecoms markets and the promotion of competition in those 
m arkets.300 Mexico, a huge m arket for US telecommunications services 
operators, is an im portant m arket to the US with enormous gains to be 
made from the liberalization of Mexico’s telecommunications industry and 
rules based on m arket and competition principles that w ill allow US 
operators to compete w ith the Mexican giant Telmex on an equal footing.
The difficulty for Mexico, although a party to the NAFTA and aspires 
to compete in world trade on the same footing as Canada and the US, is 
that it is nonetheless still a developing country. Mexico may have made 
international commitments in regional agreements and m ultilateral 
agreements like the WTO but the volatility that often characterizes a 
developing country’s political and economic system makes it difficult for 
such a country, even w ith in itia l good intentions to reform towards a 
m arket economy, to implement and then enforce the m ultilateral 
commitments that it has embarked upon. Mexico’s telecommunications 
sector, like most other countries’, was served by a monopoly un til the wave 
of privatization and liberalization of the telecommunications industry 
swept the globe beginning in the 1990s. Mexico adopted new laws and
3°o See Chapter 2, Section VI.
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rules over the past decade to introduce competition to the Mexican 
telecoms sector. Enforcement, however, has not been easy or straight 
forward. Privatization of Telmex alone does not satisfy Mexico’s 
obligations under the WTO to promote the liberalization of trade in  the 
telecommunications sector, nor does it mean the m arket autom atically 
becomes truly competitive.301
The difference in developing country regulation from developed 
country is that the realities of corruption and non-transparent political 
dealings continue to persist in developing countries to make the move 
from monopoly to competitive m arkets in  telecommunications especially 
difficult. Mexico’s telecommunications industry, for instance, is still 
dominated by Telmex, which is not ju s t a powerful oligopolistic corporate 
entity but more the strong personality of its chairman and largest 
shareholder, Carlos Slim, Mexico’s and Latin America’s wealthiest man. 
Not only is Carlos Slim the most successful businessman in  Latin 
America, he was also a kingmaker in  the Institutional Revolutionary Party 
(PRI) which held power for seven decades until President Vicente Fox took 
office in December 2000.302
It could be argued that the US recognized the political realities 
infecting Mexico’s telecommunications industry and because Mexico is its 
biggest m arket for the export of telecoms services, the US took action 
before the WTO dispute system in a move to compel Mexico to comply w ith 
its m ultilateral commitments. The Mexican government and Cofetel have 
continuously failed to do this, and the US no longer believed they would be 
able to do in the future without a definitive decision from the WTO.
301 Nagle (2002), p. 248.
302 Nagle (2002), p. 208.
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This first WTO telecommunications services case demonstrates the 
US executing its leadership role in  enforcing commitments towards the 
liberalization of telecommunications services and more generally trade in  
services.303 The US is determined to ensure that the WTO Reference Paper 
is utilized as an established and clear set of regulatory principles to be 
applied regularly and faithfully by a ll WTO Members. In  order to advance 
the global liberalization of telecommunications services, Members who 
have committed to open up their telecommunications m arket under the 
auspices of the WTO must abide by the negotiated and agreed m ultilateral 
rules by implementing them into their domestic regime, encouraging 
competition w ithin their telecommunications markets, and adhering to the 
regulatory principles to which they have committed. The signing up of 
more Members to commitments on telecommunications services, 
especially from developing countries, would further advance the 
liberalization process.
303 cf. the recent services case of US-Gambling, W T/DS285,R, where the case is against the 
US.
Chapter 5
The Liberalization of Telecommunications in a 
Developing Country: the Case of India
Like most other countries around the world the Indian 
telecommunications industry was, prior to the introduction of competition 
and liberalization, a state monopoly. Liberalization of the 
telecommunications sector began in 1992 w ith the introduction of lim ited 
competition in value-added services and in cellular telephony. Major 
reforms took place in 1994 and 1999, and an independent, albeit weak, 
regulator was established in  1997. Today, competition from private sector 
companies has been allowed although the biggest telecommunications 
providers in India are m ajority state-owned. Meanwhile, w ithin the WTO 
framework, India has made very lim ited commitments towards the 
liberalization of telecommunications services. Nonetheless, it has 
autonomously liberalized many sections of its telecoms industry since the 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1994 and the subsequent Agreement 
on Basic Telecommunications (ABT).
India is moving towards competition but it must be recognized that 
developing countries such as India do not have the same m arket economy 
dynamics as exist in  developed countries. For India, as for many other 
developing countries introducing competition into economic sectors of 
state monopolies, the process of privatization and de-monopolization is a 
gradual process that requires a certain degree of flexibility.1 In  the
1 WTO, WGTCP, “Communication from India: The Impact of State Monopolies, Exclusive 
Rights and Regulatory Policies on Competition and International Trade”, 
W T/W GTCP/W /110, 16 November 1998, para. 4.
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international arena, India is an active participant in the WTO and it has 
taken steps to liberalize its telecommunications sector in accordance with 
WTO rules. It must be recognized, however, that deregulation and 
privatization of any traditionally reserved sector is not without domestic 
political difficulties.
This chapter studies the telecommunications industry in India to 
provide insight into the development and circumstances of the 
liberalization of telecommunications in a fast-growing developing country. 
The first half of the chapter examines the position of developing countries 
in the WTO. It begins by looking at the special treatm ent given to 
developing countries in  the context of the WTO Agreements, with 
particular reference to the GATS. It then examines the liberalization of 
trade in services from the perspective of developing countries followed by 
an account of their participation in the current services negotiations that 
commenced in February 2000. Here, the chapter looks at the developing 
countries’ position on services liberalization generally and also at the 
specific issue of telecommunications. The chapter continues w ith a 
background examination of India’s current telecommunications structure. 
It then examines the reform policies in telecommunications over the years, 
and finally how and to what extent India has implemented its WTO 
commitments on telecommunications services.
It is clear that the Indian government has been keen to embrace 
reforms introducing competition into the telecommunications sector. 
However, the new b ill on communications is still very restrictive and 
continues to m aintain heavy government involvement in most aspects of 
telecoms. India has made lim ited commitments in basic 
telecommunications in the WTO at the end of the Uruguay Round and the
298
extended negotiations on basic telecommunications. Furthermore, 
although India has adopted autonomous liberalizing measures in the 
telecommunications sector, it has, in its recent offers on trade in services 
tabled in the current Doha Round, scheduled very few of these 
autonomous measures as commitments.2
I. Developing Countries and the WTO
In  the WTO, there is no definition of developed or developing countries. A 
country nominates itself as either a developed or developing country, 
although this self-classification is not automatically accepted in all WTO 
bodies. Developing countries currently make up about two-thirds of the 
WTO, and India is among them. Least-developed countries (LDCs), 
however, are defined in a lis t established by the United Nations. Out of 
the 49 least-developed countries on the UN list, 30 are Members of the 
WTO and 9 more are in the process of accession.3
The categorization of WTO Members into developing/least-developed 
countries is im portant because the WTO Agreements contain provisions 
dealing with special situations applicable to these countries. These 
provisions can be found in  the GATT, the GATS, the Agreements in Annex 
1A of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 
(namely, the TBT Agreement, the SPS Agreement, the Agreement on 
Agriculture) and the Dispute Settlement Understanding w ith regard to 
least-developed countries.
2 See Appendix IX. See also the Indian Ministry of Commerce’s monthly newsletter on the 
WTO, December Issue, Volume 5(12) at http: /  /commerce.nic.in/wtodec2003.htm#h9.
3 See WTO website at http: /  / www.wto.org.
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GATT 1994 has a special section, Part 4, on Trade and Development 
which includes provisions on non-reciprocity in trade negotiations between 
developed and developing countries.4 Under these special provisions, 
when developed countries grant trade concessions to developing countries 
they cannot require developing countries to make matching offers in  
return. The GATT also enables countries to grant special concessions to 
developing countries w ithout having to do the same for the entire 
membership. This is known as “special and differential treatm ent”.5
Developing country Members in the WTO did not always have special 
provisions in the GATT system giving them differential status. The GATT 
1947 did not originally recognize the special situation of developing 
countries since the fundamental principle of the agreement was that rights 
and obligations should be applied uniform ly to all Contracting Parties. 
Developing countries, including India, between 1948 and 1955 thus 
participated in ta riff negotiations and other aspects of the GATT activities 
as equal partners.6 Then, at the Review Session in 1954-55, Article X V III 
of the GATT 1947 on governmental assistance to economic development7 
was amended w ith a view to giving developing countries additional 
flexibility w ith regard to several of their obligations in cases where it was 
necessary for a developing country to promote a particular industry, and
4 Part 4 was added to the GATT in 1968 in response to UNCTAD recommendations. 
Developing countries in 1964 formed UNCTAD to address the special and distinctive 
economies of the developing countries.
5 GATT Contracting Parties, Decision of November 28, 1979 on Differential and More 
Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, GATT, 
26th Supp. BISD 203 (1980). Now part of GATT 1994, as incorporated by GATT 1994, 
Section l(b)(iv).
6 11 of the 23 original signatories of the GATT 1947 were developing countries: Brazil, 
Burma (Myanmar), Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Chile, Cuba, China, India, Lebanon, Pakistan, 
Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and Syria.
7 The original title of Article XV III GATT, “Government Assistance to Economic Development 
and Reconstruction*, was changed at the Review Session of 1954-55.
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also to deal w ith balance-of-payments problems.8 Article X V III became the 
first article of the GATT designed to grant special privileges to developing 
countries.9
During the Uruguay Round major changes and new provisions were 
adopted in the m ultilateral trading system to advance the development of 
developing countries and increase their participation in world trade. The 
significant changes beneficial to developing countries include: i) steps 
taken to establish a fair and m arket-oriented agricultural trading system 
through the Agreement on Agriculture; ii) phasing-out of discrim inatoiy 
restrictions on textiles and clothing and progressive integration of the 
sector into GATT; iii) establishing that emergency safeguard action must 
be temporary and norm ally non-discriminatory and that grey-area 
measures such as “voluntary export restraints” and “orderly m arket 
arrangements” are prohibited; and iv) a more judicial dispute settlement 
system. These features of the WTO Agreements have contributed to 
integrating developing countries into the m ultilateral trading system.10
Least-developed countries receive extra attention in the WTO and 
with regard to dispute settlement, they enjoy a special privilege. Article 24 
of the DSU requires WTO Members to “exercise due restraint” in bringing a 
case against a least-developed country.11 In  addition, a least-developed 
country can ask the WTO Director General or the Chairman of the Dispute 
Settlement Body to help settle the dispute through conciliation, mediation 
or other means.12 While all other provisions giving special treatm ent to
8 WTO, “High Level Symposium on Trade and Development, Geneva, 17-18 March 1999", 
Background Document, p. 11. (High Level Symposium 1999\.
9 Jackson, Davey and Sykes, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations: Cases, 
Materials and Text (1995), p. 1110.
10 WTO, High Level Symposium 1999, p. 17.
11 DSU, Article 24(1).
12 DSU, Article 24(2).
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developing countries are also applicable to least-developed countries, the 
provisions of Article 24 DSU are lim ited to LDCs.
1. Special and Differential Treatment in the GATS
In  the GATS, there are also provisions giving special attention to the needs 
of developing countries. However, there are no provisions on “special and 
differential” treatm ent like those in the GATT. The GATS provisions on 
developing countries provide special treatm ent to developing countries in 
three main ways.13 First, there are provisions aimed at increasing their 
trade opportunities. These are in the three paragraphs that make up 
Article IV , which is exclusively about encouraging the participation of 
developing countries in world trade. From the wording, Article IV  amounts 
merely to a “promise” or an intention to help promote developing countries’ 
participation in trade and does not provide an effective means of aiding 
developing countries through “special and differential” treatm ent. In  
practice, this Article has not proved very helpful to developing countries. 
This is discussed in more detail below.
Second, special treatm ent is given to developing countries through 
flexibility w ith regard to commitments, and use of policy instruments. 
Article 111:4 allows flexibility for individual developing country Member with 
respect to the tim e-lim it for establishing enquiry points to provide specific 
information to other Members. Article V:3 provides flexibility with regard 
to the Article V:1 requirement for substantial sectoral coverage and
13 LDCs are given further attention in GATS Articles IV:3, XIX:3 and Section 6(d) Annex on 
Telecommunications.
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elimination of discrimination between Members in the context of an 
agreement liberalizing trade in services entered into by Members.
On progressive liberalization, Article XIX:2 grants,
appropriate flexib ility  for ind ividual developing country Mem bers for opening fewer 
sectors, liberalizing fewer types of transactions, progressively extending m arket 
access in line w ith  th e ir developm ent situation and, when m aking access to th e ir 
m arkets available to foreign service suppliers, attaching to such access conditions 
aim ed a t achieving the objectives referred to in  A rticle IV  [on increasing  
participation of developing countries].
Article XIX:2 is one of the most im portant provisions of the GATS giving 
special treatm ent to developing countries. It was the securing of the 
inclusion of this provision into the GATS that provided the incentive for 
many developing countries to accept the GATS as part of the WTO 
package.14 Sim ilar to Article XIX:2 of the GATS is Section 5(g) of the GATS 
Annex on Telecommunications perm itting developing countries to have the 
flexibility to attach conditions to the access and use of public 
telecommunications networks and services by foreign suppliers. It has 
been suggested that these conditions can be extended to embrace 
conditions related to preferential pricing for access to and use of 
developing countries’ networks.15 However, for developing countries to 
take advantage of this provision they must specify such conditions in their 
Schedules. This was confirmed by the Panel’s ruling in Mexico- 
Telecommunications.16
Third, technical assistance is provided to aid developing countries in  
their integration into the GATS system. This is set out in Article XXV:2
14 Asoke Mukeiji, “Developing Countries and the WTO: Issues of Implementation", 34(6) 
JWT (2000), p. 33 at 59.
15 Boutheina Guermazi, “International Accounting Rates, Developing Countries and the 
WTO: the Dilemma and a Possible Solution", International Journal o f Communication Law 
and Policy, Issue 3, summer 1999, p. 20.
16 Mexico-Telecommunications, Panel Report, W T/DS204/R , adopted 1 June 2004, para. 
7.388. See also Chapter 4.
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and Section 6 of the Annex on Telecommunications. In  the Annex, WTO 
Members recognize the importance of efficient and advanced 
telecommunications infrastructure to the expansion of trade in services. 
The provision therefore requires Members to make available to developing 
countries information on telecommunications services and developments 
in telecommunications and information technology to help them  
strengthen their domestic telecommunications sector. Members must also 
encourage and support telecommunications cooperation among developing 
countries at the international, regional and sub-regional levels.17
To carry out this mandate of providing technical assistance, the WTO 
Secretariat provides a variety of training courses especially for developing 
countries to help them strengthen their knowledge and understanding of 
the WTO rules and its Agreements. For example, the WTO has held 
specialized courses on trade in services as well as dispute settlement. 
Most recently, the WTO and the ITU organized jo intly a training workshop 
for telecoms regulators from member countries.18 The workshop provided 
the participants from regulatory authorities w ith the opportunity to learn 
more about the WTO rules that affect their domestic systems and 
participate in practical, interactive exercises on how to apply these rules.
2. Developing Countries and the Liberalization of Trade in Services
Developing country Members of the WTO are bound by the rules of trade 
in services contained in the GATS as part of the ‘package-deal’ every WTO 
Member accepted at the end of the Uruguay Round. They have not,
17 Section 6(b) Annex on Telecommunications.
is See WTO News, 1 December 2004 at
http://www.wto.org/engligh/news e/news04 e/tpc ldec04 e.htm .
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however, embraced the WTO m ultilateral rules on trade in services as 
enthusiastically as the developed countries have. There are a number of 
reasons why developing country Members find it difficult to have 
confidence in the GATS and the m ultilateral system of liberalizing trade in  
services.
First, there is the issue of data and assessing the impact of trade in  
services. More specifically, there seems to be a lack of concrete evidence 
that proves that liberalization of trade in services brings substantial 
economic benefits to developing countries. Until there is substantial 
evidence that liberalization of trade in  services brings noticeable benefits 
to developing countries, they w ill remain skeptical of the world trade 
system in  services and make lim ited WTO commitments on sector-specific 
trade in services. They believe they have good reason to be suspicious. 
Developing countries have not received concessions of any meaningful 
economic value under the movement of natural persons mode of supply. 
As a result, most developing countries have a deficit in trade in services 
except in  the areas of tourism  and travel, and worker rem ittances.19
In  addition, developing countries, who make up two-thirds of WTO 
membership, only accounted for about 21 per cent of world exports of 
commercial services in 1997, while Canada and the US alone made up 20 
per cent and Western Europe accounted for 45 per cent.20 The 
concentration of trade in  services is thus among the advanced economies, 
with most of the trade taking place between North America and Western
19 WTO, CTS, Special Session, “Communication from Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, the 
Dominican Republic, Haiti, India, Kenya, Pakistan, Peru, Uganda, Venezuela and 
Zimbabwe: Assessment of Trade in Services", S /C SS /W /114, 9 October 2001, para. 7.
2° WTO, High Level Symposium 1999, p. 11. In  2001, developing countries’ share of world 
export in commercial services was just over 23 per cent. WTO, International Trade Statistics 
2002, p. 14.
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Europe, thereby making developing countries “traders at the margin”.21 
Developing country providers, who are mostly small enterprises, face 
competition from large m ultinationals that have massive financial 
strength, access to the latest technology, worldwide networks and 
sophisticated IT  infrastructures. It  is therefore difficult, if  not impossible, 
for developing countries to “catch up” under such unequal circumstances 
of competition.22
Second, provisions in the GATS giving special treatment to developing 
countries, in particular Article IV , are not being implemented by developed 
country Members.23 Article IV  of GATS is intended to assist developing 
countries through increasing their participation in world trade through 
negotiated specific commitments relating to, among others, “the 
liberalization of m arket access in  sectors and modes of supply of export 
interest to them .”24 Developed country Members seem to have ignored this 
in  practice by continuing to restrict market access through the fourth 
mode of supply (movement of natural persons) -  the mode where most 
developing countries, including India, have a comparative advantage due 
to their abundant supply of relatively cheap labour.25
21 Neela Mukheijee, “GATS and the Millennium Round of Multilateral Negotiations: 
Selected Issues from the Perspective of Developing Countries", 33(4) JWT (1999), p. 87 at 
92.
22 WTO, CTS, Special Session, S /C S S /W /114, para. 15.
23 The only real special support given to developing countries are in the form of technical 
assistance -  for example, training government officials from developing countries through 
workshops and seminars, and the setting up of the Advisory Centre on WTO Law in 2000. 
But what developing countries need and desire are specific commitments from the 
developed country Members in services sectors, especially in those where they are strong 
in, and in particular for those of mode 4 delivery.
2* Article IV: 1 (b) of the GATS.
25 Furthermore, new items for potential inclusion into the WTO system concerning 
investment, competition policy and labour standards have been introduced by developed 
countries before the GATS is even fully implemented. These new issues, driven forward 
mainly by the EU, have pushed the initial Uruguay Round commitments into the 
background, and thus making it difficult for the developing countries to keep pace with 
such rapid developments. A range of developing countries broadly supports the view, 
voiced by India, that the issue of fair implementation of special and differential treatment 
should be tackled first (see Mukheijee, 33(4) JWT (1999), p. 98). In  May 2004, the EU 
agreed to drop the “new issues" from the Doha Development Agenda (DDA).
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Third, developing countries do not have an advanced regulatory 
environment sim ilar to that of developed countries. The architects of the 
GATS were from developed countries, and they used the economic and 
legal models that governed the regulatory system in their countries to 
draw up the GATS. The systems of the developed world are alien to 
developing countries. Many developing countries have signed up to 
complex agreements like the GATS without understanding their fu ll 
implications.26 This has left them considerably handicapped in applying 
the technical agreements to their policy framework.
The design of an appropriate regulatory system to suit their service 
industries and comply w ith their WTO commitments is one of the many 
challenges facing developing countries. Although developing countries are 
skeptical of the benefits to them of opening up their markets to trade in  
services, they do recognize the significance of the growth in the 
internationalization of services that has come about through rapid 
technological change in information technology and telecommunications. 
There are opportunities to be gained by developing countries from the 
growth of trade in services but for this to happen, they must adapt their 
regulatory environments. An appropriate regulatory system is crucial to 
the liberalization of trade in services.
As a consequence of the above concerns, developing countries are 
taking an active role in the current GATS negotiations which commenced 
in 2000.27 They are demanding that the special treatm ent provisions in  
the GATS with regard to developing countries be implemented by 
developed countries, and that the im portant GATS concepts of flexibility
26 N. Mukheijee (1999), p. 97.
27 Hereinafter GATS 2000 negotiations.
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and autonomous liberalization are put into practice for the benefit of 
developing countries. Developing countiy Members are determined that 
this round of negotiations should focus on the interests and demands of 
developing countries and that true benefits to them are achieved. They are 
intent on remedying the Uruguay Round which they alleged “had neither 
achieved a balance of rights and obligations nor promoted the interests of 
all participants, particularly those of developing countries’’.28
II. GATS 2000 Negotiations and Developing Countries
The GATS 2000 negotiations commenced as part of the WTO’s mandate on 
progressive liberalization. This obligation is contained in GATS Article 
XIX. The services negotiations must aim to provide effective m arket access 
and thereby reduce or elim inate the adverse effects on trade in services 
caused by restrictive measures. The services negotiations is now 
incorporated into the Doha agenda, adopted in November 2001 as part of 
the WTO’s new round of m ultilateral negotiations (the Doha Round).29
GATS Article X IX  provides opportunities for developing countries to 
increase their participation and standing in world trade. As seen above in  
Section 1.1, the provisions granting special treatment are of particular 
importance to developing countries. Article XIX:2 provides
28 WTO, CTS (Special Session), Report o f the Meeting held on 5 and 6 December 2000, 
S /C S S /M /7 , 2 March 2001, para. 46.
29 The progress and timetable of the services negotiations are as follows: the negotiating 
guidelines and procedures of the services negotiations were adopted on 28 March 2001; 
initial offers of market access were to be tabled by 31 March 2003; stock-taking took place 
at the WTO Fifth Ministerial Conference in Cancun, Mexico in September 2003; and the 
negotiations were due to complete on 1 January 2005 as part of a single package of the 
WTO Doha Round. Due to the stalling of the Doha Round since Cancun, the negotiations 
have been extended. The new timetable includes revised services offers to be tabled by May 
2005, and the Doha Round is extended at least until the Sixth Ministerial Meeting in Hong 
Kong in December 2005. See WTO, Doha Work Programme, W T /L /579, 2 August 2004.
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the flexibility developing countries need with regard to liberalization by 
allowing them to open fewer sectors and liberalize fewer types of 
transactions, while progressively extending m arket access in line with 
their level of developments. In  Article X IX:3, the provision on autonomous 
liberalization is significant to developing countries.
1. Autonomous Liberalization
Article XIX:3 of the GATS states:
Negotiating guidelines shall establish modalities for the treatment of liberalization 
undertaken autonomously by Members since previous negotiations.
Autonomous liberalization first became a negotiating issue during the 
Uruguay Round and was discussed extensively in the negotiating group on 
m arket access. The concept of autonomous liberalization has always been 
difficult to tackle due to its unlim ited flexibility. It is not defined in the 
GATS. The essential problem was “whether autonomous liberalization was 
trade liberalization undertaken and bound in an autonomous manner, i.e. 
outside the context of a negotiation, or trade liberalization undertaken 
unilaterally but not bound.”30 The WTO Secretariat has suggested that 
autonomous liberalization most likely means “liberalization undertaken by 
individual Members unilaterally, outside a negotiating context.”31
Autonomous liberalization is of the “utmost importance” to 
developing countries.32 Many developing countries, motivated m ainly by 
national interest, have undertaken extensive measures of autonomous
30 WTO, CTS (Special Session), Report o f the Meeting held on 1 December 2000 on the 
Treatment o f Autonomous Liberalization, S /C S S /M /6 , 22 January 2001, para. 4.
31 WTO, CTS (Special Session), Report o f the Meeting held on 5 and 6 June 2002, 10 July 
2002, T N /S /M /2 , para. 27.
32 WTO, CTS (Special Session), Report of the Meeting held on 14 to 17 May 2001, 
S /C S S /M /9 , 22 June 2001, para. 7.
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liberalization in the different services sectors. Developing countries 
therefore sought credit and recognition for these liberalization measures 
undertaken autonomously for the purpose of strengthening their 
negotiating positions in the WTO. The issue was whether the measures 
undertaken autonomously had to be bound before credit was given. 
Developing countries argued that this issue was im portant to them and 
that credit should not depend on autonomous measures being bound. 
This was especially more so when a developing country was undergoing 
structural and regulatory reforms in the services sector because there is 
more flexibility to adjust or modify an unbound measure.33
India was among the developing country Members active in  
highlighting the importance of autonomous liberalization. India, like most 
other developing country Members, argued that the modalities for 
autonomous liberalization should not result in  simply expecting countries 
to bind such liberalization. Autonomous measures should be clearly 
distinguished from international commitments in the WTO. India argued 
that if Members had to bind those measures they had autonomously 
liberalized in order to obtain credit, they would have no incentive to carry 
out further autonomous liberalization in the future.34 Furtherm ore, 
autonomous liberalization should be encouraged and more favourable 
treatm ent should be accorded to countries having undertaken such 
liberalization.35
The encouragement of autonomous liberalization could be achieved 
through giving credit and recognition to it, but this should be done
33 WTO, CTS, Report o f Meeting 1 December 2000, S /C S S /M /6 , para. 24; and ibid.
34 WTO, CTS, Report of Meeting 5 and 6 December 2000, S /C S S /M /7 , para. 7.
35 WTO, CTS, S /C S S /M /9 , para. 10.
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through multilateraUy agreed criteria and should not be left completely to 
bilateral bargaining.36 For the purposes of transparency, it was im portant 
to address autonomous liberalization in a m ultilateral forum and assess 
the actual level of liberalization in services sectors undertaken by 
Members.37
Negotiators in the WTO finally agreed on the modalities for the 
treatm ent of autonomous liberalization in March 2003.38 The modalities 
define an “autonomous liberalization measure” as a measure,
(a) subject to scheduling under Part III of the GATS, and/or leading to the 
termination of an MFN exemption,
(b) compatible with the MFN principle,
(c) undertaken by the liberalizing Member unilaterally,39 since previous 
negotiations, in accordance with Article XIX of the GATS, and
(d) applicable to any or all service sectors.40
The modalities provide a illustrative list of criteria which a Member may 
use to assess the value of an autonomous liberalization measure. The 
same criteria may be used to assess the value of credits. The modalities 
do not stipulate that an autonomously liberalized measure must be bound 
before credit could be given. However, “whether the measure in question 
has already been scheduled and if  not, whether the lib era liz in g  Member is 
willing to do so”41 can be taken into account when assessing both the 
value of the specific autonomous measure and the corresponding credit.42
36 WTO, CTS, Report o f Meeting 1 December 2000, S /C S S /M /6 , para. 11.
37 Ibid.
38 WTO, CTS Special Session, “Modalities for the Treatment of Autonomous Liberalization”, 
adopted on 6 March 2003, T N /S /6 , 10 March 2003. (Hereinafter Modalities).
39 It is understood that liberalization measures undertaken as part of economic reform 
programmes, including those under the auspices of the IMF and the World Bank, should 
be considered as "autonomous liberalization measures" for the purposes of these 
modalities, in so far as they meet the criteria set out in this paragraph.
40 Modalities, para. 3.
41 Modalities, para. 4(i).
42 Modalities, paras. 4(i) and 6.
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The issue of autonomous liberalization is relevant to 
telecommunications liberalization. India, like other developing countries, 
has undertaken significant measures which autonomously liberalize its 
telecommunications sector. This is discussed below.
2. Developing Countries and Telecommunications Liberalization 
Generally
As discussed in Chapter 4, the significance of telecommunications services 
as a service economy in its own right and as an underlying mode for the 
delivery of other services renders this economic sector crucial to the 
economic growth and development of any country. Telecommunications 
services is an area of critical relevance for countries interested in pursuing 
outward-oriented strategies of development.43 The telecommunications 
sector is one of the key infrastructures of a country and it is essential to 
cany out other economic activities. In  the age of rapid development in  
technologies and the global nature of modem trade, in particular as a 
result of the services revolution, an effective, advanced and competitive 
telecommunications system is requisite to a country wanting and needing 
to develop and compete globally.
Many developing countries, however, are hard pressed to meet the 
demand for even basic telecommunications services, and investment in  
networks for value-added services may be considered an unaffordable 
luxury. Some developing country governments are reluctant to liberalize 
for several reasons. One of these is the fear that the introduction of 
competition would result in enormous job losses. However, according to a
43 C. Braga, “The Impact of the Internationalization of Services on Developing Countries", 
March 1996. Available at http: /  7www.worldbank.org.
312
comparative analysis of twenty-six countries in Asia and Latin America 
conducted by the ITU, the evidence seems to suggest that this is not the 
case. The analysis showed that during 1990-1994 employment in markets 
with vaiying degrees of competition increased by 20.73 per cent, while in  
monopoly markets employment grew by only 3.13 per cent.44
Another reason for developing countries’ resistance to 
telecommunications liberalization is the fear of some governments that 
competition w ill put universal service at risk. In  practice, however, most 
of the available data point to an increase in network penetration and 
service availability w ith competition.45 This seems to be the case in  India. 
When India’s telecommunications system was run by the state monopoly 
provider, the Department of Telecommunications, teledensity46 in 1994 
was a mere O.8.47 After introduction of some competition in 1994 and the 
opening up of all telecommunications services to competition in 2002, 
India’s teledensity has increased to 4 by 2002,48 and 8.37 by end of 
2004.49
In  addition, competition in  cellular services, which has been 
introduced more widely and for longer than competition in wireline 
services in developing countries, clearly has led to much greater network 
penetration than monopolies.50 Again, this is the experience in India. 
Ever since the Indian government allowed private sector competition in
44 Ben Petrazzini, “Competition in Telecoms -  Implications for Universal Service and 
Employment”, Public Policy fo r the Private Sector, Note No. 96, October 1996.
45 B. Petrazzini (1996).
46 The number of main telephone lines or connections per one hundred persons.
47 Government of India, DoT, The National Telecom Policy 1994. (NTP 1994).
48 WTO, TPRB, Trade Policy Review, India: Report by the Secretariat, W T/TP R /S /100, 22 
May 2002, p. 130, para. 100.
49 This figure includes mobile phone connections. The Economic Times Online, “Tele-density 
moves up", 2 January 2005.
50 C. Fink, A. Mattoo and R. Rathindran, “An Assessment of Telecommunications Reform in 
Developing Countries", World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, WPS2909, October 
2002, p. 5.
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mobile services in the early 1990s, private operators have made mobile 
services the fastest growing sector in  India.51 There were 6.7 m illion 
cellular subscribers by the beginning of May 2002,52 which increased to 
37.8 m illion by the end of June 2004.53 Mobile phones grew by 160% from  
March 2003 to March 2004 while fixed lines grew by only 3%.54 
Connectivity in rural areas of India has also been enhanced by a 
competitive cellular sector.55
A third reason why some developing countries have restricted 
telecommunications liberalization is the need to protect the cultural 
identity of the country. Developing country governments, including the 
cultural m inistry of the Indian government, fear that foreign companies 
w ill end up taking control of the country’s telecommunications industry 
and force upon their citizens imported content unacceptable to their 
culture or worse still m arginalizing their cultural identity.56
A further concern is national security. This is often cited as an 
argument against opening up the domestic telecommunications m arket. 
This problem, however, can be addressed through legislation restricting 
liberalization of telecommunications services serving government bodies 
dealing w ith national security. Every other telecoms sectors can then be 
safely liberalized.
Despite the concerns developing countries have for liberalization of 
the telecommunications sector, over the past few years many have come to
51 The Economist, “Indian Telecoms: Connecting Competition", 4 April 2002.
52 Over 28,000 additional customers were signed up in the month of April alone. The 
Hindu, Business Line, Internet Edition, 10 May 2002, at 
http: /  /  www.blonnet.com/2002 /0 5 /1 0 /stories/2002051000610700.htm.
53 TRAI, The Indian Telecom Services Performance Indicators July-September 2004 
(December 2004), p. 12. (Hereinafter Indicators July-September 2004).
54 Government of India, DoT, Annual Report 2003-2004, p. II. (Hereinafter Annual Report 
2003-2004).
55 The Economist, “Mobile Phones in India: Another Kind of Net Work", 1 March 2001.
56 The Economist, “When India wires up," 20 July 2000.
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realize that a modem, high-quality telecommunication services 
infrastructure is essential to the country’s economy. As a result, more 
than ninety developing countries opened their telecommunications sector 
to private participation between 1990 and 1998.57 Driving this 
liberalization of state-owned networks has been the desire to expand and 
improve services as national governments were unable to finance the 
necessary infrastructure improvements to their respective 
telecommunications system.58 Furthermore, the belief that liberalization 
in the telecommunications sector was essential to their development was 
reflected by the participation of developing countries in the negotiations on 
basic telecommunications that took place after the Uruguay Round from  
1994-1997.59
The WTO telecommunications commitments made by developing 
countries in the WTO are of varying extent. As we w ill see later, India was 
among those developing country Members who made rather lim ited 
commitments. Nonetheless, most developing countries, including India, 
scheduled higher level of commitments regarding commercial presence 
than on any other mode of supply.60 The considerable challenge for many 
developing countries since the signing of the ABT has been the practical 
implementation of the commitments. Developing countries are once again 
negotiating on telecommunications services in the WTO as part of the 
WTO’s mandate on progressive liberalization. In  this Round, they have to 
deal w ith developed countries’ insistence that telecommunications be
57 A. Izaguirre, “Private Participation in Telecommunications -  Recent Trends", Public Policy 
fo r the Private Sector, Note No. 204, December 1999.
58 E. Leahy and M. O’Brien, “Prospering from the International Telecommunications 
Revolution: A Party by Invitation Only’", International Journal o f Communications Law and 
Policy, Issue 4, W inter 1999/2000, p. 7.
59 Over 40 developing countries took part in the extended negotiations on basic 
telecommunications. WTO website: http: /  / www.wto.org.
60 WTO, High Level Symposium 1999, p. 22.
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further liberalized through fu ll adherence to the Reference Paper and 
making greater commitments towards m arket access. Some developing 
countries, however, have yet to implement fully the commitments made in  
the previous negotiations.
3. GATS 2000 Negotiations and Telecommunications
The discussions that have taken place on telecommunications 
liberalization in the GATS 2000 negotiations have so far been pursued 
more actively by developed country Members, w ith the US taking its 
participation further by proposing certain issues beyond liberalization. In  
its proposal at the meeting of the Special Session of the Council for Trade 
in  Services held in May 2001, the US suggested that fu ll privatization of 
operations and telecommunications networks was an im portant first step 
in  the liberalization of telecommunications.61 The US argued for 
privatization because historically, the US telecommunications industry 
has always been operated by private companies.62 US companies thus 
have a comparative advantage in privately-run telecommunications 
markets. Moreover, a privatized telecoms sector enables the US to apply 
its anti-trust laws through the WTO system and affect the domestic 
policies of its trading partners. In  this way, the US can increase its 
telecommunications trade. Privatization also means less government 
involvement which could mean greater access to markets for competitors.
61 WTO, CTS (Special Session), “Communication from the United States: Market Access in 
Telecommunications and Complementaiy Services: the WTO’s Role in Accelerating the 
Development of a Globally Networked Economy*, S /C S S /W /30, 18 December 2000. See 
also WTO, CTS, Report of Meeting 14-17 May 2001, S /C S S /M /9 , paras. 180-195; and 
WTO, CTS (Special Session), Report o f the Meeting held on 9 to 12 July 2001, S /C S S /M /10, 
21 September 2001, para. 183.
62 See Chapter 2.
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Even though the US model for a privatized telecommunications sector 
involves an independent regulator overseeing the industry’s operations, 
such a regulator provides greater transparency and im partiality than 
state-run telecoms operators.
The US call for fu ll privatization attracted strong reaction from  
developing countries who stressed that privatization was a domestic 
m atter and should not be made a subject of negotiations under the 
GATS.63 Even other developed countries like Japan and the EC did not 
share the US view for prioritizing privatization through the m ultilateral 
arena.64 They pointed out that what was more im portant w ith regard to 
telecommunications liberalization was the promotion of competition 
through an independent regulator and a pro-competitive regulatory 
framework.65
Other active participants in the GATS 2000 negotiations included 
‘richer’ developing countries like the Republic of Korea, Singapore and 
Hong Kong who supported further liberalization of the telecommunications 
sector through making further commitments and adopting and adhering to 
the Reference Paper in fu ll.66 Other developing countries - Turkey, Brazil, 
Argentina, Israel, and Venezuela - who have experienced great economic 
benefits through the liberalization of their telecommunications sectors, 
have also expressed fu ll support for the liberalization of telecoms services 
and the opening up of markets through m arket access and national 
treatm ent commitments.67 Meanwhile Mexico, which claimed that all its 
telecommunications sub-sectors have been opened to competition (except
63 WTO, CTS, Report o f Meeting 14-17 May 2001, S /C S S /M /9 , paras. 180-195.
64 Ibid., paras. 189 and 191.
65 Ibid. See also WTO, CTS, Report o f Meeting 9-12 July 2001, S /C S S /M /10, para. 189.
66 WTO, CTS, Report o f Meeting 14-17 May 2001, S /C S S /M /9 , paras. 190, 192 and 193.
67 WTO, CTS, Report o f Meeting 9-12 July 2001, S /C S S /M /10, paras. 186, 193, 194, 200, 
201.
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in  satellite services) and that it had adopted the Reference Paper, stressed 
that liberalization for developing countries should be gradual and that the 
negotiations should also take into consideration the results of the 
assessment of trade in services under GATS Article X IX .68
Saint Lucia, a smaller developing country participant, stressed that it 
was incorrect to state in such a sweeping manner (as the US had done)69 
that restricted access would only hurt developing countries. Saint Lucia 
stated that the “one-size-fits-all” approach was inappropriate,70 reiterating 
that,
The flexibility of the GATS approach must not be undermined by the liberalization 
process and that developing countries should be able to make commitments on 
the basis of their level of development and the size of their economy.71
Another active developing country Member who expressed the need 
to take account of the special and differential needs of developing 
economies was Cuba whose proposal on telecommunications was intended 
to promote measures to facilitate the growing participation of developing 
countries in telecommunications trade, by having regard for their 
economic situation and development, trade and financial needs.72 Cuba 
pointed out that
[Although private sector participation in telecommunications sector financing in 
certain developing countries in the 1990s had reflected the increasing coverage of 
telephony in these countries, the technological divide which separated them from 
the developed world had not been bridged, adequate access to information and 
communication technologies had not been provided, particularly in rural and 
remote areas, and this continued to present a barrier to the potential of these 
countries to participate in world trade on an equal footing [...] this demonstrated 
why developing countries needed satisfactory regulation of the sector in order to 
ensure harmonious national development (...) the right of Members to regulate
68 Ibid., para. 182.
69 Ibid., para. 183.
70 Ibid., para. 204.
71 Ibid., para. 204. Emphasis added.
72 WTO, CTS (Special Session), “Communication from Cuba: Negotiating Proposal on 
Telecommunications Services”, T N /S /W /2 , 30 May 2002.
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and introduce new regulations was reaffirmed by Ministers in paragraph 7 of the 
Doha Declaration.73
Cuba recognized the importance of global telecommunications trade to the 
economic and social development of developing countries and proposed 
that the negotiations take this into account by applying Article XIX: 2 of 
the GATS to the letter.74
In  the current negotiations, India has so far not made any statements 
of substance nor submitted proposals on this service sector. India’s main 
focus in the Doha round of services negotiations is the movement of 
natural persons for which India has submitted a proposal75 and to which 
India has devoted itself to making sure that this im portant issue receives 
due recognition in the debates and discussions. Another im portant 
service sector to India is the computer and related services sector as 
computer software services have recently and rapidly grown in India into a 
large industry generating enormous revenues. India has also submitted a 
proposal in  this service sector.76 In  its conditional offer submitted to the 
WTO in December 2003, India has greatly committed to liberalize the 
computer services sector.77 Its offers to liberalize telecommunications 
services, however, rem ain very lim ited.78
The next section examines India’s telecommunications sector and the 
extent of its liberalization.
73 WTO, CTS (Special Session), Report o f the Meeting held on 5 and 6 June 2002, 
T N /S /M /2 , 10 July 2002, para. 100.
74 ibid., paragraph 101.
75 WTO, CTS (Special Session), “Communication from India: Proposed Liberalization of 
Movement of Professionals under General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)", 
S /C S S /W /12, 24 November 2000, and 11 December 2000, S /C S S /W /12 /C o rr.l.
76 WTO, CTS (Special Session), “Communication from India: Negotiating Proposal on 
Computer and Related Services", S /C S S /W /141, 22 March 2002.
77 WTO, CTS, “India: Conditional In itial Offer", TN /O /IN D , 12 January 2004. See Appendix 
IX.
73 Ibid.
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I I I .  Background to Ind ia’s Telecom m unications Industry
From the time India gained independence from British rule on 15 August 
1947 up to 1991, the Indian economy was based on what has become 
known as “Nehruvian socialism”.79 Central planning and strong state 
control of the most influential sectors of the economy through large-scale 
enterprises were India’s economic policies. In  the telecommunications 
sector, for instance, all foreign telecommunications companies were 
nationalized in 1947 to form the Posts, Telephone and Telegraph (PTT), a 
monopoly run by India’s M inistry of Communications. Nehru thought that 
competition was bad and he had “contempt for the price mechanism”.80 
The result of this policy, together w ith heavy protectionist measures, was 
slow economic growth rate - falling considerably behind those of South 
East Asian countries - and severe trade imbalances and double-digit 
inflation. Indian policies eventually required the IM F to step in w ith an 
emergency help of a US $2.3 billion loan.
The intervention of the IM F resulted in the most sweeping and 
dramatic economic reforms in India’s history when P.V. Narasimha Rao 
became Prime M inister in  1991. The Indian government under Rao had as 
its objective the integration of the Indian economy more closely w ith the 
world economy. The radical economic reforms of the Rao government, 
through the New Industrial Policy 1991, saw a dramatic increase in India’s 
economic growth to 7.2%  in 1994-1995, with an average growth rate
79 Lara Srivastava and Sidharth Sinha, Fixed-Mobile Interconnection: the Case o f India, 
2000, p. 7.
80 Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, The Commanding Heights: The Battle Between 
Government and the Marketplace that is Remaking the Modem World (1998), as cited in A. 
Menon, “India: Adopting a Pro-Competitive Policy for Telecommunications”, 12 May 1999,
p. 20.
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during the years 1993-1996 at 7%.81 India’s external reforms focused on 
trade liberalization and export promotion, culminating in India’s active 
participation in the Uruguay Round. As regards internal reforms, India 
began to move towards privatization of state-owned enterprises from 1991.
The telecommunications sector was no exception. Liberalization of 
India’s telecommunications sector began in the early 1990s w ith the 
introduction of competition, in 1992, from the private operators in value- 
added telecommunications services and cellular mobile telephone. In  the 
following years, the Indian government adopted two major policies, one in  
1994 and the other in  1999, to reform the telecommunications industry. 
Today, the Indian telecommunications industry is one of the fastest 
growing in the world, w ith a growth rate averaging 22 per cent per annum  
in recent years.82 Prior to the 1990s, however, India’s government policies, 
like those of other countries pre-competition, were adopted on the firm  
belief that the telecommunications industry was a natural monopoly and 
that to avoid wasteful duplication, state telephone companies should 
m aintain their legal monopoly.
1. The Regulatory Framework during the Monopoly Years
Prior to the reforms, India’s telecommunications legislation consisted of 
the India Telegraph Act 1885 and the Indian Wireless Act 1933. The India 
Telegraph Act gave the Indian government the exclusive privilege of
81 WTO, Press release, 1 April 1998, PRESS/TPRB/71.
82 Government of India, DOT, Annual Report 2001-2002, p. 5. (Hereinafter Annual Report 
2001-2002).
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providing basic telecommunications services, and this provided the legal 
basis for the government’s monopoly in telecommunications. U ntil 1985, 
India’s telecommunications services were provided by the PTT state 
monopoly run by the government’s M inistry of Communications. In  1985, 
Rajiv Gandhi ordered the bifurcation of the Department of Posts and 
Telegraph into the Department of Posts and a separate Department of 
Telecommunications (DoT). U ntil recently, the PTT and after 1985, the 
DoT, was the sole provider of all telecommunications services: local, 
domestic long-distance and international services. The DoT was also the 
regulator and policy-maker of India’s telecommunications sector.
The India Telegraph Act 1885 also allowed the Indian government to 
authorize a licensee to provide basic telecommunications services under 
specified conditions. As a monopoly provider, the DoT did not issue any 
licenses to any other operators but when competition was introduced into 
the basic telecommunications sector in 2000 the DoT became responsible 
for the grant of licenses to private sector operators.
2. Current Structure of India's Telecommunications Sector
The DoT was the state operator of telecommunications services as well as 
the licensor un til October 1999. The role of regulator, however, now lies in  
a new independent body called the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India 
(TRAI), which was established in 1997. The TRAI is discussed in Section 
V I.2 below.
In  October 1999, however, the DoT was further divided into the 
Department of Telecom Services (DTS) and the Department of 
Telecommunications (DoT), and this somewhat separated the activities of
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the operator and the licensor. The DTS is responsible for providing 
telecommunications services and the DoT retains its mandate as policy­
maker and licensor. This separation, however, was largely artificial. It 
has been observed that despite the separation, the two departments are 
effectively one and the same organization. In  fact, many DoT/ DTS officials 
work for both organizations simultaneously.83
Further changes were made when the DTS was “corporatized”84 in  
October 2000 and became Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (BSNL). BSNL 
is wholly government owned and is today the largest public sector 
undertaking in India.85 It  is the dominant provider and operator of 
telecommunications services in India, except for the metro regions of New 
Delhi and Mumbai. BSNL, inheriting the business of the monopoly PTT 
and later the DoT, provides the largest telecom network in the country. It 
runs telecommunications services in 24 Telecom Circles and 2 Metro 
Districts, provides cellular services86 and it is also an Internet Service 
Provider (ISP).
The metro areas of Mumbai and New Delhi are serviced by the 
government m ajority owned (56.25%) dominant operator, Mahanagar 
Telephone Nigam Limited (MTNL). MTNL started operating in 1987 in  
order to supplement the insufficient efforts of the DoT in providing 
telecommunications services.87 MTNL launched mobile cellular services
83 L. Srivastava and S. Sinha (2000), p. 15.
84 Corporatization involves the re-structuring of a government enterprise into 
organizational and management forms similar to a private company. Coporatization is not 
privatization although it has been used, for example in New Zealand, as a prelude to 
privatization.
85 Annual Report 2003-2004, p. 39.
86 BSNL launched its cellular services on 19 October 2002, and became the first operator to 
provide cellular services nationwide, except in Delhi and Mumbai where MTNL operates. 
See BSNL News, 20 October 2002, at
htto: /  / www.bsnl.in/bsnlnews.asp?intNewsId=53189&strNewsMore=more.
87 When MTNL was formed on 1 April 1986, it was wholly owned by the government.
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using GSM88 technology in  Delhi in  January 2001 and in Mumbai in  
February 2001.89 It has also become an ISP from February 1999.
In  May 2004, the Indian government ruled out privatization of BSNL 
and MTNL.90 Instead, the plan introduced in September 2002, to the 
surprise of the industry, to merge the two state-owned operators is set to 
go ahead and -  after having been stalled for a year -  is scheduled to take 
place towards the end of 2005.91 The combined BSNL-MTNL is estimated 
to control over 95 per cent of the fixed line m arket and have nearly 40 
m illion wireless phone customers.92 The union could, according to some 
analysts, catapult the merged entity into the top-10 integrated 
telecommunications operator in  the world.93 Some analysts, however, 
warn that the merger is not likely to solve any of the existing problems 
faced by the two operators: namely, red tape, political interference and 
high employee costs (elements which cause inefficiency).94 They stress 
that the savings expected to occur from the merger, contrary to what DoT 
officials insists, would be m inim al.95
As for international telecommunications services, Videsh Sanchar 
Nigam Limited (VSNL) was set up in 1986 as the sole operator and 
provider. The international services provided and controlled by VSNL
88 Global Standard for Mobile Telephony.
89 Prior to this, MTNL started its mobile services in Delhi in October 1999 and in Mumbai 
in August 2000, using CDMA (Code Division Multiple Access) technology.
90 The Hindu, “They are off disinvestment list”, 27 May 2004, at
http: /  /  www.thehindu.com/2004 /0 5 /2 7 /  stories72004052704311200.htm .
91 The Financial Express, “BSNL-MTNL merger process may take 10-12 months", 18 
November 2004, at http://www.financialexpress.com/fe full storv.php?content id=74428.
92 Sify, “BSNL-MTNL merger within 6 months", 17 November 2004, at
http: /  /  sifv.com/finance /  fullstorv.php?id=13612320.
93 Integrated telecommunications companies provide all types of telecoms services, as 
opposed to those providing only mobile or fixed-line services for example. The Economic 
Times, “Tale of 2 Titans: When BSNL merges with MTNL", 22 November 2004.
94 The Economic Times, “Government dogged by hurdles in MTNL-BSNL merger plan", 11 
January 2005.
95 Ibid. The government-appointed consultants of ICICI Securities and ABN Rothschild are 
expected to give their combined report on the proposed merger by March 2005.
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include 1) basic service such as telephony, telegraph, telex 2) specialized 
services, which cover a broad range of data services and 3) value added 
services such as Internet connectivity. In  August 1995, VSNL introduced 
Internet services on a commercial scale. Basic services, however, 
contributed more than 85% of VSNL’s revenue.96
The VSNL monopoly ceased officially on 31 March 2002, opening the 
m arket of international telecommunications to competition on 1 April 
2002. Today, there are four operators, including the incumbent VSNL, 
providing international long-distance (ILD) services in India.97 Meanwhile, 
BSNL has been given a licence in early 2003 to supply ILD services but 
has not yet started providing them. In  addition, MTNL was issued w ith a 
Letter of Intent (LOI) in  March 2004.
In  m id-February 2002, the Indian government sold 25% of its 52.97%  
stake in VSNL to the Tata Group, a strategic partner. Today, the 
government retains a share of 26% in VSNL while 45% is owned by the 
Tata Group.
IV . Reform o f the Telecom m unications Industry
The Rao government recognized that telecommunications services of world 
class quality were necessary for the success of the New Industrial Policy of 
1991. The government, as part of India’s economic reform, thus set about
96 Annual Report 2001-2002, p. 80.
97 They are Bharti Infotel which started providing ILD services on 19 July 2002; Data 
Access (India) which started its services on 23 July 2002; and Reliance Infocomm which 
commenced its services on 29 March 2003.
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giving the highest priority to the development of the telecommunications 
sector.
1. National Telecom Policy 1994
As seen above, the lim ited liberalization of India’s telecommunications 
sector began in value-added services and mobile services. Value-added 
services were opened to the private sector in  July 1992,98 and private 
sector companies were invited by the DoT to make competitive bids for 
non-exclusive digital mobile licenses for the four metropolitan cities of 
Mumbai, Delhi, Calcutta and Chennai. In  basic telecommunications 
services, the DoT remained the sole provider. Although the DoT was 
successful in making improvements to the telecommunications 
infrastructure, the DoT did not succeed in reducing the waiting lis t for 
demands for telephone lines.
The Indian government therefore initiated the National Telecom Policy 
in 1994 (NTP 1994) to meet these rapidly growing demands. The NTP 
1994 was India’s first major move towards liberalizing the 
telecommunications sector. The NTP 1994 introduced the license-bidding 
process to end the DoT’s country-wide monopoly on basic services. This 
resulted in India being divided up into 21 “telecom service circles” -  each 
categorized as either A, B or C according to its importance.99 Category A 
includes the heaviest areas such as Delhi. One private operator was
98 These services included: electronic mail, voice mail, data services, audio text services, 
video conferencing, radio paging and cellular mobile telephone. The National Telecom Policy 
1994, Section 8.
99 The Indian government divides the country into “telecom service circles/areas* for the 
purpose of issuing licenses to telecom service providers, whether for cellular or fixed 
telephony or cable providers. The circles are usually co-terminus with state boundaries. 
Today, there are 28 circles. Cf. US’s LATA system after the break-up of AT&T; See Chapter 
2, Section IV.3.
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allowed a license for each telecom circle. Any number of Indian or foreign 
companies can combine and constitute a bidder company, but the 
maximum foreign equity perm itted is 49%.
In addition to the plan for private sector entiy into basic telecoms, 
the NTP 1994 set out a number of objectives that would develop the Indian 
telecommunications industry to match the growing needs of the Indian 
economy. The ultim ate objective of the NTP 1994 was to achieve world 
class quality in telecommunications and to make available a whole range 
of services.100 However, some major objectives of the NTP 1994 failed to be 
achieved: namely, the availability of telephone on demand by 1997, 
telecommunications coverage of a ll villages by 1997 and effective 
penetration of basic telecommunications m arket by private companies to 
compete w ith the DoT.
The NTP 1994 failed to achieve a world class telecommunications 
industry as planned due to many implementation hurdles and lim ited 
private services in implementing and providing new services. These 
hurdles included high license fees which resulted in high costs in  
providing the services.101 In  addition, TRAI’s recommendations for 
granting licenses were blocked consistently by the DoT. Consequently, 
private sector entry was slower than anticipated by the NTP 1994.
Nonetheless, the NTP 1994 did achieve a number of its objectives. 
The government met the target of providing 1 public call offices (PCO) per 
500 urban population (it actually achieved an urban PCO penetration of 1 
PCO per 522).102 As for the increase in telephone lines, the government
100 Sown Rajan Komandur, “The Telecom Policy of India: Globalization and Global 
Information Society" (2000), p. 2. Available at
http: /  /  www.its2000.org.ar/conference/komandur.pdf.
101 Ibid., p. 3.
i°2  New Telecom Policy 1999 (NTP 1999), Section 1.2.
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managed, during the NTP 1994, to exceed the Eighth Plan103 target of 7.5 
m illion lines by 1.23 m illion.104 However, it did not meet its NTP 1994 
plan of releasing 10 m illion lines necessary to provide telephone on 
demand by 1997. The government was thus prompted into reconsidering 
the targets of the NTP 1994 and setting new objectives in the New Telecom 
Policy 1999 (NTP 1999).
2. The New Telecom Policy 1999
The NTP 1999, announced by the government in March 1999, became 
effective from April 1999. New objectives were set for the achievement of a 
comprehensive and forward looking telecommunications policy. These 
objectives were to ensure the following:
i) the availability of affordable and effective communications for 
citizens;
ii) the provision of a balance between the provision of universal 
service and the provision of high-level services capable of 
meeting the needs of India's economy;
iii) the encouragement of the development of telecommunications 
facilities in remote, h illy and tribal areas of the country;
iv) the creation of a modem and efficient telecommunications 
infrastructure taking into account the convergence of IT, media, 
telecom and consumer electronics;
103 Since 1950 the Indian government has initiated five-year plans in telecommunications 
infrastructure investment and development. The Eighth Plan was from 1992-1997.
104 NTP 1999, Section 1.2.
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v) the transformation of the telecommunications industry, w ithin a 
time lim it, into a more competitive environment w ith equal 
opportunities for all m arket players;
vi) efficiency and transparency in spectrum management;
vii) protection of defence and security interests of the country; and
viii) that Indian telecommunications companies become truly global 
players.105
To achieve these new objectives, specific targets were set. First, 
telephone on demand was to be made available by 2002 and sustained 
thereafter so as to achieve a teledensity of 7 by the year 2005106 and 15 by 
2010. Second, suitable ta riff structure for rural areas had to be set and 
rural communications made mandatory for all fixed service providers. 
Third, rural teledensity was to be increased from the 1999 level of 0.4 to 4 
by the year 2010 and reliable transmission media to be provided in all 
rural areas. Fourth, telecom coverage of all villages was to be achieved 
and reliable media to be made available to all exchanges by 2002. Fifth, 
Internet access was to be provided to all district head quarters by the year 
2000. Finally, high speed data and m ultimedia capability using 
technologies such as ISDN (Integrated Services Digital Network) was to be 
supplied to all towns w ith a population greater than 200,000 by the year 
2002.107
The NTP 1999 put forward firm  governmental commitments towards 
the corporatization of the DoT/DTS, the introduction of competition for 
domestic long-distance services, and an increase in competition for basic
105 NTP 1999, Section 2.0.
106 India successfully achieved this a year ahead of the target date. In March 2004, 
teledensity was 7.02. See Annual Report 2003-2004, p. 4.
107 NTP 1999, Section 2.0.
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and mobile services. The policy aims to create a modem and efficient 
telecommunications infrastructure taking account of the convergence of 
electronics, telecom, IT  and media. The NTP 1999 thus grouped 
telecommunications service providers of cellular mobile service, fixed 
telephony service and cable service under the collective term  of ‘access 
providers’.108
The following is an overall framework for ‘access providers’ wishing to 
provide telecommunications services:
1) An access provider can provide services w ithin its own service area 
without the need of an additional license.
2) An access provider m ust obtain a separate license for each service 
area it wishes to further operate in.
3) A one-off entry fee is applicable.
4) License fee is to be based on revenue share.
5) The TRAI is responsible for recommending the determination of 
entry fee and selection of additional service operators.109
The NTP 1999 also provides a policy framework for cellular mobile 
service providers (CMSPs). This is a huge departure from the NTP 1994 in  
that the new policy allows both mobile and private fixed operators to 
provide long-distance services w ithin circle areas. Also a significant 
departure in the NTP 1999 is the allowance for cable operators to apply for 
basic licenses, allowing them to provide last-m ile linkages and switched 
services w ithin their areas of operation.
108 Other telecom groups include, for example, national long-distance operators, 
international long-distance operators, radio paging service providers, among others.
109 The government, however, was not bound by these recommendations.
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To implement the NTP 1999 objectives, major changes have been 
made to the structure of India’s telecommunications industry. As a result, 
national long-distance (NLD) service has been opened for unrestricted 
entry in August 2000 and as of 31 March 2002, VSNL’s monopoly officially 
ceased. All telecommunications services are now open to private 
participation and competition. Licensing of a ll telecoms services is now 
under the policy framework of the NTP 1999.
There is no lim it to the number of operators wishing to provide any 
type of telecommunications services. However, the applicant for a license 
must be an Indian company registered under the Indian Companies Act 
1956, and foreign equity in the applicant company is restricted to a 
maximum of 49% .110 Hence, although the Indian telecommunications 
sector is open to competition, it has not completely opened up its 
telecommunications m arket to foreign penetration or trade in  
telecommunications services through commercial presence (mode 3).
As to Internet telephony, the NTP 1999 did not perm it this in India at 
that tim e.111 Nonetheless, the NTP 1999 stipulated that the government 
review this issue at a later appropriate date. Accordingly, an expert 
committee was constituted to review the m atter and the government 
consequently decided to open up Internet telephony. After having 
considered the TRAI’s recommendations112 on the issue, the government 
legalized Internet telephony services from 1 April 2002. Internet telephony 
can provide a cheaper alternative to traditional international telecoms
110 Government of India, DoT, Guidelines fo r the Issue of Licence fo r Basic Service, No. 10- 
2/2000-B S -II, 25 January 2001.
in  NTP 1999, Section 3.2.
112 TRAI, “Recommendations on Opening Up Internet Telephony", 20 February 2002.
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services offered by public telecoms operators because they bypass the 
international accounting rate system where rates are often not cost-based.
The criteria for providing Internet telephony services include 
principally: only ISP licensees are perm itted to offer Internet telephony, 
and it can only be provided from a personal computer (PC) to another PC 
(both w ithin and outside India) and from a PC to phones outside India. 
The conditions for the provision of Internet telephony are thus restrictive. 
Latest figures show that although there are currently 121 ISPs licensed to 
offer Internet telephony,113 they are still in the in itia l stage of setting up 
business. Forty-two of these ISPs are currently providing Internet 
telephony.114
Since the launch of the NTP 1999, further liberalization has been 
pursued, often ahead of schedule. The NTP 1999, however, failed to 
clearly define TRAI’s role.
V. In d ia ’s WTO Telecom m unications Com m itm ents
India was an active member of the GATT and a founding member of the 
WTO. It strongly favours the m ultilateral approach to trade relations and 
is committed, w ithin the WTO, to ensuring that the sectors in which the 
developing countries enjoy a comparative advantage are adequately 
opened up to international trade.115 India recognized the importance of 
trade in services and had therefore tirelessly contributed to the debate 
surrounding the liberalization of trade in services and specific sectors like
113 Annual Report 2003-2004, p. 12.
114TRAI, Indicators July-September 2004, p. 14.
115 WTO, Press release, 1 April 1998, PRESS/TPRB/71.
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telecommunications in both the Uruguay Round and the extended 
negotiations.
1. India’s Participation in the Uruguay Round and the Negotiations on 
Basic Telecommunications
(a) Uruguay Round (1986-1994)
In  the working group on telecommunications services (WGTS) during the 
Uruguay Round, India presented and represented the points of the view of 
developing countries through its active involvement in the negotiations on 
an annex, in  addition to the general framework on services, for 
telecommunications. India stressed the fundamental importance of 
telecommunications for national economies and highlighted the fact that 
developing countries had poor telecommunications infrastructure and 
thus trade in telecommunications services, in  stark contrast to developed 
countries, was negligible.116
India, together w ith Egypt, spoke for developing countries in WGTS 
highlighting the fact that developing country participation was crucial to 
progressive liberalization and should therefore be encouraged. However, 
as the telecommunications sector is weak in all developing countries, they 
should be free to provide incentives to strengthen their domestic capacities 
with a view to securing a minimum level of domestic operations. India 
pointed out that in making liberalization commitments at the m ultilateral
GATT, WGTS, Note on the Meeting o f 9-11 July 1990, MTN.GNS/TEL/2, 6 August 1990, 
para. 33.
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level of the Uruguay Round, reciprocity should not be expected from 
developing countries w ithin the telecommunications sector.117
India took the view that an annex should not be used to impose 
additional obligations on parties to a general agreement on services. India 
argued that issues of m arket access fell w ithin the ambit of the general 
framework and not the annex.118
In  making scheduled commitments on telecommunications services, 
India agreed that the positive lis t approach was the most appropriate. In  
this way, there was no need to distinguish between basic and non-basic 
services. Members lis t in  their schedules those telecommunications 
services where they wish to allow m arket access, and those not listed are 
not subject to the WTO’s liberalization process.
Nonetheless, at the end of the Uruguay Round, India, like most other 
WTO Members, scheduled commitments to liberalize value-added services, 
but none on basic telecommunications services. India’s commitments 
cover all value-added services,119 except EDI and code and protocol 
conversion. India accords fu ll m arket access and national treatm ent to 
foreign suppliers for cross-border supply of value-added services.120 There 
are no lim itations to national treatm ent w ith regard to the supply of value- 
added services through commercial presence, but there is a restriction of 
foreign equity ceiling of 51% for m arket access.121 India did not make any 
commitments for consumption abroad nor on presence of natural persons
117 Ibid., para. 168.
118 GATT, WGTS, Note on the Meeting o f 10-12 September 1990, M TN.GNS/TEL/3, 12 
October 1990, para. 174.
119 WTO, GATS, India Schedule of Specific Commitments, GATS/SC/42, 15 April 1994. See 
Appendix V II.
!20 ibid.
121 Ibid.
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(except as indicated in the horizontal section).122 These relatively liberal 
commitments w ith respect to value-added telecommunications services 
may reflect India’s acceptance that unrestricted access to such services is 
an essential element for attracting foreign direct investment and 
participating actively in global commerce.
In  any case, India’s telecommunications commitments scheduled at 
the end of the Uruguay Round reflected the situation of the 
telecommunications industry in India at the time: value-added services 
were liberalized in 1992. They were standstill provisions and were not 
measures that committed India to liberalize further. Nonetheless, it has 
been argued that this is not necessarily damaging for the liberalization 
process.123 Standstill provisions assist the trade liberalization process by 
establishing binding benchmarks where few or none had been established 
before, and by providing some improvement in regulatory transparency. 
Thus, the schedules of commitments, in  combination w ith the general 
obligations and provisions for progressive liberalization, provide an 
effective foundation to support future rounds of negotiations.124
122 Commitments scheduled in the horizontal section include measures permitting the 
temporary stay of managers, executives, specialists, business visitors and professionals. 
Managers, executives, and specialists may reside in India for a maximum of 5 years, while 
persons visiting for business negotiations, or for conducting preparatory work to establish 
a commercial presence, may reside for no more than 90 days. Professionals are subject to 
a 1-year stay. WTO, GATS, India Schedule o f Specific Commitments, Supplement 2, 
G ATS/SC/42/Suppl.2, 28 July 1995.
123 U.S. International Trade Commission, “General Agreement on Trade in Services: 
Examination of the Schedules of Commitments Submitted by Asia/Pacific Trading 
Partners”, August 1997, Investigation No. 332-374, Publication 3053, p. 15-10.
124 Ibid.
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(b) Extended negotiations on basic telecommunications (1994- 
1 9 9 7 )1 2 5
India became a fu ll participant of the WTO negotiations on basic 
telecommunications in the fifth  meeting of the negotiating group on basic 
telecommunications (NGBT).126 India decided to participate in the NGBT 
on the understanding that the negotiations took place w ithin the 
framework of the GATS and that progressive liberalization meant that 
there would be differentiated responsibilities w ith regard to liberalizing 
between developed and developing country participants, as granted by 
Article X I X : 2 . i2 7
In  the negotiations on basic telecommunications India stressed that 
the liberalization of telecommunications should encompass all modes of 
supply as India attached tremendous importance to the fourth mode -  the 
presence of natural persons -  as an area where it possessed competitive 
strength. India was relying on the special treatm ent provided in Article IV  
of the GATS to assist developing country Members in their participation in  
world trade. At the successful conclusion of the negotiations on basic 
telecommunications, however, few countries made commitments in the 
fourth mode of delivery. Neither the US nor the EC, the two strongest 
advocates of telecommunications liberalization and the two largest 
markets, made commitments to liberalize trade in telecommunications 
through the presence of natural persons (except as indicated in its
125 See also Chapter 3.
126 Meeting of 27-28 February 1995.
127 WTO, NGBT, Report on the High-level Meeting o f 6 October 1995, S /NG B T/9, 31 October 
1995, para. 17.
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horizontal section). Consequently, India itself refrained from committing 
to this mode of delivery.
As discussed above, it has been difficult for developing countries to 
have confidence in the liberalization of trade in services and commit 
themselves fully to th is process because developed countries have not 
proved to them by im plem enting GATS Article IV  that liberalizing the 
services sector would yield benefits to developing countries. And here also 
with regard to telecommunications, developed countries have not made 
commitments to liberalize services that are delivered through the fourth 
mode -  which is one of In d ia ’s reasons for making lim ited commitments in  
basic telecommunications.128
2. India’s Commitments in the Agreement on Basic Telecommunications
At the end of the negotiations on basic telecommunications India made 
very lim ited commitments to liberalize its telecommunications sector. 
India listed voice telephone services, circuit switched data transmission 
services, facsimile services, private leased circuit services and cellular 
mobile services in its schedule but only made commitments on market 
access for mode 3 delivery.129 No other commitments were made for the 
other three modes of delivery for either m arket access or national 
treatment. Its commitment to m arket access for commercial presence has 
a restriction of m aximum foreign equity of 25%.
128 In the Doha Round of negotiations on services, India’s delegate stated that the real test 
of the negotiations was the extent to which Article IV  would be effectively implemented 
through meaningful commitments by developed countries in sectors and modes of interest 
to developing countries, such as mode 4. WTO, CTS (Special Session), Report o f the 
Meeting held on 5 and 6 December 2000, 2 March 2001, S /C S S /M /7 , para. 7.
129 See Appendix V III.
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(a) A Modified Reference Paper
India made partial commitments pursuant to the WTO Reference Paper on 
telecommunications services through scheduling as additional 
commitments in its Schedule modified provisions of the Paper.130 In  fact, 
all six sections of the Reference Paper have been altered.
i) Competitive Safeguards
Under this section of India’s Reference Paper, the provisions apply to all 
service suppliers and not only to “a m ajor supplier” as in the original. The 
purpose of having competitive safeguards apply only to major suppliers is 
to protect new entrants from being bu llied ’ out of the m arket by aggressive 
anti-competitive tactics used by m ajor suppliers, and so to ensure that 
competition is effectively introduced into the telecommunications sector. 
However, since India has om itted “major supplier” in its version of the 
Reference Paper, a new entrant, although not yet having any significant 
control of the telecommunications m arket, could be alleged to engage in  
anti-competitive behaviour if  it carried out either of the two practices listed 
in India’s Reference Paper, namely: i) using information obtained from  
competitors w ith anti-com petitive results, and ii) not making available to 
other service suppliers technical inform ation on essential facilities and 
commercially relevant inform ation which are necessary for them to provide 
services. This would defeat the Reference Paper’s purpose of ensuring
130 See the US Reference Paper in Appendix V as an example of a fully-committed or 
“original" Reference Paper. See Appendix V III for India’s Reference Paper (WTO, GATS, 
“Explanatory Paper on Additional Commitments by India", India Schedule o f Specific 
Commitments, Supplement 3, G ATS/SC/42/Suppl. 3, 11 April 1997 (India Reference 
Paper)).
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effective competition by keeping the dominant supplier, usually the 
incumbent operator, In  check’.
The list of anti-competitive practices in India’s Reference Paper is 
confined to two practices only. The original Reference Paper, on the other 
hand, contained a non-exhaustive lis t of anti-competitive practices. 
Furthermore, India omits “anti-com petitive cross-subsidization” from its 
list. The reason is this: India’s telecommunications sector at the time of 
the extended basic telecoms negotiations was completely run by the DoT, 
which was also regulator and policy-maker, and the DoT cross-subsidized 
its telecommunications services, particularly subsidizing local services 
with revenues from international services. India was not going to make 
international commitments which clashed with its domestic practices.
ii) Interconnection
The Reference Paper provisions on interconnection have also been 
modified by India, thus lim iting its commitments in the WTO. The original 
Reference Paper requires that interconnection w ith a major supplier is 
ensured at “any technically feasible point in  the network.”131 India, 
however, has committed itself to ensure interconnection only at “any 
specified feasible point in  the network as indicated in the license”132 
Therefore, where there has been no agreement on a specified point in the 
network where interconnection is to be accorded, foreign operators cannot 
rely on India to interconnect them to India’s major supplier(s) (at the time
131 WTO, Reference Paper, Section 2.2. Emphasis added.
132 India Reference Paper, Section 2.2 first sentence. Emphasis added.
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was the DoT and now BSNL, MTNL and VSNL) even if it is technically 
feasible to do so.
Section 2.2(a) of India’s Reference Paper omits the obligation to 
ensure interconnection on non-discrim inatoiy terms, conditions and 
rates.133 Non-discrimination is one of the core principles of the WTO. It is 
a safeguard for equal treatm ent of all players in trade. W ithout the 
obligation to interconnect suppliers of telecommunications services under 
non-discriminatory terms, conditions and rates foreign suppliers can find 
themselves being charged more, for example, than Indian suppliers, such 
as MTNL, for interconnecting to BSNL, India’s major supplier. This clearly 
disadvantages potential competitors to India’s major telecommunications 
operator and thereby obstructs the introduction of competition into the 
domestic market.
Further modifications to the original Reference Paper include leaving 
out Section 2.2(b) and altering the wordings of Section 2.2(c) (see 
Appendices V and V III). The modifications of both these provisions are 
with regard to cost-oriented rates and provision of the infrastructures of a 
major supplier needed by other operators to supply their services. More 
specifically, India did not commit to provide interconnection,
in  a tim ely fashion, on term s, conditions (including technical standards and  
specifications) and cost-oriented rates th a t are transparent, reasonable, having  
regard to economic feasib ility , and sufficiently unbundled so th a t the supplier 
need not pay for netw ork com ponents or facilities th a t it  does not require for the 
service to be provided.134
133 What India does guarantee is that quality of interconnection is not less favourable than 
that provided for its own like services or for like services of non-affiliated suppliers or for its 
subsidiaries or other affiliates.
134 WTO, Reference Paper, Section 2.2(b).
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Instead India w ill provide interconnection “upon request, at points in  
addition to the network term ination points offered to the m ajority of users 
as per licence conditions, subject to mutually agreed charges.”135
Section 2.5 on settlement of interconnection disputes is also 
modified. India has committed to have disputes resolved by a domestic 
regulatory authority, but not necessarily one that is independent of the 
major supplier. This is because at the time of the signing of the ABT, 
India’s telecommunications regulator was also its supplier, the DoT.
iii) Universal Service
This provision of the Reference Paper has been modified by India to ensure 
that its right to enact its universal service policies is uncompromised by its 
WTO commitments. India regards universal service obligation as not being 
anti-competitive per se, since, claims India, it would be administered in a 
transparent and non-discrim inatory manner. However, India has not 
bound itself to make sure that such obligations are administered in a 
transparent, non-discrim inatoiy and competitively neutral manner. By 
doing so, India allows itself leeway to restrict competition in its 
telecommunications markets for the purposes of imposing a universal 
service obligation.
India’s policy reason for modifying this provision of the Reference 
Paper stems from the fear that competition would put the provision of 
universal services at risk. This was one of the general fears cited by many 
developing countries for their reluctance to introduce competition into the
135 Cf. Section 2.2(c) of the original Reference Paper: “[...] subject to charges that reflect the 
cost of construction of necessary additional facilities*.
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telecommunications sector (see section II.2 above). As shown above, 
however, network and services penetration seem to have increased with 
the introduction of competition.
iv) Public availability of licensing criteria
Again India made a few changes to the Reference Paper. It commits to 
provide all the licensing criteria where a license is required but it is not 
obliged to make publicly known how long it would take to issue a license 
nor to give reasons for the denial of a license.
v) Regulatory Authority
On the provision for an independent regulatory body, Section 5 of the 
Reference Paper, India committed itself only to the second requirement: 
“The decisions of and the procedures used by the regulatory authority
shall be im partial w ith respect to a ll m arket participants.” India omitted
the first phrase: “The regulatory body is separate from, and not 
accountable to, any supplier of basic telecommunications services.” At 
the time of the negotiations on basic telecommunications, an independent 
regulatory authority which was to be the TRAI was under consideration. 
The TRAI was established in January 1997, at the time of the conclusion 
of the basic telecoms negotiations. It thus seems odd that India, having 
already established an independent regulatory authority by the time of its 
signing to the ABT, should refrain from making fu ll commitment to the 
corresponding provision in the Reference Paper.
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A closer look, however, reveals the reasons behind such lim ited 
commitment. Although a regulatory authority was being established 
outside the DoT, also the country's telecommunications provider, it was 
not intended to be tru ly independent. The TRAI was financially dependent 
on the DoT and although the TRAI was responsible for making 
recommendations on granting new licenses, the DoT was not obligated to 
put any of these recommendations into action. The TRAI was thus not 
truly separate from and was to some extent still accountable to the basic 
telecommunications supplier.136
vi) Allocation of scarce resources
India has committed to carry out procedures for the allocation of the use 
of scarce resources in an objective and tim ely manner but makes no 
mention of transparency or non-discrim ination as contained in the original 
Reference Paper. India has not committed to making the current state of 
allocated frequency bands publicly available.137 This could be for national 
security reasons.
(b) Additional Commitments and Exemptions
Further additional commitments scheduled by India include the 
commitment to review the opening up of NLD service beyond the service
136 India’s initial services offer in the GATS 2000 negotiations now includes a full 
commitment with regard to the Reference Paper’s provision on independent regulators. See 
Appendix IX.
137 India’s initial offer in GATS 2000 has now added this commitment. See Appendix IX.
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area to competition in 1999,138 and the commitment to review the opening 
up of international services to competition in 2004.
India was among the nine WTO Members that maintained MFN 
exemptions concerning basic telecommunications (as perm itted under 
GATS Article II) and annexed them to the Fourth Protocol. India’s MFN 
exemptions are w ith regard to accounting rates. Although it was agreed by 
WTO Members that the issue of differential accounting rates would not be 
subject to dispute resolution in  the WTO, India nonetheless felt the need 
to schedule them as MFN exemptions. Four other countries also 
maintained MFN exemptions in respect of the application of differential 
accounting rates to services and service suppliers of other Members.139
V I. Im plem entation o f In d ia ’s WTO Com m itm ents: 
Telecom m unications in  Practice
To determine the extent of India’s implementation of its WTO 
commitments in telecommunications, this section examines India’s 
domestic policy on telecommunications. Surprisingly, India’s telecoms 
policy is generally more liberal than its scheduled bindings regarding the 
liberalization of this sector. Proposals to liberalize telecommunications in  
India have long been opposed by the labour wing of the previous Prime 
M inister’s140 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which ran the country’s 
biggest trade union and feared that jobs would be lost, and by the cultural 
wing, which worried that foreigners would end up controlling India’s
138 This commitment was reinforced by the NTP 1999, which declared that the market for 
NLD should be opened up to competition in January 2000.
139 They are Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Turkey.
140 The Prime Minister in question was Atal Berhari Vajpayee. His terms of office as Prime 
Minister were from 16 May 1996 -1 June 1996, 19 March 1998-13 October 1999, and 13 
October 1999 to May 2004.
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telecommunications industry. As the new m illennium  was approaching 
and India’s IT sector was growing rapidly, the Prime M inister saw the 
benefits and the need to modernize and speed up the liberalization process 
of India’s telecommunications sector. As has been pointed out,
There is no question that liberalization is beneficial and that countries should 
liberalize. However, this is not always the case in practice, and even more rarely 
so in developing countries.141
1. Autonomous Liberalization
India, like many developing countries, although having made lim ited WTO 
commitments to liberalize telecommunications services, has over the past 
few years liberalized the telecommunications sector autonomously. A 
significant step was the introduction of competition in  international 
telecommunications services in  April 2002, which began the liberalization 
process in  this sector two years earlier than required by its WTO 
commitments.142 As seen above, today there are three other operators 
competing against the incum bent VSNL in  the provision of international 
services. It w ill nonetheless take some tim e before any new entrants can 
pose any real threat to the recently de-monopolized VSNL, but it is the 
right step towards further liberalization in telecommunications.
W ith regard to the liberalization of trade in telecommunications 
through commercial presence, India allows in  a company providing basic 
telecoms service foreign equity not exceeding 49 per cent. The company
141 Caglar Ozden speaking at the World Bank on the paper by himself and Eric Reinhardt 
titled “The Perversity of Preferences", available at http: /  / www.worldbank.org/wbi/B- 
SPAN/sub perversitv.htm.
142 Another significant step taken by the government in the telecommunications sector was 
the privatization of VSNL in February 2002 which was described as the “most important” 
privatization in India. The Economist, “Privatization in India; An Incredible Shrinking 
Government”, 7 February 2002.
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must, however, be registered under the Indian Companies Act of 1956. A 
foreign equity ceiling of 49% is an improvement from that listed in India’s 
WTO Schedule on telecommunications (maximum foreign equity of 25%).
The process of liberalization in  telecommunications was pushed 
forward by Prime M inister Vajpayee, who wanted to be remembered as the 
leader who ushered in the era of inform ation technology.143 He fully 
opened up the NLD m arket to competition on 15 August 2000, India’s 
independence day. India’s own telecoms commission had wanted to 
liberalize gradually, by allowing ju st four private operators to bid for 
licenses. The Prime M inister, however, thought the process would be too 
lengthy and would be plagued by legal challenges. In  his view, the aim  
should be to get the most telephone connections rather than the highest 
license fees.144 Now there w ill be no lim it to the number of licenses 
available. Operators w ill simply pay the government a fixed fee and a 
share of their revenue. Today, four companies (including the incumbent 
BSNL) provide NLD services.145 B harti Tele-Ventures was the first to offer 
a challenge to the long-distance monopoly of BSNL in January 2002.146
In  the area of basic fixed local telephone services, competition has 
been encouraged since 1994 as a major policy of the NTP 1994. In  
contrast to most other governments, India liberalized its local basic 
telecoms m arket before its NLD and international services markets. 
Currently, five licensed private operators provide fixed line services in
143 The Economist, “When India Wires Up", 20 July 2000.
144 One of the reasons why the Indian Prime Minister wanted to see the deregulation of NLD 
services was because India is falling well behind the rest of Asia in its use of new 
technologies, such as the Internet, and old ones like the telephone. Ibid.
145 The other three are Bharti Infotel which started its service on 26 January 2002; VSNL 
which commenced its operation on 25 September 2002; and Reliance Infocomm which 
started providing NLD services on 1 May 2003.
146 The Economist, “Connecting Competition", 4 April 2002.
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addition to the incumbents BSNL and MTNL. 147 The number of 
subscribers served by private basic telecoms providers increased from 
272,761 in April 2001 to 447,618 in  December 2001.148 As of September 
2004, the subscriber base of private operators stood at around 3.5 
m illion.149 This, however, is a tiny 8 per cent share of the total fixed line 
subscriber base of 43.9 m illion .150 The state-owned operators BSNL and 
MTNL have 83% and 9% m arket share respectively. Most strikingly, 
private operators only have a 0.11%  share of the rural m arket in fixed 
lines while BSNL controls 99.89% .151
Significantly, nonetheless, all telecommunications services are now 
opened to competition and private participation. This has allowed the cost 
of mobile phone calls to fa ll by 90% over the past 3 years, and NLD rates 
dropped by 60% in  January 2002.152 International rates are already 
beginning to decrease since the introduction of competition in April 2002.
2 . An Independent Regulator: the TRAI
A strong independent regulator is essential to providing a competitive and 
effective telecommunications sector. It  is one of the issues considered in  
the WTO to be an essential part of the liberalization process. India 
established the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) in January 
1997 by the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act 1997153 to separate
147 These five are Bharti, Tata Teleservices, HFCL Infotel, Shyam Telelink, and Reliance 
Infocomm Ltd.
148 Annual Report 2001-2002, p. 17.
149 TRAI, Indicators July-September 2004, p.6-7.
180 Ibid.
wi Ibid.
152 The Economist, “Privatization in India: An Incredible Shrinking Government”, 7 February 
2002.
153 Section 3 Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act 1997 (TRAI Act 1997).
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the regulatory functions from policy form ulation and operational functions 
in  the telecommunications sector. The TRAI was established in response 
to pressures from foreign investors who were aggrieved by the unstable 
m arket and investment environment in  the Indian telecommunications 
sector, and who consequently pulled out of India one by one.154
The 1997 Act also gave the TRAI a dispute settlement role. The TRAI 
was to settle disputes arising among service providers or between service 
providers and a group of consumers.155 However, the TRAI was to be 
“effectively stripped of its judicial powers”156 by the Telecom Regulatory 
Authority of India (Amendment) Ordinance 2000. The 2000 Ordinance 
made a few amendments to the 1997 Act, one being the establishment of a 
separate disputes settlem ent body known as the Telecom Disputes 
Settlement and Appellate Tribunal (TDSAT).157 The new dispute 
settlement body is to adjudicate any dispute between a licensor and a 
licensee, between two or more service providers and between a service 
provider and a group of consumers.158 The TRAI was also reduced in size 
by the 2000 Ordinance.159
From the moment the TRAI was created, its powers were challenged 
by the DoT who feared its influence in  the telecommunications industry 
was in jeopardy. The DoT brought cases against almost every direction 
made by the TRAI. One of the most contentious issues was in the area of 
interconnection, especially w ith regard to cellular operators and fixed
154 A. Achar, “Untangling a telecoms revolution: Central Asia-India*, Telecommunications 
Online (October 1999).
155 Section 14(1) TRAI Act 1997.
156 L. Srivastava and S. Sinha (2000), p. 16.
157 Section 11 The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (Amendment) Ordinance, 2000. 
(Hereinafter TRAI Ordinance 2000).
iss ibid.
159 The TRAI was reduced from a maximum of six members and a Chairperson to a 
mflyimum of two whole time members and two part-time members and a Chairperson. 
Terms of office for the Chairperson and members have also been reduced from six years to 
three years. Section 4 and Section 6 TRAI Ordinance 2000, respectively.
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operators. When the TRAI introduced the policy of Calling Party Pays 
(CPP), proceedings were brought against this order (originally by a 
consumer group but later joined by MTNL).160
The High Court ruling that the TRAI did not have jurisdiction to 
implement the CPP Regime of 1999 resulted in amendment to the powers 
of the TRAI in the 2000 Ordinance: Section ll(l)(b )(ii) of the 1997 Act was 
amended to allow the TRAI to “fix the terms and conditions of inter­
connectivity between the service providers”.161 The amendment was made 
in order to make a clear distinction between the regulatory and 
recommendation functions of the TRAI. W ith this new power, the TRAI 
adopted the Telecommunication Interconnection Usage Charges (IUC) 
Regulation 2003 which re-introduced the CPP policy.162 The CPP regime 
finally came into effect on 1 May 2003.163
The TRAI has the power to regulate tariffs and terms and conditions 
of interconnection.164 However, it can only recommend terms and 
conditions of licenses and the need for the introduction of new service 
providers.165 The government must invite the TRAI’s recommendations 
before issuing licenses, but these recommendations are not binding on the 
government. The TRAI also does not have the authority to issue further 
licenses or the authority to allocate spectrum frequencies for wireless 
communications. However, the TRAI’s decision in the areas of ta riff fixing, 
interconnection, including tariffs and technology and laying down quality 
standards, are mandatory for the government.
160 See L. Srivastava and S. Sinha (2000), p. 33.
161 Section 9 TRAI Ordinance 2000.
162 TRAI, Notification, “Telecommunication Interconnection Usage Charges (IUC) Regulation 
2003", 24 January 2003.
163 TRAI, Notification, “Telecommunication Interconnection Usage Charges (IUC) (First
Amendment) Regulation 2003”, 27 March 2003.
164 Section 9(a) TRAI Ordinance 2000.
!65 ibid.
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The US has raised concerns at the weak enforcement powers of the 
TRAI and about apparent conflicts of interest arising out of the Indian 
government’s ownership interest in  India’s telecom operators.166 India still 
lacks a strong independent regulatory body. It also needs a regulator that 
can keep up with the m arket. Charges of regulatory bad faith are among 
the reasons why foreign investors have largely stayed away from Ind ia.167 
The Communications Commission of India, which w ill be established when 
the Communication Convergence B ill becomes law, w ill replace the TRAI 
as the new autonomous regulator of communications. The extent of this 
autonomy is discussed below.
V II. Further L iberalization: Dom estic Regulatory Reforms and 
A New Com m unications B ill
Despite the liberalization of India’s telecommunications sector having 
begun in  the early 1990s, basic fixed telecommunications services are 
today dominated by three enterprises, two of which are state-owned (BSNL 
and MTNL). Liberalization, however, has been steadily taking place over 
the past two years in  various sectors of India’s fast-growing 
telecommunications industry.
1. Telecommunications Expansion in India
One area that required further liberalization was in the fundamental issue 
of interconnection, which is “the cornerstone to a tru ly competitive
166 USTR, “Results of the 2002 “Section 1377" Review of Telecommunications Trade 
Agreements*. Available at httn: /  / www.ustr.gov.
167 The Economist, “Connecting Competition", 4 April 2002.
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m arket. The power to interconnect increases the value of any network and 
the inability to do so can be a severe barrier to entry”.168 In  India, 
interconnection has been one of the main stumbling blocks in the 
development of mobile interconnection. In  order to term inate their calls, 
mobile operators are forced to interconnect w ith MTNL in Delhi and 
Mumbai, and BSNL for local and long-distance connections in other 
regions. They also need access to VSNL’s gateways for routing 
international traffic.
Negotiating effective interconnection has been a daunting task for 
these operators. Prior to the CPP regime m obile/fixed interconnection was 
governed by the receiving party pays (RPP) system. Under the RPP, fixed 
operators (usually BSNL and MTNL) did not pay any access charges 
(interconnection fees) to mobile operators to term inate calls originating 
from fixed lines to mobile networks. Furthermore, in  the case of mobile to 
fixed calls, the mobile operators paid the incumbent fixed operators the 
fu ll local call charge. There was no revenue sharing arrangement between 
mobile and fixed operators. The RPP regime resulted in exorbitant costs to 
mobile operators and thus high rates charged to mobile users. The 
incumbent fixed operators insisted on m aintaining the RPP system. This 
was because high access charges paid to them by mobile operators were 
used by the incumbents to subsidize services such as cheap local fixed 
calls, roll-out of networks to unprofitable rural areas and free-number 
services. The consequence, however, was restricted competition in India's 
telecommunications m arket.
168 Srivastava and Sinha (2000), p. 26. See also the historical importance of 
interconnection in the early years of the US telecoms industry in Chapter 2, Section 1.4.
351
Mobile operators represent the only significant private sector 
presence in Indian telecommunications and are a major source of 
competition to the state-owned BSNL. Mobile operators, aided by the 
implementation of the CPP regime, are playing a key role in  the future 
development of the telecommunications sector in India. In  fact, mobile 
phones significantly contributed to India meeting its teledensity target of 7 
by 2005 -  mobile phones, including WLL phones,169 made up 44% of 
India’s total telephones in March 2004.170 By the end of November 2004 
the teledensity in  India stood at around 8 .37 .171 Between March and 
November 2004, there were over 14 m illion new telephone connections, 
88% of which were mobile phones.172 As of December 2004, there were 46 
m illion mobile phones173 compared to 44.5 m illion fixed line 
connections.174 M ainly due to mobile phones, private sector share of the 
Indian telecommunications m arket at the end of March 2004 was 39.27%  
- a promising 18.31% increase from the year before.175
India’s telecommunications has also experienced significant 
developments in  the Internet sector. To promote the sector, India began 
issuing licenses on a non-exclusive basis from November 1998 and 
allowed ISPs to setup their own international gateways using satellite and 
submarine cable landing stations. Furthermore, India’s ISP Policy
169 WLL stands for Wireless Local Loop technology. WLL was introduced in India to 
promptly expand telephone connections. WLL connects a phone in a home or office to a 
fixed telephone network through wireless technology. It differs from the standard local loop 
in that WLL does not use copper wires or cable to connect to the public switched telephone 
network (PSTN). WLL is also different from cellular mobile phones because they are not 
truly mobile. WLL is also known as fixed wireless. WLL allows for shorter construction 
period and reduces installation and operation costs. Private operators used WLL in the 
initial stages of their network rollout when the Indian telecoms market was opened to 
competition in order to quicken their entry into the market.
170 Annual Report 2003-2004, p. I.
171 The Economic Times Online, “Tele-density moves up", 2 January 2005.
Ibid.
173 This figure includes WLL phones.
174 The Economic Times Online, 2 January 2005.
175 Annual Report 2003-2004, p. I.
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advanced liberalization by allowing a maximum foreign equity of 74% in  
ISPs and even up to 100% in cases where the ISP does not set up an 
international gateway. In  addition, as we have seen above, India has 
legalized voice Internet telephony.176
More recently, India has adopted the Broadband Policy 2004177 in a 
move to take India into the inform ation super-highway digital age and 
catch up with its Asian neighbours.178 In  January 2005, BSNL launched 
its first broadband service “Data One” in over 200 cities across India. 
Prior to this, broadband penetration in  India was only around 0.02% .179 
To hasten broadband rollout TRAI has proposed local loop unbundling 
(LLU), following the regulatory trends in  the EU and the US.180
In  another liberalization move, the government, on the 
recommendation of the TRAI, adopted the Unified Access Service License 
regime in November 2003. This new regime permits operators to offer both 
fixed-wire and cellular services in  the same service area -  previously 
prohibited by the former licensing regime.181 Since the Unified Access 
regime came into effect, 27 licenses out of 31 basic service licenses have 
been converted into a Unified Access Service License.182 This regime is 
likely to result in  better services at lower tariffs, increasing competition 
among providers, and, because it gives players the means to make fixed
176 See Section IV.2 above.
177 DoT, Broadband Policy 2004, File No.813-07/03-LR, available at http: /  / www.dot.gov.in.
178 See TRAI, “TRAI releases recommendations on Broadband India*, Press Release No. 
30/2004, 29 April 2004.
179 The Financial Express, “Broadband ... ready to take ofT, 6 January 2005.
180 See The Hindu, Business Line, “For a new telecom mantra*, 1 July 2004; see TRAI, 
“Recommendation for allowing copper cable in last mile*, 18 March 2004.
181 The Unified Access Service License Regime is the first part of the recommended unified 
license/authorization regime which is to be achieved in a two-stage process. The unified 
license/authorization regime when implemented in full envisages service providers to be 
able to offer any or all services using any technology in the defined area of operation in a 
liberalizing move to promote greater participation of all types of entrepreneurs. Meanwhile, 
the second phase of the proposed unified license is in its consultation stage. Annual Report 
2003-2004, p. 6.
182 Annual Report 2003-2004, p. I.
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wireless connections fully mobile by acquiring cellular operation licenses 
on very favourable licensing conditions, w ill boost the growth of the WLL 
sector.183 The regime has already led to growth in mobile subscriber base 
and the resulting price decreases.184
Connecting a ll of India’s ru ra l population to the country’s 
communications network has however proved more formidable. The NTP 
1999 stated as one of its objectives to achieve telecom coverage of all 
villages by 2002. As of September 2004, however, there were still 83, 190 
villages (13%) left uncovered (524,301 villages out of 607,491 (87%) have 
been connected through the provision of village public telephones 
(VPTs)).185 Nonetheless, w ith the im plem entation of the Universal Service 
Obligation (USO) Fund in March 2004, it  is expected that India’s entire 
rural community would be connected in  the near future.186
Further im plementation of its WTO commitments, or more correctly 
further autonomous liberalization of In d ia’s telecommunications sector, is 
in the form of the Communications Convergence B ill, introduced in 2000 
and has yet to become law.
183 Eurolndia 2004 Co-operation Forum on the Information Society, “Eurolndia 2004 
Market Background Document Overview", p. 6, at http: /  / www.euroindia2004.org.
184 Annual Report 2003-2004, p. 6.
185 TRAI, Indicators July-September 2004, para. 1.2.2.
186 Annual Report 2003-2004, p. III. The USO Fund was established by the Indian 
Telegraph (Amendment) Rules 2004, The Gazette o f India, Extraordinary, Part II-Section 3- 
Sub-section (i), 26 March 2004. It determines that a USO Fund will be used to support the 
Universal Service Providers (selected through a bidding process from among basic service 
operators, cellular mobile operators and unified access service licensees) in their provision 
of public telephone services and rollout and maintenance of services to rural areas.
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2. The Communications Convergence Bill 2001
The Communications Convergence B ill 2001187 was introduced into 
Parliament (“Lok Sabha”) on 31 August 2001 and was expected to become 
law in the summer of 2002. The B ill was put on hold in 2003 because of 
certain unresolved issues m ainly regarding the regulation of content and 
whether India was ready to have a super regulator. The question was 
whether it was better to have one regulator oversee communications 
services and another separate one to regulate content. The issue of 
content regulation is particularly im portant to India’s policies on the 
protection of its cultural identity and the safeguarding of national 
security.188 The B ill is currently still under consideration.
India had hoped to develop and modernize its entire 
telecommunications system by introducing a new piece of legislation that 
is comprehensive in scope and effectiveness to address the convergence of 
communications, and is intended to remain valid over tim e, technologies 
and industries. The Indian government desired to make India, through 
the new legislation, a country w ith a complete convergence law .189
The Communications Convergence B ill, when it becomes law, w ill 
repeal five existing legislation: the Indian Telegraph Act 1885, the Indian  
Wireless Telegraphy Act 1933, the Telegraph Wires (Unlawful Possession)
187 The original title was the Communications Convergence Bill 2000. A revised draft was 
submitted to Parliament in 2001 and the title was finalized as the Communications 
Convergence Bill 2001. (Hereinafter CCB 2001).
188 See above Section II.2 .
189 The Indian government’s ambition to achieve such a complete convergence law was 
coupled with the belief that the US and Malaysia, countries who have passed convergence 
law prior to India, have addressed the convergence issue in a “limited” way. Ministry of 
Information Technology (India), IT News, “Convergence Bill gets GoM nod, commission 
likely by 2002, from Economic Times, 17 January 2001.
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Act 1950, the Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act 1995, and the
Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act 1997. The B ill has four main 
objectives:
(i) to facilitate development of national infrastructure for an information-based 
society, and to enable access thereto;
(ii) to provide a choice of services to the people with a view to promoting plurality 
of news, views and information;
(iii) to establish a regulatory framework for carriage and content of communication 
in the scenario of convergence of telecommunication, broadcasting, data- 
communication, multimedia and other related technologies and services; and
(iv) to establish the powers, procedures and functions of a single regulatory and 
licensing authority and of the Appellate Tribunal.190
One of the salient features of the B ill is the creation of a new 
autonomous regulator which w ill replace the TRAI. The Communications 
Commission of India (CCI), the new regulator, would be vested with the 
powers to grant licenses,191 manage spectrum for commercial use,192 
determine the conditions for fa ir, equitable and non-discrim inatory access 
to network facility and service,193 and resolve disputes.194 It w ill consist of 
a Chairperson and seven Members serving terms of five years. This is an 
increase in size from the TRAI which had its size reduced by the 2000 
Ordinance.195
The CCI is, according to the proponents of the B ill, meant to be a 
tru ly independent body in  every sense. This would rectify the weak powers 
and lack of autonomy of the TRAI. Thus, although India lim ited its WTO 
commitments in  the Reference Paper w ith regard to an independent 
regulator (see above), the establishment of the CCI accounts for India’s
190 Preamble, CCB 2001.
191 The Bill envisages giving licenses to all communications services under four broad 
categories of network facilities which are technology-neutral and sector-neutral: 1) network 
infrastructure facilities, 2) networking services, 3) application services, and 4) content 
application services. Section 20(2)(ii)-(iv), Appendices I and II, CCB 2001.
192 Section 20(2)(i) CCB 2001.
193 Section 20(2)(vi) CCB2001.
19« Section 22 CCB 2001.
195 See Section V I.2 above.
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move to liberalize autonomously. India could use this action to support its 
position in the current Doha negotiations on telecommunications services. 
Perhaps it might even consider making changes to its scheduled 
commitments on telecommunications and adopting the Reference Paper in  
fu ll.
In  reality, however, this w ill probably not happen. On a closer look 
at the Communications Convergence B ill, we discover th at the CCI is not 
truly autonomous. For instance, India’s central government controls the 
appointment of the members of the CCI, as well as the removal of such 
members.196 Furtherm ore, and very im portantly, the CCI w ill not be 
independent of the government in exercising its licensing and regulatory 
functions as,
[T]he Commission shall follow such policy directives as may be communicated to 
it in writing by the Central Government [...] and the decision of the Central 
Government whether a question is one of policy or not shall be final.197
Thus, if  there is a conflict between law and policy, policy w ill prevail.198
The B ill seems to provide no lim it to the areas where the government 
may intervene. For instance, although the CCI w ill manage and assign 
spectrum to users, it is the central government which is responsible for 
the allocation of available spectrum.199 In  addition, the government can 
direct the CCI to assign spectrum to certain classes of persons as it deems 
fit.200 Furthermore, the B ill gives open-ended power to the government to
196 Sections 7(1) and 8(A), CCB 2001. Cf. the US Communications Act of 1934 as amended 
by the 1996 Telecommunications Act. In  the US, the FCC’s five Commissioners are 
appointed by the President but subject to the Senate’s consent. See Chapter 2, Section 
11.3(a).
197 Sections 23(1) and 23(3), CCB 2001. Cf. the FCC’s broad power to “perform any and all 
acts, make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with [the 
1934] Act, as may be necessary in the execution of is functions." 47 U.S.C. 154. See 
Chapter 2, Section 11.3(b).
198 Beth Noveck, “India’s Communications Convergence Bill", 15 April 2001. Available at 
httn: /  / www.bethnoveck.com/papersandpubs/html.
i "  Section 24(1) CCB 2001.
200 Section 25(2) CCB 2001.
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make rules for carrying out provisions of the Act, where such rules may 
provide for “any other m atter which is or may be required to be provided 
by way of rules”.201 This pervasive interference of the central government 
in communications regulation subjects policy to undesirable political 
discretion, creating a climate of uncertainty for the sector. The lack of any 
power for the CCI to contradict the government strips it of independence.
In  addition, there is no requirement that the CCI’s decision-making 
be transparent and subject to public scrutiny. The B ill only requires that 
the CCI, while exercising its functions, “be guided” by the principle that 
“licensing criteria are transparent and made known to the public”.202 The 
CCI must also submit an annual report on its financial activities to the 
Central Government which w ill be laid before the Houses of Parliam ent,203 
but the B ill contains no provisions requiring the CCI to make these reports 
and information available to the general public. In  contrast, the US 
regulator the FCC is legally required to make public its proceedings upon 
request by any party (not ju st the government); must enter as record every 
vote and official act it takes; m ust enter as record all reports of 
investigations it makes; and m ust publish its reports and decisions for 
public information and use.204
A closer look therefore reveals that the new communications 
regulator of India is neither tru ly independent nor transparent. This is a 
situation which India should remedy before the B ill becomes law if it 
wants to become an information society with a modernized 
communications sector as intended by the original introduction of the
201 Sections 83(1) and 83(2)(x) CCB 2001.
202 Section 19(ix), CCB 2001.
203 Section 58A(1), CCB 2001.
204 Section 4 (jHm) Communications Act 1934 as amended.
358
Communications Convergence Bill.
Another salient feature of the B ill is that the CCI w ill regulate not 
only the carriage of communications, but also its content.205 Firstly, the 
CCI can “take steps to regulate or curtail the harm ful and illegal content 
on the internet and other communication services”.206 The difficulty here 
is the precise meaning of “harm ful”, which is not defined in  the B ill nor 
clarified any further. The lack of such a definition can lead to unlim ited 
intervention by the CCI on what it deems to be harm ful and the 
censorship of any content it does not approve. This could be used to 
restrict political speech and curtail freedom of expression, contrary to 
fundamental democratic rights.207
Secondly, the Commission w ill be required to enact regulation that is 
tantamount to social regulation.208 Section 21 of the B ill states that the 
Commission shall enact regulations to: (i) ensure that nothing is contained 
in any programme which is prejudicial to the interests of the sovereignty 
and integrity of India; (ii) ensure fairness and im partiality in  the 
presentation of news; (iii) ensure emphasis on the promotion of Indian  
culture; (iv) ensure decency in  the portrayal of women and restraint in  the 
portrayal of violence and sexual conduct; and (v) enhance general 
standards of good taste, decency and m orality. While the protection of 
local values and traditions is a valid goal, this provision accords too much 
discretionary power to the Commission to censor free speech.
The B ill, if  enacted in  its present form, would give India a 
telecommunications legislation that has been described as attem pting “to
205 Sections 20(2)(viii) and (x) and Section 21, CCB 2001.
206 Section 20(2)(x), CCB 2001.
207 B. Noveck, (2001).
208 Tata Energy Research Institute, “Communications Convergence Bill, 2001", TERIvision, 
October 2001, Issue No. 39.
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cover so much ground (broadcasting, telecom, Internet services) and yet 
does so in such a cursory and vague manner as to be almost 
unintelligible”.209 In  effect, adopting the B ill as it is w ill provide no 
predictability, stability or transparency to the regulation of India’s 
telecommunications industry and as a result w ill not help implement 
GATS principles on telecommunications liberalization.
V III. Concluding Remarks
The services sector remains crucial to India’s economy, accounting for 
49% of GDP in 2 0 0 0 /2 0 0 1.210 Stronger efforts to liberalize the 
telecommunications sector in India, together w ith those already in  
operation for financial services, would on all the evidence certainly 
contribute to higher efficiency of India’s industry and its ability to compete 
with other nations.
India is embarking on domestic regulatory reform of its  
telecommunications sector: noticeable improvements were made in 2003- 
2004. For example, TRAI has decreased the access deficit charge 
(interconnection fees); the CPP regime has finally been implemented; 
license fees have been lowered; and a regulatory scheme for better 
interconnection deals for mobile operators has been adopted (this w ill 
allow new entrants into the m arket and thereby increase trade). These 
reforms w ill lower costs for competitors and thereby better the 
environment to compete against incumbents.
209 b . Noveck (2001), p.2.
210 WTO, TPRB, Trade Policy Review, India: Report by the Secretariat, W T/TPR /S /100, 22 
May 2002, p. 117, para. 69.
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Thus, although India has not made extensive commitments in the 
WTO on telecommunications services, it has adopted autonomous 
measures w ithin its domestic sector to liberalize its telecommunications 
industry. India must now also embrace the liberalization of trade in  
telecommunications services through making more commitments in the 
WTO. For example, trade in  basic telecoms services through cross-border 
supply is still unbound for both m arket access and national treatm ent.211 
India is therefore not bound to provide cost-based interconnection for 
cross-border supply of telecoms services or even to ensure the cross- 
border supply of telecoms services. In  not committing in this way India 
cannot be held accountable, unlike Mexico, for using the above-cost 
accounting rate system. Nonetheless, India is itself in itiating a move 
towards cost-based ta riff rates both domestically and internationally.
It could be argued that international commitments could encourage a 
country to embark on domestic regulatory reform that would benefit them. 
Thus India should undertake greater liberalization commitments in the 
WTO in order to hasten its telecoms regulatory reforms and bring its 
straggling industry up to speed. The greatest areas of potential growth in  
telecoms trade in India are in  mobile services and the Internet. In  a 
positive move, India has adopted reforms to its telecoms rules and policies 
that are geared to attract foreign investment in  these areas. Regrettably, 
with regard to making international commitments, India’s in itia l offer on 
services tabled in the WTO in December 2003 as part of the current 
negotiations on trade in services contains again unduly lim ited 
commitments on telecommunications services.212
211 See Appendix IX.
212 For example, the scheduled maximum foreign equity for commercial presence remains a 
low 25% although in practice India allows maximum 49% foreign equity. See Appendix IX.
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The issue of autonomous liberalization in the current round of WTO 
negotiations is of crucial importance to India and to other developing 
country Members. India should not pass up this opportunity in the Doha 
Round to transform into binding commitments the liberalization measures 
adopted autonomously. Through setting an example to other developing 
countries, this would contribute to the strengthening of the m ultilateral 
trading system of the WTO. India needs only to show the courage of its 
convictions.
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion
The liberalization of trade in  telecommunications services involves the 
interplay between the m ultilateral rules of the WTO and the domestic law  
and policies of Member States. It consists of three inter-dependent 
dimensions: international, domestic, and the im plem entation of the 
international through the domestic.
Crucial to the liberalization of trade in telecommunications services 
under the GATS rules is the clear, accurate and generous scheduling of 
commitments. WTO Members need to schedule their commitments in as 
clearly defined and precise terms as possible in  accordance w ith the GATS 
provisions in order to strengthen the liberalization process of the WTO 
m ultilateral trading system. As the first WTO case on telecommunications 
services shows, interpreting Mexico’s commitments was at the heart of the 
dispute between the Parties and the decision brought transparency and 
clarification to Mexico’s commitment to liberalize.
To some developed countries, such as the US, the GATS rules do not 
go far enough to liberalize trade in telecommunications services. The 
Reference Paper on pro-competitive regulatory principles was adopted in  
response to the US position. Some regard the flexibility of the GATS, for 
example the positive lis t approach of scheduling commitments, as a 
weakness. To developing countries, however, the provisions in  the GATS 
do not allow them enough room to manoeuvre. They would prefer special 
and differential treatm ent along the same lines as the GATT. The GATS,
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however, only provides for special treatm ent for developing countries in  
lim ited situations.
Developed countries, particularly the US and the European Union 
and its Member States, have an im portant role to play in leading the 
m ultilateral trading system of the WTO towards further liberalization by 
opening up their markets to foreign competition and giving effective 
implementation to the m ultilateral rules on trade in services, and 
particularly trade in telecommunications services, in  their domestic 
markets. The US and the EC must set examples in trade liberalization. 
Since they have fully committed to telecommunications liberalization for 
all types of supply of trade in services, with the exception of mode 4, 
including adopting the Reference Paper in fu ll, they must now ensure that 
the telecommunications sectors in their respective countries are and 
remain fully competitive in  practice. Following that, domestic regulation 
should be lightened and then removed in  order to allow for the workings of 
competition law to take over in  the ‘free-m arket’ monitoring and 
‘regulating’ of a competitive and liberalized telecommunications sector.
The liberalization of telecommunications services w ithin the WTO has 
taken the form of the transplantation of US and EC domestic laws and 
policies into the GATS and the Agreement on Basic Telecommunications. 
The Reference Paper also reflects the US experience. Developing countries 
w ill find themselves incorporating and implementing US and EC policies 
and legal concepts on the liberalization of telecommunications services if 
they commit fu lly to the WTO rules on services liberalization and in  
particular to the pro-competitive principles contained in  the Reference 
Paper. However, this should not be a reason for developing countries not 
to commit fully to the WTO liberalization of telecommunications services.
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Telecommunications liberalization is crucial to development and has 
been shown in practice to provide greater efficiency and growth in  
countries’ economies. Even for the developing countries, particularly 
India, telecommunications liberalization can bring enormous benefits if 
the GATS m ultilateral framework is committed to in fu ll, particularly the 
Reference Paper, and more im portantly if it is implemented in  fu ll and 
accurately in  the domestic regulatory framework.
Developing countries, nevertheless, w ill require substantial domestic 
regulatory reform to re-structure their telecommunications systems to 
comply w ith the WTO framework. The problem with the liberalization of 
trade in telecommunications in developing countries is that they have 
made lim ited WTO commitments. Developing countries should schedule 
more m arket access commitments in telecommunications services. 
Nonetheless, allowance should be made for special and preferential 
treatm ent for developing countries in order to assist them in  making their 
liberalization process smoother, in  particular by allowing them more time 
to implement their m ultilateral commitments to liberalize 
telecommunications services as well as to accord them greater recognition 
of their autonomous liberalization efforts. If  they are not ready to commit 
to the liberalization of telecoms services in fu ll at the present moment, 
they could enter phase-in commitments. At least by committing 
themselves to future liberalization, developing countries can give 
themselves a concrete reason to embark on domestic reform in an effort to 
fu lfil their commitments and thereby help move the liberalization process 
of trade in telecommunications services forward.
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Developing countries have adopted autonomous measures to 
liberalize their domestic telecommunications m arkets. However, they need 
to go further and schedule these measures. Through scheduling 
autonomous liberalization measures, developing countries would 
contribute to promoting the stability and reciprocity of the m ultilateral 
trading system by upholding the core principles of transparency, non­
discrimination and progressive liberalization. In  addition, through such 
commitments, developing countries could increase their own participation 
in  trade. W ithout making liberalizing commitments in the WTO, 
developing countries deny themselves the benefits of access to other 
countries’ markets through global trade in telecommunications services. 
Furthermore, the purpose of the WTO m ultilateral trading system is to 
move forward from unilateral measures of deregulation to a system of 
world-wide binding obligations. By not scheduling their autonomous 
measures, developing countries risk stalling the entire m ultilateral 
process.
The WTO dispute settlement system can be used to ‘regulate’ trade in  
telecommunications services and further its liberalization. This can be 
achieved by enforcing a Member’s commitments by bringing a case before 
a WTO panel, as was done for the first time when the US took Mexico 
before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. A Member’s domestic regulatory 
reform in telecommunications can thus be advanced through the 
enforcement of its international commitments.
The thesis concludes that adherence to the WTO framework on the 
liberalization of trade in services, and telecommunications services more 
specifically, provides for transparency, predictability and stability that 
developed and developing countries alike need in order to reap the
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economic benefits that liberalization can offer. It  has shown that the 
movement in both developed and developing countries is now uniform ly 
towards liberalization and competition in telecommunications services. 
However, domestic deregulation does not equate to trade liberalization. In  
particular, it does not mean that there are improvements in access to the 
domestic m arket for foreign suppliers. In  order to achieve the 
liberalization of trade in  telecommunications services w ithin the GATS 
framework, a combination of trade liberalization -  the removal of 
discriminatory restrictions to foreign suppliers -  and domestic regulatory 
reform -  the removal of non-discrim inatory measures that restrict trade in  
services -  must be applied. This liberalization of trade in  
telecommunications services, like all services liberalization, is about the 
balancing of competing interests: particularly between developed and 
developing countries, between international and domestic, between 
economic and social. This may not come as a surprise, but it should 
constantly be borne in m ind by States, especially developing States, as the 
onward rush towards liberalization continues to gain pace.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX I
ANNEX ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS
1. Objectives
Recognizing the specificities of the telecommunications services sector and, in 
particular, its dual role as a distinct sector of economic activity and as the underlying 
transport means for other economic activities, the Members have agreed to the following 
Annex with the objective of elaborating upon the provisions of the Agreement with respect 
to measures affecting access to and use of public telecommunications transport networks 
and services. Accordingly, this Annex provides notes and supplementary provisions to the 
Agreement.
2. Scope
(a) This Annex shall apply to all measures of a Member that affect access to 
and use of public telecommunications transport networks and services.1
(b) This Annex shall not apply to measures affecting the cable or broadcast 
distribution of radio or television programming.
(c) Nothing in this Annex shall be construed:
(i) to require a Member to authorize a service supplier of any other 
Member to establish, construct, acquire, lease, operate, or supply 
telecommunications transport networks or services, other than as 
provided for in its Schedule; or
(ii) to require a Member (or to require a Member to oblige service 
suppliers under its jurisdiction) to establish, construct, acquire, 
lease, operate or supply telecommunications transport networks 
or services not offered to the public generally.
3. Definitions
For the purposes of this Annex:
(a) "Telecommunications" means the transmission and reception of signals by 
any electromagnetic means.
(b) "Public telecommunications transport service" means any 
telecommunications transport service required, explicitly or in effect, by a Member to be 
offered to the public generally. Such services may include, inter alia, telegraph, telephone, 
telex, and data transmission typically involving the real-time transmission of customer- 
supplied information between two or more points without any end-to-end change in the 
form or content of the customer's information.
1 This paragraph is understood to mean that each Member shall ensure that the obligations of this Annex are 
applied with respect to suppliers of public telecommunications transport networks and services by whatever 
measures are necessary.
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(c) "Public telecommunications transport network" means the public 
telecommunications infrastructure which permits telecommunications between and among 
defined network termination points.
(d) "Intra-corporate communications" means telecommunications through 
which a company communicates within the company or with or among its subsidiaries, 
branches and, subject to a Member's domestic laws and regulations, affiliates. For these 
purposes, "subsidiaries", "branches" and, where applicable, "affiliates" shall be as defined 
by each Member. "Intra-corporate communications" in this Annex excludes commercial or 
non-commercial services that are supplied to companies that are not related subsidiaries, 
branches or affiliates, or that are offered to customers or potential customers.
(e) Any reference to a paragraph or subparagraph of this Annex includes all 
subdivisions thereof.
4. Transparency
In the application of Article HI of the Agreement, each Member shall ensure that 
relevant information on conditions affecting access to and use of public 
telecommunications transport networks and services is publicly available, including: tariffs 
and other terms and conditions of service; specifications of technical interfaces with such 
networks and services; information on bodies responsible for the preparation and adoption 
of standards affecting such access and use; conditions applying to attachment of terminal 
or other equipment; and notifications, registration or licensing requirements, if  any.
5. Access to and use of Public Telecommunications Transport Networks and Services
(a) Each Member shall ensure that any service supplier of any other Member 
is accorded access to and use of public telecommunications transport networks and services 
on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions, for the supply of a service 
included in its Schedule. This obligation shall be applied, inter alia, through paragraphs
(b) through (f).2
(b) Each Member shall ensure that service suppliers of any other Member 
have access to and use of any public telecommunications transport network or service 
offered within or across the border of that Member, including private leased circuits, and 
to this end shall ensure, subject to paragraphs (e) and (f), that such suppliers are permitted:
(i) to purchase or lease and attach terminal or other equipment 
which interfaces with the network and which is necessary to 
supply a supplier's services;
(ii) to interconnect private leased or owned circuits with public 
telecommunications transport networks and services or with 
circuits leased or owned by another service supplier; and
(iii) to use operating protocols of the service supplier's choice in the 
supply of any service, other than as necessary to ensure the 
availability of telecommunications transport networks and 
services to the public generally.
2 The term "non-discriminatory" is understood to refer to most-favoured-nation and national treatment as 
defined in the Agreement, as well as to reflect sector-specific usage of the term to mean "terms and conditions 
no less favourable than those accorded to any other user of like public telecommunications transport networks 
or services under like circumstances".
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(c) Each Member shall ensure that service suppliers of any other Member may
use public telecommunications transport networks and services for the movement of 
information within and across borders, including for intra-corporate communications of 
such service suppliers, and for access to information contained in data bases or otherwise 
stored in machine-readable form in the territory of any Member. Any new or amended 
measures of a Member significantly affecting such use shall be notified and shall be subject 
to consultation, in accordance with relevant provisions of the Agreement.
(d) Notwithstanding the preceding paragraph, a Member may take such
measures as are necessary to ensure the security and confidentiality of messages, subject to 
the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade in 
services.
(e) Each Member shall ensure that no condition is imposed on access to and
use of public telecommunications transport networks and services other than as necessary:
(i) to safeguard the public service responsibilities of suppliers of
public telecommunications transport networks and services, in 
particular their ability to make their networks or services 
available to the public generally;
(ii) to protect the technical integrity of public telecommunications
transport networks or services; or
(iii) to ensure that service suppliers of any other Member do not
supply services unless permitted pursuant to commitments in the 
Member's Schedule.
(0 Provided that they satisfy the criteria set out in paragraph (e), conditions
for access to and use of public telecommunications transport networks and services may
include:
(i) restrictions on resale or shared use of such services;
(ii) a requirement to use specified technical interfaces, including 
interface protocols, for inter-connection with such networks and 
services;
(iii) requirements, where necessary, for the inter-operability of such 
services and to encourage the achievement of the goals set out in 
paragraph 7(a);
(iv) type approval of terminal or other equipment which interfaces 
with the network and technical requirements relating to the 
attachment of such equipment to such networks;
(v) restrictions on inter-connection of private leased or owned 
circuits with such networks or services or with circuits leased or 
owned by another service supplier; or
(vi) notification, registration and licensing.
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(g) Notwithstanding the preceding paragraphs of this section, a developing 
country Member may, consistent with its level of development, place reasonable conditions 
on access to and use of public telecommunications transport networks and services 
necessary to strengthen its domestic telecommunications infrastructure and service capacity 
and to increase its participation in international trade in telecommunications services. Such 
conditions shall be specified in the Member's Schedule.
6. Technical Cooperation
(a) Members recognize that an efficient, advanced telecommunications 
infrastructure in countries, particularly developing countries, is essential to the expansion 
of their trade in services. To this end, Members endorse and encourage the participation, to 
the fullest extent practicable, of developed and developing countries and their suppliers of 
public telecommunications transport networks and services and other entities in the 
development programmes of international and regional organizations, including the 
International Telecommunication Union, the United Nations Development Programme, and 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
(b) Members shall encourage and support telecommunications cooperation 
among developing countries at the international, regional and sub-regional levels.
(c) In cooperation with relevant international organizations, Members shall 
make available, where practicable, to developing countries information with respect to 
telecommunications services and developments in telecommunications and information 
technology to assist in strengthening their domestic telecommunications services sector.
(d) Members shall give special consideration to opportunities for the least- 
developed countries to encourage foreign suppliers of telecommunications services to assist 
in the transfer of technology, training and other activities that support the development of 
their telecommunications infrastructure and expansion of their telecommunications services 
trade.
7. Relation to International Organizations and Agreements
(a) Members recognize the importance of international standards for global 
compatibility and inter-operability of telecommunication networks and services and 
undertake to promote such standards through the work of relevant international bodies, 
including the International Telecommunication Union and the International Organization 
for Standardization.
(b) Members recognize the role played by intergovernmental and non­
governmental organizations and agreements in ensuring the efficient operation of domestic 
and global telecommunications services, in particular the International Telecommunication 
Union. Members shall make appropriate arrangements, where relevant, for consultation 
with such organizations on matters arising from the implementation of this Annex.
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APPENDIX I I
ANNEX ON NEGOTIATIONS ON BASIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS
1. Article II and the Annex on Article II Exemptions, including the requirement to list 
in the Annex any measure inconsistent with most-favoured-nation treatment that a Member 
will maintain, shall enter into force for basic telecommunications only on:
(a) the implementation date to be determined under paragraph 5 of the 
Ministerial Decision on Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications; or,
(b) should the negotiations not succeed, the date of the final report of the 
Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications provided for in that 
Decision.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to any specific commitment on basic 
telecommunications which is inscribed in a Member's Schedule.
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APPENDIX HI
World  Trade 
Organization
Trade in Services
FOURTH PROTOCOL TO THE 
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES
Members o f the World Trade Organization (hereinafter referred to as the "WTO") 
whose Schedules o f Specific Commitments and Lists of Exemptions from Article II of the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services concerning basic telecommunications are annexed 
to this Protocol (hereinafter referred to as " Members concerned"),
Having carried out negotiations under the terms of the Ministerial Decision on 
Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications adopted at Marrakesh on 15 April 1994,
Having regard to the Annex on Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications,
Agree as follows:
1. Upon the entry into force o f this Protocol, a Schedule o f Specific Commitments and 
a List o f Exemptions from Article II concerning basic telecommunications annexed to this 
Protocol relating to a Member shall, in accordance with the terms specified therein, 
supplement or modify the Schedule o f Specific Commitments and the List o f Article II 
Exemptions o f that Member.
2. This Protocol shall be open for acceptance, by signature or otherwise, by the
Members concerned until 30 November 1997.
3. The Protocol shall enter into force on 1 January 1998 provided it has been accepted
by all Members concerned. If by 1 December 1997 the Protocol has not been accepted by all 
Members concerned, those Members which have accepted it by that date may decide, prior to 
1 January 1998, on its entry into force.
4. This Protocol shall be deposited with the Director-General o f the WTO. The
Director-General o f the WTO shall promptly furnish to each Member o f the WTO a certified 
copy o f this Protocol and notifications o f acceptances thereof.
5. This Protocol shall be registered in accordance with the provisions of Article 102 of 
the Charter o f the United Nations.
Done at Geneva this[ — day o f month] one thousand nine hundred and ninety-seven, 
in a single copy in the English, French and Spanish languages, each text being authentic, 
except as otherwise provided for in respect o f the Schedules annexed hereto.
S/L/20
30 April 1996
(96- 1750)
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APPENDIX IV
GENERAL AGREEM ENT
ON TRADE IN  SERVICES_____________
TH E U N ITE D  STATES OF A M ER IC A  
Schedule of Specific Commitments
(This is authentic in English only)
GATS/SC/90 
15 April 1994
(94-1088)________
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THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA - SCHEDULE OF SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS
Modes of supply: 1) Cross-border supply 2) Consumption abroad 3) Commercial presence 4) Presence of natural persons
Sector or subsector Limitations on market access Limitations on national treatment Additional commitments
2. COMMUNICATION 
SERVICES
^TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Enhanced Telecommunications
Services, as defined by the US 
Federal Communications 
Commission in Section 64.702 
of the Commission's Rules 
and Regulations: services, 
offered over common carrier 
transmission facilities (i.e., 
public telecommunications 
transport services) which 
employ computer processing 
applications that:
i)act on the format, content code, 
protocol or similar aspects of 
the subscriber's transmitted 
information; or
ii)provide the subscriber additional, 
different, or restructured 
information; or
iii)involve subscriber interaction 
with stored information.
1) None 1) None
2) None 2) None
3) None 3) None
4)Unbound, except as indicated in the horizontal section 4) None
co
o \
Includes the following:
h)Electronic Mail
i)Voice Mail
j)On-line Information and Data Base 
Retrieval 
k)Electronic Data Interchange 
l)Enhaneed/Value-added Facsimile 
Services (including store and 
forward, store and retrieve) 
m)Code and Protocol Conversion 
n)On-line Information and/or Data 
Processing (including 
transaction processing) 
o)Other
APPENDIX V
W o r ld  T r a d e  gats/sc/9o/suppi.2
11 April 1997
O r g a n iz a t io n
_________________________________________________________________________ (97-1457)____________
T ra d e  in  Services
T H E  U N IT E D  S T A T E S  O F  A M E R IC A  
Schedule o f Specific C om m itm ents  
Supplem ent 2
(This is authentic in English only)
This text supplements the entries relating to the Telecommunications section 
contained on pages 45 to 46 o f document GATS/SC/90.
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U N ITED  STATES - SCHEDULE O F SPEC IFIC  C O M M ITM E N TS
M odes o f  supply: 1) Cross-border supply 2) Consumption abroad 3) Commercial presence 4) Presence o f  natural persons
Sector or Sub-sector Limitations on M arke t Access Limitations on National Treatment Additional Commitments
2.C .TELECOM M UNICATIONS
SERVICES*:
2.C .a.Voice services
2.C .b.Packet-switched data
transmission services
2.C.c.Circuit-switched data
transmission services
2.C.d.Telex services
2.C.e.Telegraph services
2.C.f.Facsimile services
2.C.g.Private leased circuit services
(1)None
(2)None
(3)None, other than
-Comsat has exclusive rights to links with Intelsat 
and Inmarsat.
-Ownership o f  a comm on carrier radio license:
Indirect: None
Direct: M ay not be granted to or held by
(a)foreign government or the representative 
thereof
(b)non-U.S. citizen or the representative o f any 
non-U.S. citizen
(1)None
(2)None
(3)None
The United States undertakes 
the obligations contained in the 
reference paper attached 
hereto.
2.C.O. Other 
M obile Services 
Analogue/Digital cellular
(c)any corporation not organized under the laws
o f  the United States or
(d)U.S. corporation o f  w hich more than 20% o f
the capital stock is owned or voted by a
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Modes o f supply: 1) Cross-border supply 2) Consumption abroad 3) Commercial presence 4) Presence of natural persons
Sector or Sub-sector Limitations on M arke t Access Limitations on National Treatment Additional Commitments
services
PCS (Personal Communications 
services)
Paging services
M obile data services
’Excluding one-way satellite
transmissions o f  DTH and DBS 
television services and o f  
digital audio services
foreign governm ent or its 
representative, non-U.S. citizens or 
their representatives or a corporation 
not organized under the laws o f  the 
United States.
(4)Unbound except as indicated by horizontal 
commitments
(4)Unbound except as indicated by 
horizontal commitments.
ATTACHMENT TO THE UNITED STATES SCHEDULE 
REFERENCE PAPER
Scope
The following are definitions and principles on the regulatory framework for the basic 
telecommunications services.
Definitions
Users mean service consumers and service suppliers.
Essential facilities mean facilities o f a public telecommunications transport network or 
service that
(a)are exclusively or predominantly provided by a single or limited number o f suppliers; and
(b)cannot feasibly be economically or technically substituted in order to provide a service.
A major supplier is a supplier which has the ability to materially affect the terms of 
participation (having regard to price and supply) in the relevant market for basic 
telecommunications services as a result of:
(a) control over essential facilities; or
(b) use o f its position in the market.
1. Competitive safeguards
1.1 Prevention o f anti-competitive practices in telecommunications
Appropriate measures shall be maintained for the purpose o f preventing suppliers 
who, alone or together, are a major supplier from engaging in or continuing anti-competitive 
practices.
1.2 Safeguards
The anti-competitive practices referred to above shall include in particular:
(a)engaging in anti-competitive cross-subsidization;
(b)using information obtained from competitors with anti-competitive results; and
(c)not making available to other services suppliers on a timely basis technical information
about essential facilities and commercially relevant information which are 
necessary for them to provide services.
2. Interconnection
2.1 This section applies to linking with suppliers providing public telecommunications
transport networks or services in order to allow the users of one supplier to communicate 
with users o f another supplier and to access services provided by another supplier, where 
specific commitments are undertaken.
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2.2 Interconnection to be ensured1
Interconnection with a major supplier will be ensured at any technically feasible 
point in the network. Such interconnection is provided.
(a)under non-discriminatory terms, conditions (including technical standards and
specifications) and rates and of a quality no less favourable than that 
provided for its own like services or for like services o f non-affiliated 
service suppliers or for its subsidiaries or other affiliates;
(b)in a timely fashion, on terms, conditions (including technical standards and specifications)
and cost-oriented rates that are transparent, reasonable, having regard to 
economic feasibility, and sufficiently unbundled so that the supplier need not
pay for network components or facilities that it does not require for the
service to be provided; and
(c)upon request, at points in addition to the network termination points offered to the majority
of users, subject to charges that reflect the cost o f construction of necessary 
additional facilities.
2.3 Public availability o f the procedures for interconnection negotiations
The procedures applicable for interconnection to a major supplier will be made 
publicly available.
2.4 Transparency o f interconnection arrangements
It is ensured that a major supplier will make publicly available either its 
interconnection agreements or a reference interconnection offer.
2.5 Interconnection: dispute settlement
A service supplier requesting interconnection with a major supplier will have 
recourse, either:
(a) at any time or
(b) after a reasonable period o f time which has been made publicly known
to an independent domestic body, which may be a regulatory body as referred to in paragraph 
5 below, to resolve disputes regarding appropriate terms, conditions and rates for 
interconnection within a reasonable period of time, to the extent that these have not been 
established previously.
‘Rural local exchange carriers may be exempted by a state regulatory authority for a 
limited period o f time from the obligations o f section 2.2. with regard to interconnection with 
competing local exchange carriers.
Rural telephone companies do not have to provide interconnection to competing local 
exchange carriers in the manner specified in section 2.2. until ordered to do so by a state 
regulatory authority.
382
3. Universal service
Any Member has the right to define the kind of universal service obligation it wishes 
to maintain. Such obligations will not be regarded as anti-competitive per se, provided they 
are administered in a transparent, non-discriminatory and competitively neutral manner and 
are not more burdensome than necessary for the kind o f universal service defined by the 
Member.
4. Public availability o f licensing criteria
Where a licence is required, the following will be made publicly available:
(a)all the licensing criteria and the period of time normally required to reach a decision
concerning an application for a licence and
(b)the terms and conditions o f individual licences.
The reasons for the denial of a licence will be made known to the applicant upon
request.
5. Independent regulators
The regulatory body is separate from, and not accountable to, any supplier o f basic 
telecommunications services. The decisions of and the procedures used by regulators shall be 
impartial with respect to all market participants.
6. Allocation and use o f scarce resources
Any procedures for the allocation and use of scarce resources, including frequencies, 
numbers and rights o f way, will be carried out in an objective, timely, transparent and non- 
discriminatory manner. The current state of allocated frequency bands will be made publicly 
available, but detailed identification of frequencies allocated for specific government uses is 
not required.
383
APPENDIX V I
W o r l d  T r a d e
T N /S /O /U S A  
9 April 2003
O r g a n iz a t io n
______________________________________________________________________________(03-2003)___________
C o u n c il fo r  T ra d e  in  S ervices Original: English
Specia l Session
C O M M U N IC A T IO N  F R O M  T H E  U N IT E D  S T A T E S  
Initial Offer
The following initial offer has been received from the delegation o f the United 
States on 31 March with the request that it be circulated to Members o f the Council for 
Trade in Services.
In tro d u c tio n
1. Recognizing WTO Members commitment in these negotiations to achieve a 
progressively higher level o f  liberalization and to provide effective market access, and 
recognizing that current U.S. commitments under the GATS already provide among the 
highest levels o f  effective market access, in response to requests received from Members 
the United States proposes the following new commitments.
2. Consistent with GATS Article 1.3(b) and (c), this offer applies only to services 
open to private sector participants, unless otherwise indicated, in the attached draft 
schedules, and does not include the right to acquire or invest in government monopolies 
supplying services included within any o f the sectors or sub-sectors covered by this offer.
3. Under these proposed new GATS obligations, as under current obligations, the 
United States will continue to be able to establish, maintain, and fully enforce its domestic 
laws protecting, inter alia, consumers, health, safety, and the environment, as well as take 
actions it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests.
4. The United States will consider adopting new obligations under the GATS 
regarding transparency in regulation o f services if  other WTO Members are prepared to do 
so as well. The United States looks forward to work on these issues in bilateral request- 
offer discussions as well as in other appropriate WTO fora.
5. The United States reserves the right to withdraw, modify, or reduce this offer, in 
whole or in part, including necessary amendments to the offer regarding listing o f tax 
measures, at any time prior to the conclusion o f the negotiations.
6. The United State further reserves the right to make technical changes to this offer 
and to correct any errors, omissions, or inaccuracies.
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UNITED STATES -  INITIAL OFFER
Modes o f supply: 1) Cross-border supply 2) Consumption abroad 3) Commercial presence 4) Presence of natural persons
Sector or subsector Lim itations on m arket access Limitations on national treatm ent Additional commitments
2. C O M M U N IC A TIO N The U nited S tates undertakes
SERV ICES 1) None 1) None the obligations contained in the
G r reference paper attached hereto.
D. Basic Telecom m unications 2) N one 2) None
Services* Supplem enting the U nited
3) None, other than 3) None States Reference Paper
The transm ission betw een com m itm ents (attached) the
or am ong points specified — Com sat has exclusive rights to  links w ith U nited States com m its to:
by the user, o f  information Intelsat and Inmarsat.
o f  the users choosing, M aintain an absence o f  national
w ithout change in the form - O wnership o f  a com m on carrier radio governm ent ow nership in public
or content o f  the license: telecom m unications service
inform ation as sent or suppliers;
received, as defined in 47 Indirect: N one
U.S.C. 153 (43). Services M aintain a national
can be supplied on either a Direct: M ay not be granted to or held telecom m unications regulatory
public or private basis, by body independent o f  executive
regardless o f  the facilities (a) foreign governm ent or the and legislative branches, which
used. representative thereof is required to  em ploy 
transparent procedures in
Services include: (b) non-U.S. citizen or the representative developing rules (including
o f  any non-U.S. citizen notice and com m ent) and is
a) V oice telephone services em pow ered to  enforce
regulations through sanctions,
b) Packet-sw itched data
transm ission services (note: (c) any corporation not organized under including fines and revocation
1 Exclud ing  on e-w ay satellite transm issions o f  D T H -and DBS television-servioes and o f  digital audio services.
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UNITED STATES -  INITIAL OFFER
Sector or subsector Lim itations on m arket access Lim itations on national treatm ent Additional commitments
packet sw itched services 
classified as inform ation 
services are not considered 
basic telecom m unications 
services.)
c) C ircuit-sw itched data 
transm ission services
the laws o f  the U nited States or
(d) U.S. corporation o f  w hich m ore than 
20%  o f the capital stock is owned or 
voted by  a foreign governm ent or its 
representative, non-U.S. citizens or 
their representatives or a corporation 
not organized under the laws o f  the 
United States.
o f  licenses; and
Perm it licensed suppliers o f  
basic telecom m unications 
services choice o f  technology 
used in the supply o f  services, 
subject to  requirem ents 
necessary to  fulfill legitimate 
public policy objectives.
d) Telex services
e) Telegraph services
f) Facsim ile services
g) Private leased circuit 
services
[Note: N ew  definition, and 
sam e list o f  services m oved to 
value-added services, below]
 Enhanced
4) U nbound except as indicated by horizontal 
com m itm ents
4) U nbound except as indicated by horizontal 
comm itments.
In addition, subject to  the 
national regulatory body's 
appropriate exercise o f  
forbearance authority  under 47
U.S.C 160. and subject to 
exem ptions for certain rural 
carriers, the U nited States also
com m its, w ith respect to 
suppliers defined under 47 
U.S.C. 153 (26) as local 
exchange carriers to:
Ensure that local exchange
carriers, provide dialing parity;
M aintain m easures prohibiting
Telecom m unications 
Services, as de fined by the 
US Federal
4)— N one 4)— None
local exchange carriers from 
im posing unreasonable or 
discrim inatory conditions or
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UNITED STATES -  INITIAL OFFER
Sector or subsector Lim itations on m arket access Limitations on national treatment Additional commitments
C om m unications 
C om m ission in Section 
64.702 o f  the C om m ission's 
R ules and Regulations: 
services, offered over 
com m on carrier 
transm ission facilitie s (i.e ., 
public te lecom m unications 
transport-services) which 
em ploy com puter 
processing applications that:
act on the format, content 
code , protocol or sim ilar 
aspects o f  the subscriber's 
transm itted information; or
2)— None 
2)— None
4)— Unbound, except as indicated in the 
horizontal section
2)— N one 
2)— N one
4)— Unbound, except as indicated in the 
horizontal section
lim itations on the resale o f 
public telecom m unications 
services;
Ensure that local exchange 
carriers provide num ber 
portability where technically 
feasible;
Ensure that local exchange 
carriers provide access to  poles, 
ducts, conduits and rights o f 
w av at just and reasonable rates
and on non-discrim inatorv term s 
and
conditions to com peting basic
public telecom m unications 
service suppliers.
ii) provide-the subscriber 
additional, different, or 
re structured information; or
iii) involve-subscriber 
interaction with stored 
in formation. 
includes the following:
h) E lectronic Mail
i) V oice Mail
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UNITED STATES -  INITIAL OFFER
Modes o f supply: 1) Cross-border supply 2) Consumption abroad 3) Commercial presence 4) Presence of natural persons
Sector or subsector Limitations on m arket access Lim itations on national treatm ent Additional commitments
D ata Base Retrieval
(ED I)
1) Enhanced/V alue-added 
Facsim ile Services 
(including store and 
forward, store and retrieve) 
m ) Code and-Protocol 
Conversion 
ft)-On- line Inform ation and/or 
D ata Processing (including 
transaction processing)
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UNITED STATES -  INITIAL OFFER
Modes o f supply: 1) Cross-border supply 2) Consumption abroad 3) Commercial presence 4) Presence of natural persons
Sector or subsector Lim itations on m arket access Limitations on national treatm ent Additional commitments
E. Inform ation Services 
(V alue-added services)
The offering o f  a capability 
for generating, acquiring, 
storing, transform ing, 
processing, retrieving, 
utilizing, or making 
available inform ation via 
telecom m unications, as 
defined in 47 USC 153(20). 
Services include, but are not 
lim ited to:
electronic mail 
voice mail 
on-line Information 
and/or data base 
retrieval 
E lectronic Data 
Interchange (EDI)
- Enhanced/V alue-added 
Facsimile Services 
Code and Protocol 
conversion 
on-line inform ation 
and/or D ata processings
1) None
2) None
3) None
4) Unbound, except as indicated in the
horizontal section
1) None
2) None
3) None
4) Unbound, except as indicated in the 
horizontal section
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UNITED STATES -  INITIAL OFFER
Modes o f supply: 1) Cross-border supply 2) Consumption abroad 3) Commercial presence 4) Presence of natural persons
Sector or subsector Limitations on m arket access Limitations on national treatm ent Additional commitments
- packet-sw itched inform ation
services
o) O ther
Note: services below arc
redundant, as they are
captured in the definition o f
basic services above.
------M obile Services
-----Analogue/D igital eellular
services
-----PCS (Personal
---- Com m unications services)
-----Paging services
-----M obile data-services
F. O ther C om m unications 1) None 1) None
Services
2) None 2) None
Cable services provided
over cable systems, as 3) None, except that a single com pany or 3) None
defined in 47 U.S.C. firm is prohibited from owning a
522(6) and 47 U.S.C. com bination o f  newspapers, radio and/or
522(7) TV broadcast stations serving the same
local market. Radio and television
O ne-w ay satellite broadcast licenses m ay not be held by: a
UNITED STATES -  INITIAL OFFER
Modes o f supply: 1) Cross-border supply 2) Consumption abroad 3) Commercial presence 4) Presence o f natural persons
Sector or subsector Lim itations on m arket access Limitations on national treatm ent Additional commitments
transm ission o f  DTH 
and DBS television 
services and o f digital 
audio services.
Radio and Television 
Broadcast Transm ission 
Services
foreign governm ent; a corporation 
chartered under the law o f  a foreign 
country or o f  which has a non-US citizen 
as an officeF-or-director or more than 20 
per cent o f  the capital stock o f w hich is 
owned or voted by non-US citizens; a 
corporation chartered under the laws o f the 
United States that is directly or indirectly 
controlled by a corporation more than 25 
per cent o f whose capital stock is owned 
by non-US citizens or a foreign 
governm ent or a corporation o f  which any 
officer or more than 25 per cent o f  the t 
directors are non-US citizens. •
4) Unbound, except as indicated in the 4) Unbound exceot as indicated bv
-horizontal section. In addition, US horizontal com m itm ents
citizenshiD is required to obtain radio and 
television licenses.
ATTACHMENT TO THE UNITED STATES SCHEDULE
REFERENCE PAPER
Scope
The following are definitions and principles on the regulatory framework for the basic 
telecommunications services.
Definitions
Users mean service consumers and service suppliers.
Essential facilities mean facilities of a public telecommunications transport network or 
service that
(a) are exclusively or predominantly provided by a single or limited number o f  
suppliers; and
(b) cannot feasibly be economically or technically substituted in order to
provide a service.
A major supplier is a supplier which has the ability to materially affect the terms o f  
participation (having regard to price and supply) in the relevant market for basic 
telecommunications services as a result of:
(a) control over essential facilities; or
(b) use o f its position in the market.
1. Competitive safeguards
1.1 Prevention o f anti-competitive practices in telecommunications
Appropriate measures shall be maintained for the purpose o f preventing suppliers 
who, alone or together, are a major supplier from engaging in or continuing anti­
competitive practices.
1.2 Safeguards
The anti-competitive practices referred to above shall include in particular:
(a) engaging in anti-competitive cross-subsidization;
(b) using information obtained from competitors with anti-competitive results;
and
(c) not making available to other services suppliers on a timely basis 
technical information about essential facilities and commercially relevant 
information which are necessary for them to provide services.
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2. Interconnection
2.1 This section applies to linking with suppliers providing public telecommunications transport
networks or services in order to allow the users of one supplier to communicate with users of another 
supplier and to access services provided by another supplier, where specific commitments are 
undertaken.
2.2 Interconnection to be ensured1
Interconnection with a major supplier will be ensured at any technically feasible point in the 
network. Such interconnection is provided.
(a) under non-discriminatory terms, conditions (including technical standards 
and specifications) and rates and of a quality no less favorable than that provided for 
its own like services or for like services of non-affiliated service suppliers or for its 
subsidiaries or other affiliates;
(b) in a timely fashion, on terms, conditions (including technical standards and
specifications) and cost-oriented rates that are transparent, reasonable, having regard 
to economic feasibility, and sufficiently unbundled so that the supplier need not pay
for network components or facilities that it does not require for the service to be
provided; and
(c) upon request, at points in addition to the network termination points offered 
to the majority o f users, subject to charges that reflect the cost o f construction of 
necessary additional facilities.
2.3 Public availability o f the procedures for interconnection negotiations
The procedures applicable for interconnection to a major supplier will be made publicly 
available.
2.4 Transparency o f interconnection arrangements
It is ensured that a major supplier will make publicly available either its interconnection
agreements or a reference interconnection offer.
1 Rural local exchange carriers may be exempted by a state regulatory authority for a limited period of time from the 
obligations o f section 2.2. with regard to interconnection with competing local exchange carriers.
Rural telephone companies do not have to provide interconnection to competing local exchange carriers in the manner 
specified in section 2.2. until ordered to do so by a state regulatory authority.
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2.5 Interconnection: dispute settlement
A service supplier requesting interconnection with a major supplier will have 
recourse, either:
(a) at any time or
(b) after a reasonable period of time which has been made publicly known
to an independent domestic body, which may be a regulatory body as referred to in paragraph 
5 below, to resolve disputes regarding appropriate terms, conditions and rates for 
interconnection within a reasonable period of time, to the extent that these have not been 
established previously.
3. Universal service
Any Member has the right to define the kind of universal service obligation it wishes 
to maintain. Such obligations will not be regarded as anti-competitive per se, provided they 
are administered in a transparent, non-discriminatory and competitively neutral manner and 
are not more burdensome than necessary for the kind of universal service defined by the 
Member.
4. Public availability o f licensing criteria
Where a license is required, the following will be made publicly available:
(a) all the licensing criteria and the period of time normally required to 
reach a decision concerning an application for a license and
(b) the terms and conditions o f individual licenses.
The reasons for the denial o f a license will be made known to the applicant upon
request.
5. Independent regulators
The regulatory body is separate from, and not accountable to, any supplier o f basic 
telecommunications services. The decisions o f and the procedures used by regulators shall be 
impartial with respect to all market participants.
6. Allocation and use o f scarce resources
Any procedures for the allocation and use o f scarce resources, including frequencies, 
numbers and rights o f way, will be carried out in an objective, timely, transparent and non- 
discriminatory manner. The current state of allocated frequency bands will be made publicly 
available, but detailed identification of frequencies allocated for specific government uses is 
not required.
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APPENDIX V II
GENERAL AGREEMENT 
ON TRADE IN  SERVICES
INDIA
Schedule o f Specific C om m itm ents
(This is authentic in English only)
GATS/SC/42 
15 April 1994
(94-1040)_______
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INDIA - SCHEDULE OF SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS
Modes of supply: 1) Cross-border supply 2) Consumption abroad 3) Commercial presence 4) Presence of natural persons
Sector or subsector Limitations on m arket access Limitations on national treatment Additional commitments
2. COM M UNICATION 
SERVICES
C.Telecomm unication Services 1) None 1) None
Data and m essage transmission 
services, the following:
h)Electronic mail 
(CPC 7523**)
2) Unbound
3)Only through incorporation with a foreign equity 
ceiling o f  51 per cent
4)Unbound except as indicated in the horizontal 
section
2) Unbound
3) None
4)Unbound except as indicated in the 
horizontal section
i)Voice mail
(CPC 7523**)
j)O n-line inform ation and data 
base retrieval 
(CPC 7523**)
l)Enhanced/value added 
facsimile services, 
including store and 
forward, store and retrieve 
(CPC 7523**)
n)On-line information and/or 
data processing 
(CPC 843**)
APPENDIX V III
W o r l d  T r a d e  
O r g a n iz a t io n
T ra d e  in  Services
IN D IA
Schedule o f  Specific C o m m itm en ts  
S u pp lem ent 3
(This is authentic in English only)
G A T S /S C /4 2 /S u p p l.3
11 April 1997
(97-13911___________
This text supplements the entries relating to the Telecommunication services section 
contained on page 7 of document GATS/SC/42.
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INDIA - SCHEDULE OF SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS
Modes o f supply: 1) Cross-border supply 2) Consumption abroad 3) Commercial presence 4) Presence of natural persons
Sector or Sub-sector Limitations on M arke t Access Limitations on National Treatment Additional Commitments
2.COM M UNICATION
SERVICES
C. Telecom munication The definition and principles on the
Services1 regulatory framework for the basic
(l)U nbound (l)U nbound telecomm unication services
(a) Voice telephone service subscribed to by India are contained
(CPC 7521**) (2)Unbound (2)Unbound in the annex titled "Explanatory 
Paper on Additional Commitments
Limited to  local/long distance, for (3)The service will be permitted to be provided by India".
public use over a public only after the operator gets a licence from (3)Unbound
telecomm unication transport the Designated Authority who shall
network. determine the need, if  any, for issuance o f  
new licences. The term s and conditions o f 
the licence will be as laid down by the 
Designated Authority or Government or 
the prevailing laws in the country.
Wire based (i.e. for fixed network There will be one operator other than
o f subscribers). Department o f  Telecommunications 
(DOT)/M ahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. 
(M TNL) in each service area for a period 
o f  10 years from the grant o f  licence after 
which the position will be reviewed.
Excluding broadcasting services and measures affecting such services. Broadcasting is defined as a form o f the uni-directional telecommunications intended for large number o f users having appropriate 
receiving facilities and carried out by means o f radio or cable network. This may include sound transmission, television transmission or other types o f transmission.
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Modes of supply: 1) Cross-border supply 2) Consumption abroad 3) Commercial presence 4) Presence o f natural persons
Sector or Sub-sector Limitations on M arke t Access Limitations on National Treatment Additional Commitments
The private operator should be a com pany 
registered in India in which total foreign 
equity m ust not exceed 25%.
The subject o f  opening up o f  national 
long-distance service beyond service 
area to competition will be reviewed 
in the year 1999.
(c)Circuit switched data
transmission services (CPC 
7523**)
Service operator will be perm itted to  provide 
long distance service within the licensed 
service area only.
Resale o f voice telephone services will not be 
permitted. However, licensees can grant 
franchises on commission basis for 
providing public call offices (PCOs) 
service.
The detailed term s and conditions for providing 
the service will be as per licence 
conditions.
(4) Unbound except as indicated in the 
horizontal commitments.
(1) Unbound
(2)Unbound
(3)Licensed voice telephone service operators
(4) Unbound except as indicated in the 
horizontal commitments
(1) Unbound
(2) Unbound
(3)Unbound
Also, the subject o f opening up o f  
international service to competition 
will be reviewed in the year 2004.
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Modes of supply : 1) Cross-border supply 2) Consumption abroad 3) Commercial presence 4) Presence of natural persons
Sector or Sub-sector Limitations on M arke t Access Limitations on National Treatment Additional Commitments
will be perm itted for transmission o f  data 
on the PSTN2 network in its licensed 
service area.
(4)Unbound except as indicated in the horizontal 
commitments
(4)Unbound except as indicated in the 
horizontal commitments
(f)Facsimile services 
(CPC 7521**)
(g)Private Leased Circuit Services 
(CPC 7522**)
(1)Unbound
(2)Unbound
(3) Licensed voice telephone service operators
will be perm itted for transmission o f 
facsimile on the PSTN network in its 
licensed service area. Franchisees o f 
service operators can provide commercial 
facsimile services
(4)Unbound except as indicated in the horizontal 
commitments
(1)Unbound
(2)Unbound
(3) Licensed voice telephone service operators
will be permitted to provide leased circuits
(1) Unbound
(2)Unbound
(3)Unbound
(4)Unbound except as indicated in the 
horizontal commitments
(1)Unbound
(2)Unbound
(3)Unbound
2PSTN refers to Public Switched Voice Telephone Network which is operated by DoT/M TNL or licensed operator.
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Modes o f supply: 1) Cross-border supply 2) Consumption abroad 3) Commercial presence 4) Presence of natural persons
Sector or Sub-sector Limitations on M arke t Access Limitations on National Treatm ent Additional Commitments
to their customers, for their ow n use within 
their licensed service area. Resale o f  such 
leased circuits w ill not be permitted.
(4)Unbound except as indicated in the horizontal 
commitments (4)Unbound except as indicated in the 
horizontal commitments
(o)Other
Cellular mobile telephone 
services.
(1)Unbound
(2)Unbound
(3)The service will be permitted to be provided 
only after the operator gets a licence from 
the Designated A uthority who shall 
determine the need, i f  any, for issuance o f  
new licences. The term s and conditions o f  
the licence will be as laid down by the 
Designated Authority or Government or 
the prevailing laws in the country
Only digital (GSM ) technology will be permitted 
and this will only be terrestrial based.
There will be tw o cellular service operators in 
each service area. The position will be 
reviewed after 10 years. The right o f  
DoT/M TNL to  enter into each service area 
is reserved.
The private operator should be a company
(1)Unbound
(2)Unbound
(3)Unbound
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Modes of supply: 1) Cross-border supply 2) Consumption abroad 3) Commercial presence 4) Presence o f natural persons
Sector or Sub-sector Limitations on M arke t Access Limitations on National Treatm ent Additional Commitments
registered in India in which total foreign 
equity m ust not exceed 25%.
The detailed term s and conditions for providing 
the service will be as per licence 
conditions.
(4)Unbound except as indicated in the horizontal 
commitments. (4)Unbound except as indicated in the 
horizontal commitments.
Explanatory Paper on 
Additional Commitments bv India
Scope
The following are definitions and principles on the regulatory framework for the basic 
telecommunications services.
Definitions
Users mean service consumers and service suppliers.
Essential facilities mean facilities of a public telecommunications transport network or 
service that
(a) are exclusively or predominantly provided by a single or limited 
number of suppliers; and
(b) cannot feasibly be economically or technically substituted in order 
to provide a service.
A maior supplier is a supplier which has the ability to materially affect the terms of 
participation (having regard to price and supply) in the relevant market for basic 
telecommunications services as a result o f :
(a) control over essential facilities; or
(b) use o f its position in the market.
1. Competitive safeguards
Appropriate measures shall be maintained for the purpose o f preventing service 
suppliers from engaging in or continuing in anti-competitive practices o f the following type:
(a) using information obtained from competitors with anti-competitive results; and
(b) not making available to other services suppliers on a timely basis technical 
information about essential facilities and commercially relevant information which are 
necessary for them to provide services.
2. Interconnection
2.1 This section applies to linking with suppliers providing public telecommunications 
transport network or services in order to allow the users of one supplier to communicate with 
users of another supplier and to access services provided by another supplier, where specific 
commitments are undertaken.
2.2 Interconnection to be ensured
Interconnection with a major supplier will be ensured at any specified feasible point 
in the network as indicated in the licence. Such interconnection is provided:
(a)of a quality no less favourable than that provided for its own like services or for like 
services of non-affiliated service suppliers or for its subsidiaries or other 
affiliates;
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(b)upon request, at points in addition to the network termination points offered to the 
majority of users as per licence conditions, subject to mutually agreed 
charges.
2.3 Public availability of the procedures for interconnection negotiations
The procedures applicable for interconnection to a major supplier will be made 
publicly available.
2.4 Transparency of interconnection arrangements
It will be ensured that a major supplier will make publicly available either its 
interconnection agreements, or a reference interconnection offer.
2.5 Interconnection: dispute settlement
A service supplier requesting interconnection with a major supplier will have 
recourse, either:
(a) at any time or
(b) after a reasonable period of time which has been made publicly 
known
to a domestic regulatory authority to resolve disputes regarding appropriate terms, 
conditions and rates for interconnection within reasonable period of time, to the extent that 
these have not been established previously.
3. Universal service
India retains the right to define the kind of universal service obligation it wishes to 
maintain. Such obligations are not regarded as anti-competitive per se, since they would be 
administered in a transparent and non-discriminatory manner.
4. Public availability o f licensing criteria
Where a licence is required, the following will be made publicly available:
(a) All the licensing criteria and
(b) the terms and conditions of individual licences.
5. Regulatory Authority
The decisions of and the procedures used by the regulatory authority shall be 
impartial with respect to all market participants.
6. Allocation and use o f scarce resources
Any procedures for the allocation and use of scarce resources, including frequencies, 
numbers and rights o f way, will be carried out in an objective and timely manner.
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W o r l d  T r a d e  
O r g a n iz a t io n
APPENDIX IX RESTRICTED
TN/S/O/IND 
12 January 2004
(04-0077)
Council for Trade in Services 
Special Session
Original: English
INDIA
Conditional Initial Offer
The following communication, dated 16 December 2003, from the delegation of India, is 
being circulated to the Members of the Council for Trade in Services.
1. India hereby submits its Conditional Initial Offer under the ongoing negotiations on Trade in 
Services under Article XIX of the General Agreement on Trade in Services and pursuant to 
paragraph 15 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration.
2. This offer is conditional on other WTO Members making substantive and satisfactory offers 
in sectors and modes of supply where India has indicated its interests. India reserves the right to 
withdraw, modify or reduce any part of this offer and any subsequent conditional offers that could 
follow, in whole or in part, at any time on or prior to the conclusion of the current Services 
Negotiations if offers made by India’s negotiating partners are not satisfactory. India further reserves 
the right to make any technical amendments or corrections to this initial conditional offer and any 
subsequent conditional offer that could follow.
3. This offer is also conditional on the outcome of the negotiations underway on the
development of disciplines on domestic regulations.
4. To the extent possible, the individual sectors and sub-sectors are identified in accordance with 
the Services Sectoral Classification List (MTN.GNS/W/120).
Specific Commitments
5. India has offered to undertake extensive commitments under Modes 1 and 4.
6. In addition to the above, India has substantially improved access in critical service sectors
such as Accounting and Book Keeping services, Engineering services, Computer & related services, 
Medical and Dental services, Services provided by Midwives, Nurses , Physiotherapists and para­
medical personnel, Construction and related Engineering services, Financial services, Health services, 
Tourism services and Maritime Transport services.
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Modes of supply: 1) Cross-border supply 2) Consumption abroad 3) Commercial presence 4) Presence of natural persons
Sector o r Sub-sector L im ita tio n s  on M a rk e t Access L im ita tio n s  on N a tio n al T rea tm en t A d d itio n a l C om m itm ents
n . S E C T O R - S P E C IF IC  C O M M IT M E N T S  -
l;  BU SIN ESS  
SER VIC E S
A . Professional Services
(b ) A ccounting and Book  
K eeping Services
^■‘'■fCPC862)'r- ■
(excluding A u d itin g  
Services) "
(e) Engineering Services 
(C PC  8672)
1) None
2 ) None
3 ) U nbound
4) U nbound except as in  h orizon tal 
com m itm ents and fu rth e r subject to the  
fo llow ing:
(a ) Access lim ite d  to  Business V is ito rs  and  
Independent Professionals only.
1) Unbound None
2 ) Unbound None
3 ) O nly through incorporation w ith  a foreign  
equity ceiling o f 51 per cent and subject to  the  
condition th a t in  the case o f foreign investors 
having p rio r co llaboration in  th a t specific 
service sector in  In d ia , F IP B  approval w ould  
be req u ired .
4 ) Unbound except as indicated in  the horizontal 
section
1) None
2 ) None
3 ) U nbound
4 ) Unbound except as in  horizon tal 
com m itm ents and fu rth e r subject to the  
fo llow ing:
(a ) Access lim ited  to Business V is ito rs  and  
Independent Professionals only.
(b ) R equ irem ent o f obtain ing professional 
ind em nity insurance fro m  hom e country  
o f service p ro v id er.
1) Unbound None
2 ) Unbound None
3 ) None
4 ) Unbound except as indicated in the 
horizontal section
;! 8 ■
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Modes of supply: 1) Cross-border supply 2) Consumption abroad 3) Commercial presence 4) Presence of natural persons
Sector or Sub-sector Lim itations on M arke t Access Lim itations on National Treatm ent A dditional Com m itm ents
(h ) M edical and Dental 
Services (C P C  9312)
( j)  Services provided by 
M idw ives, Nurses, 
Physiotherapists and 
para>m edical 
personnel 
(C P C  93191)
B. Comouter and Related 
Services
(a) Consultancy services 
related to the 
installation of computer 
hardware (CPC 841)
(b) Software 
implementation services 
(CPC 842)
(c) Data processing 
services (CPC 843)
(d) Database services 
(CPC 844)
(e) Maintenance and repair 
services of office 
machinery and 
equipment including 
computers (CPC 845)
1) None fo r provision o f services on provider to 
provider basis such th at the transaction is 
between established m edical institutions 
covering areas o f second opinion to help in 
diagnosis o f cases o r in  the field  o f research.
2) None
3) O nly through incorporation w ith a foreign 
equity ceiling o f 74 per cent subject to the 
condition that the latest technology fo r 
treatm ent w ill be brought in  and to the 
condition that in the case o f foreign investors 
having p rio r collaboration in th at specific 
service sector in  In d ia , F IP B  approval would 
be required.
4 ) Unbound except as indicated in the 
horizontal section
1) Unbound None
2) Unbound None
3) Only through incorporation with a foreign 
equity ceiling o f $4% 74 per cent and subject 
to the condition that in the case o f foreign  
investors having p rio r collaboration in  that 
specific service sector in  In d ia , F IP B  
approval would be required.
4) Unbound except as indicated in the horizontal 
section
1) None
2) None
3) Publicly funded services m ay be available 
only to Ind ian  citizens o r may be supplied 
at d ifferen tial prices to persons other 
than Ind ian  citizens.
4 ) Unbound except as indicated in the 
horizontal section
1) Unbound None
2) Unbound None
3) None
4) Unbound except as indicated in the 
horizontal section
Modes of supply: 1) Cross-border supply 2) Consumption abroad 3) Commercial presence 4) Presence of natural persons
Sector or Sub-sector Limitations on Market Access Limitations on National Treatment Additional Commitments
2. COMMUNICATION 
SERVICES
C. Telecommunication 
Services1
(a) Voice telephone
service (CPC 7521**)
■Limited-to leeal/leng 
distanoe, for public use 
over a public 
telecommunication
■Wkebased (i.e., for 
' fixed network of 
subscribers).
(b) Packet Switched Data 
Transmission 
Services 
(CPC 7523**)
(i) Radio Paging 
Service (CPC 
7523**)
1) Unbound
2) Unbound
3) The service will be permitted to be provided 
only after the operator gets a licence from the 
Designated Authority who shall determine the 
need, if any, for issuance of new licences. The 
terms and conditions of the licence will be as 
laid down by the Designated Authority or 
Government or the prevailing laws in the 
country.
In the case of foreign investors having prior 
collaboration in that specific service sector in 
India, FIPB approval would be required.
There will be one operator other than 
Department of Telecommunications 
(DOT)/Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. 
(MTNL) in each service area for a period of 10 
years from the grant of licence after which the 
position will be reviewed.
1) Unbound
2) Unbound
3) Unbound
The definition and principles on 
the regulatory framework for the 
basic telecommunication 
services subscribed to by India 
are contained in the annex titled 
"Explanatory Paper on 
Additional Commitments by 
India".
The subjeot of opening up-ef  
national long distanoe oerviee 
beyond servioe area to 
oompetition-will-be- reviewed-in 
the year 1999.
Also the-eubjeot of opening-up 
of international service to . 
competition will be reviewed in 
the year2004^
^  1 Excluding broadcasting services and measures affecting such services. Broadcasting is defined as a form of the uni-directional telecommunications intended for large number of users
Ghaving appropriate receiving facilities and carried out by means of radio or cable network. This may include sound transmission, television transmission or other types of transmission.
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Modes of supply: 1) Cross-border supply 2) Consumption abroad 3) Commercial presence 4) Presence of natural per&ns
Sector or Sub-sector Limitations on Market Access Limitations on National Treatment Additional Commitments
(c) Circuit switched data 
transmission services 
(CPC 7523**)
(d) Telex Service 
(CPC 7523**)
(e) Telegraph Service 
(CPC 7522**)
. (f) Facsimile Service 
(CPC 7521** + 
7529**)
(g) Private Leased Circuit 
Services (CPC 7522** 
+ 7523**)
(0) Others
(1) Cellular mobile 
telephone services.
(ii) V-SAT service
(e)~-Girouit switohed-data 
transmission services
The private operator should be a company 
registered in India in which total foreign equity 
must not exceed 25 per cent.
Service operator will be permitted to provide 
long distance service within the licensed service 
area only.
Resale of voice telephone services is will not be 
permitted. However, licensees can grant 
franchises on commission basis for providing 
public call offices (PCOs) service.
The detailed terms and conditions for providing 
the service will be as per licence conditions.
There will be two cellular service operators in 
each service area, including one Public Sector 
operator.
4) Unbound except as indicated in the horizontal 
commitments.
4)— Unbound 
2)-—Unbound
4) Unbound except as indicated in the 
horizontal commitments.
1) Unbound
2)— Unbound
will be permitted for tranomission-of dato on 
the PSTN^network m-its lioensed servioe
dF6Qr
commitments horizontal oommitments
2 PSTN refers to Public Switched Voice Telephone Network which is operated by DoT/MTNL or licensed operator.
Modes of supply: 1) Cross-border supply 2) Consumption abroad 3) Commercial presence 4) Presence of natural persons
Sector or Sub-sector Limitations on Market Access Limitations on National Treatment Additional Commitments
-Faosimile servioea 
(GPG7521**)
(g)—Privote Leased Cirouit 
Servioea (CPC 
3532* * )
Data and message 
transmission services, the 
following:
(h) Electronic mail 
(CPC 7523**)
(i) Voice mail 
(CPC 7523**)
4)— Unbound 
3).— Unbound
3) — Lioenoed voioe telephone service operators
will be permitted ■for-transmission of facsimile 
on the PSTN network-in its lioensed service 
area.- Franohisees of servioe operatore-oan 
provide commercial foosimile services
4) — Unbound exoept as-indieated in the horizontal
commitments
1)-- Unbound
2) — Unbound
3) — Lioensed voioe teiephoneserviee-operators
w ill be permitted 4o-provide  leased oirouits to 
their oustomero; for their-own use-within t heir 
lioensed servioe area. Resale o f  suoh leased 
oirouits will not be permitted ?
4)— Unbound exoept as indieated iiHhe4iorizontal 
oommitments
1) None
2) Unbound
3) Only through incorporation with a foreign 
equity ceiling of 51 percent.
In the case of foreign investors having 
prior collaboration in that specific service 
sector in India, FIPB approval would be 
required.
4) Unbound except as indicated in the horizontal 
section.
1) Unbound 
3)— Unbound
3) Unbound
4)— Unbound exoept-as indicated in the 
horizontal-eommitments
4)— Unbound
3)— Unbound
3)- ■ -Unbound
4)— Unbound exoept os mdioated-in-the 
horizontal-eommitments
1) None
2) Unbound
3) None
4) Unbound except as indicated as indicated in 
the horizontal section.
Modes of supply: 1) Cross-border supply 2) Consumption abroad 3) Commercial presence 4) Presence of natural persons
Sector or Sub-sector Limitations on Market Access Limitations on National Treatment Additional Commitments
(j) On-line information 
and data base retrieval 
(CPC 7523**)
(1) Enhanced / value 
added facsimile 
services, including 
store and forward, 
store and retrieve 
(CPC 7523**)
(n) On-line information 
and/or data processing 
(CPC 843**)
(o) -Other 4-)- - Unbound
2) • Unbound
-Cellular-mobile
telephone-servioes.-
2)— The servioe will be permitted to-be provided 
only after the operator gets o-tioenoe-from the 
Designated Authority who shall-determine the 
need, if  any, for issuanoe of new lioenoes;
The terms-and eonditions-of the4ioenee will 
be-as laid down by the Designated Authority 
or-Govemment or the prevailing laws in the 
country
Only digital (GSM) teohnology will be 
permitted and this will only be terrestrial 
based;
There-will-be two cellular servioe-operators in 
eaoh servioe area. The position will-be 
feviewed-after-10 years.- -The right-of 
DoT/MTNL to enter into-eaoh serviee-area is 
reserved.
The- private-operator should-be a oompany 
registered in-India in whioh-total-foreign 
equity must not exoeed 25%.
- Unbound
-—Unbound
Modes of supply: 1) Cross-border supply 2) Consumption abroad 3) Commercial presence 4) Presence of natural persons
Sector or Sub-sector Limitations on Market Access Limitations on National Treatment Additional Commitments
D.* Audiovisual Services
(a) Motion picture or 
video tape distribution 
services (CPC 96113)
The detailed terms end-eonditionsfor 
providmg-the service-wili be as per-lioenoe 
conditions;
commitments.
1) Unbound
2) Unbound*
3) (i) Only through representative offices which 
will be allowed to function as branches of 
companies incorporated outside India.
(ii) Import of titles restricted to 100 per year
4) Unbound except as indicated in the horizontal 
section.
horizontal-oommitmente;
1) Unbound
2) Unbound*
3) Subject to the prescribed authority having 
certified that the motion picture has:
(a) won an award in any of the international 
film festivals notified by the Ministry of 
Information & Broadcasting, Government of 
India; or
(b) participated in any of the official sections of 
the notified international film festivals; or
(c) received good reviews in prestigious film 
journals notified by the Ministry of 
Information & Broadcasting, Government of 
India
4) Unbound except as indicated in the 
horizontal section
Explanatory Paper on 
Additional Commitments bv India
Scope
The fo llo w in g  are defin itions and principles on the regulatory fram ew ork fo r the basic 
telecom m unications services.
D efin itions
Users mean service consumers and service suppliers.
Essential fac ilities  m ean fac ilities  o f a  public telecom m unications transport netw ork or service that
(a ) are exclusively o r predom inantly provided by a single o r lim ited  num ber o f suppliers;
and
(b ) cannot feasib ly be econom ically or technically substituted in  order to  provide a
service.
A  m ajor supplier is a supplier w hich has the ab ility  to  m aterially affect the terms o f participation  
(having regard to  price and supply) in  the relevant m arket fo r basic telecom m unications services as a 
result o f :
(a ) control over essential fac ilities; or
(b ) use o f its position in  the m arket.
1. Com petitive-Safeguards
A ppropriate measures shall be m aintained fo r the purpose o f preventing service suppliers 
from  engaging in  o r continuing in  anti-com petitive practices o f the fo llo w in g  type:
(a ) using inform ation  obtained from  com petitors w ith  anti-com petitive results; and
(b ) not m aking availab le to  other services suppliers on a  tim e ly  basis technical 
inform ation  about essential fac ilities  and com m ercially relevant inform ation w hich  
are necessary fo r them  to  provide services.
2 . Interconnection
2.1 Th is section applies to  lin k in g  w ith  suppliers providing public telecom m unications transport 
netw ork o r services in  order to  a llo w  the users o f one supplier to  com m unicate w ith  users o f another 
supplier and to  access services provided by another supplier, where specific com m itm ents are 
undertaken.
2.2 Interconnection to  be ensured
Interconnection w ith  a m ajor supplier w ill be ensured at any specified feasible point in  the 
netw ork as indicated in  the licence. Such interconnection is provided:
(a ) o f a  quality  no less favourable than that provided fo r its ow n lik e  services or fo r like
services o f n o n -affilia ted  service suppliers or fo r its subsidiaries or other affilia tes;
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(b ) upon request, at points in  addition to  the netw ork term ination points offered to the 
m ajo rity  o f users as per licence conditions, subject to  m utually agreed charges.
x * 2.3 Public a v a ila b ility  o f the procedures fo r interconnection negotiations
The procedures applicable fo r interconnection to a  m ajor supplier w ill be made publicly  
available.
2 .4 Transparency o f interconnection arrangem ents y
It  w ill be ensured that a m ajor supplier w ill m ake public ly availab le either-its interconnection  
agreements, or a reference interconnection o ffer.
2.5 Interconnection: dispute settlem ent
A  service supplier requesting interconnection w ith  a m ajor supplier w ill have recourse, either:
(a ) at any tim e or
(b ) afte r a  reasonable period o f tim e w hich has been made public ly known
to a dom estic-authority to  resolve disputes regarding appropriate term s, conditions and rates 
fo r interconnection w ith in  reasonable period o f tim e, to  the extent that these have not been established 
previously.
3. U niversal service
Ind ia  retains the rig ht to  define the kind o f universal service obligation it wishes to m aintain. 
Such obligations are not regarded as anti-com petitive per se, since they w ould be-adm inistered in a 
transparent and non-discrim inatory m anner.
4 . Public ava ilab ility  o f licensing crite ria
W here a  licence is required, the fo llo w in g  w ill be m ade pub lic ly available:
(a ) A ll the licensing c rite ria , and
(b ) T he term s and conditions o f  ind ividu al licences.
5. R egulatory A u th o rity
The  decisions o f  and-the- procedures used by the regul ato iy- authority-sh a ll -be im partial w ith  
respect to a ll m arket participants;
The regulatory body is separate from, and not accountable to, any supplier of basic 
telecommunications services. The decisions of, and the procedures used by, regulators shall be 
impartial with respect to all market participants.
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6. Allocation and use of scarce resources
A n y  procedures fo r the allocation  and use o f scarce resources, including frequencies, numbers 
and rights o f  w ay, w ill be carried  out in  an objective and tim ely  m anner. T h e  c u rre n t state o f 
allocated  fre q u en cy  bands w ill be m ade p u b lic ly  av a ila b le , b u t d eta iled  id e n tifica tio n  o f 
frequencies a llo ca ted  fo r  specific  g o vern m en t uses is n o t re q u ire d .
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INDIA -  FINAL LIST OF ARTICLE II (MFN) EXEMPTIONS
Sector or Sub-sector Description of measure 
indicating its inconsistency 
with Article II
Countries to which the 
measure applies
Intended duration Conditions creating the 
need for the exemption
2.C Telecommunication 
services -  International 
Service
Measure including the 
application of different 
accounting rates for different 
operators/countries covered 
by International 
Telecommunication Services 
Agreements between Videsh 
Sanchar Nigam Limited and 
various foreign operators.
Countries covered by 
International
Telecommunication Services 
Agreements between Videsh 
Sanchar Nigam Limited and 
foreign operators.
Indefinite On account of bilateral 
agreements between Videsh 
Sanchar Nigam Limited and 
various foreign operators 
dealing with various aspects 
of cooperation.
2.C Telecommunication 
services -  International 
Service
■ j
Measures including the 
application of different 
accounting rates for different 
neighbouring countries 
covered by 
Telecommunication 
Agreements entered into by 
the Government of India with 
governments of neighbouring 
countries.
Neighbouring countries 
(Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal 
and Bhutan)
Indefinite On account of bilateral 
agreements with governments 
of neighbouring countries.
Sector or Sub-sector Description of measure 
indicating its inconsistency 
with Article II
Countries to which the 
measure applies
Intended duration Conditions creating the 
need for the exemption
AUDIOVISUAL SERVICES Measures which define norms 
for co-production of motion 
pictures andtelevision 
programmes with foreign 
countries and grant national 
treatment to motion pictures 
and television programmes 
co-produced with foreign 
countries which maintain a 
co-production agreement with 
India.
All countries Indefinite The agreements aim at the 
promotion of cultural 
exchange.
SHIPPING
(a) Cargo sharing between 
bilateral partners
Equality in freight liftings 
originating in the ports of 
partners to the agreement and 
equality in freight earnings
Bulgaria, Pakistan and the 
United Arab Republic
Indefinite In the context of overall trade 
relations.
(b) Cargo Reservations Cargo reservation under the 
UN Code of Conduct for 
Liner Conferences, Sharing 
of cargo between the national 
lines of contracting states and 
third country lines in the ratio 
of40:40:20 as provided in the 
Liner Code.
All countries Indefinite To fulfil obligations under the 
covention.
RECREATIONAL
SERVICES
Waiver on the prohibition of 
sale of lottery tickets in India.
Bhutan Indefinite It is part of a comprehensive 
bilateral agreement between 
India and Bhutan.
APPENDIX X
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O r g a n iz a t io n
_____________________________________________________________________(97-13261
T ra d e  in  S ervices
M E X IC O  
S chedu le o f S p ec ific  C o m m itm en ts  
S u p p lem en t 2
(This is authentic in Spanish only)
This text supplements the Telecommunication services section contained on pages 20 to 22 
o f document GATS/SC/56.
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M E X IC O  -  S C H E D U L E  O F  S P E C IF IC  C O M M IT M E N T S
Modes of supply: (l)Cross-border supply(2)Consumption abroad(3)Commercial presence (4)Presence of natural persons
Sector o r subsector Lim itations on m arket access Lim itations on national treatm ent Additional commitments
2.C.TELECOMMUNICATIONS
SERVICES
Telecommunications services supplied 
by a facilities based public
(l)None, except the following: (l)None Mexico undertakes the obligations 
contained in the reference paper
telecommunications network 
(wire-based and radioelectric) 
through any existing 
technological medium, included 
in subparagraphs (a), (b), (c), 
(f), (g) and (o).
Radio broadcasting, cable television,
International traffic must be routed through 
the facilities of an enterprise that has a 
concession granted by the Ministry of 
Communications and Transport (SCT).
(2) None
(3)A concession1 from the SCT is required.
(2)None
attached hereto.
satellite transmissions of DTH 
and DBS services and of audio 
digital services are excluded.
Only enterprises established in 
conformity with Mexican law may 
obtain such a concession.
Concessions for spectrum frequency bands 
for specific uses will be granted by 
public invitation to tender.
Foreign governments may not participate in 
an enterprise set up in accordance with
(3)None
Concession: The granting of title to install, operate or use a facilities-based public telecommunications network.
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Modes of supply: (l)Cross-border supply(2)Consumption abroad(3)Commercial presence (4)Presenee of natural persons
Sector o r subsector Lim itations on m arket access Lim itations on national treatm ent Additional commitments
Mexican law nor obtain any 
authorization to provide 
telecommunications services.
(a)Voice telephony (CPC 75211, 
75212)
(b)Packet-switehed data transmission 
services
(CPC 7523**)
Direct foreign investment up to 49 per cent 
is permitted in an enterprise set up in 
accordance with Mexican law.
Telecomunicaciones de Mexico (Telecomm) 
has exclusive rights to links with 
Intelsat and Inmarsat.
Services other than international
long-distance services which require 
use of satellites must use Mexican 
satellite infrastructure until the 
year 2002.
(4)Unbound, except as indicated in the 
horizontal section.
(1) None, except as indicated in 2.C. 1.
(2) None
(3)As indicated in 2.C.3.
(4)Unbound, except as indicated in the 
horizontal section.
(1) None
(2) None
(3) None
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(c)Circuit-switched data transmission 
services 
(CPC 7523**)
(4)Unbound, except as indicated in the 
horizontal section.
(4)Unbound, except as indicated in the 
horizontal section.
(f)Facsimile services 
(CPC 7521** + 7529**)
(1) None, except as indicated in 2.C. 1.
(2)None
(1) None
(2)None
(3)As indicted in 2.C.3.
A permit issued by the SCT is required in 
order to provide a public facsimile 
service. Only enterprises set up in 
accordance with Mexican law may 
obtain such a permit.
(4)Unbound, except as indicated in the 
horizontal section.
(3) None
(4)Unbound, except as indicated in the 
horizontal section.
(g)Private leased circuit services 
(CPC 7522** + 7523**)
(1)None, except as indicated in 2.C.I.
(2) None
(3)As indicated in 2.C.3.
Operators of private networks wishing to 
exploit services commercially must 
obtain a concession from the SCT, 
whereupon such networks assume the 
character of public networks.
(1)None
(2) None
(3) None
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(4)Unbound, except as indicated in the 
horizontal section.
(4)Unbound, except as indicated in the 
horizontal section.
(o)Other (1) None, except as indicated in 2.C. 1. (1) None
-Paging services (2) None (2) None
(PC 75291)
(3) As indicated in 2. C. 3. (3) None
(4)Unbound, except as indicated in the (4)Unbound, except as indicated in the
horizontal section. horizontal section.
-Cellular telephone services (75213**) (l)N one, except as indicated in 2 .C .I . (l)N one
on the "A" and "B" bands2
(2)None (2)None
(3)As indicated in 2.C.3. (3)None
Foreign investment in excess of 49 per cent
of an enterprise's capital will be
permitted following a favourable
decision by the Foreign Investment
Commission
(4)Unbound, except as indicated in the (4)Unbound, except as indicated in the
horizontal section. horizontal section.
frequencies 825-835/870-880 and 835-845/880-890 Mhz.
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-Commercial agencies3 (1)None, except as indicated in 2.C.I.
(2)None
(3)None, except:
A permit issued by the SCT is required. 
Only enterprises set up in accordance with 
Mexican law may obtain such a permit.
Foreign governments may not participate in 
an enterprise set up in accordance with 
Mexican law nor obtain any authorization to 
provide telecommunications services.
Except where specifically approved by the 
SCT, public telecommunications network 
concessionaires may not participate, direcdy 
or indirectly, in the capital of a commercial 
agency.
(1)None
(2)None
(3)None
The establishment and operation of 
commercial agencies is invariably subject to 
the relevant regulations. The SCT will not 
issue permits for the establishment of a 
commercial agency until the corresponding
3Agencies which, without owning transmission means, provide third parties with telecommunications services by using capacity leased from a public network 
concessionaire.
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regulations are issued.
(4)Unbound, except as indicated in the (4)Unbound, except as indicated in the
horizontal section. horizontal section
REFERENCE PAPER
Scope
The following are principles and definitions on the regulatory framework for the 
basic tdecomnunications services.
Definitions
Users mean service consumers and service suppliers.
Essential facilities mean facilities of a public telecommunication; network of service
that:
(a)Are exclusively or predominantly provided by a single or limited number of 
suppliers; and
(b)cannot feasibly be economically or technically substituted in order to provide a 
service.
A major supplier is a supplier which has the ability to materially affect the terms of 
participation (having regard to price and supply) in the relevant market for basic 
telecomnunications services as a result of:
(a) Control over essential facilities; or
(b)use of is  position in the market.
1- Competitive safeguards
1.1 Prevention of anti-competitive practices in telecommunications
Appropriate measures shall be maintained for the purpose of preventing suppliers 
who, alone or together, are a major supplier from engaging in or continuing anti-competitive 
practices.
1.2 Safeguards
The anti-competitive practices referred to in the above paragraph shall include in 
particular:
(a)Engaging in anti-competitive cross-subsidization;
(b)using information obtained from competitors with arti-competitive results; and
(c)not making available to other services suppliers on a timely basis technical
information about essential facilities and commercially relevant information 
which are necessay for them to provide services.
2. Interconnection
2.1 This section applies, on the basis of the specific commitments undertaken, to linking
with suppliers providing public telecommunications transport network or services in order to 
allow the users of one supplier to communicate with users of another supplier and to access 
services provided by another supplier.
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2-2 Interconnectionto be ensured
Interconnection with a major supplier will be ensured at any technically feasible 
point in the network. Such interconnection is provided:
(a)Under non-discriminatoiy terms, conditions (including technical standards and 
specifications) and rates and of a quality no less favourable than that 
provided for its own like services or for like services of non-affiliated 
service suppliers or for its subsidiaries or other affiliates;
(b)in a timely fashion, on terms, conditions (including technical standards and
specifications) and cost-oriented rates that are transparent, reasonable, 
having regard to economic feasibility, and sufficiently unbundled so that the 
supplier need not pay for network components or facilities that it does not 
require for the service to be provided; and
(c)upon request, at points in addition to the network termination points offered to the 
majority of users, subject to charges that reflect the cost of construction of 
necessary additional facilities.
2.3 Public a\ailabilitv of the procedures forinterconnection negotiations
The procedures applicable for interconnection to a major supplier will be made 
publicly available.
2.4 Transparency of interconnection arrangements
It is ensured that a major supplier will make publicly available either its 
interconnection agreements or a refeience interconnection offer.
2.5 Interconnection dispute settlement
A service supplier requesting interconnection with a major supplier will have 
recourse, either:
(a) At anytime; or
(b)after a reasonable period of time which has been made publicly known
to an independent domestic body, which may be a regulatory body as referred to in paragaph 
5, to resolve disputes regarding appropriate terms, conditions and rates for interconnection 
within a reasonable period of time, to the extent that these have not been established 
previously.
3. Universal service
Any Member has the right to define the kind of universal service obligation it wishes 
to maintain. Such obligations will not be regarded as anti-competitive per se, provided they 
are administered in a transparent, non-discriminatory and competitively neutral manner and 
are not more burdensome than necessary for the land of universal service defined by the 
Member.
4. Public a\ailabilitv of licensing criteria
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Where a licence is required, the following will be nnde publicly available:
(a)All the licensing criteria and the period of time normally required to reach a
decision concerning an application for a licence; and
(b)the terms and conditionsof individual licences.
The reasons for the denial of a licence will be made known to the applicant upon
request.
5. Independent regulators
The regulatory body is separate from, and not accountable to, any supplier of basic 
telecommunications services. The decisions of and the procedures used by regulators shall 
be impartial with respect to all market participants.
6. Allocation and use of scarce resources
Any procedures for the allocation and use cf scarce resources, inducing frequencies, 
numbers and rights of way, will be canied out in an objective, timely, transparent and non- 
discriminatory manner. The current state of allocated frequency bands will be made publicly 
available, but detailed identification of frequencies allocated for specific government uses is 
not requiied.
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APPENDIX X I
O rg a n iz a c io n  M u n d ia l GATS/SC/56/Suppl.2
11 de abril de 1997
DEL COMERCIO
_______ _ _ _______________________________________________________ (97-1326)________
Comercio de Serviaos
MEXICO 
Lista de compromisos especfficos 
Suplemento 2
(Esta lista es aut&itica en espaiiol unicamente)
Esta lista complementa la seccidn sobre los servicios detelecomunicaciones cortenidas en las 
paginas 19 a 21 del docunento GATS/SC/56.
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MEXICO - LISTA DE COMPROMISOS ESPECtFICOS
{PRIVATE }Modos de suministro: 1) Suminstro transfronterizo 2) Ccosumo en el extranjero 3) Resencia comercial 4) ftesencia de personas fisicas
Sector o subsector Limitaclones al acceso a los mercados Limitaciones al trato nacional Compromisos adicionales
2.C. SERVICIOS DE 
TELECOMUNICACIONES 
Los servicios de 
telecomunicaciones, 
suministrados por una red 
publica de telecomunicaciones 
basada en infraestructura 
(alambrica y radio-efectrica) a 
travds de cualquier medio 
tecnologico actual, incluidos en 
las literales a), b), c),f), g) y o).
Se excluyen los servicios de 
radiodifusidn, de televisidn por 
cable, de transmisidn satelital de 
DTH y DBS, y de audio digital.
1)Ninguna, excepto la siguiente:
el trdfico intemacional debe ser enrutado a traves de 
las instalaciones de una empresa con una 
concesidn otorgada por h Secretaria de 
Comunicaciones y Transportes (SCI).
2)Ninguna
3)Se requiere concesidn1 otorgada por SCT. S61o 
empresas constituidas conforme a la ley 
mexicana pueden obtener tal concesidn.
Las concesiones sobre bandas de frecuencias del 
espectro parausos determinados se otorgarin 
mediante licitacidn publica.
Los gobiemos extranjeros no podr^nparticipar en 
una empresa consdtuida conforme a las leyes 
mexicanas, ni obtener autorizacidn alguna 
para prestar servicios de telecomunicaciones.
Se permite la participacidn de la inversidn
extranjera directa hasta 49 por ciento en una 
empresa constituida conforme a las leyes 
mexicanas.
1)Ninguna
2)Ninguna
3)Ninguna
Mdxico adopta las obligaciones 
contenidas en el documento de 
referenda anexo a la presente.
Telecomunicaciones de Mdxico (Telecomm) tiene
1 Concesibn: Se refiere al otoigamiento de un ti'tuk) para instahr, operar o explotaruna red publica de telecomunicaciones basada en infiaestructura.
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{PRIVATE }Modos de suministro: 1) Suminstro transfronterizo 2) Ccosumo en el extranjero 3) R-esencia comercial 4) R-esencia de personas fisicas
Sector o subsector Limitaciones al acceso a los mercados Limitaciones al trato nacbnal Compromisos adicionales
los derechos exclusivos para bs enlaces con 
Intelsat e Inmarsat.
Los servicios distintos a los de larga distancia
intemacbnal que requieran del uso de sat61ites 
hasta el ano 2002 deberdnutilizar 
infraestructura satelital mexicana.
4)No consolidado, excepto lo indicado por bs 
compromisos horizontales.
4)No consolidado, excepto lo indicado por 
los compromisos horizontales.
a.Servicios de telefonia 
(CCP 75211,75212)
b.Servicios de transmisidn de 
datos con conmutaci6n de 
paquetes (CCP 7523**)
c.Servicios de transmisidn de 
datos con conmutaci&n de 
circuitos (CCP 7523**)
1)Ninguna, excepto la indicada en 2.C.1).
2)Ninguna
3)Lo indicado en 2.C.3)
4)No consolidado, excepto lo indicado por bs 
compromisos horizontales.
1)Ninguna
2)Ninguna
3)Ninguna
4)No consolidado, excepto lo indicado por 
los compromisos horizontales.
f.Servicios de facsnnil 
(CCP 7521**+7529**)
1)Ninguna, excepto la indicada en 2.C.1).
2)Ninguna
3)Lo indicado en 2.C.3).
Se requiere de penniso expedido por SCTpara 
prestar servicio publico de facsimil. S61o
1)Ninguna
2)Ninguna
3)Ninguna
{PRIVATE }Modos de suminstro: 1) Suminstro transfronterizo 2) Ccnsumo en el extranjero 3) Bresencia comercial 4) R-esencia de personas fisicas
Sector o subsector Limitaciones al acceso a los mercados Limitaciones al trato nacbnal Compromisos adicionales
empresas constituidas conforme a las leyes 
mexicanas pueden obtener dicho penniso.
4)No consolidado, excepto lo indicado por bs 
compromisos horizontales. 4)No consolidado, excepto lo indicado por 
los compromisos horizontales.
g.Servicios de circuitos privados l)Ninguna, excepto lo indicado en 2.C.1). l)Ninguna
arrendados
(CCP7522**+7523**) 2)Ninguna
3)Lo indicado en 2. C. 3).
Los operadoresde redes privadas que pretendan 
explotar comercialmente servicios, deber£n 
obtener concesidn otorgada por SCT, 
adoptando tales redes el car&cter de red 
publica de telecomunicaciones.
4)No consolidado, excepto lo indicado por bs 
compromisos horizontales.
2)Ninguna
3)Ninguna
4)No consolidado, excepto lo indicado por 
los compromisos horizontales.
o.Otros l)Ninguna, excepto lo indicado en2.C.l). l)Ninguna
-Servicios de localization de 2)Ninguna 2)Ninguna
personas
(CCP75291) 3)Lo indicado en 2.C.3).
4)No consolidado, excepto lo indicado por bs
3)Ninguna
4)No consolidado, excepto lo indicado por
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{PRIVATE }Modos de suministro: 1) Suminstro transfronterizo 2) Ccnsumo en el extranjero 3) Resencia comercial 4) Bresencia de personas fisicas
Sector o subsector Limitaciones al acceso a los mercados Limitaciones al trato nacional Compromisos adicionales
- Servicios de telefonia 
cehilar (75213**) en las bandas 
“A” y “B” 2
compromisos horizontales.
1)Ninguna, excepto lo indicado en2.C.l).
2)Ninguna
3)Lo indicado en 2.C.3).
Se peimitird inversidn extranjera superior al 49% 
del capital de una empresa, previa resolucidn 
favorable de la Ccmisidn Nacional de 
Inversidn Extranjera.
4)No consolidado, excepto lo indicado por bs 
compromisos horizontales.
los compromisos horizontales.
1)Ninguna
2)Ninguna
3)Ninguna
4) No consolidado, excepto lo indicado por
los compromisos horizontales.
- Comercializadoras3 1) Ninguna, excepto lo indicado en2.C.l).
2) Ninguna
3) Ninguna excepto:
Se requiere penniso otorgado por SCT. S61o 
empresas constituidas conforme a la ley mexicana 
pueden obtener tal permiso.
1)Ninguna
2)Ninguna
3)Ninguna
2 Frecuencias 825-835/870-880 y 835-845/880-890 Mhz.
3 Empiesas que, sin ser propietarias o poseedoras de medios de ttansmisifa, proporcionan a tercwos servicios de telecomunicaciones mediante d  uso de capacidad arrendada de un concesionano de 
redes pubKcas de tdecomunicacicnes.
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{PRIVATE }Modos de suministro: 1) Suminstro transfronterizo 2) Ccnsumo en el extranjero 3) fresencia comercial 4) Bresencia de personas fisicas
Sector o subsector Limitaciones al acceso a los mercados Limitaciones al trato nacional Compromisos adicionales
Los gobiemos extranjeros no podr&nparticipar en 
una empresa constituida conforme a las leyes 
mexicanas, ni obtener autorizacidn alguna para 
prestar servicios de telecomunicaciones.
Salvo aprobacidn expresa de la SCT, los 
concesionarios de redes publicas de 
telecomunicaciones no podran participar, directa o 
indirectamente, en el capital de una empresa 
comercializadora.
El establecimiento y operacbn de las empresas 
comercializadoras deberd sujetarse invariablemente 
a las disposiciones reglamentarias respectivas. SCT 
no otorgara pennisos para el establecimiento de una 
comercializadora hasta emitir la reglamentacidn 
correspondiente.
4)No consolidado, excepto lo indicado por bs 
compromisos horizontales. 4)No consolidado, excepto lo indicado por 
los compromisos horizontales.
DOCUMENTO DE REFERENCIA
Alcance
A continuacion se presentan definiciones y principios relativos al marco regulatorio 
de los servicios basicos de telecomunicaciones.
Definiciones
Usuarios. significa consumidores del servicio y proveedores del servicio.
Recursos esenciales. significa los recursos de una red publica de telecomunicaciones de 
transporte o de servicios que:
(a)son exclusivamente o predominantemente suministradas por un solo proveedor o por un
numero limitado de proveedores; y
(b)no pueden ser facilmente sustituidas economica o tecnicamente para poder suministrar un
servicio.
Proveedor principal, es aquel proveedor que tiene la capacidad de afectar materialmente los 
terminos de participation en el mercado relevante de servicios basicos de telecomunicaciones 
(teniendo en cuenta el precio y la oferta), como resultado del:
(a) control sobre los recursos esenciales; o
(b) uso de su position en el mercado.
1. Salvaeuardas Competitivas
1.1 Prevention de practicas anticompetitivas en telecomunicaciones:
Se mantendran las medidas apropiadas, con el proposito de prevenir que, los 
proveedores que se constituyan, de manera individual o conjunta, como proveedor principal, 
se involucren en, o continuen con practicas anticompetitivas.
1.2 Salvaeuardas:
Las practicas anticompetitivas a las que se refiere el parrafo anterior incluiran_en 
particular:
(a)incurrir en subsidios cruzados anticompetitivos;
(b)utilizar informacion obtenida de la competencia con resultados
anticompetitivos; y
(c)no poner a disposition de otros proveedores de servicios, de manera oportuna, informacion
tecnica relativa a recursos esenciales e informacion comercialmente 
relevante que les sea necesaria para suministrar servicios.
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2. Interconexion
2.1 Esta seccion es aplicable a la conexion con los proveedores de redes publicas de
telecomunicaciones de transporte o de servicios a fin de permitir a los usuarios de un 
proveedor comunicarse con los usuarios de otro proveedor y tener acceso a los servicios 
suministrados por algun otro proveedor, respecto de los cuales se contraigan compromisos 
especificos.
2.2 Interconexion a ser garantizada
La interconexion con un proveedor principal quedara asegurada en cualquier punto 
tecnicamente factible de la red. Tal interconexion se llevara a cabo:
(a)bajo terminos, condiciones, (incluyendo normas tecnicas y especificaciones) y tarifas no
discriminatorios y con calidad no menos favorable que la proporcionada
para servicios similares propios, o para servicios similares de proveedores de
servicios no afiliados o para sus subsidiarias u otras filiales:
(b)de manera oportuna, en terminos, condiciones (incluyendo normas tecnicas y
especificaciones) y tarifas basadas en costos que sean transparentes, 
razonables, economicamente factibles y que sean lo suficientemente 
desagregadas para que el proveedor no necesite pagar por componentes o 
recursos de la red que no se requieran para que el servicio sea suministrado;
y
(c)previa solicitud, en puntos adicionales a los puntos term inales de la red offecidos a la
mayoria de los usuarios, sujeta a un precio que refleje el costo de la 
construccion de las instalaciones adicionales necesarias.
2.3 Disponibilidad publica de procedimientos para las negociaciones de interconexion
Los procedimientos aplicables para la Interconexion a un proveedor principal 
deberan estar a disposition del publico.
2.4 Transparencia de los acuerdos de interconexion
Garantizar que el proveedor principal hara publicamente disponibles sus acuerdos de
interconexion o una oferta de interconexion de referencia.
2.5 Interconexion: Solution de controversias
Un proveedor de servicios que solicite la interconexion con un proveedor principal
podra interponer recurso:
(a)en cualquier momento, o
(b)despues de un periodo razonable de tiempo que se haya dado a conocer
publicamente
a una entidad nacional independiente, la cual puede ser un organo regulador al que se hace 
referencia en el parrafo 5, para resolver las disputas relacionadas con los terminos, 
condiciones y tasas apropiados para la interconexion dentro de un plazo razonable, en la 
medida en que estos no hayan sido establecidos previamente.
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3. Servicio universal
Cualquier Miembro tiene el derecho de defmir el tipo de obligation de servicio 
universal que desee mantener. Tales obligaciones no seran consideradas como 
anticompetitivas per se siempre y cuando sean administradas de manera transparente, no 
discriminatoria y competitivamente neutrales y no sean mas onerosas de lo necesario para el 
tipo de servicio universal definido por el Miembro.
4. Disponibilidad publica de los criterios de licenciamiento
Donde se requiera una licencia lo siguiente debera ser publicamente disponible:
(a)todos los criterios para el licenciamiento y los plazos normalmente requeridos para llegar a
una decision concemiente a la solicitud de una licencia, y
(b)los terminos y condiciones para licencias individuales.
Las razones para la negativa a una solicitud de licencia debera hacerse del 
conocimiento del solicitante a petition del mismo.
5. Reguladores Independientes
La entidad reguladora sera independiente de todo proveedor de servicios basicos de 
telecomunicaciones y no respondera ante el. Las decisiones y los procedimientos empleados 
por los reguladores seran imparciales con respecto a todos los participantes en el mercado.
6. Atribucion v uso de recursos escasos
Cualquier procedimiento para la atribucion y el uso de recursos escasos, incluyendo 
frecuencias, numeros y derechos de via sera llevado a cabo de manera objetiva, oportuna, 
transparente y no discriminatoria. La situation actual de las bandas de frecuencia atribuidas, 
debera hacerse publicamente disponible no requiriendose la identification detallada de 
frecuencias atribuidas para propositos gubemamentales.
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